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Hirsch, Alexander
- Hirsch, Alexander V. and Kang, Karam, el al. (2023) Lobbyists as Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence; Journal of Politics; Vol. 85; No. 2; 731-748; 10.1086/723026
- Hirsch, Alexander V. (2023) Polarization and Campaign Spending in Elections; Journal of Politics; Vol. 85; No. 1; 240-249; 10.1086/722045
- Hirsch, Alexander V. and Kastellec, Jonathan P. (2022) A theory of policy sabotage; Journal of Theoretical Politics; Vol. 34; No. 2; 191-218; 10.1177/09516298221085974
- Hirsch, Alexander V. and Shotts, Kenneth W. (2018) Policy-Development Monopolies: Adverse Consequences and Institutional Responses; Journal of Politics; Vol. 80; No. 4; 1339-1354; 10.1086/698930
- Gurantz, Ron and Hirsch, Alexander V. (2017) Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence; Journal of Politics; Vol. 79; No. 3; 1041-1056; 10.1086/691054
- Beim, Deborah and Hirsch, Alexander V., el al. (2016) Signaling and Counter-Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 60; No. 2; 490-508; 10.1111/ajps.12193
- Hirsch, Alexander V. (2016) Experimentation and Persuasion in Political Organizations; American Political Science Review; Vol. 110; No. 01; 68-84; 10.1017/S0003055415000568
- Hirsch, Alexander V. and Shotts, Kenneth W. (2015) Competitive Policy Development; American Economic Review; Vol. 105; No. 4; 1646-1664; 10.1257/aer.20130250
- Beim, Deborah and Hirsch, Alexander V., el al. (2014) Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 58; No. 4; 904-918; 10.1111/ajps.12108
- Baron, David P. and Hirsch, Alexander V. (2012) Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy; Economic Theory; Vol. 49; No. 3; 639-681; 10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4
- Hirsch, Alexander V. and Shotts, Kenneth W. (2012) Policy-Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 56; No. 1; 67-83; 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00538.x
- Hirsch, Alexander V. (2011) Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study; Political Analysis; Vol. 19; No. 1; 87-102; 10.1093/pan/mpq028
