Palfrey, Thomas R.

Combined from CaltechAUTHORS

• Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2023) Organizing for Collective Action: Olson Revisited; 10.7907/k04xn-z8w46
• Fong, Meng-Jhang and Lin, Po-Hsuan, et el. (2023) A Note on Cursed Sequential Equilibrium and Sequential Cursed Equilibrium; 10.7907/k9a6d-7gv65
• Fong, Meng-Jhang and Lin, Po-Hsuan, et el. (2023) Cursed Sequential Equilibrium; 10.7907/qnknz-6g493
• Kim, Jeongbin and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2022) Games Played by Teams of Players; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 14; No. 4; 122-157; 10.1257/mic.20200391
• Lin, Po-Hsuan and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2022) Cognitive Hierarchies in Extensive Form Games; 10.7907/fv09c-16q24
• Holt, Charles A. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2022) Bilateral Conflict: An Experimental Study of Strategic Effectiveness and Equilibrium; 10.7907/phwgk-0c835
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2021) Trading Votes for Votes: A Laboratory Study; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 125; 1-26; 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.004
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2020) Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study; Journal of the European Economic Association; Vol. 18; No. 4; 1969-2012; 10.1093/jeea/jvz031
• Elbittar, Alexander and Gomberg, Andrei, et el. (2020) Ignorance and bias in collective decisions; Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization; Vol. 174; 332-359; 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.011
• Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2020) Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality; European Economic Review; Vol. 123; Art. No. 103372; 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103372
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2019) Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory; 10.7907/r7xsa-fam18
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Casella, Alessandra (2019) An Experimental Study of Vote Trading; 10.7907/zx62f-jxa23
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas (2019) Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory; Econometrica; Vol. 87; No. 2; 631-652; 10.3982/ecta15940
• Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2019) Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Experimental Study; American Political Science Review; Vol. 113; No. 1; 209-225; 10.1017/S0003055418000631
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pogorelskiy, Kirill (2019) Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party; Economic Journal; Vol. 129; No. 618; 961-990; 10.1111/ecoj.12563
• Merlo, Antonio and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2018) External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery; Public Choice; Vol. 176; No. 1-2; 297-314; 10.1007/s11127-018-0523-7
• Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement; 10.7907/7fkp2-7p565
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2017) On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games; 10.7907/wc5xm-c6909
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games; 10.7907/084hn-k3v09
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) Social Learning with Private and Common Values; 10.7907/qp2k9-37b69
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis; 10.7907/fwy9p-8mk22
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (2017) Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis; 10.7907/2vnat-k7q66
• Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs; 10.7907/keft3-2tk29
• Ordeshook, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information; 10.7907/2h7ha-fxg91
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (2017) On Bayesian Implementable Allocations; 10.7907/0fhs2-c5n57
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (2017) Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies; 10.7907/3fyfp-rks37
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (2017) Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem; 10.7907/jh4qb-j1857
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (2017) Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism; 10.7907/b0q0b-b0t12
• Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark, et el. (2017) Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions; 10.7907/x766n-4cd70
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law; 10.7907/n9fr9-jvy72
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (2017) Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication; 10.7907/69xq2-h8e74
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (2017) A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games; 10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design; 10.7907/hvv49-r3f64
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (2017) Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study; 10.7907/d4sd9-y8j89
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (2017) Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments; 10.7907/1rdj0-77t87
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information; 10.7907/h5sgq-1q935
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game; 10.7907/46qat-kfm09
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information; 10.7907/kz8hk-4de75
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote; 10.7907/kqm1m-g9v70
• Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (2017) An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games; 10.7907/g1kfx-nex14
• Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incumbency in Congressional Elections; 10.7907/a9wsd-5xx59
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design; 10.7907/gkc2n-v7q38
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Implementation Theory; 10.7907/f4x3p-w1n11
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games; 10.7907/prxgj-mg253
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games; 10.7907/m8276-pad75
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem; 10.7907/y319s-0vv88
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jackson, Matthew O. (2017) Dynamic Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining; 10.7907/t1fke-af726
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2 x 2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria; 10.7907/95xv9-jkv06
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Political Confederation; 10.7907/04xcr-91r09
• Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data; 10.7907/v39vq-q2c70
• Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (2017) An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules; 10.7907/49qpb-78b68
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., et el. (2017) Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions; 10.7907/7m89d-44815
• Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Voluntary Implementation; 10.7907/q2nj0-z2j43
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes; 10.7907/v811f-scj07
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles H., et el. (2017) Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium; 10.7907/jex2e-1q546
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate; 10.7907/d5xt1-9dh42
• Kuzmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) Symmetric play in repeated allocation games; 10.7907/eb78v-njd23
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Experiments in Political Economy; 10.7907/c54mq-f2c90
• Grosser, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Anti-Median Voter Theorem; 10.7907/v1seg-1j538
• Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study; 10.7907/0xp5n-z9471
• Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas, et el. (2017) Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination; 10.7907/m9p9a-hyz82
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) Vote trading with and without party leaders; 10.7907/4nb9v-8rb51
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2017) The Free Rider Problem: a Dynamic Analysis; 10.3386/w17926
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., et el. (2017) Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections; 10.7907/b2f8f-w2r02
• Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium; 10.7907/gdsn6-c9x32
• Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) No Trade; 10.7907/h4tdm-q9r95
• Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Dynamics of Distributive Politics; 10.7907/qn20c-9s527
• Jacob, S. Nageeb Ali and Goeree, Jacob K., et el. (2017) Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees; 10.7907/s6x5b-ztg37
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2017) Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment; 10.7907/sffq8-8mn50
• Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo, et el. (2017) Turnout and Power Sharing; 10.7907/sh7hr-xth11
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study; 10.7907/w2rzf-2gt58
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A Voting Model of Federal Standards with Externalities; 10.7907/7cdr5-27t20
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) Self-correcting Information Cascades; 10.7907/3dd4s-jz194
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., et el. (2017) The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory; 10.7907/7b0ph-rw267
• Casella, Alessandra and Gelman, Andrew, et el. (2017) An Experimental Study of Storable Votes; 10.7907/m1m03-52j79
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., et el. (2017) Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms; 10.7907/2mhxz-jsh85
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pevniskaya, Svetlana (2017) Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study; 10.7907/y1s3v-psz75
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information; 10.7907/v19cb-txp80
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments; 10.7907/fwfvf-9g770
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) Minorities and Storable Votes; 10.7907/ncqpj-fb226
• Camerer, Colin F. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2017) Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies; 10.7907/1dxq5-hze86
• Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Compromise Game: Two-sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory; 10.7907/xv853-bxx57
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pogorelskiy, Kirill (2017) Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party; 10.7907/33gtv-w8n81
• Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) Candidate entry and political polarization: An experimental study; 10.7907/92153-cfm32
• Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2017) The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality; 10.7907/15m59-zva74
• Palfrey, Thomas and Rosenthal, Howard, et el. (2017) How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 101; 234-259; 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004
• Agranov, Marina and Fréchette, Guillaume, et el. (2016) Static and dynamic underinvestment: An experimental investigation; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 143; 125-141; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.001
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2016) The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 8; No. 4; 268-308; 10.1257/mic.20150126
• Camerer, Colin and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2016) Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 98; 243-263; 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.009
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms; 10.7907/x8d9n-q6988
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2016) Political Reputations and Campaign Promises; 10.7907/fkwdm-vm028
• Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2016) Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: an Experimental Investigation; 10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54
• Camerer, Colin F. and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2016) Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions; 10.7907/pr9cf-1xg79
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2016) The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study; 10.7907/5wr2k-ph607
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) Trading Votes for Votes. A Decentralized Matching Algorithm; 10.3386/w21645
• Merlo, Antonio and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery; 10.7907/x0b0n-1k851
• Elbittar, Alexander and Gomberg, Andrei, et el. (2016) Ignorance and Bias in Collective Decisions; 10.7907/6fx75-j5292
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard, et el. (2016) How Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Public Goods Games; 10.7907/99d56-9zp69
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2016) The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study; 10.7907/fbzrt-67w98
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) Experiments in political economy; ISBN 1400883172; The Handbook of Experimental Economics; 347-434
• Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2015) Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 130; 45-58; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008
• Kusmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas, et el. (2014) Symmetric play in repeated allocation games; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 154; 25-67; 10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.002
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2014) Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments; American Economic Review; Vol. 104; No. 9; 2858-2871; 10.1257/aer.104.9.2858
