Book Section records
https://feeds.library.caltech.edu/people/Palfrey-T-R/book_section.rss
A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenSat, 13 Apr 2024 00:02:12 +0000An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-095511103
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Ferejohn-J-A', 'name': {'family': 'Ferejohn', 'given': 'John A.'}}, {'id': 'Forsythe-R', 'name': {'family': 'Forsythe', 'given': 'Robert'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5821-1519'}, {'id': 'Noll-R-G', 'name': {'family': 'Noll', 'given': 'Roger G.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0001-9012-3773'}, {'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 1982
[Introduction] In previous research (Ferejohn et al., 1976, 1977, 1979a, 1979b) we have addressed the problem of designing well-behaved choice mechanisms for simultaneously purchasing more than one discrete public good from among several independent alternatives. A "discrete public good" is a public good which is provided in a single, fixed quantity. The initial example that motivated our work (see Ferejohn et al., 1976) was the selection of roughly 30 television programs of fixed duration and content from more than 100 programs that were proposed to public television stations. Several other examples are equally germane, such as the selection of research proposals to be supported by a foundation or the decision by partners in a joint oil exploration venture as to the tracts in a field on which to bid. In practice, most collective decisions are posed as a choice among discrete alternatives to simplify the selection process. See Ferejohn et al. (1979b) for more examples.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3zzda-eb698Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a Multiproduct Monopolists: A Laboratory Test
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114452846
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 1985
[Introduction] This paper reports the findings of a laboratory test of a number of predictions derived from modern auction theory. The primary focus is on the efficiency and distributional consequences of the common practice of selling a variety of different items in "lots" or "bundles." Recent developments in auction theory allow one to make rather sharp predictions about how allocations are affected by the way the seller chooses to package different items together to form lots. By replicating the environment specified by the model very accurately in controlled laboratory auctions, these predictions are tested. The data are found to provide strong support for many of the theoretical propositions.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3799s-vd653An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-111052470
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}, {'id': 'Romer-T', 'name': {'family': 'Romer', 'given': 'T.'}}]}
Year: 1986
In service and product markets where warranties are offered, disputes over warranty performance frequently occur between buyer and seller. Resolving such disputes in a fair and effective way has become an increasingly important and controversial question in recent years. Some observers have gone so far as to argue that the pervasiveness of such disputes and the inability to resolve them effectively is having a corrosive effect on society.1 This is probably somewhat extreme, but even a less excited perspective suggests that the design of procedures to handle consumer disputes is a matter for serious concern.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dfx2v-ara79A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.3998/mpub.12284
[No abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6wtem-h3j68Testing game-theoretic models of free riding: New evidence on probability bias and learning
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140418477
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}, {'id': 'Rosenthal-H', 'name': {'family': 'Rosenthal', 'given': 'Howard'}}]}
Year: 1991
[No abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/vxkts-dfm67Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-153653525
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 1992
Implementation theory links together social choice theory and game theory. At a less abstract level, its application provides an approach to welfare economics based on individual incentives. The underlying motivation for implementation theory is most easily seen from the point of view of a relatively uninformed planner who wishes to optimize a social welfare function that depends on environmental parameters about which relevant information is scattered around in the economy. Thus, the planner wishes to both collect as much of this relevant information as possible, and, with this information, make a social decision (e.g., an allocation of resources). This is the classic problem identified by Hurwicz (1972). In the twenty years since, we find numerous research agendas falling into the general category of implementation problems: the study of planning procedures, contracts, optimal regulation and taxation, agency relationships, agendas and committee decision-making, comparative electoral systems, non-cooperative foundations of general equilibrium theory, and even much of the recent theoretical work in accounting and the economics of law.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wm8ee-q5t63The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'McKelvey-R-D', 'name': {'family': 'McKelvey', 'given': 'Richard D.'}}, {'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 1995
This paper investigates a two-person infinitely repeated game of incomplete information in which both players have private information on their individual type before the first game is played; this initial private information is followed by an infinite sequence if identical simultaneous-move stage games. Players observe their own payoff and the other player's move after each stage game has been played. Payoffs in the game are given by the discounted sum of payoffs in all the stage games.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cknck-sac32Implementation theory
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2
This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999). Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/09wz0-82w58Implementation theory
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2
This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999). Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rzwd0-cnq31Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114044999
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}, {'id': 'Aragones-E', 'name': {'family': 'Aragones', 'given': 'Enriqueta'}}]}
Year: 2005
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4
This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey [2], when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/1bdmv-0en72Quantal Response Equilibrium
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114418045
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Goeree-J-K', 'name': {'family': 'Goeree', 'given': 'Jacob K.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0001-9876-3425'}, {'id': 'Holt-C-A', 'name': {'family': 'Holt', 'given': 'Charles A.'}}, {'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 2008
DOI: 10.1057/9780230226203.1372
A quantal response specifies choice probabilities that are smooth, increasing functions of expected payoffs. A quantal response equilibrium has the property that the choice distributions match the belief distributions used to calculate expected payoffs. This stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium provides strong empirical restrictions that are generally consistent with data from laboratory experiments with human subjects. We define the concept of regular quantal response equilibrium and discuss several applications from the recent literature.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/amxdh-6vw23A Citizen Candidate Model with Private Information and Unique Equilibrium
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142744314
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Großer-J', 'name': {'family': 'Großer', 'given': 'Jens'}}, {'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 2009
[Introduction] We study a citizen candidate model with private information about the candidates' preferred policies (or, ideal points). By contrast, in the seminal models of Osborne and Slivinski (OS 1996) and Besley and Coate (BC 1997), and most citizen candidate models that have followed, the candidates'ideal points are assumed to be common knowledge. In the baseline model, a community is about to elect a new leader to implement a policy decision. Each citizen may enter the electoral competition as a candidate at some commonly known cost. Because each candidate's preferred policy is public information, she cannot credible promise any other than this policy in case of being elected. Anticipating this, citizens prefer the candidate whose ideal point is closest to their own ideal point, possibly themselves. OS assume a continuum of citizens (i.e., potential candidates) and sincere voting. That is, citizens vote for the most preferred candidate. BC assume a finite number of citizens and strategic voting (i.e., a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies for the voting game). They identify a variety of different kinds of equilibria supporting different numbers of entrants, and show how the set of equilibria depends on the distribution of ideal points as well as the entry costs and benefits from holding office. For most environments, there are multiple equilibria. Both median and non-median policy outcomes can be supported in equilibrium.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/x8qe1-ks254Experiments in political economy
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-141853344
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Palfrey-T-R', 'name': {'family': 'Palfrey', 'given': 'Thomas R.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-0769-8109'}]}
Year: 2016
[No abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mjqph-q9187