<h1>Palfrey, Thomas</h1>
<h2>Combined from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS</a></h2>
<ul>
<li>Lin, Po-Hsuan and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2024) <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/230np-cas26">Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 220; 105871; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2024.105871">10.1016/j.jet.2024.105871</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2023) <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/k04xn-z8w46">Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/k04xn-z8w46">10.7907/k04xn-z8w46</a></li>
<li>Fong, Meng-Jhang and Lin, Po-Hsuan, el al. (2023) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20230127-215732171">Cursed Sequential Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/qnknz-6g493">10.7907/qnknz-6g493</a></li>
<li>Fong, Meng-Jhang and Lin, Po-Hsuan, el al. (2023) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20230412-232506011">A Note on Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/k9a6d-7gv65">10.7907/k9a6d-7gv65</a></li>
<li>Kim, Jeongbin and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2022) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20230103-818063100.37">Games Played by Teams of Players</a>; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 14; No. 4; 122-157; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200391">10.1257/mic.20200391</a></li>
<li>Lin, Po-Hsuan and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2022) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220207-233838741">Cognitive Hierarchies in Extensive Form Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fv09c-16q24">10.7907/fv09c-16q24</a></li>
<li>Holt, Charles A. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2022) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220125-191230556">Bilateral Conflict: An Experimental Study of Strategic
Effectiveness and Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/phwgk-0c835">10.7907/phwgk-0c835</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2021) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20201104-143445798">Trading Votes for Votes: A Laboratory Study</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 125; 1-26; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.004">10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.004</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2020) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20201218-135643046">Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study</a>; Journal of the European Economic Association; Vol. 18; No. 4; 1969-2012; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz031">10.1093/jeea/jvz031</a></li>
<li>Elbittar, Alexander and Gomberg, Andrei, el al. (2020) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-140248447">Ignorance and bias in collective decisions</a>; Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization; Vol. 174; 332-359; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.011">10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.011</a></li>
<li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2020) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200124-151122461">Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality</a>; European Economic Review; Vol. 123; Art. No. 103372; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103372">10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103372</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas (2019) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190410-153818170">Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 87; No. 2; 631-652; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15940">10.3982/ecta15940</a></li>
<li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2019) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190228-143118586">Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 113; No. 1; 209-225; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000631">10.1017/S0003055418000631</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pogorelskiy, Kirill (2019) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190418-081954322">Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party</a>; Economic Journal; Vol. 129; No. 618; 961-990; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12563">10.1111/ecoj.12563</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2018) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-095413777">An Experimental Study of Vote Trading</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/zx62f-jxa23">10.7907/zx62f-jxa23</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2018) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191022-145133373">Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/r7xsa-fam18">10.7907/r7xsa-fam18</a></li>
<li>Merlo, Antonio and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2018) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180801-164035934">External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery</a>; Public Choice; Vol. 176; No. 1-2; 297-314; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0523-7">10.1007/s11127-018-0523-7</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas and Rosenthal, Howard, el al. (2017) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170418-110358624">How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 101; 234-259; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004">10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004</a></li>
<li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-100521521">Candidate entry and political polarization: An experimental study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/92153-cfm32">10.7907/92153-cfm32</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161202-123810870">The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study</a>; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 8; No. 4; 268-308; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150126">10.1257/mic.20150126</a></li>
<li>Agranov, Marina and Fréchette, Guillaume, el al. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161116-152246560">Static and dynamic underinvestment: An experimental investigation</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 143; 125-141; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.001">10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.001</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pogorelskiy, Kirill (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170725-105126699">Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/33gtv-w8n81">10.7907/33gtv-w8n81</a></li>
<li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-111918164">The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/15m59-zva74">10.7907/15m59-zva74</a></li>
<li>Camerer, Colin and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160930-133028251">Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 98; 243-263; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.009">10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.009</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-115133535">The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fbzrt-67w98">10.7907/fbzrt-67w98</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-141853344">Experiments in political economy</a>; ISBN 1400883172; The Handbook of Experimental Economics; 347-434</li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-115651807">Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w21645">10.3386/w21645</a></li>
<li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20151210-103521591">Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 130; 45-58; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008">10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard, el al. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-120023499">How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Public Goods Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/99d56-9zp69">10.7907/99d56-9zp69</a></li>
<li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2015) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-144613925">Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: an  Experimental Investigation</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54">10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54</a></li>
