[ { "id": "authors:ptmwj-pgf95", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "ptmwj-pgf95", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ABRjp08", "type": "article", "title": "The Hispanic vote in the 2004 Presidential election: Insecurity and moral concerns", "author": [ { "family_name": "Abrajanoa", "given_name": "Marisa A.", "clpid": "Abrajanoa-M-A" }, { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "This paper examines Hispanic voting behavior in the 2004 Presidential election. Our research makes a significant\ncontribution to the literature on Hispanic politics, as this is the first study to apply theories of issue and economic\nvoting to a nationwide sample of Hispanic voters. We demonstrate that, similar to Anglos, issues and ideology were\nhighly influential in the vote choice of Hispanics in the 2004 election. However, using the best available data on\nHispanic voting behavior for this election, a statewide aggregation of the National Election Pool (NEP), we\ndemonstrate that in this election Hispanic voters placed more emphasis on moral values issues and national\nsecurity than on traditional domestic issues such as the economy and education. This accounted for Republican\ngains beyond the overall increase in Bush's vote share from 2000 to 2004. We also show that moral values and\nnational security had roughly equal importance in Bush's victory.", "doi": "10.1017/S0022381608080365", "issn": "0022-3816", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "publication": "Journal of Politics", "publication_date": "2008-04", "series_number": "2", "volume": "70", "issue": "2", "pages": "368-382" }, { "id": "authors:6pgc1-r8089", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "6pgc1-r8089", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110120-105045038", "type": "article", "title": "Strategic voting in British elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Boehmke", "given_name": "Frederick J.", "clpid": "Boehmke-F-J" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "In this paper we examine the extent to which voters engage in strategic behavior. Our contribution is accounting for the context in which voters have the opportunity to behave in a strategic fashion. We also demonstrate that previous measures of strategic voting significantly underestimated the willingness of voters to engage in strategic behavior when presented with the opportunity to do so. We use as cases for our study of strategic voting behavior two recent elections in Britain, the 1987 and 1997 general elections. Our analysis produces estimates of strategic voting in these elections that are substantially greater than reported in previous research.", "doi": "10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.008", "issn": "0261-3794", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Electoral Studies", "publication_date": "2006-03", "series_number": "1", "volume": "25", "issue": "1", "pages": "1-19" }, { "id": "authors:vjfrz-m2017", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "vjfrz-m2017", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ALVpa04", "type": "article", "title": "Party System Compactness: Measurement and Consequences", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "An important property of any party system is the set of choices it presents to the electorate. In this paper we analyze the distribution of parties relative to voters in the multidimensional issue space and introduce two measures of the dispersion of the parties in the issue space relative to the voters, which we call measures of the compactness of the parties in the issue space. We show how compactness is easily computed using standard survey items found on national election surveys. Because we study the spacing of the parties relative to the distribution of the voters, we produce metric-free measures of compactness of the party system. The measures can be used to compare party systems across issues, over time within countries, and across countries. Comparing the compactness of party systems across countries allows us to determine the relative amount of issue choice afforded voters in different polities. We examine the compactness of the issue space and test the impact it has on voter choice in four countries: the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, and Great Britain. We demonstrate that the more compact the distribution of the parties in the issue space on any given issue, the less voters weight that issue in their vote decision. Thus we provide evidence supporting theories suggesting that the greater the choice offered by the parties in an election, the more likely it is that issue voting will play a major role in that election.", "doi": "10.1093/pan/mph003", "issn": "1047-1987", "publisher": "Oxford University Press", "publication": "Political Analysis", "publication_date": "2004", "series_number": "1", "volume": "12", "issue": "1", "pages": "46-62" }, { "id": "authors:9yvn5-z9808", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "9yvn5-z9808", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-154500911", "type": "book_section", "title": "Should I stay or should I go? Sincere and strategic crossover voting in California assembly races", "book_title": "Voting at the Political Fault Line: California's Experiment with the Blanket Primary", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Cain", "given_name": "Bruce E.", "clpid": "Cain-B-E" }, { "family_name": "Gerber", "given_name": "Elisabeth R.", "clpid": "Gerber-E-R" } ], "abstract": "There at least two important questions about voter behavior in California's blanket primary. The first is: How many voters took the opportunity to cast a ballot for a candidate of a party different than that of the voter's registration or identification? The second question is: Why did these crossover voters decide to defect from their own party's nomination campaign and support a candidate from another party? In this chapter, we focus on these two questions at the Assembly district level.", "isbn": "0520228332", "publisher": "University of California Press", "place_of_publication": "Berkeley, CA", "publication_date": "2002", "pages": "107-123" }, { "id": "authors:2vd86-f2t93", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "2vd86-f2t93", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-070002328", "type": "article", "title": "Measuring the relative