[
    {
        "id": "thesis:18869",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "18869",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:07222026-154024700",
        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Building Agency: Toward a Mechanistic Understanding of Human Autonomous Goal Pursuit",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Aenugu",
                "given_name": "Sneha R.",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-9329-2863",
                "clpid": "Aenugu-Sneha-R"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "O'Doherty",
                "given_name": "John P.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531",
                "clpid": "O'Doherty-J-P"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Perona",
                "given_name": "Pietro",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-7583-5809",
                "clpid": "Perona-P"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Doyle",
                "given_name": "John Comstock",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-1828-2486",
                "clpid": "Doyle-J-C"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "O'Doherty",
                "given_name": "John P.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531",
                "clpid": "O'Doherty-J-P"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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        "abstract": "<p>Agency is unique to biological life and reaches its pinnacle in humans, whose behavior is marked by the ability to set elaborate long-term goals and pursue them efficiently. This thesis develops a mechanistic account of human agency by investigating the computational and neural mechanisms that enable humans to select among competing long-term goals, sustain commitment over extended periods, monitor goals relative to alternatives, and flexibly switch when necessary.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>To study extended goal pursuit in a controlled setting, I developed behavioral paradigms inspired by board games: simulated worlds in which participants freely set and switch between goals. Because these goals unfold over time, successful performance requires balancing stability in commitment with flexibility in response to changing circumstances. By intermittently devaluing goals during the games, I created situations in which these competing demands could be directly measured.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>To explain how humans navigate this stability\u2013flexibility tradeoff, I introduced the computational construct of goal momentum. Goal momentum integrates both goal progress and the velocity of progress to approximate time-to-goal-completion, a quantity relevant for agents optimizing discounted rewards. I show that momentum explains human overpersistence and preferences for progressing goals better than alternative accounts of goal selection, while also providing a parsimonious approximation of goal completion prospects.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>I then extend the momentum framework to hierarchical goal pursuit. In a behavioral paradigm where extended goals are composed of extended subgoals, momentum accounts for persistence patterns at both goal and subgoal levels. Translating this paradigm to functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), I identify neural correlates of momentum computations and dissociable neural subsystems supporting goal and subgoal pursuit.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Finally, I lay the groundwork for a circuit-level account of momentum through a dynamical systems perspective. I show that goal commitment manifests as attractor modes in decision policies modulated by drives incorporating both progress and progress velocity, and hypothesize that switching costs during goal transitions arise from the intrinsic dynamics of goal commitment.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Taken together, this work advances a mechanistic account of human agency and provides a foundation for investigating the principles underlying artificial agency.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/gh3v-dt73",
        "publication_date": "2027",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2027"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:18806",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "18806",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06082026-203419979",
        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Experiments in Decision-Making Under Risk and Uncertainty",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Adeney",
                "given_name": "Jack Field",
                "orcid": "0009-0005-8112-8376",
                "clpid": "Adeney-Jack-Field"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles D.",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Nielsen",
                "given_name": "Kirby",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-4536-1021",
                "clpid": "Nielsen-Kirby"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Caradonna",
                "given_name": "Peter",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4197-4739",
                "clpid": "Caradonna-Peter-P"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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        ],
        "abstract": "The decision-making under risk and uncertainty literature is built upon two canonical models---Expected Utility Theory (EU) for risk, and Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU) for uncertainty. Since their inception, researchers have identified a number of paradoxes that represent normatively appealing violations of these theories. Most notably, Allais' Common Consequence Problem demonstrates a frequent violation of EU in favor of certain outcomes, while Ellsberg's Three Color Problem demonstrates a violation of SEU by avoiding bets that require constructing subjective beliefs over uncertain outcomes. Both of these paradoxes have spurred the literature into analyzing not if, but why, these violations occur. As a consequence, increasingly more complex models have been developed to motivate these seemingly paradoxical behaviors. This thesis experimentally explores these motivations, focusing specifically on the two paradoxes formerly mentioned, and the space of novel problems between them. Finally, in addition to the canonical problems, we explore a more modern phenomenon violating EU. This phenomenon is referred to as \"mixture effects\", which occurs when an individual makes different choices after facing the same set of options multiple times.",