<li>Camerer, Colin F. and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-134857624">Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/pr9cf-1xg79">10.7907/pr9cf-1xg79</a></li>
<li>Kusmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20150212-121723022">Symmetric play in repeated allocation games</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 154; 25-67; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.002">10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.002</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20141009-095955387">Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments</a>; American Economic Review; Vol. 104; No. 9; 2858-2871; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.9.2858">10.1257/aer.104.9.2858</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140609-100018522">Vote trading with and without party leaders</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 112; 115-128; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.001">10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.001</a></li>
<li>Elbittar, Alexander and Gomberg, Andrei, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-133946961">Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/6fx75-j5292">10.7907/6fx75-j5292</a></li>
<li>Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo, el al. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-162743341">Turnout and Power Sharing</a>; Economic Journal; Vol. 124; No. 574; F131-F162; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12116">10.1111/ecoj.12116</a></li>
<li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2014) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140203-071145621">Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 58; No. 1; 127-143; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12032">10.1111/ajps.12032</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2013) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-150555535">Experiments in Political Economy</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/c54mq-f2c90">10.7907/c54mq-f2c90</a></li>
<li>Merlo, Antonio and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2013) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-134313074">External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/x0b0n-1k851">10.7907/x0b0n-1k851</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2013) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-135235371">The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/5wr2k-ph607">10.7907/5wr2k-ph607</a></li>
<li>Brocas, Isabelle and Carrillo, Juan D., el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20121205-095756144">Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 51; No. 3; 649-676; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0615-9">10.1007/s00199-011-0615-9</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20121026-080755730">Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets With Information Flows</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 80; No. 5; 1937-1976; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8781">10.3982/ECTA8781</a></li>
<li>Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-144342297">Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/0xp5n-z9471">10.7907/0xp5n-z9471</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130116-093012236">Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes</a>; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 120; No. 4; 593-658; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/667988">10.1086/667988</a></li>
<li>Kuzmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-092437236">Symmetric play in repeated allocation games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/eb78v-njd23">10.7907/eb78v-njd23</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130102-092329553">Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 106; No. 2; 407-429; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000160">10.1017/S0003055412000160</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-172615506">Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information  Flows</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/370gk-wbz86">10.7907/370gk-wbz86</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-100308276">Vote trading with and without party leaders</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/4nb9v-8rb51">10.7907/4nb9v-8rb51</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2012) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120907-150828156">The dynamics of distributive politics</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 49; No. 3; 739-777; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0612-z">10.1007/s00199-011-0612-z</a></li>
<li>Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-102658422">Turnout and Power Sharing</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/sh7hr-xth11">10.7907/sh7hr-xth11</a></li>
<li>Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120228-105149483">Network architecture, salience and coordination</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 73; No. 1; 76-90; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001">10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-112335038">Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/sffq8-8mn50">10.7907/sffq8-8mn50</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-105218172">The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w17926">10.3386/w17926</a></li>
<li>Grosser, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170725-171230569">Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Anti-Median Voter Theorem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v1seg-1j538">10.7907/v1seg-1j538</a></li>
<li>Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2011) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110725-093131929">No trade</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 71; No. 1; 66-87; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.006">10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.006</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, el al. (2010) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-163224980">Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7qftr-6q446">10.7907/7qftr-6q446</a></li>
<li>Battaglia, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, el al. (2010) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-162558894">Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Investment</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/0s53y-9sr42">10.7907/0s53y-9sr42</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2010) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180813-091037247">The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 77; No. 1; 61-89; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00569.x">10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00569.x</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2010) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100518-113824373">The Swing Voter's Curse in the
Laboratory</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 77; No. 1; 61-89; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00569.x">10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00569.x</a></li>
<li>Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas, el al. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-165659587">Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m9p9a-hyz82">10.7907/m9p9a-hyz82</a></li>
<li>Brocas, Isabelle and Carrillo, Juan D., el al. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-170755087">Information  Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/n9sr9-wbh87">10.7907/n9sr9-wbh87</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-140744431">On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games</a>; Journal of Economic Behavior &amp; Organization; Vol. 71; No. 2; 98-109; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.025">10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.025</a></li>
<li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142744314">A  Citizen Candidate Model with Private Information and Unique Equilibrium</a>; ISBN 9788496515918; The Political Economy of Democracy; 15-29</li>
