CaltechAUTHORS_contributor: Contributor
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A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenTue, 12 Nov 2024 13:18:30 -0800Toward a theory of legislative decision
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-140049018
Year: 1978
Recent developments in formal political analysis have spawned two seemingly related theories of democratic political processes. The more familiar of the two is the theory of electoral competition based on Downs' (1957) heuristics and greatly elaborated by Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Kramer (1975), McKelvey (1976), and others. Somewhat less familiar (perhaps because the intellectual movement is less well integrated) is the theory of legislative decision which has grown from roots in game theory and the theory of social choice. Black (1958), Riker (1962), Plott (1967), Wilson (1969), Schwartz (1970), Kadane (1972), and several others have nurtured the rudimentary models which compose this theory.https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-140049018On the properties of stable decision procedures
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068
Year: 1982
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_8
Nonunanimous voting processes seldom possess voting equilibria if the number of alternatives is large. The discovery of this fact has led to an intense search for new "solution concepts" for voting games that are capable of predicting outcomes in cases in which equilibria fail to exist. The reader is referred to papers by Kramer (1977), Fiorina and Shepsle (this volume), and Riker (this volume) for examples and further discussion.https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-154915736
Year: 1982
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_5
Perhaps it overstates matters to say that there is a crisis in formal political theory, but it is apparent that much mischief has been caused by a series of theorems that depict the chaotic features of majority-rule voting systems. These theorems, proved elegantly in recent papers by Cohen (1979), McKelvey (1976, 1979) and Schofield (1978), establish that the cyclicity of the majority preference relation is both generic and pervasive. To paraphrase the title of a recent paper by Bell (1978), when majority rule breaks down, it breaks down completely; and it "almost always" breaks down.https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-154915736Electoral accountability and incumbency
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089
Year: 1989
This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory textsâ€”Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.3998/mpub.12284
[No abstract]https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276