[ { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2xr9q-wnz20", "eprint_id": 114683, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 17:01:44", "lastmod": "2023-10-24 15:07:18", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Anufriev-Mikhail", "name": { "family": "Anufriev", "given": "Mikhail" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-1842-6814" }, { "id": "Arifovic-Jasmina", "name": { "family": "Arifovic", "given": "Jasmina" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-7092-6541" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Panchenko-Valentyn", "name": { "family": "Panchenko", "given": "Valentyn" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-3144-7502" } ] }, "title": "The role of information in a continuous double auction: An experiment and learning model", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Continuous double auction; Experiments; Individual evolutionary learning; Applied Mathematics; Control and Optimization; Economics and Econometrics", "note": "\u00a9 2022 Elsevier. \n\nAvailable online 14 April 2022, Version of Record 26 July 2022. \n\nWe thank the organizers and participants of the 2021 Conference on Markets and Economies with Information Frictions, and especially the discussant, Te Bao, for many suggestions that helped to improve the paper. We also thank participants of the ESA meeting in Tucson, and the seminar at Simon Fraser University for their comments on the earliest results of this research. We are grateful to Michiel van de Leur for providing research assistance during the earlier stages of this research. Mikhail Anufriev acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council through Discovery Project DP200101438.\n\n
Accepted Version - 1-s2.0-S0165188922000914-main_accepted.pdf
", "abstract": "We analyze trading in a modified continuous double auction market. We study how more or less information about trading in a prior round affects allocative and informational efficiency. We find that more information reduces allocative efficiency in early rounds relative to less information but that the difference disappears in later rounds. Informational efficiency is not affected by the information differences. We complement the experiment with simulations of the Individual Evolutionary Learning model which, after modifications to account for the CDA, seems to fit the data reasonably well.", "date": "2022-08", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control", "volume": "141", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "Art. No. 104387", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20220511-150585300", "issn": "0165-1889", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220511-150585300", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Australian Research Council", "grant_number": "DP200101438" } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104387", "primary_object": { "basename": "1-s2.0-S0165188922000914-main_accepted.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2xr9q-wnz20/files/1-s2.0-S0165188922000914-main_accepted.pdf" }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2022", "author_list": "Anufriev, Mikhail; Arifovic, Jasmina; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/h8b1v-76536", "eprint_id": 104593, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 22:32:32", "lastmod": "2024-01-15 17:03:01", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Asparouhova-E", "name": { "family": "Asparouhova", "given": "Elena" } }, { "id": "Bossaerts-P", "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Price Formation in Multiple, Simultaneous Continuous Double Auctions, with Implications for Asset Pricing", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Continuous Double Auction, Walrasian Equilibrium, Marshallian\nEquilibration, Experimental Economics, Asset Pricing.", "note": "We would like to thank Bernard Cornet for pointing out a mistake in an earlier draft, and to Sean Crockett, Dan Friedman and Sophie Moinas for their comments and suggestions. We gratefully acknowledge comments on prior versions from participants in seminars (Bocconi, UBC, Copenhagen Business School, Columbia University, GATE (Lyon, France), U of Geneva, Hebrew University, U of Lausanne, U of Michigan, NYSE, New University in Lisbon, Norwegian Business School, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Ohio State University, SEC, Stanford, SIFR, Tel Aviv University, UC Berkeley, UC Irvine, UC San Diego, UC Santa Cruz, U of Kansas, U of Paris\u2013Dauphine; U of Vienna, U of Zurich) and conferences (2003 ESA meetings, 2003 WFAs, 2003 and 2009 SAET, 2004 Kyoto Conference on Experiments in Economic Sciences, 2005 Princeton Conference on Econometrics and Experimental Economics, 2005 Purdue Conference in honor of Roko Aliprantis, 2006 Decentralization Conference in Paris, 2010 Experimental Society Conference in Gothenburg, 2016 Experimental Finance Society Conference, Tucson), and the 2018 ESAM meetings in Auckland, New Zealand. We acknowledge the support from NSF grant SES-0527491 Bossaerts, Ledyard), SES-0616431 (Bossaerts), SES-106184 (Asparouhova, Bossaerts), and the Swiss Finance Institute (Bossaerts).\n\nAccepted Version - sswp_1450.pdf
", "abstract": "We propose a Marshallian model for price and allocation adjustments in parallel continuous double auctions. Agents quote prices that they expect will maximize local utility improvements. The process generates Pareto optimal allocations in the limit. In experiments designed to induce CAPM equilibrium, price and allocation dynamics are in line with the model's predictions. Walrasian aggregate excess demands do not provide additional predictive power. We identify, theoretically and empirically, a portfolio that is closer to mean-variance optimal throughout equilibration. This portfolio can serve as a benchmark for asset returns even if markets are not in equilibrium, unlike the market portfolio, which only works at equilibrium. The theory also has implications for momentum, volume and liquidity.", "date": "2020-07-28", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20200727-111303655", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200727-111303655", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0527491" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0616431" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-106184" }, { "agency": "Swiss Finance Institute" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/h8b1v-76536", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp_1450.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/h8b1v-76536/files/sswp_1450.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2020", "author_list": "Asparouhova, Elena; Bossaerts, Peter; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rbga4-d5742", "eprint_id": 97053, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:19:49", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 21:53:26", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Oliveira-A-C-M", "name": { "family": "Oliveira", "given": "Angela C. M." } }, { "id": "Salmon-T-C", "name": { "family": "Salmon", "given": "Timothy C." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Putterman-L", "name": { "family": "Putterman", "given": "Louis" } } ] }, "title": "Introduction to the Symposium on Research on Social Dilemmas", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2019 Western Economic Association International. \n\nVersion of Record online: 10 July 2019; Manuscript accepted: 20 June 2019; Manuscript received: 14 June 2019.", "abstract": "In 2002 Elinor Ostrom and some of her colleagues organized a working group on Testing Theoretical Models of Individual Behavior in Dynamic Social Dilemmas and held the first meeting of this group at Indiana University Bloomington in 2003. There have now been five subsequent meetings of different incarnations of this group (2006, Max Planck Institute, Jena; 2008, Florida State University; 2010, Rice University; 2013, California Institute of Technology; 2015, Brown University) prior to the most recent one, the seventh in total, held in 2017 at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. With each of these meetings, the size of the group and scope of the work presented has changed and shifted as new people become part of the group and as the research questions relevant to social dilemma researchers change over time. As a way of commemorating these events, the organizers have felt that it would be useful to create special issues or symposia in journals related to the meetings as a way of capturing a snapshot of the issues at the frontier of social dilemma research at each point in time. The 2013 meeting at Cal Tech was the first to take place after Ostrom's death in 2012, and it produced two such special issues, in part to memorialize her: one at the Journal of Theoretical Politics edited by Eric Coleman and Rick Wilson published in 2016, and one at Experiment Economics edited by Jimmy Walker and Mark Isaac published in 2015. In conjunction with the 2017 meetings at UMass Amherst, a call for papers went out for submissions to this current Symposium issue inviting submissions from people who have been affiliated with this group and to others working in the area so that we could present a compelling set of papers that encompass a broad range of the work aimed at helping us to better understand issues related to social dilemmas. The journal received a large number of submissions of very high\u2010quality work that was sent through the standard review process for the journal. In the end we are publishing eight of those submissions and are pleased with the quality and breadth of coverage these papers represent. We are also happy that while we received and will be publishing papers by authors with a direct association with these meetings, we also received many submissions by authors with no connection to the meetings and will be publishing several of these as well.", "date": "2020-01", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Economic Inquiry", "volume": "58", "number": "1", "publisher": "Wiley", "pagerange": "9-11", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20190711-102156844", "issn": "0095-2583", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190711-102156844", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1111/ecin.12824", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2020", "author_list": "Oliveira, Angela C. M.; Salmon, Timothy C.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a6fvp-ke472", "eprint_id": 99370, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 08:24:07", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 22:00:32", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Design of Tradable Permit Programs under Imprecise Measurement", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "quota, permits, rights, tradable, imprecise measurement, voluntary participation, imperfect enforcement", "note": "I thank the Max Factor Family Foundation in partnership with the Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles for its financial support of this project.\n\nAccepted Version - sswp1438.pdf
", "abstract": "If the measurement of production in a commons is accurate and precise, it is possible to design a tradable permit program such that, under a fairly general set of conditions, the market equilibrium is efficient for the given aggregate permit level and everyone is better off after the permit program than before. Often, however, implementation of a tradable permit system is postponed or never undertaken because an inexpensive technology able to provide accurate and precise measurements does not exist. However, there often is an inexpensive technology which accurate but not precise. I study the possibilities for the design of a tradable permit system when the measurement technology involves an imprecise, indirect measure of production that contains statistical uncertainty. To the best of my knowledge, this has not been studied before.\nAs one might expect, imprecise measurement can lead to inefficiency and prevent voluntary participation. But there are positive results. If measurement errors are proportional to use, it is possible to design so that aggregate output is efficiently allocated. Also, it is possible to calculate a set of individual firm lump-sum subsidies to attain voluntary participation.", "date": "2019-10-18", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-120435407", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-120435407", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Max Factor Family Foundation" }, { "agency": "Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/a6fvp-ke472", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1438.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a6fvp-ke472/files/sswp1438.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2019", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/aja3h-jjv83", "eprint_id": 87950, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 23:53:52", "lastmod": "2023-10-18 21:33:27", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Arifovic-J", "name": { "family": "Arifovic", "given": "Jasmina" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-7092-6541" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Learning to alternate", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Battle of Sexes; Alternation; Learning", "note": "\u00a9 2018 Economic Science Association. \n\nReceived: 12 January 2016; Revised: 3 January 2018; Accepted: 19 March 2018; Published online: 12 April 2018. \n\nWe thank Sarah Deretic, Kevin James, Brian Merlob and Heng Sok for their excellent research assistance. We would also like to thank John Duffy, Tim Cason, Julian Romero, participants at the Workshop in Memory of John van Huyck, Southern Methodist University, 2015, participants at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, New Orleans, 2015, as well as two referees and an editor. Jasmina Arifovic gratefully acknowledges financial support from CIGI-INET Grant #5553. John Ledyard thanks the Moore Foundation whose grant to Caltech for Experimentation with Large, Diverse and Interconnected Socio-Economic Systems, Award #1158, supported the experimental work.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1437_-_revised.pdf
Supplemental Material - 10683_2018_9568_MOESM1_ESM.pdf
Draft - sswp1437.pdf
", "abstract": "The Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) model explains human subjects' behavior in a wide range of repeated games which have unique Nash equilibria. Using a variation of 'better response' strategies, IEL agents quickly learn to play Nash equilibrium strategies and their dynamic behavior is like that of humans subjects. In this paper we study whether IEL can also explain behavior in games with gains from coordination. We focus on the simplest such game: the 2 person repeated Battle of Sexes game. In laboratory experiments, two patterns of behavior often emerge: players either converge rapidly to one of the stage game Nash equilibria and stay there or learn to coordinate their actions and alternate between the two Nash equilibria every other round. We show that IEL explains this behavior if the human subjects are truly in the dark and do not know or believe they know their opponent's payoffs. To explain the behavior when agents are not in the dark, we need to modify the basic IEL model and allow some agents to begin with a good idea about how to play. We show that if the proportion of inspired agents with good ideas is chosen judiciously, the behavior of IEL agents looks remarkably similar to that of human subjects in laboratory experiments.", "date": "2018-09", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Experimental Economics", "volume": "21", "number": "3", "publisher": "Springer", "pagerange": "692-721", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20180718-090852064", "issn": "1386-4157", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180718-090852064", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "CIGI-INET", "grant_number": "5553" }, { "agency": "Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation", "grant_number": "1158" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "1437", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/s10683-018-9568-1", "primary_object": { "basename": "10683_2018_9568_MOESM1_ESM.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/aja3h-jjv83/files/10683_2018_9568_MOESM1_ESM.pdf" }, "related_objects": [ { "basename": "sswp1437.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/aja3h-jjv83/files/sswp1437.pdf" }, { "basename": "sswp1437_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/aja3h-jjv83/files/sswp1437_-_revised.pdf" } ], "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2018", "author_list": "Arifovic, Jasmina and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qk8yn-ng985", "eprint_id": 82586, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 10:23:32", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:45:28", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Incentive Compatibility and Incomplete Information", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Both the National Science Foundation and the Fairchild Foundation are gratefully acknowledged for their support. Early parts of this work were completed at The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University. I thank Ted Groves, Andy Postlewaite, and John Roberts for helpful conversations. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O. \"Incentive compatibility and incomplete information.\" Journal of economic theory 18.1 (1978): 171-189.\n\nSubmitted - sswp187.pdf
", "abstract": "It is by now reasonably well known that when informationally decentralized processes are used to make collective choice decisions or to allocate resources, individuals may find it in their interest to distort the information they provide and that these distortions may lead to non-optimal group decisions. In the social choice context, this has been formalized in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, which states that all non-dictatorial rules will have this property. In a different context, Hurwicz has shown that there is a private goods neo-classical exchange economy such that any decentralized mechanism which selects Pareto-optimal allocations and which has a no-trade option will have this property. Roberts has provided a similar example in the public goods context. Other work (e.g., Green-Laffont, Groves-Loeb, Hurwicz, and Walker) indicates that, for mechanisms designed to select efficient outcomes, in most environments some agent will have an incentive to misrepresent his information and thus to manipulate the mechanism. All these results lead one to the conjecture that it is almost impossible to design any mechanism for group decisions which is compatible with individual incentives and efficiency.", "date": "2017-10-24", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-122234187", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171023-122234187", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/qk8yn-ng985", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp187.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qk8yn-ng985/files/sswp187.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/8q2dx-kpv75", "eprint_id": 82563, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:17:31", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:45:07", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Groves-T", "name": { "family": "Groves", "given": "Theodore" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Public goods, Consumer bankruptcy, Consumer goods, Taxes, Private goods, Consumer equilibrium, Economic theory, Consumer prices, Consumer economics, Consumer choice", "note": "This work was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant SOC77-06000 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, in part by NSF Grant SOC76-20953 at the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, and a Fairchild Foundation Grant at the California Institute of Technology. This paper is a revision of one referenced as \"[16]\" in our earlier paper (referenced herein as Groves and Ledyard [1977]). \n\nPublished as Groves, Theodore, and John O. Ledyard. \"The existence of efficient and incentive compatible equilibria with public goods.\" Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1980): 1487-1506.\n\nSubmitted - sswp203.pdf