<li>Rogers, Brian W. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20090808-142501869">Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 144; No. 4; 1440-1467; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010">10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-140245830">Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy</a>; Annual Review of Poltical Science; Vol. 12; 379-388; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139">10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Carrillo, Juan D. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-141738273">The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory</a>; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 1; No. 1; 151-181; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.1.1.151">10.1257/mic.1.1.151</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-151856770">Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/b2f8f-w2r02">10.7907/b2f8f-w2r02</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142311084">Minorities and Storable Votes</a>; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 3; No. 2; 165-200; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00007048">10.1561/100.00007048</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pevnitskaya, Svetlana (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-150527129">Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study</a>; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 66; No. 3; 731-747; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.005">10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.005</a></li>
<li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-163611649">A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/gdsn6-c9x32">10.7907/gdsn6-c9x32</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca, el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BATaer08">Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections</a>; American Economic Review; Vol. 98; No. 2; 194-200; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.194">10.1257/aer.98.2.194</a></li>
<li>Ali, S. Nageeb and Goeree, Jacob K., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ALIaer08">Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees</a>; American Economic Review; Vol. 98; No. 2; 181-186; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.181">10.1257/aer.98.2.181</a></li>
<li>Jacob, S. Nageeb Ali and Goeree, Jacob K., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-145558781">Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/s6x5b-ztg37">10.7907/s6x5b-ztg37</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114418045">Quantal Response Equilibrium</a>; ISBN 9780333786765; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.1372">10.1057/9780230226203.1372</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171129-145253122">On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/wc5xm-c6909">10.7907/wc5xm-c6909</a></li>
<li>Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-151244423">No Trade</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/h4tdm-q9r95">10.7907/h4tdm-q9r95</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca, el al. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BATapsr07">Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 101; No. 3; 409-424; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070281">10.1017/S0003055407070281</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-155330544">The Dynamics of Distributive Politics</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/qn20c-9s527">10.7907/qn20c-9s527</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-144825827">Self-Correcting Information Cascades</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 74; No. 3; 733-762; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x">10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Postlewaite, Andrew, el al. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-150824425">Political Reputations and Campaign Promises</a>; Journal of the European Economic Association; Vol. 5; No. 4; 846-884; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.846">10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.846</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-090411858">A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 133; No. 1; 441-466; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006">10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006</a></li>
<li>Levine, David K. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-145732549">The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 101; No. 1; 143-158; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070013">10.1017/S0003055407070013</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-150115736">Storeable Votes: Giving Voice to Minority Preferences Without Sacrificing Efficiency</a>; CESifo DICE report; Vol. 5; No. 3; 17-22</li>
<li>Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-094538005">The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/xv853-bxx57">10.7907/xv853-bxx57</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-090500575">The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7b0ph-rw267">10.7907/7b0ph-rw267</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-151357281">Political Reputations and Campaign Promises</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fkwdm-vm028">10.7907/fkwdm-vm028</a></li>
<li>Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-091439642">Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/2mhxz-jsh85">10.7907/2mhxz-jsh85</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-153001927">An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 90; No. 10-11; 2091-2106; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.04.002">10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.04.002</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Gelman, Andrew, el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155659114">An experimental study of storeable votes</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57; No. 1; 123-154; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004">10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-161520590">Social learning with private and common values</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 28; No. 2; 254-264; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0642-5">10.1007/s00199-005-0642-5</a></li>
<li>Camerer, Colin F. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-093456313">Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/1dxq5-hze86">10.7907/1dxq5-hze86</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-092302519">Minorities and Storable Votes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/ncqpj-fb226">10.7907/ncqpj-fb226</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-161253717">Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium</a>; Experimental Economics; Vol. 8; No. 4; 347-367; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-5374-7">10.1007/s10683-005-5374-7</a></li>
<li>Gailmard, Sean and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-152530163">An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 89; No. 8; 1361-1398; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.002">10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.002</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-153559651">Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 51; No. 2; 237-242; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.002">10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.002</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles H., el al. (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-091351332">Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/jex2e-1q546">10.7907/jex2e-1q546</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Aragones, Enriqueta (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114044999">Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information</a>; ISBN 9783540220534; Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks; 93-112; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4">10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2004) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-133225091">Self-correcting Information Cascades</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/3dd4s-jz194">10.7907/3dd4s-jz194</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2004) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ARAapsr04">The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: An experimental study</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 98; No. 1; 77-90; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001017">10.1017/S0003055404001017</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-150824856">Social Learning with Private and Common Values</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/qp2k9-37b69">10.7907/qp2k9-37b69</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-152920042">A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fwfvf-9g770">10.7907/fwfvf-9g770</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-153844769">Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 45; No. 1; 97-113; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00052-6">10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00052-6</a></li>
