[ { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/w70mw-2pz19", "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-12-02 00:18:07", "lastmod": "2023-12-02 00:18:07", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Noussair-C-N", "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles N." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628" }, { "id": "Reizman-R-G", "name": { "family": "Reizman", "given": "Raymond G." } } ] }, "title": "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "International Trade ; Political Economy ; Theory of International Free Trade Agreements ; Customs Unions ; Tariff Dynamics ; Storable Votes; JEL: D50, F00, F30", "abstract": "
This paper studies a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system. The patterns of trade and output predicted by the law of comparative advantage are observed evolving within the experimental markets. Market prices and quantities move in the direction of the competitive equilibrium, but the quantitative predictions of the (risk-neutral) competitive equilibrium are rejected. Considerable amounts of economic activity occur as disequilibria. Factor-price equalization is observed, but there is a universal tendency for factors of production to trade at prices below their marginal products.
", "date": "2013", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "World Scientific", "place_of_pub": "New Jersey", "pagerange": "299-328", "isbn": "9789814390118", "book_title": "International trade agreements and political economy", "editors": { "items": [ { "id": "Reizman-R-G", "name": { "family": "Reizman", "given": "Raymond Glenn" } } ] }, "official_url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/w70mw-2pz19", "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "799", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2013", "author_list": "Noussair, Charles N.; Plott, Charles R.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ep6xc-gbs59", "eprint_id": 44368, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 22:49:43", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:25:39", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Chao-H-P", "name": { "family": "Chao", "given": "Hung-Po" } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "A Smart Market for the Spot Pricing and Pricing of Transmission Through a Power Grid", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2008 Elsevier B.V.", "abstract": "This chapter illustrates a mechanism capable of competitively allocating power through\nan electricity network in which \"loop flow\" and the unusual economic phenomenon\ncaused by loop flow are anticipated and integrated into the competitive process. At the\nbase of the complexity is Kirchoff's law governing electricity flow through power grids.\nThis physical law creates a form of externalities throughout a power transmission network\nand these externalities must be incorporated into any efficient and decentralized\npricing mechanism. The mechanism developed here is a special, continuous double auction\nin which buyers and sellers are in essence buying and selling differentiated products\nin the sense that they wish to purchase and sell power at different locations, but the purchasing\nand selling activities are technically related through resource limitations and\nthe physical law of electricity flow.", "date": "2008-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "710-718", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-150953444", "isbn": "9780444826428", "book_title": "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-150953444", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00075-3", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2008", "author_list": "Chao, Hung-Po and Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/n3pn7-wbb45", "eprint_id": 44367, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 22:49:35", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:25:34", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bossaerts-P", "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603" }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market Can Solve Systems of Equations", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2008 Elsevier B.V.", "abstract": "Since market equilibrium can be interpreted as a solution to a system of equations,\n\"price discovery,\" as it called in the language of market makers, can be viewed as having\n\"found\" the solution. Of course the information needed to even formulate the equations\ndoes not exist in one place so the idea that markets are \"searching\" for the solution to a\nsystem of equations as a numerical process would search, cannot be taken literally. Nevertheless,\nit is interesting that the language that has evolved from the world of practical\nmarkets has such an interpretation and curiosity alone makes one wonder how markets\nsettle on the particular pattern of prices that solve a particular system of equations.", "date": "2008-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "22-24", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-150805221", "isbn": "9780444826428", "book_title": "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-150805221", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00002-9", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2008", "author_list": "Bossaerts, Peter and Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/k276s-w7v14", "eprint_id": 44365, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 22:49:20", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:25:28", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Non-Convexities, Economies of Scale, Natural Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2008 Elsevier B. V.", "abstract": "The behavior of markets characterized by non-convexities has been the subject of debate\nfor almost a century. Marshall, for example, thought that the existence of large\neconomies of scale in an industry would be a sufficient condition to guarantee that\nwith any initial competition, the industry would ultimately result in monopoly. The\ngreat discussions between Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlain were focused the\nprinciples that lie beneath the process of adaptation when non-convexities are present.\nA major question was whether monopoly or some constellation of oligopolies would\nevolve when competing firms had falling average costs throughout the range of demand.\nMuch of industrial organization theory is built upon the principles of Cournot\nbehavior. The theory predicts that Cournot prices will emerge from oligpolized markets\nand that such behavior will approach competitive behavior as the size of the economy\ngrows large.", "date": "2008-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "200-205", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-145941932", "isbn": "9780444826428", "book_title": "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-145941932", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00024-8", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2008", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/45607-b6z26", "eprint_id": 44366, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 22:49:28", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:25:32", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2008 Elsevier B.V.", "abstract": "The tendency of double auction markets to converge to the equilibrium of the associated\ncompetitive equilibrium model is well known, but the equilibration process is not\nunderstood. The reason for adjustment and the processes that are actively involved with\nthe adjustment process are still a mystery. However, the study of many market reported\nover the years by many different research groups have provided some properties of disequilibria\nand the dynamics of the adjustment process.\nDouble auction markets have properties that are closely associated with certain institutional\nand environmental features and have been studied extensively. First, there is a\nperiod structure to the markets: an open and a close. Second, major changes, such as\nparameter changes, occur between the close of one period and the open of the next and\nthis fact is public information. That is, parameter changes do not occur during a period.\nThird, the commodity traded is like a service that does not have a life of over one period.