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas, et el. (2014) Vote trading with and without party leaders; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 112; 115-128; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.001
• Herrera, Helios and Morelli, Massimo, et el. (2014) Turnout and Power Sharing; Economic Journal; Vol. 124; No. 574; F131-F162; 10.1111/ecoj.12116
• Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2014) Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 58; No. 1; 127-143; 10.1111/ajps.12032
• Brocas, Isabelle and Carrillo, Juan D., et el. (2012) Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence; Economic Theory; Vol. 51; No. 3; 649-676; 10.1007/s00199-011-0615-9
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2012) Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets With Information Flows; Econometrica; Vol. 80; No. 5; 1937-1976; 10.3982/ECTA8781
• Casella, Alessandra and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, et el. (2012) Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 120; No. 4; 593-658; 10.1086/667988
• Battaglini, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2012) Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment; American Political Science Review; Vol. 106; No. 2; 407-429; 10.1017/S0003055412000160
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2012) Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows; 10.7907/370gk-wbz86
• Battaglini, Marco and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2012) The dynamics of distributive politics; Economic Theory; Vol. 49; No. 3; 739-777; 10.1007/s00199-011-0612-z
• Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas, et el. (2011) Network architecture, salience and coordination; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 73; No. 1; 76-90; 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001
• Carrillo, Juan D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2011) No trade; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 71; No. 1; 66-87; 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.006
• Casella, Alessandra and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, et el. (2010) Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes; 10.7907/7qftr-6q446
• Battaglia, Marco and Nunnari, Salvatore, et el. (2010) Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Investment; 10.7907/0s53y-9sr42
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., et el. (2010) The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 77; No. 1; 61-89; 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00569.x
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca B., et el. (2010) The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 77; No. 1; 61-89; 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00569.x
• Brocas, Isabelle and Carrillo, Juan D., et el. (2009) Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence; 10.7907/n9sr9-wbh87
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2009) On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games; Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization; Vol. 71; No. 2; 98-109; 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.025
• Rogers, Brian W. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2009) Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 144; No. 4; 1440-1467; 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010
• Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2009) A Citizen Candidate Model with Private Information and Unique Equilibrium; ISBN 9788496515918; The Political Economy of Democracy; 15-29
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2009) Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy; Annual Review of Poltical Science; Vol. 12; 379-388; 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Carrillo, Juan D. (2009) The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory; American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 1; No. 1; 151-181; 10.1257/mic.1.1.151
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2008) Minorities and Storable Votes; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 3; No. 2; 165-200; 10.1561/100.00007048
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Pevnitskaya, Svetlana (2008) Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 66; No. 3; 731-747; 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.005
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca, et el. (2008) Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections; American Economic Review; Vol. 98; No. 2; 194-200; 10.1257/aer.98.2.194
• Ali, S. Nageeb and Goeree, Jacob K., et el. (2008) Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees; American Economic Review; Vol. 98; No. 2; 181-186; 10.1257/aer.98.2.181
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., et el. (2008) Quantal Response Equilibrium; ISBN 9780333786765; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics; 10.1057/9780230226203.1372
• Battaglini, Marco and Morton, Rebecca, et el. (2007) Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms; American Political Science Review; Vol. 101; No. 3; 409-424; 10.1017/S0003055407070281
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2007) Self-Correcting Information Cascades; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 74; No. 3; 733-762; 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Postlewaite, Andrew, et el. (2007) Political Reputations and Campaign Promises; Journal of the European Economic Association; Vol. 5; No. 4; 846-884; 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.846
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 133; No. 1; 441-466; 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006
• Levine, David K. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2007) The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study; American Political Science Review; Vol. 101; No. 1; 143-158; 10.1017/S0003055407070013
• Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2007) Storeable Votes: Giving Voice to Minority Preferences Without Sacrificing Efficiency; CESifo DICE report; Vol. 5; No. 3; 17-22
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2006) An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 90; No. 10-11; 2091-2106; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.04.002
• Casella, Alessandra and Gelman, Andrew, et el. (2006) An experimental study of storeable votes; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57; No. 1; 123-154; 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2006) Social learning with private and common values; Economic Theory; Vol. 28; No. 2; 254-264; 10.1007/s00199-005-0642-5
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., et el. (2005) Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium; Experimental Economics; Vol. 8; No. 4; 347-367; 10.1007/s10683-005-5374-7