        "doi": "10.7907/rpe7-6z60",
        "publication_date": "2026",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2026"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:18764",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "18764",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06012026-235853084",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Essays on Stochastic Choice",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Sung",
                "given_name": "Po Hyun",
                "orcid": "0009-0000-5922-6686",
                "clpid": "Sung-Po-Hyun"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Tamuz",
                "given_name": "Omer",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418",
                "clpid": "Tamuz-O"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles D.",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Pomatto",
                "given_name": "Luciano",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436",
                "clpid": "Pomatto-L"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Nielsen",
                "given_name": "Kirby",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-4536-1021",
                "clpid": "Nielsen-Kirby"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Tamuz",
                "given_name": "Omer",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418",
                "clpid": "Tamuz-O"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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        ],
        "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays on stochastic choice theory, exploring the theoretical properties of stochastic choice models widely used in empirical economics and examining how these properties inform their use in applications.",
        "doi": "10.7907/9nkk-th25",
        "publication_date": "2026",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2026"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:18680",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "18680",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282026-231839884",
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            "basename": "Caltech_Thesis_Aniek_Fransen.pdf",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Neural Dynamics of Adaptive Value Computation in the Human Brain",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Fransen",
                "given_name": "Aniek",
                "orcid": "0009-0004-8385-4665",
                "clpid": "Fransen-Aniek"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "O'Doherty",
                "given_name": "John P.",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0906-4065",
                "clpid": "O'Doherty-J-P"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Rutishauser",
                "given_name": "Ueli",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-9207-7069",
                "clpid": "Rutishauser-U"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Camerer",
                "given_name": "Colin F.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871",
                "clpid": "Camerer-C-F"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "O'Doherty",
                "given_name": "John P.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-0016-3531",
                "clpid": "O'Doherty-J-P"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Rutishauser",
                "given_name": "Ueli",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-9207-7069",
                "clpid": "Rutishauser-U"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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                "literal": "div_hss"
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        ],
        "abstract": "<p>Adaptive decision-making requires the brain to flexibly compute subjective values for choice options across changing environmental contexts and distinct operational domains, such as visual stimuli versus motor actions. This dissertation elucidates the neural architectures supporting adaptive valuation across multiple scales of analysis, leveraging functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and human single-unit electrophysiology.</p> \r\n\r\n<p>First, investigating the valuation of multi-attribute stimuli under shifting goals reveals a hierarchical valuation process. While visual cortices represent static, context-independent stimulus attributes, regions within the prefrontal cortex (i.e., ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)) transform these into context-sensitive ``attributes in value space''. These intermediate representations are then integrated into a unified subjective value signal along the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC).</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Second, single-neuron recordings during structurally parallel action- and stimulus-based tasks uncover a temporally shifting representational architecture. Prior to choice, neurons across the vmPFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) broadly track available pre-decision values as to facilitate comparison across both stimuli and actions. However when probing choice-dependent valuation, the network segregates: the ACC specializes in action-based chosen value and the vmPFC tracks stimulus-based chosen value. In contrast to the specialization the preSMA encodes value and chosen identity across both choice domains.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Together, these findings demonstrate that human valuation relies on a dynamic sequence of transformations. This prefrontal network balances the abstraction required to compare disparate options with the specificity needed for accurate goal-directed behavior.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/ne5e-s133",
        "publication_date": "2026",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2026"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:17271",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "17271",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05262025-173203112",
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            "basename": "Shi_Thesis.pdf",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Shi",
                "given_name": "Ke",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-1090-5976",
                "clpid": "Shi-Ke"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Rosenthal",
                "given_name": "Jean-Laurent",
                "clpid": "Rosenthal-J-L"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Shum",
                "given_name": "Matthew S.",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X",
