<h1>Palfrey, Thomas</h1>
<h2>Book Chapter from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS</a></h2>
<ul>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2016) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-141853344">Experiments in political economy</a>; ISBN 1400883172; The Handbook of Experimental Economics; 347-434</li>
<li>Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2009) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142744314">A  Citizen Candidate Model with Private Information and Unique Equilibrium</a>; ISBN 9788496515918; The Political Economy of Democracy; 15-29</li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A., el al. (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114418045">Quantal Response Equilibrium</a>; ISBN 9780333786765; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.1372">10.1057/9780230226203.1372</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Aragones, Enriqueta (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-114044999">Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information</a>; ISBN 9783540220534; Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Scot Banks; 93-112; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4">10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-111047935">Implementation theory</a>; ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications Volume 3; 2271-2326; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2">10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069">The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information</a>; ISBN 9780521443401; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; 321-349</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171108-153653525">Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design</a>; ISBN 0521484596; Advances in Economic Theory; 283-323</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171130-140418477">Testing game-theoretic models of free riding: New evidence on probability bias and learning</a>; ISBN 0472102036; Laboratory Research in Political Economy; 239-268</li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276">A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law</a>; ISBN 0-472-10122-6; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 69-91; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12284">10.3998/mpub.12284</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. and Romer, T. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-111052470">An Experimental Study of Warranty Coverage and Dispute Resolution in Competitive Markets</a></li>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-114452846">Buyer Behavior and the Welfare Effects of Bundling by a Multiproduct Monopolists: A Laboratory Test</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and Forsythe, Robert, el al. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-095511103">An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods</a>; ISBN 9780892322633; Research in Experimental Economics; Vol. v. 2; 175-199</li>
</ul>