• Gailmard, Sean and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2005) An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 89; No. 8; 1361-1398; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.04.002
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2005) Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 51; No. 2; 237-242; 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.002
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Aragones, Enriqueta (2005) Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information; ISBN 9783540220534; Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks; 93-112; 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2004) The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: An experimental study; American Political Science Review; Vol. 98; No. 1; 77-90; 10.1017/S0003055404001017
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (2003) Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 45; No. 1; 97-113; 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00052-6
• Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2003) Corrigendum to "Voluntary implementation": J. Econ. Theor. 98 (2001) 1–25; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 110; No. 1; 204-205; 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00032-7
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 7; No. 3; 279-296; 10.1007/s100580200078
• Laussel, Didier and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information; Journal of Public Economic Theory; Vol. 5; No. 3; 449-478; 10.1111/1467-9779.00143
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., et el. (2002) Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 104; No. 1; 247-272; 10.1006/jeth.2001.2914
• Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., et el. (2002) Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in First Price Auctions; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 104; No. 1; 247-272; 10.1006/jeth.2001.2914
• Aragones, Enriqueta and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 103; No. 1; 131-161; 10.1006/jeth.2001.2821
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 83; No. 2; 153-171; 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) Implementation theory; ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Volume 3; 2271-2326; 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2
• Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2001) Voluntary Implementation; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 98; No. 1; 1-25; 10.1006/jeth.2000.2752
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) Federal mandates by popular demand; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 108; No. 5; 905-927
• Erickson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) Equilibrium Effects in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 3; 595-609; 10.2307/2585833
• Erikson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2000) Equilibrium in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 3; 595-609; 10.2307/2585833
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Weber, Roberto A., et el. (2000) The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2x2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 42; No. 4; 523-548; 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5
• Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (2000) An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 02; 407-423; 10.2307/2586020
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem; Econometrica; Vol. 67; No. 2; 435-448; 10.1111/1468-0262.00028
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) Political Confederation; American Political Science Review; Vol. 93; No. 1; 69-83; 10.2307/2585761
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods; Econometrica; Vol. 67; No. 2; 435-448; 10.1111/1468-0262.00028
• Jackson, Matthew O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1998) Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining; Econometrica; Vol. 66; No. 6; 1353-1388; 10.2307/2999620
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1998) Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games; Experimental Economics; Vol. 1; No. 1; 9-41; 10.1023/A:1009905800005
• Erickson, Robert S. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1998) Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach; Journal of Politics; Vol. 60; No. 2; 355-373; 10.2307/2647913
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1997) Anomalous Behavior in Linear Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?; American Economic Review; Vol. 87; No. 5; 829-846
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 73; No. 2; 425-437; 10.1006/jeth.1996.2225
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) Economical experiments: Bayesian efficient experimental design; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25; No. 4; 495-517; 10.1007/BF01803953
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Prisbrey, Jeffrey E (1996) Altruism, reputation and noise in linear public goods experiments; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 61; No. 3; 409-427; 10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2
• Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (1996) An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25; No. 3; 269-287; 10.1007/BF02425258
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 47; No. 2; 186-209; 10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x
• Crémer, Jacques and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) In or out?: Centralization by majority vote; European Economic Review; Vol. 40; No. 1; 43-60; 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00053-4
• Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 2; 255-283; 10.1006/game.1995.1032
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Introduction; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 1-5; 10.1006/game.1995.1022
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 6-38; 10.1006/game.1995.1023
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Introduction [to a special issue of Games and Economic Behavior devoted to what we call experimental game theory]...; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 1-5; 10.1006/game.1995.1022
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information; ISBN 9780521443401; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; 321-349
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 8; No. 2; 322-348; 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80004-1
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (1994) Learning in experimental games; Economic Theory; Vol. 4; No. 6; 901-922; 10.1007/BF01213818
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1994) Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 61; No. 3; 545-565; 10.2307/2297903
