Ledyard, John O.
- Asparouhova, Elena and Bossaerts, Peter, et el. (2020) Price Formation in Multiple, Simultaneous Continuous Double Auctions, with Implications for Asset Pricing; 10.7907/h8b1v-76536
- Ledyard, John O. (2019) Design of Tradable Permit Programs under Imprecise Measurement; 10.7907/a6fvp-ke472
- Groves, Theodore and Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods; 10.7907/8q2dx-kpv75
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information; 10.7907/qk8yn-ng985
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis; 10.7907/ck8tg-pc937
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium; 10.7907/nz1n2-wkn56
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) Market Failure; 10.7907/rjxey-cy967
- Easley, David and Ledyard, John O. (2017) Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions; 10.7907/hwega-5cv60
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Economics of Space Station; 10.7907/65nfx-ytv91
- Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources; 10.7907/68k2y-nze20
- Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources; 10.7907/mhs8g-89z20
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) Incentive Compatibility; 10.7907/k0pn8-m1r25
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections; 10.7907/96gx6-bw273
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research; 10.7907/f3s6c-3pw50
- Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results; 10.7907/dja9h-egh71
- Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly, Kristin E. (2017) Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights; 10.7907/zvw0j-4sc93
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing; 10.7907/y75p1-g1790
- Dudek, R. and Kim, Taesung, et el. (2017) First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms; 10.7907/rgkfq-awr86
- Bykowsky, Mark. M and Cull, Robert J., et el. (2017) Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem; 10.7907/r2944-rm514
- Ledyard, John O. and Noussair, Charles N., et el. (2017) The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization; 10.7907/sb8p2-77f71
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem; 10.7907/y319s-0vv88
- Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David, et el. (2017) The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous Items; 10.7907/6ehr5-jww49
- Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O. (2017) Repeated Implementation; 10.7907/b7sbx-5k980
- DeMartini, Christine and Kwasnica, Anthony M., et el. (2017) A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions; 10.7907/wve8f-fxz97
- Ledyard, John O. and Olson, Mark A., et el. (2017) The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services; 10.7907/1xbgs-71j14
- Bossaerts, Peter and Fine, Leslie, et el. (2017) Inducing Liquidity in Thin Financial Markets through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms; 10.7907/yk4m6-yrv98
- Ishikida, Takashi and Ledyard, John O., et el. (2017) Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's RECLAIM Emissions Market; 10.7907/txk4w-c9032
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes; 10.7907/v811f-scj07
- Ledyard, John O. (2017) Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs; 10.7907/74cgh-0j750
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments; 10.7907/fwfvf-9g770
- Fine, Leslie and Goeree, Jacob K., et el. (2017) ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism; 10.7907/mte8a-n4r44
- Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms; 10.7907/x8d9n-q6988
- Carlson, Dale and Forman, Charles, et el. (2014) An Analysis and Recommendation for the Terms of the RECLAIM Trading Credit
- Plott, Charles R. and Carlson, Dale, et el. (2014) An Analysis of the Information and Reporting Requirements, Market Architectures, Operational and Regulatory Issues, and Derivative Instruments for RECLAIM