[ { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mjqph-q9187", "eprint_id": 83759, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 09:38:07", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:29:07", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Experiments in political economy", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 2015 Princeton University Press. \n\nFormerly SSWP 1382.", "abstract": "[No abstract]", "date": "2016", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Princeton University Press", "place_of_pub": "Princeton, NJ", "pagerange": "347-434", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-141853344", "isbn": "1400883172", "book_title": "The Handbook of Experimental Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-141853344", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Kagel-J-H", "name": { "family": "Kagel", "given": "John H." } }, { "id": "Roth-A-E", "name": { "family": "Roth", "given": "Alvin E." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2016", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/x8qe1-ks254", "eprint_id": 64931, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:12:15", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 16:43:00", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Gro\u00dfer-J", "name": { "family": "Gro\u00dfer", "given": "Jens" } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "A Citizen Candidate Model with Private Information and Unique Equilibrium", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Published in: The Political Economy of Democracy / Edited by Enriqueta Aragon\u00e9s, Carmen Bevi\u00e1, Norman Schofield y Humberto Llavador Gonz\u00e1lez. Madrid: Fundaci\u00f3n BBVA, 2009. 1st ed. ISBN 9788496515918. pp. 15-29.\n\nPresented June 2008. Published July 2009.\n\nPrepared for presentation at The Workshop on The Political Economy of Democracy, Barcelona, June 5-7, 2008, sponsored by Fundaci\u00f3n BBVA, CSIC, Universitat Aut\u00f2noma de Barcelona, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. We thank the audience for their comments. Palfrey also acknowledges the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0617820) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. Gro\u00dfer acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and Economics Department, Princeton University, where this project started out.\n\n
Accepted Version - a_citizen__candidate_model.pdf
", "abstract": "[Introduction] We study a citizen candidate model with private information about the candidates' preferred policies (or, ideal points). By contrast, in the seminal models of Osborne and Slivinski (OS 1996) and Besley and Coate (BC 1997), and most citizen candidate models that have followed, the candidates'ideal points are assumed to be common knowledge. In the baseline model, a community is about to elect a new leader to implement a policy decision. Each citizen may enter the electoral competition as a candidate at some commonly known cost. Because each candidate's preferred policy is public information, she cannot credible promise any other than this policy in case of being elected. Anticipating this, citizens prefer the candidate whose ideal point is closest to their own ideal point, possibly themselves. OS assume a continuum of citizens (i.e., potential candidates) and sincere voting. That is, citizens vote for the most preferred candidate. BC assume a finite number of citizens and strategic voting (i.e., a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies for the voting game). They identify a variety of different kinds of equilibria supporting different numbers of entrants, and show how the set of equilibria depends on the distribution of ideal points as well as the entry costs and benefits from holding office. For most environments, there are multiple equilibria. Both median and non-median policy outcomes can be supported in equilibrium.", "date": "2009-07", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Fundaci\u00f3n BBVA", "place_of_pub": "Madrid, Spain", "pagerange": "15-29", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142744314", "isbn": "9788496515918", "book_title": "The Political Economy of Democracy", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142744314", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0617820" }, { "agency": "Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation" }, { "agency": "Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS)" }, { "agency": "Princeton University, Economics Department" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Aragones-E", "name": { "family": "Aragones", "given": "Enriqueta" } }, { "id": "Bevi\u00e1-C", "name": { "family": "Bevi\u00e1", "given": "Carmen" } }, { "id": "LLavador-H", "name": { "family": "LLavador", "given": "Humberto" } }, { "id": "Schofield-N", "name": { "family": "Schofield", "given": "Norman" } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "a_citizen__candidate_model.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/x8qe1-ks254/files/a_citizen__candidate_model.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2009", "author_list": "Gro\u00dfer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/amxdh-6vw23", "eprint_id": 65197, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 10:50:16", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:18:47", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Goeree-J-K", "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-9876-3425" }, { "id": "Holt-C-A", "name": { "family": "Holt", "given": "Charles A." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Quantal Response Equilibrium", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "coordination; extensive form games; fixed-point theorems; incomplete information; interchangeability; learning; Nash equilibrium; probabilistic choice models; quantal response equilibrium; sequential equilibria; Traveller's Dilemma", "note": "\u00a9 Palgrave Macmillan 2008. \n\nWe acknowledge financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the National Science Foundation (SBR 0094800 and 0551014; SES 0450712 and 0214013), and the Dutch National Science Foundation (VICI 453.03.606).\n\nSubmitted - QRE_Palgrave.pdf