                "clpid": "Shum-M-S"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Xin",
                "given_name": "Yi",
                "orcid": "0009-0004-9525-224X",
                "clpid": "Xin-Yi"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Ewens",
                "given_name": "Michael J.",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-6968-8451",
                "clpid": "Ewens-M-J"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Rosenthal",
                "given_name": "Jean-Laurent",
                "clpid": "Rosenthal-J-L"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Shum",
                "given_name": "Matthew S.",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X",
                "clpid": "Shum-M-S"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles D.",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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        ],
        "abstract": "<p>This thesis consists of three chapters.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Chapter 1 introduces a novel empirical framework to assess the impact of ownership consolidation on labor markets, addressing growing concerns about labor market power. I develop a two-sided matching model tailored to the creative labor force, a segment characterized by strong worker-firm complementarities. Applying this model to a major merger in the U.S. publishing industry, I leverage rich text data to analyze its effects on the author labor market. Counterfactual merger simulations reveal a trade-off between efficiency gains, creative misalignment, and redistributive effects. While the merger alleviated capacity constraints, post-merger integration led to significant creative misalignment between authors and publishers. The merger also induced substantial value transfers from competing publishers and authors to the merged entity, with established authors bearing the heaviest losses. Notably, the merger's anticompetitive effects manifested primarily in labor markets rather than in consumer markets. This research extends merger evaluation beyond consumer impact, offering a framework to analyze the broader consequences of mergers in labor markets characterized by worker-firm complementarities.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Chapter 2, coauthored with Miguel Alcobendas, Shunto J. Kobayashi, and Matthew Shum, studies the impact of online privacy protection, which has gained momentum in recent years and spurred both government regulations and private-sector initiatives. A centerpiece of this movement is the removal of third-party cookies, which are widely employed to track online user behavior and implement targeted ads, from web browsers. Using banner ad auction data from Yahoo, we study the effect of a third-party cookie ban on the online advertising market. We first document stylized facts about the value of third-party cookies to advertisers. Adopting a structural approach to recover advertisers' valuations from their bids in these auctions, we simulate a few counterfactual scenarios to quantify the impact of Google's plan to phase out third-party cookies from Chrome, its market-leading browser. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that an outright ban would reduce publisher revenue by 54% and advertiser surplus by 40%. The introduction of alternative tracking technologies under Google's Privacy Sandbox initiative would partially offset these losses. In either case, we find that big tech firms can leverage their informational advantage over their competitors and gain a larger surplus from the ban.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Chapter 3 examines how informal and formal networks shape performance in the venture capital (VC) industry. Using data on all U.S.-based VC investments from 1990 to 2009, supplemented with partner-level educational and employment histories from LinkedIn, I develop a structural framework that connects three types of networks: coinvestment ties, historical affiliations, and latent social connections. In the baseline model, VC performance is a function of peer performance, capturing network spillovers through a micro-founded production function. To address endogeneity in network formation, I extend the model using a two-step instrumental variables strategy that leverages variation in past professional and alumni ties. Finally, I introduce endogenous network formation where VCs strategically choose connections based on expected peer quality, allowing for the recovery of latent social networks from equilibrium outcomes. Across specifications, better-connected VCs exhibit significantly higher exit rates. Estimates from the endogenous model suggest that a 1% increase in social connectedness raises a VC's exit rate by 0.2 percentage points, while a 1% improvement in peer performance leads to a 0.74 percentage point increase in connection intensity. Informal relationships thus carry measurable economic weight, and the empirical approach developed here provides a new lens for identifying network effects in private capital markets.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/nb4s-x295",
        "publication_date": "2025",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2025"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:16710",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "16710",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09102024-194957107",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Essays on Sequential Sampling in Value-Based Choice",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Eum",
                "given_name": "Brenden",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-5484-495X",
                "clpid": "Eum-Brenden"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Rangel",
                "given_name": "Antonio",
                "clpid": "Rangel-A"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles D.",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Camerer",
                "given_name": "Colin F.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871",
                "clpid": "Camerer-C-F"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Woodford",
                "given_name": "Michael",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-5485-5280",
                "clpid": "Woodford-M"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Rangel",
                "given_name": "Antonio",
                "clpid": "Rangel-A"