<li>Casella, Alessandra and Gelman, Andrew, el al. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-170114634">An Experimental Study of Storable Votes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m1m03-52j79">10.7907/m1m03-52j79</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-134757637">A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7cdr5-27t20">10.7907/7cdr5-27t20</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pevniskaya, Svetlana (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-171226910">Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/y1s3v-psz75">10.7907/y1s3v-psz75</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-141851171">Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v19cb-txp80">10.7907/v19cb-txp80</a></li>
<li>Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-135446668">Corrigendum to &quot;Voluntary implementation&quot;: J. Econ. Theor. 98 (2001) 1–25</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 110; No. 1; 204-205; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00032-7">10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00032-7</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-103936514">Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters</a>; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 7; No. 3; 279-296; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200078">10.1007/s100580200078</a></li>
<li>Laussel, Didier and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110526874">Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information</a>; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 5; No. 3; 449-478; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00143">10.1111/1467-9779.00143</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-160404405">The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/w2rzf-2gt58">10.7907/w2rzf-2gt58</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-163302479">Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in First Price Auctions</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 104; No. 1; 247-272; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2914">10.1006/jeth.2001.2914</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-102832174">Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 104; No. 1; 247-272; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2914">10.1006/jeth.2001.2914</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-084105843">Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 103; No. 1; 131-161; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2821">10.1006/jeth.2001.2821</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-152243404">The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 83; No. 2; 153-171; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4">10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935">Implementation theory</a>; ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Volume 3; 2271-2326; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2">10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2</a></li>
<li>Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2001) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-163541677">Voluntary Implementation</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 98; No. 1; 1-25; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2752">10.1006/jeth.2000.2752</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-142250579">The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v811f-scj07">10.7907/v811f-scj07</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:CREjpe00">Federal mandates by popular demand</a>; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 108; No. 5; 905-927</li>
<li>Erickson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160314-165039438">Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 3; 595-609; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2585833">10.2307/2585833</a></li>
<li>Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-165400595">Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/d5xt1-9dh42">10.7907/d5xt1-9dh42</a></li>
<li>Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-164353192">Equilibrium in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 3; 595-609; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2585833">10.2307/2585833</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Weber, Roberto A., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-165356354">The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2x2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria</a>; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 42; No. 4; 523-548; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5">10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5</a></li>
<li>Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-071338534">An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 02; 407-423; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2586020">10.2307/2586020</a></li>
<li>Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-153843207">An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/49qpb-78b68">10.7907/49qpb-78b68</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-132644522">Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7m89d-44815">10.7907/7m89d-44815</a></li>
<li>Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-165154639">Voluntary Implementation</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/q2nj0-z2j43">10.7907/q2nj0-z2j43</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110828694">Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 67; No. 2; 435-448; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00028">10.1111/1468-0262.00028</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-165058131">Political Confederation</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 93; No. 1; 69-83; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2585761">10.2307/2585761</a></li>
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<li>Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-154504840">Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v39vq-q2c70">10.7907/v39vq-q2c70</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-135947000">Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 73; No. 2; 425-437; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2225">10.1006/jeth.1996.2225</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-115100309">Economical experiments: Bayesian efficient experimental design</a>; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25; No. 4; 495-517; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803953">10.1007/BF01803953</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jackson, Matthew O. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-154039652">Dynamic Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/t1fke-af726">10.7907/t1fke-af726</a></li>