\nRedemption values and costs are active for only one period at a time. If the commodity\ndoes have a time life- like a security - it will systematically change its value between\nperiods, such as a dividend that is paid at the end of a period. While the discussion that\nfollows does not specifically explore the dynamic of adjustment that occur in other\nmarket structures, the properties listed below are characteristic of the asset market that\nhave been studied: speculative markets, and economies characterized by overlapping\ngeneration.", "date": "2008-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "16-21", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-150607036", "isbn": "9780444826428", "book_title": "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-150607036", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00001-7", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2008", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ggmv6-ngb43", "eprint_id": 103150, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 21:53:28", "lastmod": "2024-01-15 03:02:09", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Williamson-D-V", "name": { "family": "Williamson", "given": "Dean V." } } ] }, "title": "Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Compatibility of markets and games; Simultaneous equilibration; Dynamic adjustment processes; Institutions", "note": "\u00a9 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.", "abstract": "The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concems how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilibrium.", "date": "2001", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer", "place_of_pub": "Berlin", "pagerange": "159-180", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-135143597", "isbn": "978-3-642-62657-9", "book_title": "Advances in Experimental Markets", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-135143597", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Cason-T-N", "name": { "family": "Cason", "given": "Timothy" } }, { "id": "Noussair-C-N", "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_9", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2001", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R. and Williamson, Dean V." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pncsz-tc885", "eprint_id": 43958, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 04:16:07", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 06:06:16", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bossaerts-P", "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603" }, { "id": "Kleiman-D", "name": { "family": "Kleiman", "given": "Daniel" } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles" } } ] }, "title": "Price Discovery in Financial markets: the case of the CAPM", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Capital Asset Pricing Model\n(CAPM), Experimental Economics, Financial Markets, Equilibrium, Equilibration", "note": "\u00a9 2001 Edward Elgar.\n\n\nPreliminary versions of this paper circulated under the title \"Experimental\nTests Of The CAPM As A Model Of Equilibrium In Financial Markets.\" The\nmany comments during a seminar at the Yale School of Management, at the Conference on\nMicrostructure and High Frequency Data in Paris (December 1998) and at the Conference on\nPrice Discovery organized by the SFS in Toulouse (March 1999) are gratefully acknowledged.\nSteve Ross reminded the authors of the opportunities created by the completeness of the\nmarkets in the experiments. The financial support of the National Science Foundation and\nthe California Institute of Technology Laboratory for Experimental Research in Economics\nand Political Science is gratefully acknowledged.\n\nFormerly SSWP 1032.\n\nAccepted Version - wp1032.pdf
", "abstract": "We report on experiments of simple, repeated asset markets in two risky securities and one risk-free security, set up to test the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which embeds the two most essential principles of modern asset pricing theory, namely, (i) financial markets equilibrate, (ii) in equilibrium risk premia are solely determined by covariance with aggregate risk. Slow, but steady convergence towards the CAPM is discovered. The convergence process, however, halts before reaching the actual equilibrium. There is ample evidence that subjects gradually move up in mean-variance space, in accordance with the CAPM. Yet, adjustment stops as if the remaining trading time was insufficient to complete all the transactions that are needed to guarantee improvements in positions. We conjecture that this is due to subjects' hesitance in the face of market thinness. Because the convergence process halts, statistical tests reject the CAPM.", "date": "1999-04-19", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Edward Elgar", "place_of_pub": "Cheltenham, UK", "pagerange": "445-492", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140224-143305188", "isbn": "9781840643954", "book_title": "Information, finance, and general equilibrium", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140224-143305188", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "1032", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "wp1032.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pncsz-tc885/files/wp1032.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1999", "author_list": "Bossaerts, Peter; Kleiman, Daniel; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/by8jv-drg35", "eprint_id": 44361, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 03:41:50", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:25:15", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Policy and the Use of Laboratory Experimental Methodology in Economics", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1999 Springer.", "abstract": "Experimentation is a process of using special cases to learn things that you hope will help you when you are dealing with complex, general cases. The simple cases teach you about theory and it is theory that you use when approaching the general and complex. The theory might be very formal; or it might be an incomplete model and cover just critical aspects of the problem; or, it might be as elementary as a \"hunch,\" a vaguely articulated belief, or some form of \"judgment and common sense.\" The theory can take many forms and in spite of the claims of the contrary by people of practical affairs, it is theory based on experience that is acquired and used in policy decision. This essay is about the fundamental importance of connections between the simple case and the complex connections and how they become established in economics when the simple cases are those that can be created in a laboratory and the complex cases are those that involve policy.", "date": "1999", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer", "place_of_pub": "Boston, MA", "pagerange": "293-316", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-141820416", "isbn": "978-1-4613-7312-4", "book_title": "Uncertain Decisions: Bridging Theory and Experiments", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140317-141820416", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Luini-L", "name": { "family": "Luini", "given": "Luigi" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1999", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2bdb5-gfc07", "eprint_id": 44450, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 11:27:00", "lastmod": "2023-10-23 19:39:32", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628" }, { "id": "Turocy-T-L", "name": { "family": "Turocy", "given": "Theodore L." } } ] }, "title": "Intertemporal Speculation Under Uncertain Future Demand, Experimental Results", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Economic Theory; Numerical Analysis", "abstract": "This paper explores a market in which a subset of agents acting independently without direct communication can purchase commodities to carry forward in time in the face of uncertain future demand. The hypothesis that the equilibrating properties of markets will coordinate decentralized decisions to speculate as if all information was public gives no theory about the mechanism through which such information transfer might take place. The results provide general support for the validity of the equilibration suggestion. The mechanisms of information transfer seem to be located in the local nature of the price formation and carry-forward decisions coupled with a tendency for traders to specialize their activities.", "date": "1997", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer", "place_of_pub": "Berlin", "pagerange": "475-493", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-093947557", "isbn": "9783642644306", "book_title": "Understanding Strategic Interaction : Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selton", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-093947557", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Albers-W", "name": { "family": "Albers", "given": "Wulf" } }, { "id": "G\u00fcth-W", "name": { "family": "G\u00fcth", "given": "Werner" } }, { "id": "Hammerstein-P", "name": { "family": "Hammerstein", "given": "Peter" } }, { "id": "Moldovanu-B", "name": { "family": "Moldovanu", "given": "Benny" } }, { "id": "van-Damme-E", "name": { "family": "van Damme", "given": "Eric" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_36", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1997", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R. and Turocy, Theodore L." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/8mj6n-9gm51", "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 11:26:57", "lastmod": "2023-08-22 11:26:57", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Turocy-T-L", "name": { "family": "Turocy", "given": "Theodore L." } } ] }, "title": "Intertemporal Speculation Under Uncertain Future Demand, Experimental Results", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Economic Theory; Numerical Analysis", "note": "The files for this record are restricted to users on the Caltech campus network:Accepted Version - Comments_on_Kahneman.pdf