", "abstract": "In our previous paper, \"Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...,\" (1977) we presented a mechanism for determining efficient public goods allocations when preferences are unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero.", "date": "2017-10-24", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-165624169", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171020-165624169", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC76-20953" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC76-20953" }, { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/8q2dx-kpv75", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp203.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/8q2dx-kpv75/files/sswp203.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Groves, Theodore and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ck8tg-pc937", "eprint_id": 82528, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:30:42", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:44:37", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "I wish to thank both the Fairchild Foundation (as a Fairchild Scholar at Caltech) and the National Science Foundation (Grant #SOC 76-20953 to the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at Northwestern University) for their support. My debt to John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, who tolerated my incursion into their domain with patience, help, and humor, will be obvious to any reader. A seminar at Caltech brought forth the expected boos, \"what is that?\", and help. I thank the participants. Finally, as expected, I alone remain responsible for any errors and misrepresentations which may be left. \n\nLedyard, John O., \"The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis,\" in Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics, edited by G. Horwich and J. Quirk. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1982, pp. 57-80.\n\nSubmitted - sswp224.pdf
", "abstract": "Conventional analysis of the decision of expected utility maximizing agents to vote has concluded that it is irrational to vote unless voters have a distorted view of their individual impact or place a direct value on the act of voting. On the other hand, mathematical analyses of the electoral process (see, e.g., Davis, Hinich, Ordeshook (1970)), have usually assumed that all voters vote. Each theory is incorrect in the sense that in actual elections turnout is neither zero nor 100%. In this paper we will argue that previous analyses of expected utility maximizing voters s topped too soon because of the partial equilibrium approach and that if each voter considers the simultaneous reactions of all voters in a \"rational\" manner, then depending on the location of the candidates' platforms, turnout will usually be positive but less than 100%. In particular we will derive a (probabilistic) vote supply function, given a distribution of voters and the choice of platforms of candidates, which has the property that, even with costs of voting, unless the candidates have identical platforms, the expected turnout is positive. The model and these results are presented in sections 1a and 1b.", "date": "2017-10-20", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171019-155736804", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171019-155736804", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC76-20953" }, { "agency": "Northwestern University" }, { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/ck8tg-pc937", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp224.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ck8tg-pc937/files/sswp224.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/nz1n2-wkn56", "eprint_id": 81585, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 18:07:38", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:30:44", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised. Originally dated to June 1984. \n\nThis paper is an extensive revision of one presented in the Theory workshop at Caltech and at the Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications at the University of Minnesota. I thank both sets of participants for their suggestions and comments. I especially thank Kim Border and Charles Plott who asked the right questions at the right time. The revision of the first version has benefited from the insightful and careful comments of Steve Matthews, Mark Satterthwaite, Robert Wilson and a good referee. Finally, I thank the intransigent referee of Easley-Ledyard, whose misguided refusal to consider the behavior proposed in that as reasonable led me to the research reported here. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O. \"The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium.\" Journal of Economic Theory 39.1 (1986): 59-82.\n\nSubmitted - sswp532_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is almost anything. Given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors and given any vector of nondominated strategies, there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of the transformed game. Any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. Some comments on the implications of these results for game theory are included.", "date": "2017-09-19", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-145551174", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-145551174", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/nz1n2-wkn56", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp532_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/nz1n2-wkn56/files/sswp532_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rjxey-cy967", "eprint_id": 81366, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:16:05", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:27:37", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Market Failure", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Published as Ledyard, John O. \"Market failure.\" The World of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. 407-412.\n\nSubmitted - sswp623.pdf
", "abstract": "Market failure is described and discussed. A summary of the current state of understanding is provided. Key words are: market failure, public good, externalities, rational expectations, information, monopoly, and competitive equilibrium.", "date": "2017-09-15", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-134741993", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-134741993", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/rjxey-cy967", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp623.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rjxey-cy967/files/sswp623.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/65nfx-ytv91", "eprint_id": 81382, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 18:52:36", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:27:48", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The Economics of Space Station", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "This paper was invited and written for the Symposium on Explorations in Space Policy: Emerging Economic and Technical Issues, sponsored by the National Academy of Engineering and Resources for the Future on June 24-25, 1986. Much of the research for this paper, the details of which can be found in the referenced JPL working papers, was funded by NASA through JPL. They bear absolutely no responsibility for any of my conclusions. This paper was significantly improved with the help of comments from Jeffrey Banks, Peter Gray, Hamid Habib-Agahi, Molly Macauley and especially David Porter. They also bear no responsibility for its contents.\n\nSubmitted - sswp617.pdf
", "abstract": "In this paper I will examine some of the economic and management issues which must be addressed if Space Station is to effectively and efficiently pursue the myriad goals that have been chosen for it. I will characterize and evaluate in a somewhat stylized fashion three possible policies: an \"engineering\" approach, an \"economics\" approach, and a systematic custom design approach. I will use Space Station as an example to highlight some of the major economic issues facing large scale multipurpose research and development efforts, the analytical capabilities we now have to address these issues, and the (non-engineering) research that needs to be done to advance the successful long-term development of space.", "date": "2017-09-15", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-150213282", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-150213282", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/65nfx-ytv91", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp617.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/65nfx-ytv91/files/sswp617.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/hwega-5cv60", "eprint_id": 81417, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 18:32:40", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:28:07", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Easley-D", "name": { "family": "Easley", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised. Original dated to March 1981. \n\nThis paper benefited from discussions in seminars at Cornell, Northwestern, Stonybrook, and an NSF Conference on Experimental Economics at the University of Arizona. This version is significantly different from earlier versions. We would like to thank Vernon Smith and Arlington Williams for making data on their Plata DOA experiments available to us. \n\nPublished as Easley, David, and John Ledyard. \"Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions.\" The double auction market: Institutions, theories, and evidence 15 (1993).\n\nSubmitted - sswp611.pdf
", "abstract": "We provide a theory to explain the data generated by Double Oral Auctions. The primary conclusion suggested by Double Oral Auction experiments is that the quantities exchanged and the prices at which transactions take place converge to, or near to, the values predicted by the competitive equilibrium model. Our theory predicts convergence to the competitive equilibrium and provides an explanation of disequilibrium behavior. The predictions of our theory fit the data better than do the predictions of Walrasian, Marshallian or game theoretic models.", "date": "2017-09-15", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-133503410", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-133503410", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/hwega-5cv60", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp611.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/hwega-5cv60/files/sswp611.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Easley, David and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/68k2y-nze20", "eprint_id": 81274, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:37:12", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:26:51", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Banks-J-S", "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David P." } } ] }, "title": "The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Mechanisms, pricing, uncertainty, fitting, experiments, priority, scheduling, auctions", "note": "We would like to acknowledge the computer programming assistance of Peter Gray and Mark\nOlson. We would like to thank Bob Benson of NASA (Payload Engineering) for his patience in\nanswering our many questions concerning Spacelab allocation procedures. Financial assistance\nfrom the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences at Caltech and from JPL is gratefully\nacknowledged.\n\nSubmitted - sswp648.pdf
", "abstract": "This paper demonstrates the use of applied organizational design to investigate possible\nmechanisms to allocate the resources of Space Station. First, a specific laboratory experimental\nenvironment (testbed) and baseline policy are developed using the salient technical features of the\nSpace Station and past Space Shuttle experiences. The use of priority contracts to assist in\ncontingent rescheduling of resources due to supply curtailments is established. Next, generalized\nversions of an English auction and Vickrey-Groves type sealed bid auction are designed and\ndeveloped to allocate scheduled resource use and priority. Finally, these mechanisms are tested and\nevaluated in the testbed. The data demonstrates that the expected efficiency increases significantly\nusing the auction mechanisms rather than allocations from first-come-first-served processes.\nHowever, the auction mechanisms do not produce outcomes near the 100% level of efficiency.\nSeveral results are dedicated to the revenue generating properties of the mechanisms and individual\nbidding behavior.", "date": "2017-09-11", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151906378", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151906378", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Caltech Division of Humanities and Social Sciences" }, { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/68k2y-nze20", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp648.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/68k2y-nze20/files/sswp648.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Banks, Jeffrey S.; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mhs8g-89z20", "eprint_id": 81195, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 20:53:21", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:25:56", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Banks-J-S", "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } } ] }, "title": "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "This work was partially funded by Caltech and NASA-JPL. We thank them for their support. They are not responsible for the content. We thank Peter Gray and Mark Olson for computer programming assistance. We also thank Charles Plott, Jim Quirk and Stan Reiter for helpful insights and discussions. This paper represents a major revision of our earlier 1987 paper. All the material on markets is new as are some of the conclusions. \n\nPublished as Banks, Jeffrey S., John O. Ledyard, and David P. Porter. \"Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach.\" The Rand journal of economics (1989): 1-25.\n\nSubmitted - sswp680.pdf
", "abstract": "We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include scheduling job shops, airports or super-computers, zero-inventory planning, and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. We show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65percent efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two that arise naturally from auctions used in the allocation of single dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of both administrative and market procedures.", "date": "2017-09-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-135234942", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-135234942", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NASA/JPL/Caltech" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/mhs8g-89z20", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp680.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mhs8g-89z20/files/sswp680.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Banks, Jeffrey S.; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/k0pn8-m1r25", "eprint_id": 81211, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:15:41", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:26:07", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Incentive Compatibility", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Published as Ledyard, John O. \"Incentive compatibility.\" In Allocation, Information and Markets, pp. 141-151. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989.\n\nSubmitted - sswp622.pdf
", "abstract": "Incentive compatibility is described and discussed. A summary of the current state of understanding is provided. Key words are: incentive compatibility, game theory, implementation, mechanism, Bayes, Nash, and revelation.", "date": "2017-09-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-145751798", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-145751798", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/k0pn8-m1r25", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp622.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/k0pn8-m1r25/files/sswp622.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/96gx6-bw273", "eprint_id": 81160, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 21:00:11", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:25:48", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "I would like to thank John Ferejohn who once asked me whether elections aggregated information like markets do. (The answer, John, is no.) I would also like to thank Richard McKelvey for helpful comments\n\nSubmitted - sswp685.pdf
", "abstract": "Many interesting political institutions, such as campaigning, polls, and sequences of elections cannot be understood in the context of standard spatial competition models of elections with fully informed candidates and voters. To fill this void, we introduce a model of elections in which candidates are privately and asymmetrically informed about the electorate. This model differs from other incomplete information models, such as the rational expectations model, in that a full range of sequential strategic behavior is considered. We begin with a model in which candidates can constantly revise their positions before the election. In this case, one might expect each to \"invert\" the other's strategies and infer the other's private information, as is done in equilibrium with rational expectations. However, we find that each candidate, knowing the other will try to make such inferences, will follow a strategy which is not invertible. No information will leak from one candidate to the other. The outcome will be identical to a single-move election with incomplete information and no information aggregation will occur.\nThe introduction of a public poll changes the results in an interesting way. Candidates still use pooling strategies (strategies that are constant on their private information) to avoid leaking anything to the opponent but, contrary to the case without the poll, candidates learn about the electorate before the election. In equilibrium, candidates use mixed strategies (pure strategy equilibria do not exist) and the better informed player cannot prevent the lesser informed from learning from the poll. No private information is leaked but information aggregation occurs. We conclude with an examination of the effect on information aggregation of a sequence of elections. In the previous results, candidates moves were \"free\" in the sense that revisions were costless as in a \"cheap talk\" model. Now moves are not free and hiding information today in order to improve one's chances of winning tomorrow may lower one's chances today. We show that information aggregation may occur both through the results of the election (as with the poll) and through the leakage of private information. We also provide an example in which the strategic choices of the candidates are skewed away from the rational expectations equilibrium. Because of the asymmetric information and the strategic issues surrounding information leakage, behavior is different than would be observed in simple one-shot elections.", "date": "2017-09-05", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-153759955", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-153759955", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/96gx6-bw273", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp685.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/96gx6-bw273/files/sswp685.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dja9h-egh71", "eprint_id": 80975, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 01:46:38", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:15:31", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Boylan-R-T", "name": { "family": "Boylan", "given": "Richard T." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." } } ] }, "title": "Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised version. Original dated to October 1991. \n\nSupport for this research was provided, in part by NSF grant #SES-8604348 to the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 2. \n\nPublished as Boylan, Richard T., John Ledyard, and Richard D. McKelvey. \"Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results.\" Economic Theory 7, no. 2 (1996): 191-205.\n\nSubmitted - sswp780.pdf