impact of issues and the economy in democratic elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" }, { "family_name": "Willette", "given_name": "Jennifer R.", "clpid": "Willette-J-R" } ], "abstract": "It is generally accepted that issues and economic outcomes influence elections. In this paper we analyze the relative importance of issues and the economy in Canadian elections. We estimate a model of the 1988 and 1993 Canadian elections in which we include voter evaluations of the parties on a variety of issues, and voter evaluations of the national economy and their personal finances. We demonstrate that it is possible to compare the effects of issues and the economy on election outcomes. And we put this in the context of the impact of issues and elections in several other democracies. We show that even in elections where other factors are dominant, we can still see the impact of economic voting. And we argue that given the tenuous connection between the actions of elected officials and macroeconomic outcomes, this suggests that voters may be giving elected officials undue leeway in their non-economic policy-making functions.", "doi": "10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00050-5", "issn": "0261-3794", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Electoral Studies", "publication_date": "2000-06", "series_number": "2-3", "volume": "19", "issue": "2-3", "pages": "237-253" }, { "id": "authors:cscnb-7qj52", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "cscnb-7qj52", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-080423992", "type": "article", "title": "Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" }, { "family_name": "Bowler", "given_name": "Shaun", "clpid": "Bowler-S" } ], "abstract": "We offer a model of multiparty elections that combines voters' retrospective economic evaluations with consideration of parties' issue positions and the issue preferences of voters. We show that both policy issues and the state of the economy matter in British elections. In 1987 voters made a largely retrospective evaluation of the Conservatives based on economic performance; those who rejected the Conservative Party chose between Labour and Alliance based on issue positions. Through simulations we move the parties in the issue space and reestimate vote shares as well as hypothesize an alternative distribution of views on the economy, and we show that Labour had virtually no chance to win with a centrist party as a viable alternative. The predictions from our 1987 simulations are supported in an analysis of the 1992 British election. We argue for multinomial probit in studying three-party elections because it allows for a richer formulation of politics than do competing methods.", "doi": "10.2307/2586385", "issn": "0003-0554", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "publication": "American Political Science Review", "publication_date": "2000-03", "series_number": "01", "volume": "94", "issue": "01", "pages": "131-149" }, { "id": "authors:19dd4-k0j48", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "19dd4-k0j48", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-160126753", "type": "article", "title": "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Whether citizens vote strategically, using their votes to defeat their least-preferred candidate, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Secondly, we incorporate a new operationalization of the objective potential for strategic behaviour. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British general election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information about the relative standings of parties in their constituency in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained.", "issn": "0007-1234", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "publication": "British Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "2000-01", "series_number": "1", "volume": "30", "issue": "1", "pages": "57-75" }, { "id": "authors:dzd16-5b729", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "dzd16-5b729", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-162807834", "type": "article", "title": "A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Whether citizens vote strategically, using their votes to defeat their least-preferred candidate, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of longstanding interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Secondly, we incorporate a new operationalization of the objective potential for strategic behaviour. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British general election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information about the relative standings of parties in their constituency in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained.", "issn": "0007-1234", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "publication": "British Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "2000-01", "series_number": "1", "volume": "30", "issue": "1", "pages": "57-75" }, { "id": "authors:f4t52-keg72", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "f4t52-keg72", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-154207193", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Is the Sleeping Giant Awakening? Latinos and California Politics in the 1990's", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "[No abstract]", "doi": "10.7907/f4t52-keg72", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1999-05" }, { "id": "authors:swzy5-vb688", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "swzy5-vb688", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-132613359", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Measuring The Relative Impact of Issues and the Economy in Democratic Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" }, { "family_name": "Willette", "given_name": "Jennifer R.", "clpid": "Willette-J-R" } ], "abstract": "It is generally accepted that issues and economic outcomes influence elections. In this paper we analyze the relative importance of issues and the economy in Canadian elections. We estimate a model of the 1988 and 1993 Canadian elections in which we include voter evaluations of the parties on a variety of issues, and voter evaluations of the national economy and their personal finances. We demonstrate that it is possible to compare the effects of issues and the economy