", "abstract": "A quantal response specifies choice probabilities that are smooth, increasing functions of expected payoffs. A quantal response equilibrium has the property that the choice distributions match the belief distributions used to calculate expected payoffs. This stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium provides strong empirical restrictions that are generally consistent with data from laboratory experiments with human subjects. We define the concept of regular quantal response equilibrium and discuss several applications from the recent literature.", "date": "2008", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Palgrave MacMillan", "place_of_pub": "New York, NY", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114418045", "isbn": "9780333786765", "book_title": "The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114418045", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Alfred P. Sloan Foundation" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-0094800" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-0551014" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0450712" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0214013" }, { "agency": "Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO)", "grant_number": "VICI 453.03.606" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Durlauf-S-N", "name": { "family": "Durlauf", "given": "Steven N." } }, { "id": "Blume-L-E", "name": { "family": "Blume", "given": "Lawrence E." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1057/9780230226203.1372", "primary_object": { "basename": "QRE_Palgrave.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/amxdh-6vw23/files/QRE_Palgrave.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2008", "author_list": "Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/1bdmv-0en72", "eprint_id": 65196, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 15:08:33", "lastmod": "2023-12-15 19:52:27", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" }, { "id": "Aragones-E", "name": { "family": "Aragones", "given": "Enriqueta" } } ] }, "title": "Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Aragones acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2000-1186. Palfrey acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation grant number SES-0079301, and from the Institut d'An\u00e0lsi Econ\u00f2mica. He is also grateful for the hospitality of IAE in May 2003. We thank Clara Ponsati and participants of several seminars for helpful comments.
\n\nOriginal paper is Caltech Social Sciences Working Paper no. 1169, entitled \"Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information\"
\n\n\u00a9 2005 Springer.
", "abstract": "This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey [2], when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.", "date": "2005", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer", "place_of_pub": "New York, NY", "pagerange": "93-112", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114044999", "isbn": "9783540220534", "book_title": "Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks", "editors": { "items": [ { "id": "Austen-Smith-D", "name": { "family": "Austen-Smith", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Duggan-J", "name": { "family": "Duggan", "given": "John" } } ] }, "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114044999", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog\u00eda (MCyT)", "grant_number": "SEC2000-1186" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0079301" }, { "agency": "Institut d'An\u00e0lsi Econ\u00f2mica" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "1169", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2005", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R. and Aragones, Enriqueta" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rzwd0-cnq31", "eprint_id": 80675, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 22:51:05", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 17:04:46", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Implementation theory", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "implementation theory; mechanism design; game theory; social choice", "note": "\u00a9 2002 Elsevier B.V.", "abstract": "This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999). Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.", "date": "2002", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "2271-2326", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935", "isbn": "978-0-444-89428-1", "book_title": "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Volume 3", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Aumann-R-J", "name": { "family": "Aumann", "given": "Robert J." } }, { "id": "Hart-Sergiu", "name": { "family": "Hart", "given": "Sergiu" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2002", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/09wz0-82w58", "eprint_id": 80675, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 22:51:08", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 17:04:48", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Implementation theory", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "implementation theory; mechanism design; game theory; social choice", "note": "\u00a9 2002 Elsevier B.V.", "abstract": "This chapter surveys the branch of implementation theory initiated by Maskin (1999). Results for both complete and incomplete information environments are covered.", "date": "2002", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Elsevier", "place_of_pub": "Amsterdam", "pagerange": "2271-2326", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935", "isbn": "978-0-444-89428-1", "book_title": "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Volume 3", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Aumann-R-J", "name": { "family": "Aumann", "given": "Robert J." } }, { "id": "Hart-Sergiu", "name": { "family": "Hart", "given": "Sergiu" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2002", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cknck-sac32", "eprint_id": 65195, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 05:09:30", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 16:43:35", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1995 Cambridge University Press. \n\nThis research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant no. SES-9011828 to the California Institute of Technology. We wish to thank Michael Fey, Daniel Kim, Janice Lau, Jessie McReynolds, and Jeff Prisbrey for research assistance. Comments by participants in the June 1992 meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (Caen, France) are