", "abstract": "We study a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation and consumption are made through a political process of two candidate competition. Each voter's utility for a consumption stream is the discounted value of that voter's utility of consumption in each period. We consider the case when voters' one period utility functions for consumption are identical but discount factors are different. We are particularly interested in the conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth paths occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur.\nThe answer depends on the ability or inability of the candidates to commit to multi-period investment strategies. If candidates can commit indefinitely into the future, then a political (majority rule) equilibrium path will not exist if all discount factors are different. For any feasible consumption path, there is a perturbation which is majority preferred to it. For any neoclassical optimal path there exists a perturbated path that is preferred to it either unanimously or by all but one voter. These results are true even if the perturbations can differ at no more than three consecutive periods from the original path.\nIf candidates are unable to commit to multi-period plans, we show there is a unique subgame perfect, stationary, symmetric equilibrium to the infinite horizon two candidate competition game; namely the optimal consumption path for the median voter. The equilibrium is unique in the following sense: It is the unique limit of subgame perfect equilibria to the finite horizon electoral game.\nIn the case when candidates can commit for a finite time into the future, we show that a stationary minmax path (a path which minimizes the maximum vote that can be obtained against it) yields a political business cycle.", "date": "2017-08-30", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-135904085", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-135904085", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-8604348" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/dja9h-egh71", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp780.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dja9h-egh71/files/sswp780.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Boylan, Richard T.; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/f3s6c-3pw50", "eprint_id": 80749, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 03:54:49", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:11:21", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised version. Original dated to August 1993. \n\nI thank the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA for their financial support. For their intellectual help and advice, I thank Peter Bohm, Don Coursey, Robyn Dawes, Roy Gardner, Mark Johnson, John Kagel, Jamie Brown-Kruse, Susan Laury, Gerald Marwell, Rosemarie Nagel, John Orbell, Elinor Ostrom, Tom Palfrey, Charles Plott, Amnon Rapoport, Al Roth, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Steve Slutsky, Richard Thaler, James Walker, most of the participants in the Conference on Experimental Research on the Provision of Public Goods and Common-Property Resources at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, and especially Mark Isaac without whom I would not have gotten even this far. Some of these strongly disagree with parts of my commentary. They may be justified. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O., \"Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research\" in Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton University Press 1995. 111-194\n\nSubmitted - sswp861_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. A review is made of various public goods experiments. It is found that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.", "date": "2017-08-30", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-160736011", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170823-160736011", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/f3s6c-3pw50", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp861_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/f3s6c-3pw50/files/sswp861_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/zvw0j-4sc93", "eprint_id": 80804, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:54:43", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:13:45", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Szakaly-K-E", "name": { "family": "Szakaly", "given": "Kristin E." } } ] }, "title": "Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised version. Original Published in February 1993. \n\nWe would like to thank the Flight Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Lab (NASA) for financial support through their grant to the Program on Organization Design at Caltech. This is one of a number of studies on the transition from non-market allocation to market-like allocation mechanisms. We would also like to thank Jamie Kruse, Linda Cohen, and two anonymous referees for their comments. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O., and Kristin Szakaly-Moore. \"Designing organizations for trading pollution rights.\" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 25, no. 2 (1994): 167-196.\n\nSubmitted - sswp838_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "Regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions. Our research focuses on choosing a permit trading mechanism that is both economically efficient and politically viable. We consider an organized trading process and a revenue neutral auction, both of which involve an initial allocation of permits based on past history. Each is tested in a competitive and in a non-competitive environment to determine which mechanism performs best. The results of our research suggest that, overall, the organized trading process outperforms the revenue neutral auction.", "date": "2017-08-28", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-143301240", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-143301240", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/zvw0j-4sc93", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp838_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/zvw0j-4sc93/files/sswp838_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly, Kristin E." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/y75p1-g1790", "eprint_id": 80809, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:21:26", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:13:50", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Computing", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "assignment problem, mechanism design, incentive compatibility, cooperation, experimental economics.", "note": "This paper relies heavily on the results from an ongoing research project with Mark Olson and David Porter funded by the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (NASA) through a grant to the Program on Organizational Design (PrOD) at Caltech. None of them is responsible for any errors. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O. \"The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing.\" Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce 3, no. 1 (1993): 121-134.\n\nSubmitted - sswp836.pdf
", "abstract": "We provide an introduction to a theory of coordination mechanism design and show how to apply it to an assignment problem. The purpose is to introduce those familiar with organizational computing, but unfamiliar with game theory and economics, to the subject. We also describe briefly how we can test new mechanisms before taking them into the field. Finally, we raise some unresolved research questions.", "date": "2017-08-28", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-145611518", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-145611518", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/y75p1-g1790", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp836.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/y75p1-g1790/files/sswp836.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rgkfq-awr86", "eprint_id": 80684, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 05:40:58", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:10:23", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Dudek-R", "name": { "family": "Dudek", "given": "R." } }, { "id": "Kim-Taesung", "name": { "family": "Kim", "given": "Taesung" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "First Best Bayesian Privatization Mechanisms", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised version. Original dated to August 1994. \n\nWe are grateful to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, Mathew Jackson, Herve Moulin and Tom Palfrey for their comments on an early version. We have also benefited greatly from the many valuable suggestions of two anonymous referees.\n\nSubmitted - sswp896_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "A planner is interested in designing an ex-post efficient, individually rational, Bayesian mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of the agents who knows his own valuation and only the distribution of other agents' valuations of the object. In this paper, we show that it is impossible to design such a mechanism without any transfers among agents and the planner. However, we discover and describe an ex-post efficient, ex-post individually rational, Bayesian mechanism which balances transfers among agents without any payment to (or from) the planner.\nOur result that an ex-post efficient, ex-post individually rational, transfer balanced, Bayesian mechanism exists, is in stark contrast to two well-known impossibility results in the literature; the nonexistence of a Bayesian public good mechanism satisfying expost efficiency, individual rationality and budget balance (Laffont and Maskin (1979)) and the impossibility of an ex-post efficient, individually rational, Bayesian bilateral trading mechanism between a seller and a buyer without an outside subsidy (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).", "date": "2017-08-23", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-135920548", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-135920548", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/rgkfq-awr86", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp896_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rgkfq-awr86/files/sswp896_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Dudek, R.; Kim, Taesung; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/r2944-rm514", "eprint_id": 80631, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 02:58:21", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:09:39", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bykowsky-M-M", "name": { "family": "Bykowsky", "given": "Mark. M" } }, { "id": "Cull-R-J", "name": { "family": "Cull", "given": "Robert J." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised version. Original dated to January 1995. \n\nPublished as Bykowsky, Mark M., Robert J. Cull, and John O. Ledyard. \"Mutually destructive bidding: The FCC auction design problem.\" Journal of Regulatory Economics 17, no. 3 (2000): 205-228.\n\nSubmitted - sswp916_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "Dissatisfaction with previous assignment mechanisms and the desire to raise revenue induced Congress to grant the FCC authority to auction radio licenses. The debate over an appropriate auction design was wide ranging with many imaginative proposals. Many of the arguments and their scientific support are unfortunately not publicly available. Here, we present our side of this debate for the record.\nSynergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a \"simple\" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in \"fitting complexity.\" In some environments, bidding may become \"mutually destructive.\" Experiments indicate that a combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a \"threshold\" problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.", "date": "2017-08-21", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-151840242", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-151840242", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/r2944-rm514", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp916_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/r2944-rm514/files/sswp916_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Bykowsky, Mark. M; Cull, Robert J.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/sb8p2-77f71", "eprint_id": 80630, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 05:15:20", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:09:37", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Noussair-C-N", "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles N." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David P." } } ] }, "title": "The Allocation of a Shared Resource Within an Organization", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Scheduling, Auctions, Mechanism design", "note": "The authors thank the Implementation Development Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA for their financial support.\n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O., Charles Noussair, and David Porter. \"The allocation of a shared resource within an organization.\" Review of Economic Design 2, no. 1 (1996): 163-192.\n\nSubmitted - sswp917.pdf
", "abstract": "Many resources such as supercomputers, legal advisors, and university classrooms are shared by many members of an organization. When the supply of shared resources is limited, conflict usually results between contending demanders. If these conflicts can be adequately resolved, then value is created for the organization. In this paper we use the methodology of applied mechanism design to examine alternative processes for the resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems. We construct a laboratory environment, within which we evaluate the outcomes of various allocation mechanisms. In particular, we are able to measure efficiency, the value attained by the resulting allocations as a percentage of the maximum possible value. Our choice of environment and parameters is guided by a specific application, the allocation of time on NASA's Deep Space Network, but the results also provide insights relevant to other scheduling and allocation applications. We find (1) experienced user committees using decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations in lower conflict situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) there is a mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) which charges users for time, which yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but because of the prices paid, the net surplus available to the users is less than that resulting from the inefficient user committee (a reason why users may not appreciate \"market solutions\" to organization problems) and (3) there is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, or internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus is still an issue, the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM.", "date": "2017-08-21", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-150309360", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170818-150309360", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/sb8p2-77f71", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp917.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/sb8p2-77f71/files/sswp917.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Noussair, Charles N.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/y319s-0vv88", "eprint_id": 80533, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 01:27:08", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:08:23", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "public goods, mechanism design, referendum, interim efficiency, incentive compatibility, private values", "note": "Second revised version. Previously revised November 1996. Original dated to February 1996. \n\nWe are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation grant no. SBR-9223701, and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author is grateful for the hospitality and research support at Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle and at Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique. The paper has benefited from the comments of seminar participants at Universite de la Mediterranee, Northwestern University, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise, the Conference on Efficiency in Economics with Public Goods and Private Information at the University of Venice, the Roy Seminar at Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees, the 1996 Francqui Prize Colloquium in Brussels, and from discussions with Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet and Jean-Charles Rochet. Three referees and a coeditor provided additional helpful suggestions which have improved the paper. The usual disclaimer applies. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1999) Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem. Econometrica, 67 (2). pp. 435-448.\n\nSubmitted - sswp956_-_revised_2.pdf
", "abstract": "We consider a Bayesian public goods environment with independent private valuations, where a public good can be produced at constant returns to scale, up to some capacity. We fully characterize the interim efficient allocation rules and prove that they correspond to decision rules based on a virtual cost-benefit criterion, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. Compared to the classical Lindahl-Samuelson solution there are generally distortions that depend on the welfare weights because the efficient way to reduce the tax burden on low-valuation (resp: high-valuation) types is to reduce (resp: increase) the level of provision of the public good. Second, we explore the implementation of efficient allocations by means of simple, dominant strategy voting rules, called referenda. In a referendum, individuals vote for or against production of the public good. If a sufficiently large fraction vote in favor, the good is provided at maximum capacity and costs are distributed equally across the population. Otherwise the good is not produced. We prove that for each interim efficient allocation rule there exists a referendum that approximates that achieves the same total surplus in large populations. Furthermore, if there is common value uncertainty in addition to the private valuations uncertainty, then the approximately optimal referendum is unique.", "date": "2017-08-17", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-164222869", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170816-164222869", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-9223701" }, { "agency": "JPL New Millennium Program" }, { "agency": "Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle" }, { "agency": "Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/y319s-0vv88", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp956_-_revised_2.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/y319s-0vv88/files/sswp956_-_revised_2.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6ehr5-jww49", "eprint_id": 80451, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 07:20:58", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:07:36", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Rangel-A", "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" } } ] }, "title": "The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous Items", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Some of the trials and the data generated are described in a report to the FCC. See Ledyard, Plott, and Porter (1994). For a discussion of the role of experimentation in the FCC design process, see Plott (1996). We would like to thank Robin Hanson for his design of the spatial environments. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, J.O., Porter, D., & Rangel, A. (1997). Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6(3), 639-675.\n\nSubmitted - sswp978.pdf