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        "abstract": "<p>This dissertation comprises three chapters related to the fields of psychology, computational neuroscience, and experimental economics. Chapters 1 and 2 use experimental and computational methods to study the role of attention in simple, value-based choices. Chapter 3 examines risky choices from experience and tests some of the underlying assumptions of sequential sampling models.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>A growing body of research has shown that simple choices involve the construction and comparison of values at the time of decision. These processes are modulated by attention in a way that leaves decision makers susceptible to attentional biases. In Chapter 1, co-authored with Stephanie Dolbier and Antonio Rangel, we studied the role of peripheral visual information on the choice process and on attentional choice biases. We used an eye-tracking experiment in which participants (N = 50 adults) made binary choices between food items that were displayed in marked screen ``shelves'' in two conditions: (a) where both items were displayed, and (b) where items were displayed only when participants fixated within their shelves. We found that removing the nonfixated option approximately doubled the size of the attentional biases. The results show that peripheral visual information is crucial in facilitating good decisions and suggest that individuals might be influenceable by settings in which only one item is shown at a time, such as e-commerce.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 2, co-authored with Stephen Gonzalez and Antonio Rangel, we studied the role of attention in aversive risky choices where all outcomes were unpleasant. We used two eye-tracking experiments in which participants made binary choices between two lotteries in two conditions: (a) a gain condition where outcomes for lotteries were weakly positive, and (b) a loss condition where outcomes were weakly negative. Contrary to the predictions of the standard aDDM, we found that attentional choice biases in the loss condition were identical to those found in the gain condition, suggesting that attention nudges choices towards the attended option even in losses. To explain these results, we propose a variation of the Attentional Drift-Diffusion-Model (called the Hybrid aDDM) that incorporates (a) both a value-dependent and a value-independent effect of attention on the choice process and (b) reference-dependent value signals. We show that the observed attentional choice biases and other behavioral signatures in the loss condition can only be explained by the Hybrid aDDM with a reference-point rule that sets the reference-point at or below the minimum possible outcome in a given context.</p>  \r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 3, co-authored with Antonio Rangel, we establish that sequential sampling models apply to risky decisions from experience and test some of the underlying assumptions of these models. We ran an online study in which participants chose to Play or Skip a slot machine, based on a stream of samples drawn from its outcome distribution. We found evidence for leakage, collapsing decision boundaries, and a delay in sample integration. We also found evidence of non-linear sample weighting depending on when the sample occurred during the trial. As a bonus, we established a link between the fixed decision boundaries in a Drift-Diffusion-Model and a Modified Probit model, allowing for estimation of decision boundaries in cumulative sample space without the need to fit a computational model.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/rwy1-ry63",
        "publication_date": "2025",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2025"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:17209",
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        "collection_id": "17209",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Essays in Matching Theory",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Doe",
                "given_name": "Peter Nathanael",
                "orcid": "0009-0002-6957-8911",
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        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Echenique",
                "given_name": "Federico",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770",
                "clpid": "Echenique-F"
            },
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                "family_name": "Pomatto",
                "given_name": "Luciano",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436",
                "clpid": "Pomatto-L"
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        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Tamuz",
                "given_name": "Omer",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418",
                "clpid": "Tamuz-O"
            },
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                "family_name": "Pomatto",
                "given_name": "Luciano",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436",
                "clpid": "Pomatto-L"
            },
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                "family_name": "Echenique",
                "given_name": "Federico",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770",
                "clpid": "Echenique-F"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
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        "abstract": "<p>This dissertation consists of three essays on matching theory. The first two essays examine provide new cooperative solutions for two problems arising within matching markets in practice. The third contributes a theoretical analysis of the causes and effects of a market failure within the medical residency match.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Chapter 1 analyzes a matching market in which some agents have made prior commitments to each other. Typically, matching market models ignore prior commitments. I analyze two-sided matching markets with pre-existing binding agreements between market participants. In this model, a pair of participants bound to each other by a pre-existing agreement must agree to any action they take. To analyze their behavior, I propose a new solution concept, the agreeable core, consisting of the matches which cannot be renegotiated without violating the binding agreements. My main contribution is an algorithm that constructs such a match by a novel combination of the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. The algorithm is robust to various manipulations and has applications to numerous markets including the resident-to-hospital match, college admissions, school choice, and labor markets.