<h1>McKelvey, Richard D.</h1>
<h2>Combined from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS</a></h2>
<ul>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2007) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-144825827">Self-Correcting Information Cascades</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 74; No. 3; 733-762; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x">10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Patty, John W. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-080248185">A theory of voting in large elections</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 57; No. 1; 155-180; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003">10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Patty, John W. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-163456027">A Theory of Voting in Large Elections</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/5pq1n-gsc34">10.7907/5pq1n-gsc34</a></li>
<li>Goeree, Jacob K. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (2004) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-133225091">Self-correcting Information Cascades</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/3dd4s-jz194">10.7907/3dd4s-jz194</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-153239731">Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson–Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 107; No. 2; 336-355; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2954">10.1006/jeth.2001.2954</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (2001) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191009-131814583">Dr. Jeffrey Scot Banks - Obituary</a>; Review of Economic Design; Vol. 6; No. 1; 1-4; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013696">10.1007/PL00013696</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-152913455">An experimental study of the effect of private information in the Coase theorem</a>; Experimental Economics; Vol. 3; No. 3; 187-213; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01669772">10.1007/BF01669772</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Weber, Roberto A., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-165356354">The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2x2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria</a>; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Vol. 42; No. 4; 523-548; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5">10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5</a></li>
<li>Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-071338534">An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 02; 407-423; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2586020">10.2307/2586020</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-153048325">Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An extension of the Myerson Satterthwaite Theorem with an application to the Coase Theorem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/fykjr-x5418">10.7907/fykjr-x5418</a></li>
<li>Guarnaschelli, Serena and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-153843207">An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/49qpb-78b68">10.7907/49qpb-78b68</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R., el al. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-143845609">The Effects of Payoff Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2 x 2 Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/95xv9-jkv06">10.7907/95xv9-jkv06</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1998) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20151208-075113441">Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games</a>; Experimental Economics; Vol. 1; No. 1; 9-41; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009905800005">10.1023/A:1009905800005</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (1998) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-134102962">A Liapunov Function for Nash Equilibria</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/f61vr-arf47">10.7907/f61vr-arf47</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-133129502">An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/h25ge-vez95">10.7907/h25ge-vez95</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-135947000">Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 73; No. 2; 425-437; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2225">10.1006/jeth.1996.2225</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and McLennan, Andrew (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-095820143">The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 72; No. 2; 411-425; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2214">10.1006/jeth.1996.2214</a></li>
<li>Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-114236264">An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games</a>; International Journal of Game Theory; Vol. 25; No. 3; 269-287; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02425258">10.1007/BF02425258</a></li>
<li>Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John, el al. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-141350613">Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 7; No. 2; 191-205; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213902">10.1007/BF01213902</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-140531268">A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games</a>; Japanese Economic Review; Vol. 47; No. 2; 186-209; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x">10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00043.x</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-165243053">A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/m8276-pad75">10.7907/m8276-pad75</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-143555993">Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/prxgj-mg253">10.7907/prxgj-mg253</a></li>
<li>Boylan, Richard T. and McKelvey, Richard D. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BOYaer95">Voting over economic plans</a>; American Economic Review; Vol. 85; No. 4; 860-871</li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-164515991">Quantal response equilibria for normal form games</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 10; No. 1; 6-38; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023">10.1006/game.1995.1023</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069">The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information</a>; ISBN 9780521443401; Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics; 321-349</li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-113401222">Learning in experimental games</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 4; No. 6; 901-922; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213818">10.1007/BF01213818</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and McLennan, Andrew (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-152433647">The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/w4xpy-8z371">10.7907/w4xpy-8z371</a></li>
<li>Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-133811016">An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/g1kfx-nex14">10.7907/g1kfx-nex14</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-112533381">Computational Issues in the Statistical Design and Analysis of Experimental Games</a>; International Journal of Supercomputer Applications; Vol. 7; No. 3; 189-200; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/109434209300700302">10.1177/109434209300700302</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-134803360">The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/h5sgq-1q935">10.7907/h5sgq-1q935</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-111846023">A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games</a>; Journal of the American Statistical Association; Vol. 88; No. 422; 428-435; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1993.10476292">10.1080/01621459.1993.10476292</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-134601561">Engodeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/46qat-kfm09">10.7907/46qat-kfm09</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Riezman, Raymond (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20150114-101742922">Seniority in Legislatures</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 86; No. 4; 951-965</li>
<li>Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-135904085">Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/dja9h-egh71">10.7907/dja9h-egh71</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-135834135">Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/kz8hk-4de75">10.7907/kz8hk-4de75</a></li>