", "abstract": "During the discussion and evaluation of proposals for the design of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mechanism to sell the spectrum, over 130 auctions were run under controlled conditions at Caltech for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the FCC and others. In this paper we look at these data and try to extract some useful findings for those who may be involved in creating future designs of similar auctions. For those whose experience with experimental economics methodology is limited, we begin with a section on the general framework within which experimental work underlying applied mechanism design is conducted. Next we cover, in section 2, the various technical pieces needed to understand the data: performance measures, economic environments, mechanisms tested, and the major issues considered. The experimental data are presented and our observations are summarized in section 3. We end, in section 4, with some thoughts for future work and with the observation that there is a huge gap between, theory, scientific evidence, and practice in the design of complex auctions. Much needed research remains to be done.", "date": "2017-08-16", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-163214049", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170815-163214049", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/6ehr5-jww49", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp978.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6ehr5-jww49/files/sswp978.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Porter, David; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wve8f-fxz97", "eprint_id": 80271, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 04:41:03", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:32:39", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "DeMartini-C", "name": { "family": "DeMartini", "given": "Christine" } }, { "id": "Kwasnica-A-M", "name": { "family": "Kwasnica", "given": "Anthony M." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } } ] }, "title": "A New and Improved Design for Multi-Object Iterative Auctions", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Published as Kwasnica, A.M., Ledyard, J.O., Porter, D., & DeMartini, C. (2005). A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions. Management science, 51(3), 419-434.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1054.pdf
", "abstract": "In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design (see Milgrom (1995)) and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. We are able to demonstrate, in both simple and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.", "date": "2017-08-11", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-170308555", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-170308555", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/wve8f-fxz97", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1054.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wve8f-fxz97/files/sswp1054.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "DeMartini, Christine; Kwasnica, Anthony M.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/b7sbx-5k980", "eprint_id": 80328, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 02:34:14", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 00:53:04", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Kalai-E", "name": { "family": "Kalai", "given": "Ehud" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Repeated Implementation", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Revised version. Original dated to August 1996.\n\nThe authors wish to thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of JEL for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant No. SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millennium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA.\n\nPublished as Kalai, E., & Ledyard, J.O. (1998). Repeated implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), 308-317.\n\nPublished - sswp1027.pdf
", "abstract": "In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable.\n\nRepeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation \"folk theorem\": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.", "date": "2017-08-11", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-163520727", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-163520727", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-955421" }, { "agency": "New Millennium Project Office, JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/b7sbx-5k980", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1027.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/b7sbx-5k980/files/sswp1027.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/txk4w-c9032", "eprint_id": 79947, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 05:27:14", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:30:38", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ishikida-Takashi", "name": { "family": "Ishikida", "given": "Takashi" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Olson-M-A", "name": { "family": "Olson", "given": "Mark A." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } } ] }, "title": "Experimental Testbedding of a Pollution Trading System: Southern California's RECLAIM Emissions Market", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Ishikida, T., Ledyard, J., Olson, M., & Porter, D. (2001). Experimental testbedding of a pollution trading system: Southern California's RECLAIM emissions market. In Research in Experimental Economics (pp. 185-220). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1094.pdf
", "abstract": "[No abstract]", "date": "2017-08-09", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-140630427", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-140630427", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/txk4w-c9032", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1094.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/txk4w-c9032/files/sswp1094.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ishikida, Takashi; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/yk4m6-yrv98", "eprint_id": 79944, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 06:09:26", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:30:37", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bossaerts-P", "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603" }, { "id": "Fine-Leslie", "name": { "family": "Fine", "given": "Leslie" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Inducing Liquidity in Thin Financial Markets through Combined-Value Trading Mechanisms", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Liquidity, Portfolio trading, Financial markets, Experimental finance", "note": "Revised version. Original dated to March 2000. \n\nFinancial support was provided by The California Institute of Technology, The New Millennium Project of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and by the IBM Fellowship in Experimental Economics. The paper benefited from comments during a conference on liquidity at UCLA in May 2000, and from suggestions by Chester Spatt.\n\nPublished as Bossaerts, Peter, Leslie Fine, and John Ledyard. \"Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms.\" European Economic Review 46.9 (2002): 1671-1695.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1095_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "Previous experimental research has shown that thin financial markets fail to fully equilibrate, in contrast with thick markets. A specific type of market risk is conjectured to be the reason, namely, the risk of partial execution of desired portfolio rearrangements in a system of parallel, unconnected double auction markets. This market risk causes liquidity to dry up before equilibrium is reached. To verify the conjecture, we organized markets directly as a portfolio trading mechanism, allowing agents to better coordinate their orders across securities. The mechanism is an implementation of the combined-value trading (CVT) system. We present evidence that our portfolio trading mechanism facilitates equilibration to the same extent as thick markets do. Like in thick markets, the emergence of equilibrium pricing cannot be attributed to chance. Inspection of order submission and trade activity reveals that subjects manage to exploit the direct linkages between markets presented by the CVT system.", "date": "2017-08-09", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-135334937", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-135334937", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Caltech" }, { "agency": "JPL" }, { "agency": "IBM" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/yk4m6-yrv98", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1095_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/yk4m6-yrv98/files/sswp1095_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Bossaerts, Peter; Fine, Leslie; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/v811f-scj07", "eprint_id": 79952, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 21:38:45", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:30:46", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "public goods; interim efficiency; voting; simple mechanisms", "note": "Revised version. Original version dated to August 1999. \n\nThis is a revision of a paper entitled \"Voting is Approximately Optimal.\" We are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author is grateful for the hospitality and research support at LEI-CREST. We thank two anonymous referees for their comments. \nPublished as Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2002) The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes. Journal of Public Economics, 83 (2). pp. 153-171.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1092_-_revised.pdf
", "abstract": "This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called referenda, to the performance of interim efficient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. Costs are shared equally. We show that in large populations for any interim efficient allocation rule, there exists a corresponding referendum that yields approximately the same total welfare when there are many individuals. Moreover, if there is a common value component to the voters' preferences, then there is a unique approximating referendum.", "date": "2017-08-09", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-142250579", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-142250579", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/v811f-scj07", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1092_-_revised.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/v811f-scj07/files/sswp1092_-_revised.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/1xbgs-71j14", "eprint_id": 79948, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 05:27:18", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:30:40", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Olson-M-A", "name": { "family": "Olson", "given": "Mark A." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Swanson-J-A", "name": { "family": "Swanson", "given": "Joseph A." } }, { "id": "Torma-D-P", "name": { "family": "Torma", "given": "David P." } } ] }, "title": "The First Use of a Combined Value Auction for Transportation Services", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Games/group decisions: bidding/auctions. Transportation: costs", "note": "Published as Ledyard, J.O., Olson, M., Porter, D., Swanson, J.A., & Torma, D.P. (2002). The first use of a combined-value auction for transportation services. Interfaces, 32(5), 4-12.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1093.pdf
", "abstract": "Sears, Roebuck and Co. is one of the largest procurers of trucking services in the world through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sears Logistics Services (SLS). SLS controls supply chain elements that originate at the vendor (manufacturer) through distribution centers to retail stores, and from vendor to distribution centers to cross dock facilities. This case examines a major change in the method Sears used in contracting for truckload carrier services for this supply chain. It provides a pioneering example of complex business to business e-Commerce.", "date": "2017-08-09", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-141429666", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-141429666", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/1xbgs-71j14", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1093.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/1xbgs-71j14/files/sswp1093.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Olson, Mark A.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/74cgh-0j750", "eprint_id": 79505, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 01:24:49", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:25:30", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Market Design, Individual Fishing Quotas, Term Quotas, Auctions", "note": "This paper was prepared with the financial support of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Ecotrust. Ed Backus Karen Garrison, and Astrid Scholz provided valuable intellectual assistance. They are, of course, not responsible for any of the content.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1301.pdf
", "abstract": "I examine the impact of market design on the performance of a cap-and-trade program for Individual Fishing Quotas. In equilibrium, neither the term of the quota, the number of years for which it is valid, nor the method of initial allocation, granting or selling, has a differential effect on the protability of the shery or the quality of the environment. However, the term of the quota and the method of initialization can have a big impact on the price discovery process and whether equilibrium is attained. Because of this, both the fishery and the environment can be significantly better off with a mixture of historically based grants and auctions with some form of limited term quotas. I also discuss some additional benefits from an initialization process that generates some revenue for the public. Section 5 contains a summary.", "date": "2017-08-02", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-150205866", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-150205866", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "National Resources Defense Council" }, { "agency": "Ecotrust" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/74cgh-0j750", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1301.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/74cgh-0j750/files/sswp1301.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fwfvf-9g770", "eprint_id": 79629, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 12:33:07", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 23:26:58", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "A General Characterization of Interim Efficient Mechanisms for Independent Linear Environments", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "public goods, mechanism design, interim efficiency, incentive compatibility, private values", "note": "The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, grant SES-0079301. This is a revised version of a lecture presented at the CORE Conference in Memory of Louis-Andr\u00e9 G\u00e9rard-Varet, January, 2003. Earlier versions were presented at Northwestern University and the 1999 Midwest Mathematical Economics meeting at University of Illinois. We are grateful to seminar participants for comments. \n\nPublished as Ledyard, J.O., & Palfrey, T.R. (2007). A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments. Journal of Economic Theory, 133(1), 441-466.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1186.pdf
", "abstract": "We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. We demonstrate how these techniques can be applied easily to the design of auctions, markets, bargaining rules, public good provision, and assignment problems.", "date": "2017-08-01", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-152920042", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-152920042", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0079301" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/fwfvf-9g770", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1186.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fwfvf-9g770/files/sswp1186.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mte8a-n4r44", "eprint_id": 78852, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-18 23:57:06", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 20:32:00", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Fine-Leslie", "name": { "family": "Fine", "given": "Leslie" } }, { "id": "Goeree-J-K", "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "orcid": "0000-0001-9876-3425" }, { "id": "Ishikida-Takashi", "name": { "family": "Ishikida", "given": "Tak" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "To appear in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Cambridge University Press.\n\nJohn Ledyard would like to thank NSF for its support under grants numbered 1216024-ICES: Large: Collaborative Research: Markets - Algorithms, Applications and the Digital Economy and 1518941-NeTS: Large: Networked Markets: Theory and Applications.\n\nSubmitted - sswp1424.pdf
", "abstract": "In 1990 the South Coast Air Quality Management District created a tradable emissions program to more efficiently manage the ex- tremely bad emissions in the \nLos Angeles basin. The program created 136 different assets that an environmental engineer could use to cover emissions in place of installing expensive abatement equipment. Standard markets could not deal with this complexity and little trading occurred. A new combinatorial market was created in response and operated successfully for many years. That market design, called ACE (approximate competitive equilibrium), is described in detail and its successful performance in practice is analyzed.", "date": "2017-07-13", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "CCF-1216024" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "CNS-1518941" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/mte8a-n4r44", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp1424.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mte8a-n4r44/files/sswp1424.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2017", "author_list": "Fine, Leslie; Goeree, Jacob K.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/x8d9n-q6988", "eprint_id": 65720, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 03:06:01", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 16:46:03", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "March 1990. Revised September 1993.\n\nAcknowledgments. This paper replaces an earlier version, entitled \"On the Optimality of Lottery Drafts: Characterization of Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem.\" We have benefited from comments by two referees and by seminar participants at Caltech, MIT, Northwestern, Texas, and Texas A&M, and the 1989 FRET Conference in San Diego. We especially wish to acknowledge useful conversations with Kim Border and Ed Green. Ledyard gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Palfrey gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8718657 and SES-8815097.\n\nAccepted Version - sswp717.pdf