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 2, I turn to the problem of increasing the efficiency of student assignments in school choice subject to constraints imposed by policymakers. In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district\u2019s objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools. However, because priorities are the amalgamation of multiple policy goals, some may be more flexible than others. This paper introduces a model that distinguishes between two types of priority: a between-group priority that ranks groups of students and must be respected, and a within-group priority for efficiently allocating seats within each group. The solution I introduce, the unified core, integrates both types. I provide a two-stage algorithm, the DA-TTC, that implements the unified core and generalizes both the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. This approach provides a method for improving efficiency in school choice while honoring policymakers\u2019 objectives.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>Chapter 3 introduces a a behavioral model of early matching within the context of the National Resident Matching Program, the system by which graduating medical students are matched to hospital residency programs. In my model, two hospitals compete to match to a continuum of doctors. Each hospital can make early offers or wait until the match is produced through the matching program. Some doctors have a behavioral preference to match early while others do not. I show that the less-desirable hospital benefits from the option to make early offers. My results provide a theoretical foundation for behavior widely documented within the medical ethics and graduate medical education literature and confirm beliefs commonly held by residency program directors.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/r209-2787",
        "publication_date": "2025",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2025"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:17267",
        "collection": "thesis",
        "collection_id": "17267",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05232025-181508218",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Essays in Experimental Economics",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Detkova",
                "given_name": "Polina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4716-2758",
                "clpid": "Detkova-Polina"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Palfrey",
                "given_name": "Thomas R.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109",
                "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Nielsen",
                "given_name": "Kirby",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-4536-1021",
                "clpid": "Nielsen-Kirby"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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        "abstract": "<p>This dissertation consists of three essays that use lab and online experiments to investigate how individuals make decisions under uncertainty, in social contexts, and when forming beliefs about others. Each essay introduces a distinct setting, but all share a common goal, which is to improve our understanding of human decision-making.</p>\r\n  \r\n<p>Chapter 1 examines commitment contracts. Their high rates of failure raise concerns since individuals may end up worse off than if they had never committed. We investigate whether some of these failures are actually anticipated, with individuals recognizing that future uncertainty might make failing the contract the best option upon some realizations of uncertainty. We refer to this behavior as planning for the possibility of failure. This approach is different from the usual interpretation of failures, which we call failing to plan, as it attributes failures to take-up mistakes. To study whether individuals plan for the possibility of failure, we conducted a controlled lab experiment designed to detect patterns of such planning. Our findings indicate that about one-third of all commitment choices can be attributed to this kind of foresight. This suggests that planning for failure is common, and that high failure rates are not necessarily driven by mistaken commitments. Thus, they do not by themselves call into question the value of commitment contracts.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>The second essay studies the decision to ask for help\u2014a behavior that can be critical in addressing information asymmetries but is often avoided. In an online experiment, we find that making potential helpers even minimally identifiable (e.g., through an uninformative ID number) significantly increases the likelihood of asking. Belief data suggest that this effect stems from shifts in how individuals weigh expected payoffs and other factors (particularly social ones) when deciding whether to ask.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>The third essay explores how people expect others to update their beliefs upon receiving new information. We find that when two individuals have different priors, people expect others\u2019 beliefs to move toward their own prior upon receiving new information. Although this result is consistent with the theoretical predictions for Bayesian agents, we find no support for the precision of information affecting the magnitude of the shift in the way the theory predicts. We find that this effect occurs not only due to under-updating of one's own beliefs but also due to recognition of under-updating by others.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/p5yr-yn70",
        "publication_date": "2025",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2025"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:16198",
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        "collection_id": "16198",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09292023-062110859",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "Essays in Behavioral Economics and Game Theory",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Fong",
                "given_name": "Meng-Jhang",
                "orcid": "0009-0008-8832-3985",
                "clpid": "Fong-Meng-Jhang"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Palfrey",
                "given_name": "Thomas R.",
                "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109",
                "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Pomatto",
                "given_name": "Luciano",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436",
                "clpid": "Pomatto-L"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles David",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            }
