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A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenSat, 13 Apr 2024 01:42:36 +0000Cooperation in Reciprocity Games and in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01022013-140803168
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Prisbrey-Jeffrey-Emig', 'name': {'family': 'Prisbrey', 'given': 'Jeffrey Emig'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 1993
DOI: 10.7907/vrc7-jr64
<p>Each of the three independent chapters of this dissertation examines or justifies
cooperative behavior in one of two specific public goods environments.</p>
<p>The first chapter presents experimental evidence documenting a subject's
behavior when faced with simple games that require turn taking for efficiency.
Both symmetric and asymmetric games as well as games with explicit punishment
actions are studied and compared. The length of the game is a
treatment variable; experiments simulating one-shot, finite and infinite repetition
games are conducted. Group outcomes are sorted by the player's
average payoffs and the importance of focal solution concepts like group welfare,
equality, and symmetry are inferred. Individual strategies used in the
experiments are also sorted and compared enabling a discussion of endgame
effects and conflict within the games.</p>
<p>Standard non-cooperative game theory is not selective enough to discriminate
among many of the possible outcomes of the games examined in
Chapter One. Relying on focal and axiomatic solution concepts allows discrimination, yet these procedures are inherently ad-hoc. The second chapter
examines the outcome to a population game with evolutionary dynamics in order to theoreticly justify the results of the first chapter in a less ad-hoc manner. In particular, the second chapter applies the Replicator Dynamic. It is shown that under an assumption of limited rationality, specifically limited memory, there is a unique global equilibrium. The unique equilibrium contains a trio of outcomes: non-cooperative Nash play, payoff irrational play, and cooperative turn-taking.</p>
<p>The third chapter presents findings from a second series of experiments,
a series designed to study free riding and the voluntary contribution mechanism.
In the experimental environment, subjects arc randomly assigned
constant marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private
good. These random assignments arc changed each decision period, allowing
the measurement of player response functions. These response functions are
analogous to the bidding functions obtained in private good, sealed-bid auction
experiments. The results are quite different from the results of others
in environments with little or no heterogeneity. There is much more free
riding, very little evidence of decay across periods, and only sparse evidence
of anomalous behavior such as splitting and spite.</p>
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/7362Equilibrium in dynamic economic models
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05162013-103849592
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Schmidt-D-R', 'name': {'family': 'Schmidt', 'given': 'David Russell'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 1994
DOI: 10.7907/z723-1j18
<p>The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents
are often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their actions
or other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will
necessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The
economic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the classic
chain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles
by the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building.
The third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in
an overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand
shocks. </p>
<p>The first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building
game. A sequential equilibrium model, called the "error prone agents" model,
is developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially
subjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium
calculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than
when perfect implementation is assumed. </p>
<p>In the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experiments
run by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers
in this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications
to the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite
well in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from
the sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications
must be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs. </p>
<p>The third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping generations
model. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight competitive
equilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time
horizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One
main reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping generations
environments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially
in experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important
place to start when examining these environments because it will produce
the ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes
this a natural baseline to which other models of price dynamics could be
compared. </p>
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/7717Three aspects of multicandidate competition in plurality rule elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-10022007-130421
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Fey-M', 'name': {'family': 'Fey', 'given': 'Mark'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 1995
DOI: 10.7907/1j5k-pc62
This thesis considers three issues relevant to multicandidate competition in plurality rule elections--entry decisions by candidates, strategic voting, and informational concerns.
In the first chapter, we consider a model of spatial competition with entry introduced by Palfrey (1984). In the model, there are two dominant candidates and a potential entrant. The established candidates choose positions first, anticipating the entry decision of the third candidate. In the resulting equilibrium, this threat of entry forces the established parties to adopt spatially separated "moderate" positions. We develop a general model that applies to the complex institutional features of modern elections. Specifically, we introduce the winner-take-all aspects of the Electoral College and show how these characteristics make a difference in the equilibrium predictions of the model. We find that, in one case at least, increasing diversity in the electorate causes the established candidates to initially shift toward more moderate positions and then back toward more extreme positions.