", "abstract": "This paper is a useful integration of research that Professor Kahneman has conducted\nwith several co-authors. The phenomena of individual decisions is a source of nagging\ncuriosity for many sciences, applications of sciences, and philosophy. What he has to say\nshould be of great interest to a very large research community. In discussing his paper I\nwill narrow the perspective to economics and to a lesser extent political science, in the\nhope of facilitating better and more complete understanding of the fundamental and\nimportant perspective that he and his co-authors bring to those particular sciences.", "date": "1996-03", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Macmillan Press", "place_of_pub": "New York", "pagerange": "220-224", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-152424814", "isbn": "9780312127084", "book_title": "The rational foundations of economic behaviour", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-152424814", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Arrow-K-J", "name": { "family": "Arrow", "given": "Kenneth J." } }, { "id": "Colombatto-E", "name": { "family": "Colombatto", "given": "Enrico" } }, { "id": "Perlman-M", "name": { "family": "Perlman", "given": "Mark" } }, { "id": "Schmidt-C", "name": { "family": "Schmidt", "given": "Christian" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1057/9780230389724", "primary_object": { "basename": "Comments_on_Kahneman.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/29eqy-4wv56/files/Comments_on_Kahneman.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1996", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ah58h-ghm18", "eprint_id": 44589, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 06:55:14", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:48:11", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Rational Individual Behavior in Markets and Social Choice Processes: the Discovered Preference Hypothesis", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1996 Macmillan.\nThe support for this project, provided by the National Science Foundation, is gratefully\nacknowledged.", "abstract": "[Introduction] The focus on individual behaviour in economics is derived from an interest in the\nbehaviour of groups as they are found in markets, committees, and social choice\nprocesses. For the most part, economists have not been interested in what goes on\ninside the beads of individuals. Thought or thought processes are seldom considered\nas part of the phenomena to be studied as a part of the science. Economics is\nprimarily a study of choice behaviors and their properties as they become manifest\nin the context of specific organizational units. By contrast, psychological focus on\nthe individual is derived from a long history of research on the nature of thought and\nthought processes. In contrast to economics, psychological research does not seem\nto have been defined by any particular social, institutional, or organizational\nconstraints.", "date": "1996", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "McMillian", "place_of_pub": "London", "pagerange": "225-250", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-151203949", "isbn": "9780333621974", "book_title": "The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-151203949", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "862", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Arrow-K-J", "name": { "family": "Arrow", "given": "Kenneth J." } }, { "id": "Colombatto-E", "name": { "family": "Colombatto", "given": "Enrico" } }, { "id": "Perlaman-M", "name": { "family": "Perlaman", "given": "Mark" } }, { "id": "Schmidt-C", "name": { "family": "Schmidt", "given": "Christian" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1996", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/4vwhv-aw195", "eprint_id": 44257, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 03:32:20", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:20:16", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Experimental Political Economy Reading List", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1994 Cambridge University Press.\n\nPublished - Plott_1994p145.pdf
", "date": "1994", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "place_of_pub": "Cambridge", "pagerange": "145-163", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-144824592", "isbn": "9780521450683", "book_title": "Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-144824592", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science" }, { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Friedman-D-J", "name": { "family": "Friedman", "given": "Daniel J." } }, { "id": "Sunder-S", "name": { "family": "Sunder", "given": "Shyam" } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "Plott_1994p145.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/4vwhv-aw195/files/Plott_1994p145.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1994", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/69dpk-tg185", "eprint_id": 44258, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:03:48", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 06:06:44", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.", "abstract": "The research presented at this conference will almost certainly set the stage for\ncontingent valuation (CV) research for the next several years. The topic is one that\nmust be taken seriously. The issues are deep and challenging. The broad focus of\nthe conference ranges from survey methodologies and the interpretations of survey\ndata, to the behavioral foundations of economics and the relevance of welfare\neconomics to matters of environmental policy and regulation. The researchers are\nsome of the most prominent in the world, with credentials that read like a \"Who's\nWho\" of economics, law, and psychology. The conclusions drawn by the researchers\nare strong and critical of CV methodology. Researchers such as these do not put\ntheir scientific credentials on the line without substantial study and are, no doubt,\nprepared to defend and elaborate on their results. In the pages that follow, I speculate\nabout the nature of the issues the conference has raised.", "date": "1993", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "467-478", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-145304915", "isbn": "9780444814692", "book_title": "Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-145304915", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Hausman-J-A", "name": { "family": "Hausman", "given": "Jerry A." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1993", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5tcam-bf386", "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-11-30 20:03:58", "lastmod": "2023-11-30 20:07:45", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Clauser-L", "name": { "family": "Clauser", "given": "Laura" } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628" } ] }, "title": "On the Anatomy of the \"Nonfacilitating\" Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1992 Addison-Wesley. The research support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory of Experiments in Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. Clauser is a senior at Occidental College and Plott is a professor at Caltech. The comments of Mark Isaac led to several changes in this paper and are greatly appreciated.