        ],
        "local_group": [
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        ],
        "abstract": "<p>This thesis consists of three papers. Chapter 1 conducts experimental research on individual bounded rationality in games, Chapter 2 introduces a novel equilibrium solution concept in behavioral game theory, and Chapter 3 investigates confirmation bias within the framework of game theory.</p> \r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 1 (joint with Wei James Chen and Po-Hsuan Lin), we investigate individual strategic reasoning depths by matching human subjects with fully rational computer players in a lab, allowing for the isolation of limited reasoning ability from beliefs about opponent players and social preferences. Our findings reveal that when matched with robots, subjects demonstrate higher stability in their strategic thinking depths across games, in contrast to when matched with humans.</p>  \r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 2 (joint with Po-Hsuan Lin and Thomas R. Palfrey), we investigate how players\u2019 misunderstanding about the relationship between opponents\u2019 private information and strategies influence their equilibrium behavior in dynamic environments. This theoretical study introduces a framework that extends the analysis of cursed equilibrium from the strategic form to multi-stage games and applies it to various applications in economics and political science.</p> \r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 3, I employ a game-theoretic framework to model how decision makers strategically interpret signals, particularly when they face a utility loss from holding beliefs that differ from their partners. The study reveals that the emergence of confirmation bias is positively associated with the strength of prior beliefs about a state, while the impact of signal accuracy remains ambiguous.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/5xh7-yw15",
        "publication_date": "2024",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2024"
    },
    {
        "id": "thesis:16369",
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        "collection_id": "16369",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05042024-221411474",
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        "type": "thesis",
        "title": "An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation of Decision-Making Under Risk",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Lucia",
                "given_name": "Aldo",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4833-5948",
                "clpid": "Lucia-Aldo"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_advisor": [
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles D.",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Pomatto",
                "given_name": "Luciano",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436",
                "clpid": "Pomatto-L"
            }
        ],
        "thesis_committee": [
            {
                "family_name": "Agranov",
                "given_name": "Marina",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975",
                "clpid": "Agranov-M"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Sprenger",
                "given_name": "Charles D.",
                "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Pomatto",
                "given_name": "Luciano",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436",
                "clpid": "Pomatto-L"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Caradonna",
                "given_name": "Peter",
                "orcid": "0000-0002-4197-4739",
                "clpid": "Caradonna-Peter-P"
            }
        ],
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        ],
        "abstract": "<p>This dissertation comprises three chapters related to the fields of decision theory, game theory, and experimental economics. Chapters 1 and 2 use experimental and structural methods to study individual decision-making in the domain of risk, while Chapter 3 examines decision-making under risk in settings of strategic interaction.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 1, co-authored with Shunto Kobayashi, we conduct the first experiment that studies two classical behaviors under risk inconsistent with Expected Utility together: the common ratio effect and preferences for randomization. We show that these two behaviors are strongly positively correlated in a manner inconsistent with the predictions of leading economic models and machine learning algorithms. Motivated by this observation, we develop a novel empirical approach which, unlike machine learning algorithms, imposes some basic assumptions on preferences but does not rely on specific decision models. We further demonstrate that this approach provides more accurate predictions---both inside and outside laboratory settings---compared to leading economic models and machine learning algorithms.</p>\r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 2, I design an experiment testing Expected Utility's central independence axiom and contemporaneously eliciting measures of decision confidence. Recent theoretical work implicates decision confidence as a central component of decision-making under risk, attributing failures of Expected Utility to a lack of confidence. I find that choices characterized by high self-reported levels of decision confidence and low response times are more likely to comply with the independence axiom. Contrary to the common certainty effect rationale for independence violations, I show that subjects predominantly violate Expected Utility by choosing risky lotteries over certain amounts when they are unconfident in their choices.</p>      \r\n\r\n<p>In Chapter 3, co-authored with Marco Loseto, we study static games in which players have convex preferences. Under convexity, players' preferences admit a conservative multi-utility representation: each utility generates an evaluation for each action, and actions are ranked according to the lowest evaluation. We characterize the set of optimal actions for players with convex preferences and propose an efficiency criterion to rank them. Next, we derive a new class of mixed Nash equilibria that we call ``strict'' because players strictly prefer randomization. In general, convexity may lead to a multiplicity of mixed Nash equilibria. However, we show that when they exist, only strict equilibria ensure that all mixed actions are efficient.</p>",
        "doi": "10.7907/2sk6-j508",
        "publication_date": "2024",
        "thesis_type": "phd",
        "thesis_year": "2024"
    }
]