", "abstract": "This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and\ncost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and\nfixed size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public\ngoods decision, affects social welfare. An efficient public good decision can always be\naccomplished by a majority voting scheme, where the number of \"YES\" votes required\ndepends on the welfare weights in a simple way. The results are shown to have a natural\ngeometry and an intuitive interpretation. We also extend these results to allow for\nrestrictions on feasible transfer rules, ranging from the traditional unlimited transfers to\nthe extreme case of no transfers.\n\nFor a range of welfare weights, an optimal scheme is a two-stage procedure which\ncombines a voting stage with a second stage where an even-chance lottery is used to\ndetermine who pays. We call this the \"lottery draft mechanism\". Since such a costsharing\nscheme does not require transfers, it follows that in many cases transfers are\nnot necessary to achieve the optimal allocation. For other ranges of welfare weights\nthe second stage is more complicated, but the voting stage remains the same. If transfers\nare completely infeasible, randomized voting rules may be optimal. The paper also\nprovides a geometric characterization of the effects of voluntary participation constraints.", "date": "2016-03-28", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160328-160830650", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160328-160830650", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL Flight Projects Office" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-8718657" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-8815097" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.7907/x8d9n-q6988", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp717.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/x8d9n-q6988/files/sswp717.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2016", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ejjya-qpw45", "eprint_id": 44592, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:37:32", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:48:23", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Carlson-D", "name": { "family": "Carlson", "given": "Dale" } }, { "id": "Forman-C", "name": { "family": "Forman", "given": "Charles" } }, { "id": "Olmstead-N", "name": { "family": "Olmstead", "given": "Nancy" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David P." } }, { "id": "Sholtz-A", "name": { "family": "Sholtz", "given": "Anne" } } ] }, "title": "An Analysis and Recommendation for the Terms of the RECLAIM Trading Credit", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Contract No. R-C93074. April 27, 1993.\n\nPublished - 386760.pdf
", "abstract": "The South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) has proposed an annual RECLAIM Trading Credit (RTC) with uniform issue and compliance dates as the trading instrument for its market-based regulatory program. The proposed design for this instrument carries potential problems for both RECLAIM facilities and AQMD, including\nmarket imbalances, price volatility, economic inefficiencies, and an increase in ambient emission peaks. These problems result directly from the design of the instrument, and they can be alleviated through the selection of alternate design variables and a change in the allocation of RTCs to RECLAIM facilities. Both the problems and the effectiveness of the solutions have been tested and documented in experiments conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science at the California Institute of Technology.", "date": "2014-10-28", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "South Coast Air Quality Management District", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-152938560", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-152938560", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "primary_object": { "basename": "386760.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ejjya-qpw45/files/386760.pdf" }, "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2014", "author_list": "Carlson, Dale; Forman, Charles; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/s5jdf-g4464", "eprint_id": 44593, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:53:45", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:48:25", "type": "monograph", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." } }, { "id": "Carlson-D", "name": { "family": "Carlson", "given": "Dale" } }, { "id": "Olmstead-N", "name": { "family": "Olmstead", "given": "Nancy" } }, { "id": "Forman-C", "name": { "family": "Forman", "given": "Charles" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David P." } }, { "id": "Sholtz-A", "name": { "family": "Sholtz", "given": "Anne" } } ] }, "title": "An Analysis of the Information and Reporting Requirements, Market Architectures, Operational and Regulatory Issues, and Derivative Instruments for RECLAIM", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "date": "2014-10-28", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "South Coast Air Quality Management District", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-153839671", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140401-153839671", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "resource_type": "monograph", "pub_year": "2014", "author_list": "Plott, Charles R.; Carlson, Dale; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/q1t2j-eab44", "eprint_id": 45232, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 00:07:51", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 17:53:20", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Berliant-M", "name": { "family": "Berliant", "given": "Marcus" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.\n\nReceived June 21, 2011; Accepted April 13, 2012.\nArticle first published online: 15 Aug. 2013.\n\nWe thank Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, John Conley, Narayana Kocherlakota, Emmanuel Saez, an associate editor, two referees, and participants at the 2003 Public Choice Society Conference, the 2003 Decentralization Conference, the 2003 Association for Public Economic Theory Conference, and the fall 2003 Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Conference, as well as seminar audiences at Washington University and Northwestern University, for helpful comments. We thank Jon Hamilton and Steve Slutsky for comments and for pointing out an error in an earlier version. The first author gratefully acknowledges the kind hospitality of the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology during his sabbatical visit and the drafting of this paper, and financial support from the American Philosophical Society and Washington University in St. Louis. The authors retain responsibility for any errors: past, present, and future.", "abstract": "We wish to study optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes. Do real-world taxes share some of their features? What policy prescriptions can be made? We study a two-period model, where the consumers and government each have separate budget constraints in the two periods, so income cannot be transferred between periods. Labor supply in both periods is chosen by consumers. The government has memory, so taxes in the first period are a function of first-period labor income, whereas taxes in the second period are a function of both first- and second-period labor incomes. The government cannot commit to future taxes. Time consistency is thus imposed as a requirement. The main results of the paper show that time-consistent incentive-compatible two-period taxes involve separation of types in the first period and a differentiated lump-sum tax in the second period, provided that the discount rate is high or utility is separable between labor and consumption. In the natural extension of the Diamond () model with quasi-linear utility functions to two periods, an equivalence of dynamic and static optimal taxes is demonstrated, and a necessary condition for the top marginal tax rate on first-period income is found.", "date": "2014-04", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Public Economic Theory", "volume": "16", "number": "2", "publisher": "Wiley", "pagerange": "196-221", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140425-132301397", "issn": "1097-3923", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140425-132301397", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "American Philosophical Society" }, { "agency": "Washington University in St. Louis" } ] }, "doi": "10.1111/jpet.12061", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2014", "author_list": "Berliant, Marcus and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/jcrk9-bqz74", "eprint_id": 44843, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-09-15 04:38:21", "lastmod": "2023-10-23 21:08:01", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bossaerts-P", "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603" }, { "id": "Frydman-C", "name": { "family": "Frydman", "given": "Cary" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } } ] }, "title": "The Speed of Information Revelation and Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing Two Theories", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2013 The Authors. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association].\n\nComments from Craig Holden and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam on an earlier draft, as well as discussions with Charles Plott and Sera Linardi are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. Research supported by NSF grants DRU-0527491 and SES 0616431.", "abstract": "Two theoretical literatures, one using Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), and the other using noisy rational expectations equilibrium (NREE), both provide a foundation for understanding how private information is impounded into asset prices, yet some of their predictions are conflicting. Here, we compare for the first time, the two theories using data from carefully controlled laboratory asset markets. In the dynamics, we find strong evidence for BNE theory, although final prices support predictions of the NREE theory. Finally, we document that price volatility increases when information is being impounded in prices.", "date": "2014-01", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Review of Finance", "volume": "18", "number": "1", "publisher": "Oxford University Press", "pagerange": "1-22", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20140410-090653513", "issn": "1572-3097", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140410-090653513", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "DRU-0527491" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES 0616431" } ] }, "doi": "10.1093/rof/rfs049", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2014", "author_list": "Bossaerts, Peter; Frydman, Cary; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/4yy09-1wd81", "eprint_id": 39940, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 09:44:25", "lastmod": "2023-10-24 17:19:29", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Anufriev-M", "name": { "family": "Anufriev", "given": "Mikhail" } }, { "id": "Arifovic-J", "name": { "family": "Arifovic", "given": "Jasmina" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-7092-6541" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Panchenko-V", "name": { "family": "Panchenko", "given": "Valentyn" } } ] }, "title": "Efficiency of continuous double auctions under individual evolutionary learning with full or limited information", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Allocative efficiency; Continuous double auction; Individual evolutionary learning", "note": "\u00a9 2011 The Author(s).\n\nThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution\nNoncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in\nany medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.\n\nWe are grateful to two referees for their thorough reading of the paper\nand numerous useful suggestions. We thank the participants of the workshop \"Evolution and\nmarket behavior in economics and finance\" in Pisa, the SCE-2009 conference in Sydney, and\nthe seminars at the University of Amsterdam, University of Auckland, Concordia University,\nMontreal, Simon Fraser University and the University of Technology, Sydney, for useful comments\non earlier drafts of this paper. Mikhail Anufriev acknowledges the financial support\nby the EU 7th framework collaborative project \"Monetary, Fiscal and Structural Policies with\nHeterogeneous Agents (POLHIA)\", grant no. 225408. Jasmina Arifovic acknowledges financial\nsupport from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council under the Standard Research\nGrant Program. Valentyn Panchenko acknowledges the support under Australian Research\nCouncil's Discovery Projects funding scheme (project number DP0986718). Usual caveats apply.\n\nPublished - 10.1007_s00191-011-0230-8.pdf
", "abstract": "In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency\nand agents' behavior affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular,\nwe are interested whether learning behavior with and without information\nabout actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We consider\na simple market for a homogeneous good populated by buyers and sellers.\nThe valuations of the buyers and the costs of the sellers are given exogenously.\nAgents are involved in consecutive trading sessions, which are organized as\na continuous double auction with order book. Using Individual Evolutionary\nLearning agents submit price bids and offers, trying to learn the most profitable\nstrategy by looking at their realized and counterfactual or \"foregone\" payoffs.\nWe find that learning outcomes heavily depend on information treatments.\nUnder full information about actions of others, agents' orders tend to be\nsimilar, while under limited information agents tend to submit their valuations/\ncosts. This behavioral outcome results in higher price volatility for the latter treatment. We also find that learning improves allocative efficiency when\ncompared to outcomes Zero-Intelligent traders.", "date": "2013-07", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Evolutionary Economics", "volume": "23", "number": "3", "publisher": "Springer Verlag", "pagerange": "539-573", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20130815-092245964", "issn": "0936-9937", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130815-092245964", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "European Union (EU) 7th Framework Collaborative Project", "grant_number": "225408" }, { "agency": "Standard Research Grant Program Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council" }, { "agency": "Australian Research Council Discovery Project funding scheme", "grant_number": "DP0986718" } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/s00191-011-0230-8", "primary_object": { "basename": "10.1007_s00191-011-0230-8.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/4yy09-1wd81/files/10.1007_s00191-011-0230-8.pdf" }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2013", "author_list": "Anufriev, Mikhail; Arifovic, Jasmina; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/y3ad7-t7p22", "eprint_id": 34507, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 06:58:37", "lastmod": "2023-10-19 15:00:48", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Arifovic-J", "name": { "family": "Arifovic", "given": "Jasmina" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-7092-6541" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } } ] }, "title": "Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "keywords": "Public goods; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Other-regarding preferences; Learning; Conditional cooperation; Reciprocity", "note": "\u00a9 2012 Elsevier B.V. Received 25 October 2010. Received in revised form 7 May 2012. Accepted 30 May 2012. Available online 15 June 2012. We thank Olena Kostyshyna and Lilong Shi for their help in generating the simulations\nin this paper. We would also like to thank participants at the 3rd annual Social\nDilemmas Workshop at Florida State in 2008; the 2008 Econometric Society Summer\nMeetings, Pittsburgh; 14th International Conference on Computing and Finance, 2008,\nParis; 2008 North-American ESA Conference, Tucson; the Decentralization Conference\nApril 2009, Amsterdam Symposium on Behavioral and Experimental Economics,\nSeptember 2011; and the participants at the seminars at University of Amsterdam, Paris\n2 University, University of NewSouthWales, University of Michigan, Chapman University,\nand George Mason University for helpful discussion. We also thank Lise Vesterlund for\nvery helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.", "abstract": "The data from experiments with the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism suggest five stylized facts, including the restart effect. To date, no theory has explained all of these facts simultaneously. We merge our Individual Evolutionary Learning model with a variation of heterogeneous other-regarding preferences and a distribution of types to provide a new theory that does. In addition, our theory answers some open questions concerning the data on partners\u2013strangers experiments. One interesting feature of the theory is that being a conditional cooperator is not a type but arises endogenously as a behavior. The data generated by our model are quantitatively similar to data from a variety of experiments, and experimenters, and are insensitive to moderate variations in the parameters of the model. That is, we have a robust explanation for most behavior in VCM experiments.", "date": "2012-10", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "volume": "96", "number": "9-10", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "808-823", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20120927-120424918", "issn": "0047-2727", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120927-120424918", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.013", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2012", "author_list": "Arifovic, Jasmina and Ledyard, John" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a0rmb-6mz52", "eprint_id": 31835, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:04:29", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 21:23:00", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Arifovic-J", "name": { "family": "Arifovic", "given": "Jasmina" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-7092-6541" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } } ] }, "title": "Individual evolutionary learning with many agents", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 2012 Cambridge University Press.\n\nWe thank Olena Kostyshyna for her very able research assistance. We also thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.\n\nPublished - Arifovic2012p18377Knowl_Eng_Rev.pdf