<li>Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-114236264">An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games</a>; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25; No. 3; 269-287; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425258">10.1007/BF02425258</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-151944005">Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 61; No. 3; 409-427; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2">10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-140531268">A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games</a>; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 47; No. 2; 186-209; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x">10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-165243053">A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m8276-pad75">10.7907/m8276-pad75</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-141704583">In or out?: Centralization by majority vote</a>; European Economic Review; Vol. 40; No. 1; 43-60; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4">10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-143555993">Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/prxgj-mg253">10.7907/prxgj-mg253</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-161032873">Implementation Theory</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/f4x3p-w1n11">10.7907/f4x3p-w1n11</a></li>
<li>Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155150772">Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 2; 255-283; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1032">10.1006/game.1995.1032</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-164515991">Quantal response equilibria for normal form games</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 6-38; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023">10.1006/game.1995.1023</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-150810359">Introduction</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 1-5; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1022">10.1006/game.1995.1022</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069">The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information</a>; ISBN 9780521443401; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; 321-349</li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-154112586">Vertigo:  Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 8; No. 2; 322-348; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80004-1">10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80004-1</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155008643">Introduction [to a special issue of Games and Economic Behavior devoted to what we call experimental game theory]...</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 1-5; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1022">10.1006/game.1995.1022</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-113401222">Learning in experimental games</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 4; No. 6; 901-922; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213818">10.1007/BF01213818</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-113706304">Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 61; No. 3; 545-565; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297903">10.2307/2297903</a></li>
<li>Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-133811016">An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/g1kfx-nex14">10.7907/g1kfx-nex14</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jackson, Matthew O., el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-154652555">Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 6; No. 3; 474-501; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1028">10.1006/game.1994.1028</a></li>
<li>Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-164842884">In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/kqm1m-g9v70">10.7907/kqm1m-g9v70</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-113140393">Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 61; No. 2; 327-355; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297984">10.2307/2297984</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-160511103">Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/gkc2n-v7q38">10.7907/gkc2n-v7q38</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-154709009">Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/1rdj0-77t87">10.7907/1rdj0-77t87</a></li>
<li>Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160328-160830650">Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/x8d9n-q6988">10.7907/x8d9n-q6988</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-112533381">Computational Issues in the Statistical Design and Analysis of Experimental Games</a>; International Journal of Supercomputer Applications; Vol. 7; No. 3; 189-200; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/109434209300700302">10.1177/109434209300700302</a></li>
<li>Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-153709478">The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incumbency in Congressional Elections</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/a9wsd-5xx59">10.7907/a9wsd-5xx59</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-111846023">A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games</a>; Journal of the American Statistical Association; Vol. 88; No. 422; 428-435; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1993.10476292">10.1080/01621459.1993.10476292</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-134803360">The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/h5sgq-1q935">10.7907/h5sgq-1q935</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-134601561">Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/46qat-kfm09">10.7907/46qat-kfm09</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-141309234">A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27">10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-135834135">Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/kz8hk-4de75">10.7907/kz8hk-4de75</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-144316123">Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/084hn-k3v09">10.7907/084hn-k3v09</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145049106">An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 60; No. 4; 803-836</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-132920230">Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/d4sd9-y8j89">10.7907/d4sd9-y8j89</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-153653525">Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design</a>; ISBN 0521484596; Advances in Economic Theory; 283-323</li>
<li>Srivastava, Sanjay and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-140227182">Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-play Communication</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 55; No. 1; 17; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-B">10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-B</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140418477">Testing game-theoretic models of free riding: New evidence on probability bias and learning</a>; ISBN 0472102036; Laboratory Research in Political Economy; 239-268</li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160405-154023040">An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-154429739">Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 3; No. 2; 183-220; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7">10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145552688">Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 59; No. 2; 479-501</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-135222800">Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/hvv49-r3f64">10.7907/hvv49-r3f64</a></li>
<li>Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140721592">Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/7fkp2-7p565">10.7907/7fkp2-7p565</a></li>
<li>Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-150324015">Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs</a>; International Economic Review; Vol. 31; No. 1; 17-47; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2526626">10.2307/2526626</a></li>
