Hirsch, Alexander V.; Kang, Karam et al. (2023) Lobbyists as Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence Journal of Politics; Vol. 85; No. 2; https://doi.org/10.1086/723026
Hirsch, Alexander V. (2023) Polarization and Campaign Spending in Elections Journal of Politics; Vol. 85; No. 1; https://doi.org/10.1086/722045
Hirsch, Alexander V.; Kastellec, Jonathan P. (2022) A theory of policy sabotage Journal of Theoretical Politics; Vol. 34; No. 2; https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221085974
Hirsch, Alexander V.; Shotts, Kenneth W. (2018) Policy-Development Monopolies: Adverse Consequences and Institutional Responses Journal of Politics; Vol. 80; No. 4; https://doi.org/10.1086/698930
Gurantz, Ron; Hirsch, Alexander V. (2017) Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence Journal of Politics; Vol. 79; No. 3; https://doi.org/10.1086/691054
Beim, Deborah; Hirsch, Alexander V. et al. (2016) Signaling and Counter-Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 60; No. 2; https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160512-104652785
Hirsch, Alexander V. (2016) Experimentation and Persuasion in Political Organizations American Political Science Review; Vol. 110; No. 01; https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000568
Hirsch, Alexander V.; Shotts, Kenneth W. (2015) Competitive Policy Development American Economic Review; Vol. 105; No. 4; https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130250
Beim, Deborah; Hirsch, Alexander V. et al. (2014) Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 58; No. 4; https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12108
Baron, David P.; Hirsch, Alexander V. (2012) Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy Economic Theory; Vol. 49; No. 3; https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4
Hirsch, Alexander V.; Shotts, Kenneth W. (2012) Policy-Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 56; No. 1; https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00538.x
Hirsch, Alexander V. (2011) Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates—A Monte Carlo Study Political Analysis; Vol. 19; No. 1; https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpq028