<h1>Ordeshook, Peter</h1>
<h2>Contributor from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS_contributor</a></h2>
<ul>
<li>Palfrey, Thomas R. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276">A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law</a>; ISBN 0-472-10122-6; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 69-91; <a href="https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12284">10.3998/mpub.12284</a></li>
<li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089">Electoral accountability and incumbency</a>; ISBN 978-0472101221; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 121-149</li>
<li>Fiorina, Morris P. and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-154915736">Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics</a>; ISBN 978-94-009-7382-4; Political Equilibrium; 49-64; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_5">10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_5</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171201-160631068">On the properties of stable decision procedures</a>; ISBN 978-94-009-7382-4; Political Equlibrium; 107-117; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_8">10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_8</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and Fiorina, Morris P., el al. (1978) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-140049018">Toward a theory of legislative decision</a>; ISBN 9780814761564; Game Theory and Political Science; 165-190</li>
</ul>