The second chapter examines strategic voting and Duverger's Law. A voter whose favorite candidate has no hope of victory may choose to avoid a "wasted vote" by settling for a less preferred candidate with a higher chance of winning. This behavior erodes the electoral support of minor candidates and results in Duverger's Law: "plurality rule elections favor two party competition." Palfrey (1989) constructs an incomplete information game among voters and shows that as the size of the electorate gets large, the support for the least popular candidate vanishes. We show that there exist equilibria in this model in which all three candidates receive votes under plurality rule, in violation of Duverger's Law, as suggested by Myerson and Weber (1993). However, we proceed to demonstrate that these equilibria are unstable and any uncertainty by voters leads voters back toward Duvergerian equilibria. In addition, we develop a dynamic model of pre-election polls that describes how voters react to changing information about the viability of the candidates and show that this process leads voters to coordinate on a Duvergerian outcome. Thus, we not only reestablish Duverger's Law, we also describe how voters can use pre-election polls to coordinate on a particular pair of competitive candidates.
In the third chapter we analyze the relationship between voter information and election outcomes in a multicandidate setting. We extend a model originally developed by McKelvey and Ordeshook for two candidate elections to the multicandidate case. In the model, voters are either informed or uninformed about the exact positions of the candidates. The uninformed voters, however, are able to make plausible inferences about these positions based on the vote share each candidate receives. In equilibrium, voters vote optimally, given their beliefs, and beliefs are self-fulfilling in the sense that they are not contradicted by observable information. Our first result is that in the unique voter equilibrium of our model, all voters, informed and uninformed alike, vote as if they had perfect information. We then define a dynamic process involving a sequence of polls that illustrates that this equilibrium is always reached. In addition, we obtain results about candidate positioning equilibria when candidates are also uncertain about the characteristics of the voters. Finally, we show that if a small minority of voters are fully informed and use this information to vote strategically, in equilibrium all voters, including uninformed sincere voters, act as if they were voting strategically based on full information. The uninformed voters view the lack of support for trailing candidates by informed voters as evidence that these candidates are undesirable and react by voting for a more prominent candidate.
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/3868Welfare Magnets, the Labor-Leisure Decision and Economic Efficiency
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06292020-131040227
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'jason.saving@dal.frb.org', 'id': 'Saving-Jason-Lee', 'name': {'family': 'Saving', 'given': 'Jason Lee'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 1996
DOI: 10.7907/sxj0-3216
<p>This thesis examines the issue of welfare recipiency. In the first chapter, I develop a model designed to capture the fiscal externalities associated with redistributive policy in a system of jurisdictions. Previous work in the migration literature ignores work-disincentive
effects and concludes that relatively generous jurisdictions will attract welfare recipients but repel workers. I present a model that integrates migration with labor-leisure choice and I find that inclusion of labor-leisure effects unambiguously worsens the fiscal externalities of redistribution. In addition, I derive conditions under which an increase in redistribution will harm its beneficiaries.</p>
<p>In the second chapter,I address the issue of benefit harmonization. Within both the European Union and the United States, advocates of redistribution have suggested that benefits be "harmonized" at levels offered by their most generous members in order to protect those members from the fiscal externalities associated with redistribution, and these advocates. further suggest that such a harmonization would enhance economic efficiency. The economic-efficiency argument is bolstered by traditional work in the public finance literature, but the work from which this conclusion is drawn does not account for the work-disincentive effects associated with redistributive policy. I find that, when work-disincentive effects are considered, the process of benefit harmonization need not improve economic efficiency unless the level at which benefits are harmonized is sufficiently low.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/13828Public Institutions and Private Incentives: Three Essays
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06302020-161202022
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Coughlan-Peter-Judd Coughlan', 'name': {'family': 'Coughlan', 'given': 'Peter Judd'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 1999
DOI: 10.7907/4k08-rw73
No abstract available.https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/13834Voting Games with Incomplete Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03242014-155640911
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Patty-John-Wiggs', 'name': {'family': 'Patty', 'given': 'John Wiggs'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-1142-9334', 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2001
DOI: 10.7907/0ebb-vz47
<p>We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over
each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to
provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting. </p>
<p>Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced
by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability
of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems.
We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system
vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as
well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with
respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates
who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize
probability of victory. </p>
<p>In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals'
preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that
Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in
which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject
to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing
a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then
examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large
electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates,
there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point
which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we
find that this equilibrium is unique. </p>
<p>Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in
games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks.
Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all
games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences
between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium
and offer possible extensions of our framework. </p>
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/8162Principal Agent Models of Bureaucratic and Public Decision Making
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:01302012-111845798
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Gailmard-Sean-Patrick', 'name': {'family': 'Gailmard', 'given': 'Sean Patrick'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.7907/AAG7-XR53
<p>In this thesis I investigate three situations in which a principal must make a public decision. The optimal decision from the principal's point of view depends on information
held only by agents, who have different preferences from the principal about how the information is used.</p>
<p>In the first two situations (Chapters 2 and 3) the principals and agents - legislatures and bureaus, respectively - are each part of the government and interact to create public policy. In Chapter 2 the bureau has private information about the cost of a public project, performed for multiple legislative principals who can each seek out cost information through oversight. The multiplicity of principals can cause the level of oversight to be inefficiently low due to a collective action problem. Further, the inefficiency becomes more likely as oversight becomes a more important part of the principals' utility functions, and as the oversight technology becomes more effective. For some parameters an increase in the effectiveness of the auditing technology reduces the welfare of the principals collectively.</p>
<p>In Chapter 3 the bureau has substantive expertise about the effects of various policy choices. The principal can delegate policy making authority to the bureau to tap its expertise, but bureaus are imperfectly controlled by statutory restrictions. On the other hand, the scope for delegation can be reduced endogenously if the legislature
chooses to acquire its own substantive expertise. I examine how strategic accounting for both bureaucratic subversion and costly development of legislative expertise affect
the legislature's delegation decision. I also show that legislatures may in fact want subversion to be "cheap," while bureaucrats may want their own authority constrained
and subversion to be costly.</p>
<p>In the third situation (Chapter 4) the information desired by the principal is the valuation of an excludable public good for each member of society. I experimentally
compare three collective choice procedures for determining public good consumption and cost shares. The first, Serial Cost Sharing, has attractive incentive properties but
is not efficient; the other two are "hybrid" bidding procedures that never exclude any agents but are manipulable. I characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria in the hybrid mechanisms, and prove some more general properties as well. Serial Cost Sharing tends to elicit values successfully, but is outperformed on several efficiency criteria by a hybrid mechanism - despite its incentive problems and coordination problems due to multiple equilibria.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/6792Learning and Status in Social Networks
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-05262006-004112
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'BRogers@wustl.edu', 'id': 'Rogers-Brian-W', 'name': {'family': 'Rogers', 'given': 'Brian W.'}, 'show_email': 'YES'}]}
Year: 2006
DOI: 10.7907/J1K7-5473
<p>The patterns in which individuals interact have important consequences. One notable phenomenon is social learning, which occurs when asymmetrically informed individuals observe the choices of others before making their own choices. This process can lead to information cascades in which the ability to learn from others ceases quickly, implying little information aggregation. However, casual empiricism suggests that such inefficiency is unlikely: many people making similar decisions over time are unlikely to be continually wrong.</p>
<p>Experiments that implement a standard social learning paradigm are reported. We examine long sequences of decisions (up to forty) and study the effects of different signal qualities. In contrast to equilibrium predictions, a pattern of cascade formation, collapse, and re-formation is routinely observed. Under such dynamics learning continues throughout the sequence of decisions, so that the truth is nearly revealed. Quantal Response Equilibrium explains nearly all the features of the data.</p>
<p>In many applications strategic considerations should play a role in determining the timing of decisions. To understand how timing issues impact social learning, I study a model in which decision times are strategic variables and individuals have heterogeneous signal qualities. The main finding is that with two players, the player with better information announces first. Consequently, both players make the same decision, but because of the sorting effect, the outcome is informationally efficient. In comparison to the standard exogenous sequence assumption, welfare is always higher. When there are many players, a herd forms immediately, and it is always on the correct action.</p>
<p>We next study a model that addresses strategic formation of social networks. Individuals allocate a budget of resources across links to others. By separating benefit flows along the links into "giving" and "taking" components, we are able to study the implications for efficiency. The main finding is that inefficiencies at equilibrium are due only to the giving of benefit.</p>
<p>The final chapter analyzes large-scale social networks. The main question concerns how correlation patterns in links affect diffusion. A surprise is that in all of the simulations considered, the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible model behaves identically on networks with varying correlation patterns.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/2102A Theory of Elections and Voting Blocs
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-03292007-172156