", "abstract": "Effective conspiracies are more easily formed in posted-offer and in sealed-bid markets than in double auction markets. A feature of double auctions is isolated as the possible source of the behavioral differences. The double auction presents conspirators with continuous temptations to defect from conspiratorial agreements. It also fosters a second type of competition among sellers for access to buyers caused by the fact that only one quotation can be exposed to the market at any instant in time. An extreme case of the restricted exposure feature is the New York rule that requires that only the (first) best offers are exposed to the market and can be replaced only by better offers. This second type of competition can be interpreted as a coordination problem for volume allocation that could interact with other features of the process to undermine conspiracy. The research demonstrates that this second type of competition cannot account for observed differences. When the second type of competition is removed through the creation of a special type of market organization called The Individualized Seller Market Double Auction, the conspiracies still have little or no effectiveness.
", "date": "1993", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Addison-Wesley", "place_of_pub": "Reading, MA", "pagerange": "333-353", "isbn": "9780201622638", "book_title": "The double auction market: institutions, theories, and evidence", "editors": { "items": [ { "id": "Friedman-D-J", "name": { "family": "Friedman", "given": "Daniel J." } }, { "name": { "family": "Rust", "given": "Jennifer M." } } ] }, "official_url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5tcam-bf386", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp771-updated.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5tcam-bf386/files/sswp771-updated.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1993", "author_list": "Clauser, Laura and Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cay2t-a1f67", "eprint_id": 44435, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 23:27:00", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:28:52", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "A Comparative Analysis of Direct Democracy, Two-Candidate Elections, and Three-Candidate Elections in an Experimental Environment", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1991 University of Michigan Press.\nThe financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Program for\nEnterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged. The Guggenheim Foundation and the\nCenter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences also provided time and the research\nassistance of Lynn Gale and Ron Rice.", "abstract": "This study explores the behavioral properties of political processes in a very\nsimple environment. The processes are two-candidate elections, three-candidate\nelections, and large committees. These alternative political processes\nare implemented under laboratory experimental conditions in which the\nissues and underlying population preferences over issues are held constant.\nThis allows the behavioral implications of the decision rule to be observed\nwithout the compounding complications caused by changing issues and attitudes.\nSuch a setting provides a method for checking the predictive accuracy\nof spatial models and related game-theoretic models of candidate competition.\nIf the models are sufficiently inaccurate in simple laboratory environments,\nthen they might readily be rejected as applicable to the much more complicated,\nnaturally occurring systems. In addition, the experimental design provides\na comparison of selected aspects of behavior of these alternative\nprocesses.", "date": "1991", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "University of Michigan Press", "place_of_pub": "Ann Arbor, MI", "pagerange": "11-31", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140320-161654696", "isbn": "9780472102037", "book_title": "Laboratory Research in Political Economy", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140320-161654696", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1991", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fphsd-evq48", "eprint_id": 44107, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 23:26:53", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:11:44", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Lynch-M", "name": { "family": "Lynch", "given": "Michael" } }, { "id": "Miller-R-M", "name": { "family": "Miller", "given": "Ross M." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Porter-R", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "Russell" } } ] }, "title": "Product Quality, Informational Efficiency, and Regulations in Experimental Markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1991 JAI Press.\n\nAccepted Version - sswp518.pdf
", "abstract": "This study reports on the behavior of experimental markets in which product\nquality is endogenously determined and cannot be observed by buyers prior to\npurchase. Several theories suggest that with asymmetric information about product\nquality between buyers and sellers and the absence of properly defined rules\nof liability, markets cannot be expected to generate products of \"optimal grade.\"\nAccording to such theories markets will be informationally inefficient. Information\nthat exists will not be properly used because the wrong people have it. As a\nresult, products that can be cheaply produced but are of undesirable quality\n(\"lemons\") will drive good grade products from the market because buyers\nwill be improperly informed at the time of purchase. However, very little noncontroversial evidence exists regarding the proposition. Several modes of\nbehavior and institutions can theoretically intervene to mitigate the problems. In\naddition, theories are hard to test because measurements of preferences, cost,\nknowledge, and so forth, of sufficient precision to determine whether a market\nhas \"failed\" are difficult in naturally occurring environments. The markets we\ncreated and studied have fewer such complications.", "date": "1991", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "JAI Press", "place_of_pub": "Greenwich, CT", "pagerange": "269-318", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-150929318", "isbn": "0-89232-652-2", "book_title": "Research in Experimental Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-150929318", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "518", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Isaac-R-M", "name": { "family": "Isaac", "given": "R. Mark" } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp518.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fphsd-evq48/files/sswp518.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1991", "author_list": "Lynch, Michael; Miller, Ross M.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wk230-my351", "eprint_id": 44254, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 21:08:31", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:20:05", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "An Updated Review of Industrial Organization: Applications of Experimental Methods", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1989 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.\n\nThe general methodological discussions of this paper found in Sections 2, 6, and 7 are taken from\nan earlier review by the author [Plott (1982)]. At additional points, when describing the literature\nprior to 1980, this review also draws heavily on the earlier paper. The financial support of the\nNational Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.", "abstract": "From the very beginning laboratory experiments in economics were motivated by\ntheories of industrial organization. The first published market experiments were\nthose of Chamberlin (1948) who explored the behavioral characteristics of\nmarkets he described as being \"purely\" but not \" perfectly\" competitive. He\nthought that the principles of monopolistic competition would be more useful\nthan the theory of competitive demand and supply in explaining the observed\nbehavior. Hoggatt (1959) and Sauermann and Selten (1959) independently provided\nthe first experimental evidence that the Cournot model might be a reasonably\naccurate description of oligopolistic behavior. Oligopoly and bilateral\nmonopoly motivated the classic work of Fouraker and Siegel (1963) which\nintroduced several of the experimental techniques still used today. Smith's (1962)\nsensitivity to the organization of the floor of the stock exchanges led him to the\nfundamental discovery that the law of competitive demand and supply can be\nobserved operating in an experimental environment. The field of experimental\neconomics has experienced substantial evolution during the intervening twenty-eight\nyears.", "date": "1989", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "1109-1176", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-142346887", "isbn": "9780444704351", "book_title": "Handbook of Industrial Organization", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-142346887", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Schmalensee-R", "name": { "family": "Schmalensee", "given": "Richard" } }, { "id": "Willig-R-D", "name": { "family": "Willig", "given": "Robert D." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02007-8", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1989", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/sn9vm-34k20", "eprint_id": 44251, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 20:03:46", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 06:06:43", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Daniels-B-P", "name": { "family": "Daniels", "given": "Brian P." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Inflation and Expectations in Experimental Markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1988 Springer-Verlag.\nThe financial support of the\nNational Science Foundation and the Caltech Program of Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged. The\nauthors also wish to thank David Grether, Kemal Guler, Jeffrey Dubin, Thomas Saving, and Edward Zanelli.", "abstract": "A total of nine experimental markets were studied. Seven of these involved eleven or twelve periods of inflation at a constant percentage and then two or three periods of no inflation. Two Experiments involved no inflation for twelve periods and then inflation at a constant rate for three periods. In all but three markets, participants were asked to guess the mean price of the upcoming market period before they had any information about the parameters for that period. The subject with the best guess was given a financial reward in addition to any profit earned in the market. \n Convergence properties are compared. Rational expectations models are tested and the structure of forecasts are studied. In general, the rational expectations models capture much of what is observed but paradoxes exist in the data and in the application of the models.", "date": "1988", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer-Verlag", "place_of_pub": "Berlin", "pagerange": "198-218", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-133427669", "isbn": "978-3-642-48356-1", "book_title": "Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140311-133427669", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Program of Enterprise and Public Policy" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Tietz-R", "name": { "family": "Tietz", "given": "Reinhard" } }, { "id": "Albers-W", "name": { "family": "Albers", "given": "Wulf" } }, { "id": "Selten-R", "name": { "family": "Selten", "given": "Reinhard" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1988", "author_list": "Daniels, Brian P. and Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dwed0-z3734", "eprint_id": 44485, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:03:26", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:31:32", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "The Robustness of the Voting Paradox", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1987 Oxford.", "abstract": "Dennis Mueller has provided us with an excellent review of data that bears\non the question of why people vote. He has attempted to provide a coherent\ntheory of a very complex pattern of behavior and he has presented us with\nparadoxes and challenges in a well-written and well-documented paper.\nThe data are fascinating, but the theory he weaves to explain it is less so.\nMy reservations begin with the formulation of the problem, but my major\nreservation rests on the primary structure of Mueller's theory.", "date": "1987", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Oxford", "pagerange": "100-102", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-161915668", "isbn": "9780631150299", "book_title": "Democracy and Public Choice: Essays in Honor of Gordon Tullock", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-161915668", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Rowley-C-K", "name": { "family": "Rowley", "given": "Charles Kershaw" } }, { "id": "Tullock-G", "name": { "family": "Tullock", "given": "Gordon" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1987", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/z90ck-mpq81", "eprint_id": 44498, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:03:33", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:21:01", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "psychology and economics", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "abstract": "[Introduction]\nSeveral developments have joined to stimulate economists to think about issues that have been\non the forefront of psychological research. First, the information revolution in economics has focused economists on the subtle nature of individual information processing. Secondly, developments in game theory have so successfully identified new solution concepts that for almost any pattern of market behaviour there exists a reasonable theory consistent with that pattern. lntrospection, a few principles of decision making, internal consistency, and a few stylized facts do not constrain possibilities enough to be sufficient guides to theory. Theorists are being forced to seek more systematic sources of data and additional principles to reduce the number of competing theories. Third, the rapid development of experimental methods applicable to economics has brought the testing of psychologically based economic theories within the realm of reality. Economists can accurately measure behaviour in economically relevant settings. As behavioural patterns become established that are difficult to reconcile with economic mode.ls alone, the profession has begun to look to psychology for answers. The data thus force the attention of economists to a broader class of models.", "date": "1987", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Stockton Press", "place_of_pub": "New York", "pagerange": "1037-1040", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-113400514", "isbn": "0935859101", "book_title": "The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-113400514", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "name": { "family": "Eatwell", "given": "John" } }, { "name": { "family": "Milgate", "given": "Murray" } }, { "name": { "family": "Newman", "given": "Peter" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1057/9780230226203.3356", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1987", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6dtmf-dn246", "eprint_id": 44499, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 18:11:48", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:21:05", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Lynch-M", "name": { "family": "Lynch", "given": "Michael" } }, { "id": "Miller-R-M", "name": { "family": "Miller", "given": "Ross M." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Porter-R", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "Russell" } } ] }, "title": "Product Quality, Consumer Information and \"Lemons\" in Experimental Markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1986 FTC.\n\nPublished - Plott_1986p251.pdf
", "abstract": "This paper reports on the behavior of experimental markets wherein buyers\nwere ignorant (unless truthfully informed by sellers) of the quality of the product\npurchased. True quality of the product was learned only after the sale. Sellers\nchose quality or \"grade\" and higher quality was more costly to produce. Our\nexperimental markets were characterised by asymmetric information possessed\nby buyers and sellers who traded a pure \"experience\" good whose quality\nwas endogenously determined.", "date": "1986", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Federal Trade Commission", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-113859023", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-113859023", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Ippolito-P-M", "name": { "family": "Ippolito", "given": "Pauline M." } }, { "id": "Scheffman-D-T", "name": { "family": "Scheffman", "given": "David T." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "Plott_1986p251.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6dtmf-dn246/files/Plott_1986p251.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1986", "author_list": "Lynch, Michael; Miller, Ross M.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/r0xnn-0k093", "eprint_id": 44497, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 17:24:12", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:20:57", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Miller-G-J", "name": { "family": "Miller", "given": "Gary J." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Revenue Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auctions: An Experimental Analysis of One-Price and Discriminative Processes", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1985 JAI Press Inc.\nThe financial support of the National Science Foundation, the Caltech Program for Enterprise\nand Public Policy, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Center for Advanced\nStudy in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford is gratefully acknowledged.", "abstract": "The two most prominent forms of sealed-bid auctions are the discriminative\npricing rule and the one-price (or \"competitive\") rule. With the discriminative\nrule such as that used by the U.S. Treasury for the sale of revenue bonds, each\nbuyer pays a price equal to his/her accepted bid. That is, when a quantity Q is\noffered for sale, the Q highest bids are accepted and the successful buyer pays\na price equal to his/her bid. With the one-price mechanism such as that used in\nFrench auctions of new stock issues, the successful buyer pays a price equal to\nthe lowest accepted bid. That is, when a given quantity, Q, is offered for sale,\nthe highest Q bids are accepted and each successful buyer pays a price equal to\nthe lowest accepted bid.", "date": "1985", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "JAI Press", "place_of_pub": "Greenwich, CT", "pagerange": "159-181", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-112523293", "isbn": "0-89232-337-X", "book_title": "Research in Experimental Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-112523293", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy" }, { "agency": "Guggenheim Foundation" }, { "agency": "Stanford Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "234", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1985", "author_list": "Miller, Gary J. and Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5xn15-bdx85", "eprint_id": 44457, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 15:33:41", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 15:25:16", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Agha-G", "name": { "family": "Agha", "given": "Gul" } } ] }, "title": "Intertemporal Speculation with a Random Demand in an Experimental Market", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1983 Springer-Verlag.\nThe financial support of the National Science Foundation, The Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy, the Guggenheim Foundation,\nand the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at\nStanford is gratefully acknowledged.", "abstract": "The behavior of three markets with speculators is studied.\nEach market is for commodities that can be carried forward one period\nby two speculators. Demand in the first period is stationary from\nyear to year and demand in the second period is randomly determined.\nThe question posed by the research is the reliability of rational expectations\nmodels relative to autarky models, in explaining market\nbehavior. The result is that the rational expectations model is more\naccurate.", "date": "1983", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer-Verlag", "place_of_pub": "Berlin", "pagerange": "201-216", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-104619136", "isbn": "9780387122779", "book_title": "Aspiration levels in bargaining and economic decision making", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-104619136", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy" }, { "agency": "John Simon Guggenheim Foundation" }, { "agency": "Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "446", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Tietz-R", "name": { "family": "Tietz", "given": "Reinhard" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1983", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R. and Agha, Gul" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/b7trc-8xm74", "eprint_id": 44101, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 15:01:57", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:11:20", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Sunder-S", "name": { "family": "Sunder", "given": "Shyam" } } ] }, "title": "The Effect of Trading Option Type Claims on the Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets (A Preliminary Report)", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1982 University of Chicago.\n\nPublished - Plott_1982p243.pdf
", "abstract": "Recent theories in economics claim that markets solve not only the\nclassical allocation problem of getting buyers and sellers together\nefficiently but that markets can also perform another function. Namely,\nmarkets can aggregate and disseminate information. By watching the price of a\nstock, \"outsiders\" can infer what insiders know. This is a variant of the\nrational expectations hypothesis. If a group of insiders are competing for\nsecurities in the market, someone outside the firm can learn almost anything\nabout the company by simply watching the economic consequences of the behavior\nof these people. This incredible idea is that markets themselves can serve to\naggregate and disseminate information that no one in particular has an\ninterest in allowing other people to know. Our original research was based on\nthe assumption that this idea is bananas. In this talk I will provide you\nwith some brief impressions of what we have observed.", "date": "1982-05", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "University of Chicago Graduate School of Business", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-142715523", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-142715523", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "primary_object": { "basename": "Plott_1982p243.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/b7trc-8xm74/files/Plott_1982p243.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1982", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R. and Sunder, Shyam" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/gvzng-22437", "eprint_id": 44503, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 14:39:35", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:21:15", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Wilde -L-L", "name": { "family": "Wilde", "given": "Louis L." } } ] }, "title": "Professional Diagnosis vs. Self-Diagnosis: An Experimental Examination of Some Special Features of Markets with Uncertainty", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1982 by JAI Press Inc.", "abstract": "Many people feel that the performance of certain industries has been\nbelow expectations and that additional legislative or regulatory action\nis required. The United States automotive service and repair industry\nhas been a major source of consumer dissatisfaction and complaint.\nPhysicians are subject to frequent criticisms. Insurance salesmen as well\nas the companies themselves are often suspected of misleading uninformed\nconsumers. In response to public pressures and criticisms of\nthese industries a variety of policies and reforms have been suggested.", "date": "1982", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "JAI Press", "place_of_pub": "Greenwich, CT", "pagerange": "63-112", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-133844504", "isbn": "0-89232-263-2", "book_title": "Research in Experimental Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140325-133844504", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "269", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1982", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R. and Wilde, Louis L." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0ryr3-xe029", "eprint_id": 44100, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 14:22:02", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:11:15", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Theories of Industrial Organization as Explanations of Experimental market Behavior", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1981 Federal Trade Commission.", "abstract": "The current professional interest in experimental economics\nseems to stem in part from a recently acquired ability of economists\nto explore subtle implications of institutional details for\nmarket performance. Advances in understanding the role of information\nin market models suggest the possibility that the contribution\nof institutions in affecting information patterns and\nresource allocation can be identified and assessed. Game theory\nhas increasingly focused upon the structure of strategy spaces as\ndictated by special institutional structures. The discovery of\nthe theoretical existence of decentralized, incentive-compatible\nprocesses for the provision of public goods allows one to speculate about the possibility of many different types of institutions\nwhich might solve the public-goods and free-rider problems. The\ncontinued growth and development of the field of law and economics\nhas directed the theory toward the study of the relationship\nbetween legal technology and economic principles. Theoretical\nworks on the nature of institutions and possible manifestations of\ntheir influence fill the journals.", "date": "1981-09", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Federal Trade Commission", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-142008043", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-142008043", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Salop-S-C", "name": { "family": "Salop", "given": "Steven C." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1981", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2fw1k-pk772", "eprint_id": 44098, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 13:42:54", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 06:06:25", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Experimental methods in Political Economy: A Tool for Regulatory Research", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Based on a conference sponsored by the Public Interest Economics Foundation and held May 31-June 1, 1979 at Coolfont Lodge, Berkeley Springs, W. Va\n\nPublished - Experimental_20methods_20in_20political_20economy_20a_20tool.pdf