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jackson, Matthew O., et el. (1994) Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 6; No. 3; 474-501; 10.1006/game.1994.1028
• Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1994) Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 61; No. 2; 327-355; 10.2307/2297984
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (1993) Computational Issues in the Statistical Design and Analysis of Experimental Games; International Journal of Supercomputer Applications; Vol. 7; No. 3; 189-200; 10.1177/109434209300700302
• El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., et el. (1993) A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games; Journal of the American Statistical Association; Vol. 88; No. 422; 428-435; 10.1080/01621459.1993.10476292
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game; Econometrica; Vol. 60; No. 4; 803-836
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design; ISBN 0521484596; Advances in Economic Theory; 283-323
• Srivastava, Sanjay and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1991) Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-play Communication; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 55; No. 1; 17; 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90057-B
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1991) Testing game-theoretic models of free riding: New evidence on probability bias and learning; ISBN 0472102036; Laboratory Research in Political Economy; 239-268
• McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1991) An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1991) Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 3; No. 2; 183-220; 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90022-7
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1991) Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies; Econometrica; Vol. 59; No. 2; 479-501
• Cramton, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1990) Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs; International Economic Review; Vol. 31; No. 1; 17-47; 10.2307/2526626
• Jagannathan, Krishna and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) Effects of Insider Trading Disclosures on Speculative Activity in Futures Prices; Economic Inquiry; Vol. 27; No. 3; 411-430; 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb02013.x
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 97; No. 31; 668-691; 10.1086/261621
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies; Econometrica; Vol. 57; No. 1; 115-134
• Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark, et el. (1989) Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 20; No. 2; 214-238
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law; ISBN 0-472-10122-6; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 69-91; 10.3998/mpub.12284
• Ordeshook, Peter C. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1988) Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 32; No. 2; 441-466; 10.2307/2111131
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 35; No. 3; 309-332; 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90035-7
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Poole, Keith T. (1987) The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 31; No. 3; 511-530
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1987) On Bayesian Implementable Allocations; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 54; No. 2; 193-208; 10.2307/2297511
• Hansen, Stephen and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (1987) The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect; Public Choice; Vol. 52; No. 1; 15-34; 10.1007/BF00116941
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjey (1986) Private Information in Large Economies; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 39; No. 1; 34-58; 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90019-0
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Romer, T. (1986) An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1986) Comments on the papers by Austen-Smith and Shepsle. The institutional social-choice paradigm; Public Choice; Vol. 50; No. 1-3; 211-219; 10.1007/BF00124933
• Coughlin, P. J. and Palfrey, T. R. (1985) Pareto Optimality in Spatial Voting Models; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1; No. 4; 307-318; 10.1007/BF00649266
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1985) Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty; American Political Science Review; Vol. 79; No. 1; 62-78; 10.2307/1956119
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1985) Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 52; No. 1; 69-83; 10.2307/2297470
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1985) Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a Multiproduct Monopolists: A Laboratory Test
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Spatt, Chester (1985) Repeated Insurance Contracts and Learning; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 16; No. 3; 356-367
• Forsythe, Robert and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (1984) Futures Markets and Informational Efficiency: A Laboratory Examination; Journal of Finance; Vol. 39; No. 4; 955-981; 10.2307/2327607
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1984) Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 24; No. 2; 171-193; 10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1984) Spatial Equilibrium with Entry; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 51; No. 1; 139-156; 10.2307/2297710
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1983) Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information; Econometrica; Vol. 51; No. 2; 463-483; 10.2307/1912001
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1983) A Strategic Calculus of Voting; Public Choice; Vol. 41; No. 1; 7-53; 10.1007/BF00124048
• Palfrey, Thomas R. and Romer, Thomas (1983) Warranties, Performance, and the Resolution of Buyer-Seller Disputes; Bell Journal of Economics; Vol. 14; No. 1; 97-117; 10.2307/3003540
• Forsythe, Robert and Palfrey, Thomas R., et el. (1982) Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market; Econometrica; Vol. 50; No. 3; 537-567
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1982) Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition; Bell Journal of Economics; Vol. 13; No. 1; 219-224; 10.2307/3003443
• Ferejohn, John A. and Forsythe, Robert, et el. (1982) An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods; ISBN 9780892322633; Research in Experimental Economics; Vol. v. 2; 175-199
• Palfrey, Thomas R. (1980) Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis; Management Science; Vol. 26; No. 9; 935-946; 10.1287/mnsc.26.9.935