gratefully acknowledged. The data for the experiment are available from the authors on request.", "abstract": "This paper investigates a two-person infinitely repeated game of incomplete information in which both players have private information on their individual type before the first game is played; this initial private information is followed by an infinite sequence if identical simultaneous-move stage games. Players observe their own payoff and the other player's move after each stage game has been played. Payoffs in the game are given by the discounted sum of payoffs in all the stage games.", "date": "1995", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "place_of_pub": "New York, NY", "pagerange": "321-349", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069", "isbn": "9780521443401", "book_title": "Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-9011828" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "804", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Barnett-W-A", "name": { "family": "Barnett", "given": "William A." } }, { "id": "Moulin-H", "name": { "family": "Moulin", "given": "Herv\u00e9" } }, { "id": "Salles-M", "name": { "family": "Salles", "given": "Maurice" } }, { "id": "Schofield-N-J", "name": { "family": "Schofield", "given": "Norman J." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1995", "author_list": "McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wm8ee-q5t63", "eprint_id": 83090, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 00:51:53", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:49:34", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 Cambridge University Press 1992. \n\nPrepared for presentation at the invited symposium on Implementation Theory at the 6th World Congress of the Econometric Society, Barcelona, Spain, August 28, 1990. Support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Mathias Dewatripont, Matthew Jackson, John Ledyard, and John Moore provided useful comments on an earlier draft. The author especially acknowledges many valuable discussions with Sanjay Srivastava, over a span of several years of collaboration on the subject. \n\nFormerly SSWP 760.", "abstract": "Implementation theory links together social choice theory and game theory. At a less abstract level, its application provides an approach to welfare economics based on individual incentives. The underlying motivation for implementation theory is most easily seen from the point of view of a relatively uninformed planner who wishes to optimize a social welfare function that depends on environmental parameters about which relevant information is scattered around in the economy. Thus, the planner wishes to both collect as much of this relevant information as possible, and, with this information, make a social decision (e.g., an allocation of resources). This is the classic problem identified by Hurwicz (1972). In the twenty years since, we find numerous research agendas falling into the general category of implementation problems: the study of planning procedures, contracts, optimal regulation and taxation, agency relationships, agendas and committee decision-making, comparative electoral systems, non-cooperative foundations of general equilibrium theory, and even much of the recent theoretical work in accounting and the economics of law.", "date": "1992", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "place_of_pub": "Cambridge", "pagerange": "283-323", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-153653525", "isbn": "0521484596", "book_title": "Advances in Economic Theory", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-153653525", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Laffont-J-J", "name": { "family": "Laffont", "given": "Jean-Jacques" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1992", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/vxkts-dfm67", "eprint_id": 83605, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 00:23:17", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 19:14:36", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" }, { "id": "Rosenthal-H", "name": { "family": "Rosenthal", "given": "Howard" } } ] }, "title": "Testing game-theoretic models of free riding: New evidence on probability bias and learning", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1991 University of Michigan. \n\nAn earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on the Provision of Public Goods and Common Pool Resources at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, May, 1990. We thank those participatns, especially Roberta Herzberg, for helpful comments. We also thank participants in seminars at Carnegie-Mellon University, MIT, and Penn for their comments. John Ledyard provided very helpful feedback on several points. The research assistance of Jessica Goodfellow and Jeffrey Prisbrey is gratefully acknowledged, as is the financial support of the National Science Foundation. The authors are solely responsible for the contents. \n\nFormerly SSWP 730.", "abstract": "[No abstract]", "date": "1991-09", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "University of Michigan Press", "place_of_pub": "Michigan", "pagerange": "239-268", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140418477", "isbn": "0472102036", "book_title": "Laboratory Research in Political Economy", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140418477", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1991", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6wtem-h3j68", "eprint_id": 83112, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 21:14:02", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:55:04", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "political science, decision making, mathematical models, elections, international relations, legislative bodies", "note": "\u00a9 University of Michigan 1989. \n\nThe author would like to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support. This paper was prepared for delivery at the Economic Theories of Politics conference in Haifa, Israel, June, 1988 and has benefited from discussions with Bruce Cain, John Ledyard, and Richard McKelvey.\n\nFormerly SSWP 688\n\nPublished - sswp688_-_published.pdf