", "abstract": "[Introduction] Regulatory research involves scholars in almost all dimensions\nof the social sciences. Economics, law and legal institutions,\npsychology, bureaucratic politics, and even voting politics become\nintermingled in complex ways to obscure the consequences\nof alternative policy options. Research undertaken to\nprovide some insights, experience, or educated guesses necessarily\nconfronts scholars with multidisciplinary considerations.\nIt also involves them with situations, problems, and institutional\narrangements for which there are no historical precedents,\nleaving them with very little shared experience to\nresolve scientific disagreements.", "date": "1981", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Ballinger Publishing Company", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-141344750", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-141344750", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "name": { "family": "Ferguson", "given": "Allen R." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "Experimental_20methods_20in_20political_20economy_20a_20tool.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2fw1k-pk772/files/Experimental_20methods_20in_20political_20economy_20a_20tool.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1981", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/p72kv-qgf26", "eprint_id": 44472, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:50:24", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:30:59", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to Public Choice", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1979 Johns Hopkins University Press.\nThe financial support supplied by the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.", "abstract": "Many claim that laboratory experimentation is impossible in economics\nand political science. Given the academic questions currently\ncentral to these disciplines, such claims, while debatable, are certainly\nunderstandable. The major focus of the field of public choice, however,\nis somewhat different from the traditional fields, and as a result laboratory\nmethodology seems to be particularly appropriate.", "date": "1979", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Johns Hopkins University Press", "place_of_pub": "Baltimore, MD", "pagerange": "137-160", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-133931204", "isbn": "9780801823206", "book_title": "Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-133931204", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "223", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Russell-C-S", "name": { "family": "Russell", "given": "Clifford S." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1979", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pf37p-v9516", "eprint_id": 44133, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:05:00", "lastmod": "2023-12-06 01:01:14", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Cohen-L", "name": { "family": "Cohen", "given": "Linda" } }, { "id": "Levine-M-E", "name": { "family": "Levine", "given": "Michael E." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Communication and Agenda Influence: The Chocolate Pizza Design", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "The financial support provided by the Henry Luce Foundation and the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Ms. Cohen is a graduate student at Caltech and a Brookings Institution Fellow. Professors Levine and Plott are affiliated with both the California Institute of Technology and the U.S.C. Law Center.
\n\nPapers presented at the second Conference on Experimental Economics, Winzenhohl, Germany, August 28th to September 2nd, 1977.
\n\n\u00a9 1978 Mohr.
", "abstract": "The previous experimental research conducted by Levine and Plott leaves little doubt that the agenda used by voting committees to sequentially eliminate options can be a major parameter in determining the group's final choice. The range of circumstances for which this proposition is true has not yet been isolated. It is clearly true for a set of experimental circumstances within which communication and casual conversations among committee members is rather severally restricted. Applications of the theory to complicated field situations suggest that the proposition is true for very rick environments but such claims are not backed by replication. Furthermore, several theories and even related experimental results suggest that the influence of the agenda will decrease as communication among group members increases. In this paper, we introduce an experimental setting designed to facilitate group discussion and interaction. Experimental results conduced within this design and reported below support the earlier findings that the agenda is a predominant factor in determining the final outcome of group choice.", "date": "1978", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Mohr", "place_of_pub": "T\u00fcbingen, Germany", "pagerange": "329-357", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153905647", "isbn": "9783163409828", "book_title": "Coalition Forming Behavior", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153905647", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Henry Luce Foundation" }, { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "167", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Sauermann-H", "name": { "family": "Sauermann", "given": "Heinz" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1978", "author_list": "Cohen, Linda; Levine, Michael E.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ha314-0wa77", "eprint_id": 44132, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:04:33", "lastmod": "2023-12-12 00:26:19", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Isaac-R-M", "name": { "family": "Isaac", "given": "R. Mark" } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628" } ] }, "title": "Cooperative Game Models of the Influence of the Closed Rule in Three Person, Majority Rule Committees: Theory and Experiment", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1978 Published for the Center for Applied Economics New York University.\n\nThe research support of the National Science Foundation is\ngratefully acknowledged. We also wish to thank the members\nof the Caltech seminar in experimental methods for many\nhelpful comments and Professor Michael Maschler for his\ncomments regarding the structure of the bargaining set.", "abstract": "Many committees operate through subcommittees which are\ncharged with the task of gathering information, debating the\nissues, and finally drafting motions for consideration and\nratification by the committee of the whole. No doubt this\nprocess saves time and enhances the ability of the entire\ndecision-making body to address many issues, but a cursory\napplication of game theory suggests that it may also change\nsubstantially the character of decisions made by the larger\ncommittee. That is, the theory implies that even if the committee of the whole took an extraordinary amount of time\non each decision, gathering information and debating the\nissues, the resulting decisions might deviate substantially\nfrom those that would have emerged from a subcommittee\nprocess.", "date": "1978", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "New York University Press", "place_of_pub": "New York", "pagerange": "283-322", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153203656", "isbn": "9780814761564", "book_title": "Game Theory and Political Science", "editors": { "items": [ { "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." } } ] }, "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-153203656", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "181", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1978", "author_list": "Isaac, R. Mark and Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qwwhe-e9518", "eprint_id": 44578, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:05:12", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 15:25:45", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles" } } ] }, "title": "On the Incorporation of Public Attitudes Toward Administrative Options", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1980 FDA.\n\nPublished - Plott_1978p38.pdf