<li>El-Gamal, Mahmoud and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-141309234">A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27">10.7907/hgs8z-hwd27</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145049106">An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 60; No. 4; 803-836</li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160405-154023040">An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Reizman, Raymond G. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-153142114">Initial Versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/w9sq4-wzr65">10.7907/w9sq4-wzr65</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-141025874">Public and private information: An experimental study of information pooling</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 58; No. 6; 1321-1339</li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Reizman, Raymond G. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-140827674">Seniority in Legislatures</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/af878-br061">10.7907/af878-br061</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-155617651">A decade of experimental research on spatial models of elections and committees</a>; ISBN 0521352843; Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting; 99-144; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896606.007">10.1017/CBO9780511896606.007</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, R. D. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-121356890">Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 6; No. 2; 139-156; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303168">10.1007/BF00303168</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-141058732">Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/t4jca-fps61">10.7907/t4jca-fps61</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-153928970">A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/bc0gn-qhp30">10.7907/bc0gn-qhp30</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-135844777">Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model</a>; Mathematical Social Sciences; Vol. 14; No. 1; 77-99; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90016-3">10.1016/0165-4896(87)90016-3</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Schofield, Norman (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-161716689">Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 55; No. 4; 923-933; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1911036">10.2307/1911036</a></li>
<li>Li, Lode and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-154623808">Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 42; No. 1; 140-166; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90107-4">10.1016/0022-0531(87)90107-4</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-134424647">Sequential elections with limited information</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 3; No. 3; 199-211; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433535">10.1007/BF00433535</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-133329550">Covering, dominance, and institution-free properties of social change</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 30; No. 2; 283-314; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111098">10.2307/2111098</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-133024179">Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/a7ntz-bnj28">10.7907/a7ntz-bnj28</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Schofield, Norman (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-170122722">Structural instability of the core</a>; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 15; No. 3; 179-198; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(86)90009-1">10.1016/0304-4068(86)90009-1</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Schofield, Norman (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-145109056">Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/scsnd-3xh89">10.7907/scsnd-3xh89</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171115-170626266">Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 36; No. 1; 55-85; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1">10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-143236008">Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Change</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/ktzhs-d3673">10.7907/ktzhs-d3673</a></li>
<li>Li, Lode and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-164128100">Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/jdn82-4bs44">10.7907/jdn82-4bs44</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Schofield, Norman (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-145130668">Structural Instability of the Core</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/e2cny-p7059">10.7907/e2cny-p7059</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-152059788">Sequential Elections with Limited Information</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v23kd-qbn10">10.7907/v23kd-qbn10</a></li>
<li>Cox, G. W. and McKelvey, R. D. (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171010-101743926">A ham sandwich theorem for general measures</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1; No. 1; 75-83; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00297061">10.1007/BF00297061</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Page, Talbot (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-144910869">Common Knowledge and Consensus with Aggregate Statistics</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/z43xd-96j96">10.7907/z43xd-96j96</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-154054641">Elections with Limited Information: A Multidimensional Model</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/ebpx6-ssr61">10.7907/ebpx6-ssr61</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171002-152708822">Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/a7hd5-zy507">10.7907/a7hd5-zy507</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and McKelvey, Richard D. (1983) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180720-161533135">Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 29; No. 1; 109-119; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90125-4">10.1016/0022-0531(83)90125-4</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M., el al. (1982) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171016-112548002">Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 49; No. 3; 439-446; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297367">10.2307/2297367</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1981) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171018-152411846">Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results for Majority Rule Voting Games</a>; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Vol. 25; No. 4; 709-724</li>
<li>Green, Edward J. and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1981) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-164948358">Methods for Comparison of Markov Processes by Stochastic Dominance</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/em073-25e98">10.7907/em073-25e98</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and McKelvey, Richard D., el al. (1981) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171004-165602546">Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/p4th4-s2326">10.7907/p4th4-s2326</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (1981) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171018-084238937">A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design</a>; Management Science; Vol. 27; No. 3; 303-321; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.27.3.303">10.1287/mnsc.27.3.303</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and McKelvey, Richard D. (1981) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171017-165532954">An Impossibility Theorem for Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/v65dx-j2z11">10.7907/v65dx-j2z11</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. (1980) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171017-142454970">A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/3f4kp-f9653">10.7907/3f4kp-f9653</a></li>
<li>McKelvey, Richard D. and Ordeshook, Peter C., el al. (1980) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120719-094709222">Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions</a>; SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics; Vol. 39; No. 1; 161-168; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1137/0139013">10.1137/0139013</a></li>
<li>Cox, Gary W. and McKelvey, Richard D. (1980) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171009-163353049">A Ham Sandwich Theorem for General Measures</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/c09md-7bk98">10.7907/c09md-7bk98</a></li>
<li>Ferejohn, John A. and Grether, David M., el al. (1980) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171013-145311553">Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297367">10.2307/2297367</a></li>
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