", "abstract": "[No abstract]", "date": "1989", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "University of Michigan Press", "place_of_pub": "Ann Arbor", "pagerange": "69-91", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276", "isbn": "0-472-10122-6", "book_title": "Models of Strategic Choice in Politics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Ordeshook-P-C", "name": { "family": "Ordeshook", "given": "Peter C." } } ] }, "doi": "10.3998/mpub.12284", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp688_-_published.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6wtem-h3j68/files/sswp688_-_published.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1989", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dfx2v-ara79", "eprint_id": 65014, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 18:27:26", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:03:42", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" }, { "id": "Romer-T", "name": { "family": "Romer", "given": "T." } } ] }, "title": "An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Published - 198404consumereconomics.pdf
", "abstract": "In service and product markets where warranties are offered, disputes over warranty performance frequently occur between buyer and seller. Resolving such disputes in a fair and effective way has become an increasingly important and controversial question in recent years. Some observers have gone so far as to argue that the pervasiveness of such disputes and the inability to resolve them effectively is having a corrosive effect on society.1 This is probably somewhat extreme, but even a less excited perspective suggests that the design of procedures to handle consumer disputes is a matter for serious concern.", "date": "1986-03", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Federal Trade Commission", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-111052470", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-111052470", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Ippolito-P-M", "name": { "family": "Ippolito", "given": "Pauline M." } }, { "id": "Scheffman-D-T", "name": { "family": "Scheffman", "given": "David T." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "198404consumereconomics.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dfx2v-ara79/files/198404consumereconomics.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1986", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R. and Romer, T." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3799s-vd653", "eprint_id": 65023, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 17:28:10", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:21:44", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a Multiproduct Monopolists: A Laboratory Test", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Copyright \u00a9 1985 by JAI Press Inc.\n\nI would like to acknowledge useful comments by Roger Noll. Charles Plott. and an anonymous referee. Any errors and shortcomings of this research are my own fault.\n\nPublished - buyerbehavior.pdf
", "abstract": "[Introduction] This paper reports the findings of a laboratory test of a number of predictions derived from modern auction theory. The primary focus is on the efficiency and distributional consequences of the common practice of selling a variety of different items in \"lots\" or \"bundles.\" Recent developments in auction theory allow one to make rather sharp predictions about how allocations are affected by the way the seller chooses to package different items together to form lots. By replicating the environment specified by the model very accurately in controlled laboratory auctions, these predictions are tested. The data are found to provide strong support for many of the theoretical propositions.", "date": "1985", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "JAI Press", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114452846", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114452846", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "buyerbehavior.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3799s-vd653/files/buyerbehavior.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1985", "author_list": "Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3zzda-eb698", "eprint_id": 64993, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 14:43:47", "lastmod": "2023-12-01 22:46:10", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ferejohn-J-A", "name": { "family": "Ferejohn", "given": "John A." } }, { "id": "Forsythe-R", "name": { "family": "Forsythe", "given": "Robert" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-5821-1519" }, { "id": "Noll-R-G", "name": { "family": "Noll", "given": "Roger G." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-9012-3773" }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1982 JAI Press Inc.", "abstract": "[Introduction] In previous research (Ferejohn et al., 1976, 1977, 1979a, 1979b) we have addressed the problem of designing well-behaved choice mechanisms for simultaneously purchasing more than one discrete public good from among several independent alternatives. A \"discrete public good\" is a public good which is provided in a single, fixed quantity. The initial example that motivated our work (see Ferejohn et al., 1976) was the selection of roughly 30 television programs of fixed duration and content from more than 100 programs that were proposed to public television stations. Several other examples are equally germane, such as the selection of research proposals to be supported by a foundation or the decision by partners in a joint oil exploration venture as to the tracts in a field on which to bid. In practice, most collective decisions are posed as a choice among discrete alternatives to simplify the selection process. See Ferejohn et al. (1979b) for more examples.", "date": "1982", "date_type": "published", "volume": "v. 2", "publisher": "JAI Press", "place_of_pub": "Greenwich, Conn", "pagerange": "175-199", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-095511103", "isbn": "9780892322633", "book_title": "Research in Experimental Economics", "editors": { "items": [ { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } } ] }, "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-095511103", "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "262", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "ferejohn.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3zzda-eb698/files/ferejohn.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1982", "author_list": "Ferejohn, John A.; Forsythe, Robert; et el." } ]