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'eguia@msu.edu', 'id': 'Eguia-Egusquiza-Jon-Xabier', 'name': {'family': 'Eguia Egusquiza', 'given': 'Jon Xabier'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2007
DOI: 10.7907/NSH1-3V64
<p>I study how a group of agents with incomplete information about their conflicting preferences make a collective decision by means of voting.</p>
<p>I present a model of representative democracy with citizen candidates in which the set of agents who runs for office is endogenously determined. I show that if the electorate is large enough and agents are not able to perfectly anticipate the electoral outcome, elections are always contested and an equilibrium with two candidates exists.</p>
<p>In the last two chapters of this dissertation, I introduce a model of voting bloc formation in which groups of agents choose to coalesce to vote together in an assembly. Looking first at one coalition, then at two coalitions, and finally at an arbitrary number of coalitions emerging in a fully endogenous model of voting bloc formation, I analyze the incentives to join a voting bloc, the stability of different voting blocs and how the incentives and stable outcomes change with the size of the blocs, the internal voting rule that each bloc uses and the heterogeneity in the preferences of the agents. This model provides a new explanation of the formation of political parties in legislatures.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/1199Essays on Dynamic Political Economy
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292012-234329897
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'salvatore.nunnari@gmail.com', 'id': 'Nunnari-Salvatore', 'name': {'family': 'Nunnari', 'given': 'Salvatore'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-1525-798X', 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2012
DOI: 10.7907/YZ75-CH25
<p>This dissertation comprises three essays that are linked by their focus on dynamic models of political economy, in which farsighted agents interact over an infinite number of periods, and the strategic environment evolves endogenously over time.</p>
<p>In Chapter 2, "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power", I analyze the consequences of veto power in an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that a Markov equilibrium of this dynamic game exists, and that, irrespective of the discount factor of legislators, their recognition probabilities, and the initial division of the dollar, policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full appropriation of the dollar by the veto player.</p>
<p>Chapters 3 and 4 -- coauthored with Thomas Palfrey and Marco Battaglini -- study free riding in a dynamic environment where a durable public good provides a stream of benefits over time and agents have opportunities to gradually build the stock. We consider economies with reversibility, where investments can be positive or negative, and economies with irreversibility, where investments are non-negative and the public good can only be reduced by depreciation. In Chapter 3, "The Free Rider Problem: A Dynamic Analysis", we study and compare the set of Markov equilibria of these models. With reversibility, there is a continuum of equilibrium steady states: the highest equilibrium steady state of the public good is increasing in the group size, and the lowest is decreasing. With irreversibility, the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero: the highest steady state possible with reversibility. In Chapter 4, "The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: An Experimental Study", we test the results from this model with controlled laboratory experiments. The comparative static predictions for the treatments are supported by the data: irreversible investment leads to significantly higher public good production than reversible investment.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/7092Essays on Cooperation and Reciprocity
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05232013-113856514
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'nilu8603@gmail.com', 'id': 'Roy-Nilanjan', 'name': {'family': 'Roy', 'given': 'Nilanjan'}, 'show_email': 'YES'}]}
Year: 2013
DOI: 10.7907/G536-ZW17
<p>This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.</p>
<p>Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.</p>
<p>Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.</p>
<p>Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.</p>
https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/7745Essays on Contests, Coordination Games, and Matching
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:02252013-111730958
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'muruvvet32@gmail.com', 'id': 'Büyükboyaci-Hanay-Mürüvvet-Ilknur', 'name': {'family': 'Büyükboyaci Hanay', 'given': 'Mürüvvet Ilknur'}, 'show_email': 'YES'}]}
Year: 2013
DOI: 10.7907/BZX2-PF49
<p>In this thesis, I use theory and experiments (sometimes only experiments), to investigate the impact of agents’ heterogeneity on economic environments such as tournaments, decentralized matching, and coordination games.</p>
<p>The first chapter analyzes a coordination game (a stag-hunt game) in which one of the equilibria gives a higher payoff to the players, but playing the corresponding strategy profile leading to this equilibrium entails strategic risk. In this chapter, I ask whether agents can coordinate on the equilibrium that gives a higher payoff when they are provided information about an opponent’s risk aversion. Two key insights result from my analysis. First, a subject’s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent’s risk attitude. Second, this propensity is independent of the subject’s own risk attitude.</p>
<p>The second chapter compares the performance of two tournament designs when contestants are heterogeneous in their abilities. One of the designs is the standard winner-take-all (WTA) tournament, which is common both in the literature and in the real world. The alternative tournament design involves two tournaments with different prizes (parallel tournaments) where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing. With a simple model and an experiment, I show that when contestants’ abilities differ substantially, the designer makes higher profit using parallel tournaments. Nevertheless, when the contestants’ abilities are similar, the designer makes higher profit in the WTA tournament.</p>
