<h1>Palfrey, Thomas</h1> <h2>Working Paper from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS</a></h2> <ul> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2023) <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/k04xn-z8w46">Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/k04xn-z8w46">10.7907/k04xn-z8w46</a></li> <li>Fong, Meng-Jhang and Lin, Po-Hsuan, el al. (2023) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20230412-232506011">A Note on Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/k9a6d-7gv65">10.7907/k9a6d-7gv65</a></li> <li>Fong, Meng-Jhang and Lin, Po-Hsuan, el al. (2023) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20230127-215732171">Cursed Sequential Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/qnknz-6g493">10.7907/qnknz-6g493</a></li> <li>Lin, Po-Hsuan and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2022) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220207-233838741">Cognitive Hierarchies in Extensive Form Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fv09c-16q24">10.7907/fv09c-16q24</a></li> <li>Holt, Charles A. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2022) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220125-191230556">Bilateral Conflict: An Experimental Study of Strategic Effectiveness and Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/phwgk-0c835">10.7907/phwgk-0c835</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2018) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-095413777">An Experimental Study of Vote Trading</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/zx62f-jxa23">10.7907/zx62f-jxa23</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2018) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191022-145133373">Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/r7xsa-fam18">10.7907/r7xsa-fam18</a></li> <li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-100521521">Candidate entry and political polarization: An experimental study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/92153-cfm32">10.7907/92153-cfm32</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pogorelskiy, Kirill (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170725-105126699">Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/33gtv-w8n81">10.7907/33gtv-w8n81</a></li> <li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-111918164">The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/15m59-zva74">10.7907/15m59-zva74</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-115133535">The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fbzrt-67w98">10.7907/fbzrt-67w98</a></li> <li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-115651807">Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w21645">10.3386/w21645</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard, el al. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-120023499">How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Public Goods Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/99d56-9zp69">10.7907/99d56-9zp69</a></li> <li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-144613925">Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: an Experimental Investigation</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54">10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54</a></li> <li>Camerer, Colin F. and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-134857624">Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/pr9cf-1xg79">10.7907/pr9cf-1xg79</a></li> <li>Elbittar, Alexander and Gomberg, Andrei, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-133946961">Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/6fx75-j5292">10.7907/6fx75-j5292</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2013) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-150555535">Experiments in Political Economy</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/c54mq-f2c90">10.7907/c54mq-f2c90</a></li> <li>Merlo, Antonio and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2013) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-134313074">External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/x0b0n-1k851">10.7907/x0b0n-1k851</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2013) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-135235371">The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/5wr2k-ph607">10.7907/5wr2k-ph607</a></li> <li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-144342297">Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/0xp5n-z9471">10.7907/0xp5n-z9471</a></li> <li>Kuzmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-092437236">Symmetric play in repeated allocation games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/eb78v-njd23">10.7907/eb78v-njd23</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-172615506">Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/370gk-wbz86">10.7907/370gk-wbz86</a></li> <li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-100308276">Vote trading with and without party leaders</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/4nb9v-8rb51">10.7907/4nb9v-8rb51</a></li> <li>Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-102658422">Turnout and Power Sharing</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/sh7hr-xth11">10.7907/sh7hr-xth11</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-112335038">Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/sffq8-8mn50">10.7907/sffq8-8mn50</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-105218172">The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w17926">10.3386/w17926</a></li> <li>Grosser, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170725-171230569">Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Anti-Median Voter Theorem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v1seg-1j538">10.7907/v1seg-1j538</a></li> <li>Casella, Alessandra and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, el al. (2010) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-163224980">Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7qftr-6q446">10.7907/7qftr-6q446</a></li> <li>Battaglia, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2010) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-162558894">Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Investment</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/0s53y-9sr42">10.7907/0s53y-9sr42</a></li> <li>Brocas, Isabelle and Carrillo, Juan D., el al. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-170755087">Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/n9sr9-wbh87">10.7907/n9sr9-wbh87</a></li> <li>Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas, el al. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-165659587">Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m9p9a-hyz82">10.7907/m9p9a-hyz82</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-151856770">Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/b2f8f-w2r02">10.7907/b2f8f-w2r02</a></li> <li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-163611649">A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/gdsn6-c9x32">10.7907/gdsn6-c9x32</a></li> <li>Jacob, S. Nageeb Ali and Goeree, Jacob K., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-145558781">Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/s6x5b-ztg37">10.7907/s6x5b-ztg37</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171129-145253122">On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/wc5xm-c6909">10.7907/wc5xm-c6909</a></li> <li>Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-151244423">No Trade</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/h4tdm-q9r95">10.7907/h4tdm-q9r95</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-155330544">The Dynamics of Distributive Politics</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/qn20c-9s527">10.7907/qn20c-9s527</a></li> <li>Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-094538005">The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/xv853-bxx57">10.7907/xv853-bxx57</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-090500575">The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7b0ph-rw267">10.7907/7b0ph-rw267</a></li> <li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-151357281">Political Reputations and Campaign Promises</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fkwdm-vm028">10.7907/fkwdm-vm028</a></li> <li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-091439642">Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/2mhxz-jsh85">10.7907/2mhxz-jsh85</a></li> <li>Camerer, Colin F. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-093456313">Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/1dxq5-hze86">10.7907/1dxq5-hze86</a></li> <li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-092302519">Minorities and Storable Votes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/ncqpj-fb226">10.7907/ncqpj-fb226</a></li> <li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles H., el al. (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-091351332">Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/jex2e-1q546">10.7907/jex2e-1q546</a></li> <li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2004) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-133225091">Self-correcting Information Cascades</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/3dd4s-jz194">10.7907/3dd4s-jz194</a></li> <li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-150824856">Social Learning with Private and Common Values</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/qp2k9-37b69">10.7907/qp2k9-37b69</a></li> <li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-152920042">A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fwfvf-9g770">10.7907/fwfvf-9g770</a></li> <li>Casella, Alessandra and Gelman, Andrew, el al. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-170114634">An Experimental Study of Storable Votes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m1m03-52j79">10.7907/m1m03-52j79</a></li> <li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-134757637">A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7cdr5-27t20">10.7907/7cdr5-27t20</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pevniskaya, Svetlana (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-171226910">Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/y1s3v-psz75">10.7907/y1s3v-psz75</a></li> <li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-141851171">Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v19cb-txp80">10.7907/v19cb-txp80</a></li> <li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-160404405">The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/w2rzf-2gt58">10.7907/w2rzf-2gt58</a></li> <li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-142250579">The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v811f-scj07">10.7907/v811f-scj07</a></li> <li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-165400595">Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/d5xt1-9dh42">10.7907/d5xt1-9dh42</a></li> <li>Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-153843207">An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/49qpb-78b68">10.7907/49qpb-78b68</a></li> <li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-132644522">Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7m89d-44815">10.7907/7m89d-44815</a></li> <li>Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-165154639">Voluntary Implementation</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/q2nj0-z2j43">10.7907/q2nj0-z2j43</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-143845609">The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2 x 2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/95xv9-jkv06">10.7907/95xv9-jkv06</a></li> <li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-144929970">Political Confederation</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/04xcr-91r09">10.7907/04xcr-91r09</a></li> <li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-164222869">Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/y319s-0vv88">10.7907/y319s-0vv88</a></li> <li>Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-154504840">Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v39vq-q2c70">10.7907/v39vq-q2c70</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jackson, Matthew O. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-154039652">Dynamic Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/t1fke-af726">10.7907/t1fke-af726</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-165243053">A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m8276-pad75">10.7907/m8276-pad75</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-143555993">Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/prxgj-mg253">10.7907/prxgj-mg253</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-161032873">Implementation Theory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/f4x3p-w1n11">10.7907/f4x3p-w1n11</a></li> <li>Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-133811016">An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/g1kfx-nex14">10.7907/g1kfx-nex14</a></li> <li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-164842884">In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/kqm1m-g9v70">10.7907/kqm1m-g9v70</a></li> <li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-160511103">Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/gkc2n-v7q38">10.7907/gkc2n-v7q38</a></li> <li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160328-160830650">Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/x8d9n-q6988">10.7907/x8d9n-q6988</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-154709009">Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/1rdj0-77t87">10.7907/1rdj0-77t87</a></li> <li>Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-153709478">The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incumbency in Congressional Elections</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/a9wsd-5xx59">10.7907/a9wsd-5xx59</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-134803360">The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/h5sgq-1q935">10.7907/h5sgq-1q935</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-134601561">Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/46qat-kfm09">10.7907/46qat-kfm09</a></li> <li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-141309234">A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27">10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-135834135">Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/kz8hk-4de75">10.7907/kz8hk-4de75</a></li> <li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-144316123">Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/084hn-k3v09">10.7907/084hn-k3v09</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-132920230">Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/d4sd9-y8j89">10.7907/d4sd9-y8j89</a></li> <li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160405-154023040">An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-135222800">Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/hvv49-r3f64">10.7907/hvv49-r3f64</a></li> <li>Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140721592">Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7fkp2-7p565">10.7907/7fkp2-7p565</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-143503727">Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/69xq2-h8e74">10.7907/69xq2-h8e74</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-145247491">A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/n9fr9-jvy72">10.7907/n9fr9-jvy72</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608">Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/b0q0b-b0t12">10.7907/b0q0b-b0t12</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-152638547">Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/jh4qb-j1857">10.7907/jh4qb-j1857</a></li> <li>Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark, el al. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-154413142">Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/x766n-4cd70">10.7907/x766n-4cd70</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170922-164525313">Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/2vnat-k7q66">10.7907/2vnat-k7q66</a></li> <li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1979) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235">Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fwy9p-8mk22">10.7907/fwy9p-8mk22</a></li> </ul>