", "abstract": "As a mathematical economist, I work at the\nfoundations level of risk/benefit analysis, group\ndecision processes, polling, and related areas. The\nfoundations, however, are frequently removed from\nreal applications.", "date": "1978", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-115648677", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-115648677", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Staffa-J-A", "name": { "family": "Staffa", "given": "Jeffrey A." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "Plott_1978p38.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qwwhe-e9518/files/Plott_1978p38.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1978", "author_list": "Plott, Charles" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/chddm-nc807", "eprint_id": 44474, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:05:08", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 15:25:23", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Rawls's Theory of Justice: An Impossibility Result", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland.\nFinancial support for this research was supplied by the National Science Foundation.", "abstract": "The theory of justice developed by John Rawls has been widely and correctly recognized as one of the great contributions to our understanding about the complicated relationships between social institutions and our notions about the morality of social actions. His work is having substantive impact on economics, and I suspect that the other social sciences including law are being similarly influenced. For me to add my own accolades here in view of this almost universal praise, would be anticlimactic at best; so let's get straight to the point.", "date": "1978", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "D. Reidel Publishing Company", "place_of_pub": "Dordrecht, Holland", "pagerange": "201-214", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-143004479", "isbn": "9789027708878", "book_title": "Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-143004479", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Gottinger-H-W", "name": { "family": "Gottinger", "given": "Hans-Werner" } }, { "id": "Leinfellner-W", "name": { "family": "Leinfellner", "given": "Werner" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1978", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fr6az-wkq11", "eprint_id": 44137, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 09:11:38", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 06:06:29", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Meyer-R-A", "name": { "family": "Meyer", "given": "Robert A." } } ] }, "title": "The Technology of Public Goods, Externalities, and the Exclusion Principle", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1975 National Bureau of Economic Research.\n\nOriginally issued as Social Science Working Paper 15.\n\nPublished - c2833.pdf
", "abstract": "Presented here are some notions which we hope will help researchers in\ntheir attempts to model various aspects of the complex situations which,\ncurrently, come tinder the heading of \"externality problems.\" Roughly,\nthe major theoretical idea is to exploit the advantages of separating into\ndifferent structural models the consumer-based activities of consumption\nand acquisition and the producer-based activities of production, marketing,\nand revenue collection. The links between these activities can then\nbe used to characterize types or classes of externality problems.", "date": "1975", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "National Bureau of Economic Research", "place_of_pub": "New York", "pagerange": "65-94", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-161846111", "isbn": "9780870142673", "book_title": "Economic Analysis of Environmental Problems", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140304-161846111", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "15", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Mills-E-S", "name": { "family": "Mills", "given": "Edwin S." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "c2833.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fr6az-wkq11/files/c2833.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1975", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R. and Meyer, Robert A." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/zv6d1-8xf96", "eprint_id": 44094, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-23 16:45:07", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 00:11:06", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Individual Choice of a Political-Economic Process", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1972 Merrill Press.", "abstract": "By what means does one determine a rule to use in determining a rule\nfor the making of social decisions? This rather perplexing problem appropriately\nhas the flavor of an infinite regress. Yet, several scholars have\nattempted to phrase the question in a manner which circumvents the problem.\nThe essay here is a discussion of the broad settings in which the problem\nhas been posed.\nAn examination of the question calls for the context of the question.\nThree separate contexts suggest themselves. The first context arises with\nthe \"justification\" of \"social actions\" or \"decisions.\" The second arises\nwhen one seeks advice on what type of rule he \"should\" support. The \nthird involves a theory about the type of rules that are \"likely\" to be \n\"agreed\" upon by a group of people.", "date": "1972", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Merrill", "place_of_pub": "Columbus, OH", "pagerange": "83-97", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-134059514", "isbn": "9780675091800", "book_title": "Probability Models of Collective Decision-Making", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-134059514", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Niemi-R-G", "name": { "family": "Niemi", "given": "Richard G." } }, { "id": "Weisberg-H-F", "name": { "family": "Weisberg", "given": "Herbert F." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1972", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a9792-80d33", "eprint_id": 44092, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 07:19:14", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 06:06:23", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } } ] }, "title": "Recent Results in the Theory of Voting", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1971 North-Holland Publishing Company.\nThis research was supported, in part, by a Ford Foundation Faculty Research\nGrant and by a Krannert Research Grant. The author benefited from many stimulating\nconversations with M.D. Intriligator and R. Wilson while a visitor at Serra House,\nStanford University. Responsibilities for the content remain with the author.", "abstract": "The theory of voting and public choice has been rapidly developing along\nseveral different lines. The purpose of this paper is to provide a review and\nsynthesis of the recent results. \"Recent\" is taken to mean roughly since 1963.\nExcellent discussions of the developments prior to 1964 can be found in\nArrow (1963), Rothenberg (1961), and Vickery (1960).\nThe materials are partitioned into three major sections. The first section\npertains to the axiomatic formulation of the social choice problem. The\nsecond section deals exclusively with majority rule and the third section\ncontains an examination of what could loosely be called the theory of\npolitical processes. The final section contains a few closing remarks.", "date": "1971", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "North-Holland Publishing Company", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "109-127", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-133713264", "isbn": "9780720431902", "book_title": "Frontiers of quantitative economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140303-133713264", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Ford Foundation Faculty Research Grant" }, { "agency": "Krannert Research Grant" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Intriligator-M-D", "name": { "family": "Intriligator", "given": "Michael D." } }, { "id": "Kendrick-D-A", "name": { "family": "Kendrick", "given": "David A." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1971", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R." } ]