<p>The third chapter studies a two-period decentralized matching game under complete information with frictions in the form of time discounting. I find that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game coincides with a stable outcome for most preference profiles. The selection of which stable outcome emerges depends on the level of frictions: the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game yields the firm-optimal stable match (a worker-optimal stable match) when the time discount is sufficiently high or low (intermediate values).</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/7494An Economic Approach to Consumer Product Ratings
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05242013-104712359
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'dustin.beckett@gmail.com', 'id': 'Beckett-Dustin-Hughes', 'name': {'family': 'Beckett', 'given': 'Dustin Hughes'}, 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2013
DOI: 10.7907/00EE-KP91
In three essays we examine user-generated product ratings with aggregation. While recommendation systems have been studied extensively, this simple type of recommendation system has been neglected, despite its prevalence in the field. We develop a novel theoretical model of user-generated ratings. This model improves upon previous work in three ways: it considers rational agents and allows them to abstain from rating when rating is costly; it incorporates rating aggregation (such as averaging ratings); and it considers the effect on rating strategies of multiple simultaneous raters. In the first essay we provide a partial characterization of equilibrium behavior. In the second essay we test this theoretical model in laboratory, and in the third we apply established behavioral models to the data generated in the lab. This study provides clues to the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in field implementations. We show theoretically that in equilibrium, ratings distributions do not represent the value distributions of sincere ratings. Indeed, we show that if rating strategies follow a set of regularity conditions, then in equilibrium the rate at which players participate is increasing in the extremity of agents' valuations of the product. This theoretical prediction is realized in the lab. We also find that human subjects show a disproportionate predilection for sincere rating, and that when they do send insincere ratings, they are almost always in the direction of exaggeration. Both sincere and exaggerated ratings occur with great frequency despite the fact that such rating strategies are not in subjects' best interest. We therefore apply the behavioral concepts of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and cursed equilibrium (CE) to the experimental data. Together, these theories explain the data significantly better than does a theory of rational, Bayesian behavior -- accurately predicting key comparative statics. However, the theories fail to predict the high rates of sincerity, and it is clear that a better theory is needed.https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/7750Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05142015-114936374
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'kirill.pogorelskiy@gmail.com', 'id': 'Pogorelskiy-Kirill-B', 'name': {'family': 'Pogorelskiy', 'given': 'Kirill B.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-3426-5870', 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2015
DOI: 10.7907/Z94B2Z8T
<p>This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.</p>
<p>Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.</p>
<p>In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.</p>
<p>Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/8860Essays in Behavioral Economics
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06012023-230351408
Authors: {'items': [{'email': 'jeff.zeidel@gmail.com', 'id': 'Zeidel-Jeffrey-Roy', 'name': {'family': 'Zeidel', 'given': 'Jeffrey Roy'}, 'orcid': '0009-0004-0407-2391', 'show_email': 'NO'}]}
Year: 2023
DOI: 10.7907/779z-c728
<p>This dissertation contains three essays in three chapters. Chapter 1 contributes to the literature on reference dependent preferences, chapter 2 introduces a new solution concept for games played by teams of players, and chapter 3 analyzes a model of biased beliefs in law enforcement.</p>
<p>In Chapter 1, I study the role of reference dependent preferences in motivating effort in online chess. In online chess, players are assigned ratings that measure chess skill and update after every game. I find evidence of bunching above round numbers in the distribution of ratings, suggesting that players care about their rating and that round numbers serve as reference points. I estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to end a playing session that nests both loss aversion and an alternative 'aspiration' specification involving a discrete jump in utility at reference points. I reject loss aversion in favor of aspirational preferences. I show that higher skilled players are significantly more aspirational, and that aspiration does not diminish with experience.</p>
<p>In Chapter 2, coauthored with Jeongbin Kim and Thomas R. Palfrey, we develop a general framework for the analysis of games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines standard non-cooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on the collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with some binary action games.</p>
<p>In Chapter 3, I model a social welfare maximizing law enforcement agency that does not know the supply of crime, that may have incorrect beliefs about its ability to detect crime, and that only observes the quantity of crime that it detects. An equilibrium is defined in which the enforcement agency is not surprised by the crime data it observes, and believes itself to be maximizing social welfare. Sufficient conditions for existence are provided. The model is shown to capture the intuition of crime-policing 'feedback loops' in which inefficient overpolicing or underpolicing is supported in equilibrium.</p>https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/15268