", "abstract": "Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) is a learning model based on the evolution of a population of strategies of an individual agent. In prior work, IEL has been shown to be consistent with the behavior of human subjects in games with a small number of agents. In this paper, we examine the performance of IEL in games with many agents. We find IEL to be robust to this type of scaling. With the appropriate linear adjustment of the mechanism parameter, the convergence behavior of IEL in games induced by Groves\u2013Ledyard mechanisms in quadratic environments is independent of the number of participants.", "date": "2012-06", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Knowledge Engineering Review", "volume": "27", "number": "2", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "pagerange": "239-254", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20120607-094141948", "issn": "0269-8889", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120607-094141948", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "doi": "10.1017/S026988891200015X", "primary_object": { "basename": "Arifovic2012p18377Knowl_Eng_Rev.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a0rmb-6mz52/files/Arifovic2012p18377Knowl_Eng_Rev.pdf" }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2012", "author_list": "Arifovic, Jasmina and Ledyard, John" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/chz37-kzj03", "eprint_id": 21201, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 01:14:08", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 23:50:29", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Healy-P-J", "name": { "family": "Healy", "given": "Paul J." } }, { "id": "Linardi-S", "name": { "family": "Linardi", "given": "Sera" } }, { "id": "Lowery-J-R", "name": { "family": "Lowery", "given": "J. Richard" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "keywords": "information aggregation; prediction markets; mechanism design", "note": "\u00a9 2010 INFORMS.\n\nReceived July 23, 2009; accepted June 14, 2010, by Teck-Hua Ho, decision analysis. Published online\nin Articles in Advance October 11, 2010.\n\nThis work was partially supported by National Science\nFoundation Grant SES-0847406. The authors thank Rachel\nCroson, Catherine Eckel, John Fountain, Rick Green, Joel\nGrus, Glenn Harrison, Ernan Haruvy, Shimon Kogan, Tony\nKwasnica, Sherry Li, Bryan Routledge, Justin Wolfers, an\nassociate editor, and two anonymous referees for their helpful\ncomments and conversations. Ines Fiorelli and Andrej\nSvorencik provided useful research assistance.", "abstract": "Double auction prediction markets have proven successful in large-scale applications such as elections and sporting events. Consequently, several large corporations have adopted these markets for smaller-scale internal applications where information may be complex and the number of traders is small. Using laboratory experiments, we test the performance of the double auction in complex environments with few traders and compare it to three alternative mechanisms. When information is complex we find that an iterated poll (or Delphi method) outperforms the double auction mechanism. We present five behavioral observations that may explain why the poll performs better in these settings.", "date": "2010-11", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Management Science", "volume": "56", "number": "11", "publisher": "INFORMS", "pagerange": "1977-1996", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20101206-154545200", "issn": "0025-1909", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20101206-154545200", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0847406" } ] }, "doi": "10.1287/mnsc.1100.1226", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2010", "author_list": "Healy, Paul J.; Linardi, Sera; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/tzztv-kxd49", "eprint_id": 16602, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 00:23:41", "lastmod": "2023-10-19 22:25:04", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Krajbich-I", "name": { "family": "Krajbich", "given": "Ian" } }, { "id": "Camerer-C-F", "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871" }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Rangel-A", "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" } } ] }, "title": "Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Free-Rider Problem", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2009 American Association for the Advancement of Science. \n\n4 June 2009; accepted 25 August 2009; published online 10 September 2009.\n\nSupporting Online Material:\nwww.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/1177302/DC1 - \nMaterials and Methods;\nFigs. S1 to S15;\nTables S1 to S3;\nReferences.\n\nFinancial support from NSF\u2013Integrative Graduate\nEducation and Research Traineeship Program (I.K.),\nGordon and Betty Moore Foundation (C.F.C., A.R.), and\nHuman Frontier Science Program (C.F.C.) is gratefully\nacknowledged.", "abstract": "Every social group needs to decide when to provide public goods and how to allocate the costs among its members. Ideally, this decision would maximize the group's net benefits while also ensuring that every individual's benefit is greater than the cost he or she has to pay. Unfortunately, the economic theory of mechanism design has shown that this ideal solution is not feasible when the group leadership does not know the values of the individual group members for the public good. We show that this impossibility result can be overcome in laboratory settings by combining technologies for obtaining neural measures of value (functional magnetic resonance imaging\u2013based pattern classification) with carefully designed institutions that allocate costs based on both reported and neurally measured values.", "date": "2009-10-23", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Science", "volume": "326", "number": "5952", "publisher": "American Association for the Advancement of Science", "pagerange": "596-599", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20091106-113059865", "issn": "0036-8075", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20091106-113059865", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation" }, { "agency": "Human Frontier Science Program" } ] }, "doi": "10.1126/science.1177302", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2009", "author_list": "Krajbich, Ian; Camerer, Colin; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/1x6xs-mhe97", "eprint_id": 97889, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 01:23:42", "lastmod": "2023-10-18 16:51:00", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } } ] }, "title": "Introduction to the issues in honor of Leonid Hurwicz", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 Springer-Verlag 2009. \n\nFirst Online: 28 March 2009.", "abstract": "In my second year in graduate school in 1965, Stanley Reiter gave me copy of \"Optimality and Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes\" published in 1959 by Leonid Hurwicz. The article had a remarkable effect on me. I knew immediately that these were the questions I went into economics to study and the precision with which I wanted to carry out that study. At the time there was no word for the area, today we call it Mechanism Design. The field and Leo's role in creating it were recognized with a Nobel Prize in 2007.", "date": "2009-04", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Review of Economic Design", "volume": "13", "number": "1-2", "publisher": "Springer", "pagerange": "1-1", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20190814-105349068", "issn": "1434-4742", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190814-105349068", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1007/s10058-009-0079-6", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2009", "author_list": "Ledyard, John" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/px5xx-0hh60", "eprint_id": 13826, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-09-14 18:48:38", "lastmod": "2023-10-23 20:45:25", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Hanson-R", "name": { "family": "Hanson", "given": "Robin" } }, { "id": "Ishikida-Takashi", "name": { "family": "Ishikida", "given": "Takashi" } } ] }, "title": "An experimental test of combinatorial information markets", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "keywords": "Prediction; Acquisition; Bias; Quantal response", "note": "\u00a9 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Received 1 March 2007;accepted 1 April 2008;available online 13 September 2008.\nFor their comments, we thank David Porter, Ryan Oprea, and participants of seminars at George Mason University,\nBrigham YoungUniversity,University of Michigan, James MadisonUniversity,University of California at Los Angeles, Overture Research, Microsoft Research, and the DIMACS Workshop on Markets as Predictive Devices. We thank DARPA for financial\nsupport.", "abstract": "While a simple information market lets one trade on the probability of each value of a single variable, a full combinatorial information market lets one trade on any combination of values of a set of variables, including any conditional or joint probability. In laboratory experiments, we compare the accuracy of simple markets, two kinds of combinatorial markets, a call market and a market maker, isolated individuals who report to a scoring rule, and two ways to combine those individual reports into a group prediction. We consider two environments with asymmetric information on sparsely correlated binary variables, one with three subjects and three variables, and the other with six subjects and eight variables (thus 256 states).", "date": "2009-02", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization", "volume": "69", "number": "2", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "182-189", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:LEDjebo09", "issn": "0167-2681", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:LEDjebo09", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "DARPA" } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.010", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2009", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Hanson, Robin; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/vrtd6-e5w04", "eprint_id": 13293, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 22:43:53", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:23:26", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Arrow-K-J", "name": { "family": "Arrow", "given": "Kenneth J." } }, { "id": "Forsythe-R", "name": { "family": "Forsythe", "given": "Robert" } }, { "id": "Gorham-M", "name": { "family": "Gorham", "given": "Michael" } }, { "id": "Hahn-R", "name": { "family": "Hahn", "given": "Robert" } }, { "id": "Hanson-R", "name": { "family": "Hanson", "given": "Robin" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Levmore-S", "name": { "family": "Levmore", "given": "Saul" } }, { "id": "Litan-R", "name": { "family": "Litan", "given": "Robert" } }, { "id": "Milgrom-P", "name": { "family": "Milgrom", "given": "Paul" } }, { "id": "Nelson-F-D", "name": { "family": "Nelson", "given": "Forrest D." } }, { "id": "Neumann-G-R", "name": { "family": "Neumann", "given": "George R." } }, { "id": "Ottaviani-M", "name": { "family": "Ottaviani", "given": "Marco" } }, { "id": "Schelling-T-C", "name": { "family": "Schelling", "given": "Thomas C." } }, { "id": "Shiller-R-J", "name": { "family": "Shiller", "given": "Robert J." } }, { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } }, { "id": "Snowberg-E", "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" } }, { "id": "Sunstein-C-R", "name": { "family": "Sunstein", "given": "Cass R." } }, { "id": "Tetlock-P-C", "name": { "family": "Tetlock", "given": "Paul C." } }, { "id": "Tetlock-P-E", "name": { "family": "Tetlock", "given": "Philip E." } }, { "id": "Varian-H-R", "name": { "family": "Varian", "given": "Hal R." } }, { "id": "Wolfers-J", "name": { "family": "Wolfers", "given": "Justin" } }, { "id": "Zitzewitz-E", "name": { "family": "Zitzewitz", "given": "Eric" } } ] }, "title": "The promise of prediction markets", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2008 American Association for the Advancement of Science.", "abstract": "The ability of groups of people to make predictions is a potent research tool that should be freed of unnecessary government restrictions.", "date": "2008-05-16", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Science", "volume": "320", "number": "5878", "publisher": "American Association for the Advancement of Science", "pagerange": "877-878", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:ARRsci08", "issn": "0036-8075", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ARRsci08", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1126/science.1157679", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2008", "author_list": "Arrow, Kenneth J.; Forsythe, Robert; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/85p42-5cd71", "eprint_id": 69866, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 20:22:00", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 20:42:34", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Chen-Yiling", "name": { "family": "Chen", "given": "Yiling" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Pennock-D-M", "name": { "family": "Pennock", "given": "David M." } }, { "id": "Zitzewitz-E", "name": { "family": "Zitzewitz", "given": "Eric" } } ] }, "title": "Second workshop on prediction markets", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Economics, Theory, Algorithms, Prediction market, information aggregation", "note": "Copyright is held by the author/owner(s).\n\nPublished - p361-chen.pdf
", "abstract": "The Second Workshop on Prediction Markets, following\nthe success of the first workshop held in 2005, explores research challenges in using markets as predictive devices. The workshop brings together researchers and practitioners from a variety of relevant fields, including economics, finance, computer science, and statistics, in both academia and industry, to discuss the state of the art today, and the challenges and prospects for tomorrow in the field of prediction markets.", "date": "2007-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "ACM", "place_of_pub": "New York, NY", "pagerange": "361-362", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160823-155716081", "isbn": "978-1-59593-653-0", "book_title": "EC '07 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160823-155716081", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1145/1250910.1250965", "primary_object": { "basename": "p361-chen.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/85p42-5cd71/files/p361-chen.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2007", "author_list": "Chen, Yiling; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/p1ac3-63b20", "eprint_id": 20120, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 08:38:40", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 22:15:12", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "keywords": "Public goods; Mechanism design; Interim efficiency; Incentive compatibility; Private values", "note": "\u00a9 2006 Elsevier.\n \nReceived 19 November 2003; revised 1 December 2005. Available online 2 March 2006. \n\nThe financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, grants SES-0079301\nand ITR/AP SES-0121478. This is a revised version of a lecture presented at the CORE Conference in Memory\nof Louis-Andr\u00e9 G\u00e9rard-Varet, January, 2003. Earlier versions were presented at Northwestern University and\nthe 1999 Midwest Mathematical Economics meeting at University of Illinois. We thank seminar participants\nand two referees for comments, and are grateful to Gregory Pavlov for finding an error in an earlier version of\nthe paper.", "abstract": "We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. We illustrate these techniques with applications to auction design and public good provision.", "date": "2007-03", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Theory", "volume": "133", "number": "1", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "441-466", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-090411858", "issn": "0022-0531", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-090411858", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-0079301" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "ITR/AP SES-0121478" } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2007", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/zt1gv-9wb06", "eprint_id": 20122, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-09-15 23:24:48", "lastmod": "2023-10-23 22:32:01", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Optimal Combinatoric Auctions with Single-Minded Bidders", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "combinatoric auctions; mechanism design; core", "note": "\u00a9 2007 ACM.\n\nYear of Publication: 2007\n\nI would like to thank the significant help of several referees\nin catching typos and adding references.", "abstract": "Combinatoric auctions sell K objects to N people who have preferences defined on subsets of the items. The optimal auction satisfies incentive compatibility (it is a dominant strategy to report true values), voluntary participation (bidders are not worse off through participation) and maximizes the expected revenue of the auctioneer among such auctions. In this paper, the optmal auction is characterized for the special case of single-minded bidders. It is shown that the optimal auction is not a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The optimal auction uses pivot prices, as in VCG, but it also uses bidder preferences. An example is provided showing improvement over the VCG mechanism can be large. The example also illustrates that auctions that are efficient or in the core are not optimal.", "date": "2007", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Association for Computing Machinery", "pagerange": "237-242", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-103442954", "isbn": "978-1-59593-653-0", "book_title": "Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-103442954", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1145/1250910.1250945", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2007", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/tt5da-rj571", "eprint_id": 24554, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 17:00:04", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 05:18:37", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Stoenescu-T-M", "name": { "family": "Stoenescu", "given": "Tudor M." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "A pricing mechanism which implements in Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in networks", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2006 IEEE.\nIssue Date: 13-15 Dec. 2006.