on election outcomes. And we put this in the context of the impact of issues and elections in several other democracies. We show that even in elections where other factors are dominant, we can still see the impact of economic voting. And we argue that given the tenuous connection between the actions of elected officials and macroeconomic outcomes, this suggests that voters may be giving elected officials undue leeway in their non-economic policy-making functions.", "doi": "10.7907/swzy5-vb688", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1999-01" }, { "id": "authors:s4ky5-3b284", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "s4ky5-3b284", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-163900072", "type": "article", "title": "Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Theory: Contemporary theories of presidential election outcomes, especially the economic voting and spatial issue voting models, are used to examine voter choice in the 1996 presidential election.\n\nHypotheses: First, we look at the effects of voter perceptions of the national economy on voter support for Clinton. Second, we look at the effects of candidate and voter positions on ideology and on a number of issues. Last, we examine whether voters' views on other issues-social issues such as abortion as well as issues revolving around entitlements and taxation that were emphasized by the campaigns-played significant roles in\nthis election.\n\nMethods: We employ multinomial probit analysis of the 1996 National Election Studies data and simulations based on counterfactual scenarios which are based on different perceptions of macroeconomic conditions and issue platforms of candidates.\n\nResults: The effects of economic perceptions are much greater than the effects of voter issue positions on the election outcome. This behavior by voters leaves presidents substantial room to shirk on policy issues. But, some social issues, namely abortion, play a role in determining the election outcome. The presence of a third centrist candidate limited the ability of other candidates to improve their vote shares by moving in the issue space.", "issn": "0092-5853", "publisher": "Midwest Political Science Association", "publication": "American Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "1998-10", "series_number": "4", "volume": "42", "issue": "4", "pages": "1349-1363" }, { "id": "authors:k3xqj-zk813", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "k3xqj-zk813", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-164821881", "type": "article", "title": "Explaining the Gender Gap in U. S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992", "author": [ { "family_name": "Chaney", "given_name": "Carole Kennedy", "clpid": "Chaney-C-K" }, { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "This article compares the voting behavior of women and men in presidential elections since 1980. We test whether the different levels of salience which men and women attribute to different issues or the different preferences men and women have on issues best accounts for the gender gap. Utilizing theories of different issue emphasis between men and women, we use a multivariate model to demonstrate that a combination of respondent views on the economy, social programs, military action, abortion, and ideology can consistently explain at least three-fourths of the gender gap in the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections. We show that, consistent with prior research on individual elections, women placed more emphasis on the national economy than men, and men placed more emphasis on pocketbook voting than women. We add evidence showing that women have consistently more negative assessments of the economy than do men, suggesting that a part of what has been considered a Re- publican-Democratic gender gap is really an anti-incumbent bias on the part of women. We also clarify the interpretation of partisan identification in explaining the gender gap.", "issn": "1065-9129", "publisher": "Sage Publications", "publication": "Political Research Quarterly", "publication_date": "1998-06", "series_number": "2", "volume": "51", "issue": "2", "pages": "311-339" }, { "id": "authors:35x80-nyt65", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "35x80-nyt65", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171107-132938469", "type": "article", "title": "When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multiparty Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Theory: The spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional logit models which consider the position of the parties in issue spaces than by multinomial logit models which only consider the position of voters in the issue space. The spatial model, and random utility models in general, suffer from a failure to adequately consider the substitutability of parties sharing similar or identical issue positions. Hypotheses: Multinomial logit is not necessarily better than successive applications of binomial logit. Conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions than does multinomial logit. The spatial model may not correspond to voter decision-making in multiple party settings. Multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the IIA condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties. Methods: Comparisons of binomial logit, multinomial logit, conditional logit, and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from multiparty elections. Results: Multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit. Conditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties, whereas multinomial logit is not. Multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters. Estimation of multinomial probit with more than three choices is feasible.", "issn": "0092-5853", "publisher": "Midwest Political Science Association", "publication": "American Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "1998-01", "series_number": "1", "volume": "42", "issue": "1", "pages": "56-96" }, { "id": "authors:80v4g-r5z56", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "80v4g-r5z56", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-170524063", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Economics, Entitlements and Social Issues: Voter Choice in the 1996 Presidential Election", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Theory: Contemporary theories of presidential election outcomes, especially the economic voting and spatial issue voting models, are used to examine voter choice in the 1996 presidential election.\nHypotheses: First, we look at the effects of voter perceptions of the national economy on voter support for Clinton. Second we look at the effects of candidate and voter positions on ideology and on a number of issues. Last, we examine whether respondents' views on other issues\u2014social issues such as abortion as well as issues revolving around entitlements and taxation that were emphasized by the campaigns\u2014played significant roles in this election. \n\nMethods: Multinomial probit analysis of the 1996 National Election Studies data; simulations based on counterfactual scenarios based on different macroeconomic conditions and different issue platforms of candidates. \n\nResults: The effects of economic perceptions are much greater than the effects of voter issue positions on the election outcome. Some social issues, namely abortion, did play a role in determining the election outcome. The presence of a third centrist candidate limited the ability of other candidates to improve their vote shares by moving in the issue space.", "doi": "10.7907/80v4g-r5z56", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1997-10" }, { "id": "authors:1ea5s-rn272", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "1ea5s-rn272", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-154700936", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "A New Approach for Modeling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Whether voters vote strategically, using their vote to best further their interests, or vote sincerely, voting for their first choice among the alternatives, is a question of long-standing interest. We offer two innovations in searching for the answer to this question. First, we begin with a more consistent model of sincere voting in multiparty democratic systems than has been presented in the literature to date. Second, we incorporate new operationalizations of the objective potential for strategic behavior than have been used in the past. We offer a test of strategic voting in the 1987 British General Election based on the variance in strategic setting across constituencies in Britain. We allow voters to use available information in deciding whether or not to cast a strategic vote. We estimate a lower level of strategic voting than many other methods have estimated. We also demonstrate that the use of self-reported vote motivation causes errors in estimating the amount of strategic voting, and that this problem is exacerbated the further from the election the self-report is obtained.", "doi": "10.7907/1ea5s-rn272", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1997-10" }, { "id": "authors:d9np1-r2b60", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "d9np1-r2b60", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-132747188", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Analysis of Crossover and Strategic Voting", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "We undertake the analysis of primary elections from 1980 through 1996 using both academic individual level survey data, media exit-polls, and aggregate election returns on a county by county basis. We come to the following conclusions:\n1. there is very little crossover voting in general in United States primaries;\n2. the difference in the amount of crossover voting between states with open primaries and closed primaries is not substantively large;\n3. the amount of strategic behavior on the part of voters is extremely small.", "doi": "10.7907/d9np1-r2b60", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1997-09" }, { "id": "authors:9absa-ab280", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "9absa-ab280", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-162353811", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Explaining the Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992", "author": [ { "family_name": "Chaney", "given_name": "Carole", "clpid": "Chaney-C" }, { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "This paper compares the voting behavior of women and men in presidential elections since 1980 to test competing explanations for the gender gap. We show that, consistent with prior research on individual elections, women placed more emphasis on the national economy than men, and men placed more emphasis on pocketbook voting than women. We add evidence showing that women have consistently more negative assessments of the economy than do men, suggesting that a part of what has been considered a Republican-Democratic gender gap is really an anti-incumbent bias on the part of women. Our multivariate analysis demonstrates that neither the differences between men and women's preferences nor emphasis on any single issue explains the significant gender gap in vote choice; but that a combination of respondent views on the economy, social programs, military action, abortion, and ideology can consistently explain at least three-fourths of the gender gap in the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections. We also clarify the interpretation of partisan identification in explaining the gender gap.", "doi": "10.7907/9absa-ab280", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1996-08" }, { "id": "authors:jcges-hyx21", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "jcges-hyx21", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-160342093", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multi-Party Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "Theory: The spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional logit than by multinomial logit. The spatial model, and random utility models in general, suffer from a failure to adequately consider the substitutability of candidates sharing similar or identical issue positions.\nHypotheses: Multinomial logit is not much better than successive applications of binomial logit. Conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions than does multinomial logit. The spatial model may not correspond to voter decision-making in multiple-candidate settings. Multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the IIA condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties.\nMethods: Comparisons of binomial logit, multinomial logit, conditional logit, and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from a three-party election.\nResults: Multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit. Conditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties, whereas multinomial logit is not. Multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters.", "doi": "10.7907/jcges-hyx21", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1996-03" }, { "id": "authors:w9f59-jzr85", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "w9f59-jzr85", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-140948569", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Issues, Economics and the Dynamics of Multi-Party Elections: The British 1987 General Election", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Bowler", "given_name": "Shaun", "clpid": "Bowler-S" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "This paper offers a model of three-party elections which allows voters to combine retrospective economic evaluations with considerations of the positions of the parties in the issue-space as well as the issue-preferences of the voters. We describe a model of British elections which allows voters to consider simultaneously all three parties, rather than limiting voters to choices among pairs of parties as is usually done. Using this model we show that both policy issues and the state of the national economy matter in British elections. We also show how voters framed their decisions. Voters first made a retrospective evaluation of the Conservative party based on economic performance; and those voters that rejected the Conservative party chose between Labour and Alliance based on issue positions. Through simulations of the effects of issues\u2014we move the parties in the issue space and re-estimate vote-shares\u2014and the economy\u2014we hypothesize an alternative distribution of views of t h e economy for voters\u2014we show that Labour has virtually no chance to win with the Alliance as a viable alternative. Even if the Alliance (or the Liberal Democrats) disappears. Labour will need to significantly moderate its policy positions to have a chance of competing with the Conservative party. We argue that the methodological technique we employ multinomial probit, is a superior mechanism for studying three-party elections as it allows for a richer formulation of politics than do competing methods.", "doi": "10.7907/w9f59-jzr85", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1996-01" }, { "id": "authors:z0hv5-kw285", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "z0hv5-kw285", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-153518647", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Correlated Disturbances in Discrete Choice Models: A Comparison of Multinomial Probit Models and Logit Models", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "In political science, there are many cases where individuals make discrete choices from more than two alternatives. This paper uses Monte Carlo analysis to examine several questions about one class of discrete choice models - those involving both alternative specific and individual-specific variables on the right-hand side - and demonstrates several findings. First, the use of estimation techniques assuming uncorrelated disturbances across alternatives in discrete choice models can lead to significantly biased parameter estimates. This point is tempered by the observation that probability estimates based on the full choice set generated from such estimates are not likely to be biased enough to lead to incorrect inferences. However, attempts to infer the impact of altering the choice set - such as by removing one of the alternatives - will be less successful. Second, the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) model is extremely unreliable when the pat tern of correlation among the disturbances is not as restricted as the GEV model assumes. GEV estimates may suggest grouping among the choices that is in fact not present in the data. Third, in samples the size of many typical political science applications \u2013 1000 observations - Multinomial Probit (MNP) is capable of recovering precise estimates of the parameters of the systemic component of the model, though MNP is not likely to generate precise estimates of the relationship among the disturbances in samples of this size. Paradoxically, MNP's primary benefit is its ability to uncover relationships among alternatives and to correctly estimate the effect of removing an alternative from the choice set. Thus this paper suggests the increased use of MNP by political scientists examining discrete choice problems when the central question of interest is the effect of removing an alternative from the choice set. We demonstrate that for other questions, models positing in dependent disturbances may be 'close enough.'", "doi": "10.7907/z0hv5-kw285", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1994-12" }, { "id": "authors:r4hfn-zvy61", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "r4hfn-zvy61", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170821-141721076", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Voter Choice in 1992: Economics, Issues, and Anger", "author": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Nagler", "given_name": "Jonathan", "clpid": "Nagler-J" } ], "abstract": "This paper examines the voting behavior of individuals in the 1 992 presidential election. Employing a multinomial probit model we disprove several commonly held beliefs regarding the uniqueness of the election and the mood of the voters. We show emphatically the dominance of the economy as an issue, and that Clinton, not Perot, was the beneficiary of economic discontent. We show the limited influence of the candidates' efforts at choosing the optimal ideological position. We also demonstrate, via simulations of the outcome under hypothetical distributions of preferences, that the effect of the economy, while large, cannot by itself explain the magnitude of Bush's defeat. We also prove the surprisingly powerful impact of the candidates' positions on abortion on voters' choices. And we disprove the stylized fact that the 1 992 election was characterized by \"angry voters.\" Finally, we show that Perot took more votes from Bush than he did from Clinton.", "doi": "10.7907/r4hfn-zvy61", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "1994-09" } ]