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A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenFri, 12 Apr 2024 16:00:19 +0000How to gerrymander: A formal analysis
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-080819996
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 1998
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004986314885
The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the "fair cake division" results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/z8qp1-nnh88Spatial competition with three firms: an experimental study
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-104826903
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Collins-R', 'name': {'family': 'Collins', 'given': 'Richard'}}, {'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2000
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00005.x
This article reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem. We compare the subjects'behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium calculated by Shaked. Overall, the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction. However, the subjects'locations were significantly more dispersed than predicted by the theory. Three alternative explanations of this phenomenon - inexperience, approximate equilibrium behavior and risk aversion - are suggested and evaluated for their predictive power. Special attention is paid to risk aversionhttps://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/98t1t-81044Collusion in private value ascending price auctions
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-160218592
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00215-3
We investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication. We find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well-motivated bidders. Collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/p3g65-fan48Collusion in private value ascending price auctions
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-160218592
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00215-3
We investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication. We find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well-motivated bidders. Collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/yy53z-znv21Spatial Competition with Three Firms: An Experimental Study
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-162532912
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Collins-R', 'name': {'family': 'Collins', 'given': 'Richard'}}, {'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/datyq-h1843
The paper reports the results of an experimental study of the three firm location problem. We compare the subjects' behavior in the experiments with the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium calculated by Shaked (1982). Overall, the findings are consistent with the equilibrium prediction. However, the subjects' locations were significantly more dispersed than predicted by the theory. Three alternative explanations of this phenomenon - inexperience, approximate equilibrium behavior and risk aversion - are suggested and evaluated for their predictive power. Special attention is paid to risk aversion.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/datyq-h1843Collusion in private value ascending price auctions
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-155523315
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/aq3gx-3at57
We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each other's' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in common value auctions with complete information, collusion does occur and is sustainable even when bidders cannot explicitly coordinate their strategies. In this study, we investigate the robustness of bidders' collusive behavior in private values, private information environments. We find that collusion still occurs as long as the bidders' gains from collusion are high.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/aq3gx-3at57The Formation of Multiple Teams
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170821-134538958
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/keya4-azx13
Organizational forms such as task-oriented teams have often been proposed as a method to enhance the efficiency of a firm. Under asymmetric information, however, the costs of acquiring the information needed to improve efficiency may outweigh the efficiency gains and lead to lower profits. We illustrate this idea by considering a profit-maximizing principal who needs to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, given that the principal has incomplete information about the agents' abilities. We study feasible incentive-compatible (truth-revealing) individually rational mechanisms under both the dominant strategy and Bayesian Nash behavioral assumptions. Some attention is also paid to Nash equilibrium mechanisms. The paper covers derivation of optimal mechanisms, efficiency analysis, and analysis of the principal's expected profit as a function of different types of environment and information structures. We find that if the principal has little or no information about the agents' private characteristics and the agents follow dominant strategy behavior, the principal may often run into losses in an attempt to discover the hidden information. Paradoxically, the loss occurs when the efficiency gains from team production are high and the competition among the agents is low. If the hidden information about each agent can be summarized as a one-dimensional type parameter, and if a prior distribution function of the agents ' types is common knowledge among the agents and the principal, an expected-profit maximizing Bayesian equilibrium mechanism exists and is of the optimal auction form (Myerson, 1 98 1 ) . Moreover, the mechanism can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies with no expected profit loss for the principal. Yet, the principal's profit often decreases with an increase in the number of projects. These findings suggest that, in profit-maximizing firms with low competition among the employees, efficient organizational forms may often be foregone in favor of profits.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/keya4-azx13Firing in Non-Repeated Incentive Contracts
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-161619896
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/f6kh2-37503
When the presence of limited liability restricts a principal from imposing monetary fines on an agent in case of poor performance, the principal might use other kinds of punishment threats to deter the agent from shirking. If firing is costly to the agent it can be used by the principal even in non-repeated contracts. This paper considers the conditions under which a profit-sharing arrangement combined with a certain firing rule improves the principal's position compared to the situation in which firing is not an option. The optimal firing rule is established, and its effectiveness is considered as a function of exogenous economic variables. Possible applications of the proposed contract are suggested.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/f6kh2-37503How To Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-145613292
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Sherstyuk-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sherstyuk', 'given': 'Katerina'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/4ncwz-88r70
The paper presents an effort to incorporate geographic and other possible exogenous constraints that might be imposed on districting into an optimal partisan gerrymandering scheme. We consider an optimal districting scheme for a party which maximizes the number of districts that it will, in expectation, win, given arbitrary distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. We show that such a scheme exists if an equal size requirement is the only constraint imposed on districting. If, further, the requirement of territorial connectedness is imposed, the optimal districting scheme still exists when arbitrarily small deviations from the equal size requirement are admissible. Additional constraints imposed on districting make gerrymandering more difficult and sometimes impossible. Although the party is assumed to ignore the risk associated with possible shifts in electoral votes and thus takes the expected share of votes as a perfect predictor of electoral outcomes, the presented approach is valid for a party with any attitude towards risk and for any kind of majority rule used in elections. The results are consistent with earlier findings on unconstrained optimal partisan gerrymandering.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/4ncwz-88r70