\nDate of Current Version: 07 May 2007.", "abstract": "We present a pricing mechanism which implements\nin Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in unicast\nservice provisioning. This mechanism is different from the ones\nwhich appear in the existing literature since it accounts for\nthe strategic behavior of individual users and achieves efficient\nallocations. We provide some insight on how one may generalize\nour mechanism, and we determine a particular network structure\nunder which this mechanism is informationally efficient.", "date": "2006", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "IEEE", "place_of_pub": "Piscataway, NJ", "pagerange": "1270-1277", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20110726-142105653", "isbn": "978-1-4244-0170-3", "book_title": "Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110726-142105653", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "9430711", "name": "INSPEC Accession Number" } ] }, "doi": "10.1109/CDC.2006.377177", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2006", "author_list": "Stoenescu, Tudor M. and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3tt2k-7b362", "eprint_id": 80345, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 03:17:29", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 15:56:12", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Kwasnica-A-M", "name": { "family": "Kwasnica", "given": "Anthony M." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "Dave" }, "orcid": "0000-0002-4219-3782" }, { "id": "DeMartini-C", "name": { "family": "DeMartini", "given": "Christine" } } ] }, "title": "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "auctions; experimental economics; combinatorial auctions", "note": "\u00a9 2005 INFORMS. \n\nReceived: May 22, 2002. Published Online: March 1, 2005. \n\nThe authors thank the associate editor and two anonymous referees for careful, constructive reviews. The authors thank Elena Katok, Evan Kwerel, Paul Milgrom, Charles Plott, and Rakesh Vohra for their helpful comments. This is a significantly revised version of DeMartini et al. (1999).", "abstract": "In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, \"Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach,\" RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1\u201325). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.", "date": "2005-03", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Management Science", "volume": "51", "number": "3", "publisher": "INFORMS", "pagerange": "419-434", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-080712373", "issn": "0025-1909", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-080712373", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1287/mnsc.1040.0334", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2005", "author_list": "Kwasnica, Anthony M.; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wa49w-k3z81", "eprint_id": 72224, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:32:25", "lastmod": "2023-10-23 20:30:47", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Lin-John-C", "name": { "family": "Lin", "given": "John C." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2794-184X" } ] }, "title": "Baby bond connect: software for combined value trading", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Algorithms, Management, Documentation, Performance, Design, Economics, Experimentation, Theory, Combinatoric Market, Combined Value Market, Mechanism \nDesign, Experimental Economics, Experimental Finance, \nLiquidity, Portfolio Trading, Financial markets", "note": "Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). \n\nOur thanks to Caltech, Net Exchange, and State Street Bank for supporting this research.\n\nPublished - p275-ledyard.pdf
", "abstract": "BabyBondConnect (BBC) is a software package for trading goods with combined-value in a call market. The software was developed at Caltech under the direction of Dr. John O. Ledyard.\n\nThe poster session will explain in detail the problem of trading combined-value goods, the mechanism used by BBC, and the technical specification of the software package. The poster will suggest further development of the BBC software package, the role software engineering and experimental economics can play in understanding traditional markets and electronic markets, and how new market mechanisms can be developed and tested.", "date": "2003-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "ACM", "place_of_pub": "New York, NY", "pagerange": "275", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20161121-165809588", "isbn": "1-58113-679-X", "book_title": "EC '03 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161121-165809588", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Caltech" }, { "agency": "Net Exchange" }, { "agency": "State Street Bank" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Menasce-D", "name": { "family": "Menasce", "given": "Danny" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1145/779928.779996", "primary_object": { "basename": "p275-ledyard.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wa49w-k3z81/files/p275-ledyard.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2003", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Lin, John C." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g3k5j-reg22", "eprint_id": 72668, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:32:29", "lastmod": "2023-10-23 22:50:06", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Polk-C", "name": { "family": "Polk", "given": "Charles" } }, { "id": "Hanson-R", "name": { "family": "Hanson", "given": "Robin" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Ishikida-Takashi", "name": { "family": "Ishikida", "given": "Takashi" } } ] }, "title": "The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Management, Design, Economics, Experimentation, Information Market, Applied Mechanism Design, Decision Support", "note": "Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). \n\nThis material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Information Awareness Office, FutureMap Program, ARPA Order No. M773/27, Program Code No. 3S10, Issued by DARPA/CMO under Contract \n#MDA972-03-C-0037.\n\nPublished - p272-polk.pdf
", "abstract": "[no abstract]", "date": "2003-06", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "ACM", "place_of_pub": "New York, NY", "pagerange": "272-273", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20161208-130503388", "isbn": "1-58113-679-X", "book_title": "EC '03 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161208-130503388", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)", "grant_number": "M773/27" }, { "agency": "Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)", "grant_number": "MDA972-03-C-0037" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Menasce-D", "name": { "family": "Menasce", "given": "Danny" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1145/779928.779994", "primary_object": { "basename": "p272-polk.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g3k5j-reg22/files/p272-polk.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2003", "author_list": "Polk, Charles; Hanson, Robin; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/azktr-6jc27", "eprint_id": 82993, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-09-28 19:43:04", "lastmod": "2023-10-24 15:26:23", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Olson-M-A", "name": { "family": "Olson", "given": "Mark A." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Swanson-J-A", "name": { "family": "Swanson", "given": "Joseph A." } }, { "id": "Torma-D-P", "name": { "family": "Torma", "given": "David P." } } ] }, "title": "The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Economics; Games/group decisions: bidding/auctions; Transportation: costs", "note": "\u00a9 2002 INFORMS. Published Online Oct. 1, 2002.\n\nFormerly SSWP 1193.", "abstract": "Combined-value auctions (CVAs) allow participants to make an offer of a single amount for\na collection of items. These auctions provide value to both buyers and sellers of goods or\nservices in a number of environments, but they have rarely been implemented, perhaps because\nof lack of knowledge and experience. Sears Logistics Services (SLS) is the first procurer\nof trucking services to use a CVA to reduce its costs. In 1993, it saved 13 percent over past\nprocurement practices. Experimental economics played a crucial role in the development, sale,\nand use of the CVA.", "date": "2002-10-01", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Interfaces", "volume": "32", "number": "5", "publisher": "INFORMS", "pagerange": "4-12", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-141307390", "issn": "1526-551X", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-141307390", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1287/inte.32.5.4.30", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2002", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Olson, Mark A.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/bq1aa-0q222", "eprint_id": 80033, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 23:45:18", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 17:31:55", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bossaerts-P", "name": { "family": "Bossaerts", "given": "Peter" }, "orcid": "0000-0003-2308-2603" }, { "id": "Fine-Leslie", "name": { "family": "Fine", "given": "Leslie" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } } ] }, "title": "Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Liquidity; Portfolio trading; Financial markets; Experimental finance", "note": "\u00a9 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. \n\nAvailable online 9 October 2002.", "abstract": "Asset pricing theory hypothesizes that investors are only interested in portfolios; individual securities are evaluated only in terms of their contribution to portfolio risk and return. Yet, standard financial market design is that of parallel, unconnected markets, whereby investors cannot submit orders in one market conditional on events in others. When markets are thin, this exposes them to substantial execution risk. Fear of ending up with unbalanced portfolios after trading may even keep investors from submitting orders, further eroding liquidity and the ability of markets to equilibrate. The suggested solution is a portfolio trading mechanism referred to as combined-value trading (CVT). Investors are allowed to submit orders for packages of securities and the system matches trades and computes prices by optimally combining portfolio orders in an open book. We study the performance of the CVT mechanism experimentally and compare it to the performance of parallel, unconnected double auctions in experiments with similar parametrization and either a similar number of subjects or substantially thicker markets. We present evidence that our portfolio trading mechanism facilitates equilibration to the extent that the thicker markets do. Inspection of order submission and trade activity reveals that subjects manage to exploit the direct linkages between markets enabled by the CVT system.", "date": "2002-10", "date_type": "published", "publication": "European Economic Review", "volume": "46", "number": "9", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "1671-1695", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-145541198", "issn": "0014-2921", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-145541198", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00240-4", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2002", "author_list": "Bossaerts, Peter; Fine, Leslie; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cx6jf-szm80", "eprint_id": 80022, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 10:00:47", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 17:31:26", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Olson-M", "name": { "family": "Olson", "given": "Mark" } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Swanson-J-A", "name": { "family": "Swanson", "given": "Joseph A." } }, { "id": "Torma-D-P", "name": { "family": "Torma", "given": "David P." } } ] }, "title": "The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 2002 INFORMS. \n\nPublished Online: October 1, 2002.", "abstract": "Combined-value auctions (CVAs) allow participants to make an offer of a single amount for a collection of items. These auctions provide value to both buyers and sellers of goods or services in a number of environments, but they have rarely been implemented, perhaps because of lack of knowledge and experience. Sears Logistics Services (SLS) is the first procurer of trucking services to use a CVA to reduce its costs. In 1993, it saved 13 percent over past procurement practices. Experimental economics played a crucial role in the development, sale, and use of the CVA.", "date": "2002-09", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Interfaces", "volume": "32", "number": "5", "publisher": "Informs", "pagerange": "4-12", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-132004799", "issn": "0092-2102", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-132004799", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1287/inte.32.5.4.30", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2002", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Olson, Mark; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qrk3b-cfk59", "eprint_id": 65044, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 23:00:24", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:08:54", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Public goods; Interim efficiency; Voting; Simple mechanisms", "note": "\u00a9 2002 Elsevier. \n\nReceived 29 March 2000; accepted 9 September 2000. \n\nThis is a revision of a paper entitled 'Voting is Approximately Optimal.' We are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author is grateful for the hospitality and research support at LEI-CREST. We thank two anonymous referees for their comments.", "abstract": "This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called referenda, to the performance of interim efficient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. Costs are shared equally. We show that in large populations for any interim efficient allocation rule, there exists a corresponding referendum that yields approximately the same total welfare when there are many individuals. Moreover, if there is a common value component to the voters' preferences, then there is a unique approximating referendum.", "date": "2002-02", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "volume": "83", "number": "2", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "153-171", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-152243404", "issn": "0047-2727", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-152243404", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF" }, { "agency": "JPL" }, { "agency": "Centre de Recherche en Economie et STatistique (CREST)" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "1092", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "local_group": { "items": [ { "id": "Social-Science-Working-Papers" } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00161-4", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2002", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ncrm5-t7v27", "eprint_id": 103130, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-21 21:53:24", "lastmod": "2024-01-15 03:02:02", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Williams-A-W", "name": { "family": "Williams", "given": "Arlington W." } }, { "id": "Smith-V-L", "name": { "family": "Smith", "given": "Vernon L." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Gjerstad-S", "name": { "family": "Gjerstad", "given": "Steven" } } ] }, "title": "Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Induced utility; General equilibrium; Double auction", "note": "\u00a9 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.", "abstract": "We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings functions defined over the two traded goods, with a fiat money expenditure constraint. Sellers receive independent marginal cost arrays for each commodity. Parameters for buyers\" earnings functions and sellers' costs are set to yield a stable, competitive equilibrium. In spite of the complexity introduced by the demand interdependence, the competitive model is a good predictor of market outcomes, although prices tend to be above (below) the competitive prediction in the low-price (high-price) market.", "date": "2001", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Springer", "place_of_pub": "Berlin", "pagerange": "15-32", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-094205367", "isbn": "978-3-642-62657-9", "book_title": "Advances in Experimental Markets", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-094205367", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Cason-T-N", "name": { "family": "Cason", "given": "Timothy" } }, { "id": "Noussair-C-N", "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_2", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2001", "author_list": "Williams, Arlington W.; Smith, Vernon L.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/j8m8y-vxn95", "eprint_id": 80028, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 07:03:28", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 17:31:43", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ishikida-Takashi", "name": { "family": "Ishikida", "given": "Takashi" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Olson-M", "name": { "family": "Olson", "given": "Mark" } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } } ] }, "title": "Experimental testbedding of a pollution trading system: Southern California's RECLAIM emissions market", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 2001 Emerald Publishing Limited.", "abstract": "The efficient management of air quality through the use of pollution emissions trading systems is not a new idea (see Montgomery (1972)). However, the implementation of such systems is new. The design of the pollution permits being exchanged and the market in which the permits are traded requires the integration of environmental economics, game theory, operations research and experimental testing (see Ledyard (1993)). This chapter reports on experiments that were used to help design and testbed a novel pollution trading system used in Southern California. This system allows participants to trade two pollutants (nitrogen and sulfur oxides \u2013 NOx and SOx) across two zones (upwind and downwind) over 9 years separate years (1994-2003). The complexity associated with such an interdependent system of commodities makes the design of the trading system challenging. Testbedding new systems is standard fare in engineering but only recently has been applied to economics through the use of experiments (see Plott (1994)). Unlike experiments designed to test specific theories of behavior, testbedding is used when theory supplies little design advice and when the process is relatively new and there is no experience.", "date": "2001", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Emerald Group", "place_of_pub": "Bingley, England", "pagerange": "185-220", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-142725559", "isbn": "978-0-76230-702-9", "book_title": "Research in Experimental Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-142725559", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Isaac-R-M", "name": { "family": "Isaac", "given": "R. M." } } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/S0193-2306%2801%2908009-7", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "2001", "author_list": "Ishikida, Takashi; Ledyard, John; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mb1ry-eq461", "eprint_id": 80765, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 05:09:12", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 18:27:52", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Bykowsky-M-M", "name": { "family": "Bykowsky", "given": "Mark M." } }, { "id": "Cull-R-J", "name": { "family": "Cull", "given": "Robert J." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. \n\nWe thank Bill Maher, Dave Porter, and Tim Sloan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are our own.", "abstract": "In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a \"simple\" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in \"fitting complexity.\" In some environments, bidding may become \"mutually destructive.\" Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a \"threshold\" problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.", "date": "2000", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Regulatory Economics", "volume": "17", "number": "3", "publisher": "Springer", "pagerange": "205-228", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-093443025", "issn": "0922-680X", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-093443025", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1023/A:1008122015102", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "2000", "author_list": "Bykowsky, Mark M.; Cull, Robert J.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/s3es9-dad66", "eprint_id": 65194, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 04:05:45", "lastmod": "2024-01-13 16:43:34", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1999 Econometric Society. \n\nManuscript received August, 1996; final revision received April, 1998. \n\nWe are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701, and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author is grateful for the hospitality and research support at Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle and at Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique. An early draft of this article was prepared for the 1996 Francqui Prize Colloquium. We are grateful to its organizer, Claude d'Aspremont, and to the participants, for useful comments. The article has also benefited from the comments of seminar participants at Universit\u00e9 de la Mediterran\u00e9e, Northwestern University, Harvard University, Universit\u00e9 de Cergy-Pontoise, the Conference on Efficiency in Economics with Public Goods and Private Information at the University of Venice, the Roy Seminar at Ecole des Ponts et Chauss\u00e9es, and from discussions with Louis-Andr\u00e9 G\u00e9rard-Varet and Jean-Charles Rochet. Three referees and a coeditor provided additional helpful suggestions which have improved the article. The usual disclaimer applies.\n\nPublished - Ledyard_et_al-1999-Econometrica.pdf