<li>Jagannathan, Krishna and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-152942560">Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity in Futures Prices</a>; Economic Inquiry; Vol. 27; No. 3; 411-430; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb02013.x">10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb02013.x</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-152427094">Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem</a>; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 97; No. 31; 668-691; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/261621">10.1086/261621</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-143503727">Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/69xq2-h8e74">10.7907/69xq2-h8e74</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145257973">Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 57; No. 1; 115-134</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276">A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law</a>; ISBN 0-472-10122-6; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 69-91; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12284">10.3998/mpub.12284</a></li>
<li>Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark, el al. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-151348936">Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in  Sealed-bid Auctions</a>; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 20; No. 2; 214-238</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-145247491">A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/n9fr9-jvy72">10.7907/n9fr9-jvy72</a></li>
<li>Ordeshook, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-150818295">Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 32; No. 2; 441-466; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111131">10.2307/2111131</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-102157237">Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 35; No. 3; 309-332; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(88)90035-7">10.1016/0047-2727(88)90035-7</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608">Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/b0q0b-b0t12">10.7907/b0q0b-b0t12</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-152638547">Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/jh4qb-j1857">10.7907/jh4qb-j1857</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Poole, Keith T. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-102054862">The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 31; No. 3; 511-530</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-103738868">On Bayesian Implementable Allocations</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 54; No. 2; 193-208; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297511">10.2307/2297511</a></li>
<li>Hansen, Stephen and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114737153">The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect</a>; Public Choice; Vol. 52; No. 1; 15-34; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00116941">10.1007/BF00116941</a></li>
<li>Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark, el al. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-154413142">Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/x766n-4cd70">10.7907/x766n-4cd70</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151520400">Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/3fyfp-rks37">10.7907/3fyfp-rks37</a></li>
<li>Ordeshook, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-143216300">Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/2h7ha-fxg91">10.7907/2h7ha-fxg91</a></li>
<li>Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-141652274">Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/keft3-2tk29">10.7907/keft3-2tk29</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-132538243">On Bayesian Implementable Allocations</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/0fhs2-c5n57">10.7907/0fhs2-c5n57</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjey (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110214889">Private Information in Large Economies</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 39; No. 1; 34-58; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90019-0">10.1016/0022-0531(86)90019-0</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Romer, T. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-111052470">An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160310-155953015">Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle. The institutional social-choice paradigm</a>; Public Choice; Vol. 50; No. 1-3; 211-219; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124933">10.1007/BF00124933</a></li>
<li>Coughlin, P. J. and Palfrey, T. R. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-104853421">Pareto Optimality in Spatial Voting Models</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1; No. 4; 307-318; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00649266">10.1007/BF00649266</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-112114151">Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79; No. 1; 62-78; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1956119">10.2307/1956119</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-112509959">Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 52; No. 1; 69-83; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297470">10.2307/2297470</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Spatt, Chester (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110800428">Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning</a>; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 16; No. 3; 356-367</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114452846">Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a Multiproduct Monopolists: A Laboratory Test</a></li>
<li>Forsythe, Robert and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-102333150">Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination</a>; Journal of Finance; Vol. 39; No. 4; 955-981; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2327607">10.2307/2327607</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114154701">Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 24; No. 2; 171-193; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9">10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-113443753">Spatial Equilibrium with Entry</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 51; No. 1; 139-156; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297710">10.2307/2297710</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-105134641">Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 51; No. 2; 463-483; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1912001">10.2307/1912001</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-110552693">A Strategic Calculus of Voting</a>; Public Choice; Vol. 41; No. 1; 7-53; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124048">10.1007/BF00124048</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170922-164525313">Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/2vnat-k7q66">10.7907/2vnat-k7q66</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Romer, Thomas (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-111703240">Warranties, Performance, and the Resolution of Buyer-Seller Disputes</a>; Bell Journal of Economics; Vol. 14; No. 1; 97-117; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3003540">10.2307/3003540</a></li>
<li>Forsythe, Robert and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-122548702">Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 50; No. 3; 537-567</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-101627882">Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition</a>; Bell Journal of Economics; Vol. 13; No. 1; 219-224; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3003443">10.2307/3003443</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and Forsythe, Robert, el al. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-095511103">An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods</a>; ISBN 9780892322633; Research in Experimental Economics; Vol. v. 2; 175-199</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1980) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-094626115">Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</a>; Management Science; Vol. 26; No. 9; 935-946; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.26.9.935">10.1287/mnsc.26.9.935</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1979) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-170452235">Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fwy9p-8mk22">10.7907/fwy9p-8mk22</a></li>
</ul>