", "abstract": "IN THIS PAPER, WE CONSIDER the following classical public goods problem. A group of individuals must decide on a level of a public good that is produced according to constant returns to scale up to some capacity constraint. In addition to deciding the level of public good, the group must decide how to tax the individuals in the group in order to cover the cost. The distribution of the burden of taxation is important because different individuals have different marginal rates of substitution between the private good taxes and the public good, and may have different incomes as well. These individual marginal rates of substitution are private information; that is, each individual knows his or her own marginal rate of substitution, but not those of the other members of the group. Adopting a Bayesian mechanism design framework, we assume that the distribution of marginal rates of substitution is common knowledge.", "date": "1999-03", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Econometrica", "volume": "67", "number": "2", "publisher": "Econometric Society", "pagerange": "435-448", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110828694", "issn": "1468-0262", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-110828694", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-9223701" }, { "agency": "NASA/JPL" }, { "agency": "Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle" }, { "agency": "Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique" } ] }, "other_numbering_system": { "items": [ { "id": "956", "name": "Social Science Working Paper" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "name": { "family": "d Aspremont", "given": "C" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1111/1468-0262.00028", "primary_object": { "basename": "Ledyard_et_al-1999-Econometrica.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/s3es9-dad66/files/Ledyard_et_al-1999-Econometrica.pdf" }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1999", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ws948-y7219", "eprint_id": 65163, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 03:58:39", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:14:36", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1999 The Econometric Society. \n\nWe are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701, and of the New Millennium Program of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. The second author is grateful for the hospitality and research support at Laboratoire d'Economie Industrialle and at Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique. An early draft of this article was prepared for the 1996 Francqui Prize Colloquium. We are grateful to its organizer, Calude d'Aspremont, and to the participants at Universit\u00e9 de Mediterran\u00e9e, Northwestern University, Harvard University, Universit\u00e9 de Cergy-Pontoise, the Conference on Efficiency in Economics with Public Goods and Private Information at the University of Venice, the Roy Seminar at Ecole des Ponts et Chauss\u00e9es, and from discussions with Louis-Andr\u00e9 G\u00e9rard-Varet and Jean-Charles Rochet. Three referees and a coeditor provided additional helpful suggestions which improved the article. The usual disclaimer applies.\n\nPublished - a_characterization_of_interim_efficiency.pdf
", "abstract": "In this paper, we consider the following classical public goods problem. A group of individuals must decide on a level of public good that is produced according to constant returns to scale up to some capacity constraint. In addition to deciding the level of public good, the group must decide how to tax the individuals in the group in order to cover the cost. The distribution of the burden of taxation is important because different individuals have different marginal rates of substitution between the private good (taxes) and the public good, and may have different incomes as well. These individual marginal rates of substitution are private information; that is, each individual knows his or her own marginal rate of substitution, but not those of the other members of the group. Adopting a Bayesian mechanism design framework, we assume that the distribution of marginal rates of substitution is common knowledge.", "date": "1999-02", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Econometrica", "volume": "67", "number": "2", "publisher": "Econometric Society", "pagerange": "435-448", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-164134782", "issn": "1468-0262", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-164134782", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-9223701" }, { "agency": "NASA/JPL" }, { "agency": "Laboratoire d'Economie Industrialle" }, { "agency": "Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique" } ] }, "doi": "10.1111/1468-0262.00028", "primary_object": { "basename": "a_characterization_of_interim_efficiency.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ws948-y7219/files/a_characterization_of_interim_efficiency.pdf" }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1999", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/060gj-fe391", "eprint_id": 83009, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 03:36:11", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:50:49", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Kalai-E", "name": { "family": "Kalai", "given": "Ehud" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Repeated Implementation", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1998 by Academic Press. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.\n\nReceived December 18, 1997; revised June 15, 1998.\n\nThe authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA.\n\nFormerly SSWP 1027.", "abstract": "In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation \"folk theorem:\" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.", "date": "1998-12", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Theory", "volume": "83", "number": "2", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "308-317", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759", "issn": "0022-0531", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SBR-955421" }, { "agency": "New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA" } ] }, "doi": "10.1006/jeth.1997.2459", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1998", "author_list": "Kalai, Ehud and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/xrgsy-bp998", "eprint_id": 80947, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 01:47:14", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 19:17:21", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Rangel-A", "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" } } ] }, "title": "Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.", "abstract": "This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.", "date": "1997-09", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economics and Management Strategy", "volume": "6", "number": "3", "publisher": "Wiley", "pagerange": "639-675", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-083453392", "issn": "1058-6407", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-083453392", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1997", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Porter, David; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fbfjy-wpv78", "eprint_id": 80652, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 11:22:46", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 17:03:57", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Noussair-C-N", "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles" } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } } ] }, "title": "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Scheduling; Auctions; Mechanism design", "note": "\u00a9 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. \n\nReceived: 01 June 1996.", "abstract": "Many resources such as supercomputers, legal advisors, and university classrooms are shared by many members of an organization. When the supply of shared resources is limited, conflict usually results between contending demanders. If these conflicts can be adequately resolved, then value is created for the organization. In this paper we use the methodology of applied mechanism design to examine alternative processes for the resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems. We construct a laboratory environment, within which we evaluate the outcomes of various allocation mechanisms. In particular, we are able to measure efficiency, the value attained by the resulting allocations as a percentage of the maximum possible value. Our choice of environment and parameters is guided by a specific application, the allocation of time on NASA's Deep Space Network, but the results also provide insights relevant to other scheduling and allocation applications. We find (1) experienced user committees using decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations in lower conflict situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) there is a mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM), which charges users for time and yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but, because of the prices paid, in which the net surplus available to the users is less than that resulting from the inefficient user committee (a reason why users may not appreciate 'market solutions' to organization problems) and (3) there is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, or internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus is still an issue, the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM.", "date": "1996-12", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Economic Design", "volume": "2", "number": "1", "publisher": "Springer", "pagerange": "163-192", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170821-150043264", "issn": "0928-5040", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170821-150043264", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "doi": "10.1007/BF02499132", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1996", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Noussair, Charles; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/atf1r-7j240", "eprint_id": 80652, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-22 11:22:43", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 17:03:59", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Noussair-C-N", "name": { "family": "Noussair", "given": "Charles" } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } } ] }, "title": "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Scheduling; Auctions; Mechanism design", "note": "\u00a9 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. \n\nReceived: 01 June 1996.", "abstract": "Many resources such as supercomputers, legal advisors, and university classrooms are shared by many members of an organization. When the supply of shared resources is limited, conflict usually results between contending demanders. If these conflicts can be adequately resolved, then value is created for the organization. In this paper we use the methodology of applied mechanism design to examine alternative processes for the resolution of such conflicts for a particular class of scheduling problems. We construct a laboratory environment, within which we evaluate the outcomes of various allocation mechanisms. In particular, we are able to measure efficiency, the value attained by the resulting allocations as a percentage of the maximum possible value. Our choice of environment and parameters is guided by a specific application, the allocation of time on NASA's Deep Space Network, but the results also provide insights relevant to other scheduling and allocation applications. We find (1) experienced user committees using decision support algorithms produce reasonably efficient allocations in lower conflict situations but perform badly when there is a high level of conflict between demanders, (2) there is a mechanism, called the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM), which charges users for time and yields high efficiencies in high conflict situations but, because of the prices paid, in which the net surplus available to the users is less than that resulting from the inefficient user committee (a reason why users may not appreciate 'market solutions' to organization problems) and (3) there is a modification of AUSM in which tokens, or internal money, replaces real money, which results in highly efficient allocations without extracting any of the users' surplus. Although the distribution of surplus is still an issue, the significant increase in efficiency provides users with a strong incentive to replace inefficient user committees with the more efficient AUSM.", "date": "1996-12", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Economic Design", "volume": "2", "number": "1", "publisher": "Springer", "pagerange": "163-192", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170821-150043264", "issn": "0928-5040", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170821-150043264", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "doi": "10.1007/BF02499132", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1996", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Noussair, Charles; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/gm6hb-ngh92", "eprint_id": 80980, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-18 23:58:37", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 19:19:17", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Boylan-R-T", "name": { "family": "Boylan", "given": "Richard T." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "McKelvey-R-D", "name": { "family": "McKelvey", "given": "Richard D." } } ] }, "title": "Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1996 Springer-Verlag. \n\nReceived: November 2, 1994. \n\nSupport for this research was provided in part by NSF grant #SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 1.", "abstract": "We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multiperiod economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.", "date": "1996-06", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Economic Theory", "volume": "7", "number": "2", "publisher": "Springer", "pagerange": "191-205", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-141350613", "issn": "0938-2259", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-141350613", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-9022932" } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/BF01213902", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1996", "author_list": "Boylan, Richard T.; Ledyard, John; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/y3bpp-z6d86", "eprint_id": 78873, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 06:04:36", "lastmod": "2023-10-26 14:25:02", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Introduction", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1995 Academic Press.", "abstract": "This special issue of Games and Economic Behavior is devoted to what we call experimental game theory, and the intention is threefold. First, we want 10 provide a window into one of the exciting new areas in game theoretic research. Second, we try to collect in one place some of the best current work that spans many of the interesting topics currently being studied. Third, we hope to encourage more game theorists to think about the behavioral and empirical content of their models, particularly in relation to data from carefully controlled laboratory experiments. The belief is that theory and experiment do not develop independently and the expectation is that better interaction will ultimately lead to both better theory and better experiment.", "date": "1995-07", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Games and Economic Behavior", "volume": "10", "number": "1", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "1-5", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-150810359", "issn": "0899-8256", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-150810359", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1006/game.1995.1022", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1995", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6w2tn-cpt82", "eprint_id": 83049, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 05:50:00", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:52:54", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "(c) 1995, by Princeton University Press. \n\nI thank the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA for their financial support. For their intellectual help and advice, I thank Peter Bohm, Don Coursey, Robyn Dawes, Roy Gardner, Mark Johnson, John Kagel, Jamie Brown-Kruse, Susan Laury, Gerald Marwell, Rosemarie Nagel, John Orbell, Elinor Ostrom, Tom Palfrey, Charles Plott, Amnon Rapoport, Al Roth, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Steve Slutsky, Richard Thaler, James Walker, most of the participants in the Conference of Experimental Research on the Provision of Public Goods and Common Property Resources at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, and especially Mark Isaac, without whom I would not have gotten even this far. Some of these strongly disagree with parts of my commentary. They may be justified. \n\nFormerly SSWP 861.", "abstract": "Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. In this chapter I will look at one small but fundamental part of the rapidly expanding experimental research. In Section 1, I describe a very simple public good experiment - what it is, what some theories predict, what usually happens, and why we should care - and then provide a methodological and theoretical background for the rest of the chapter. In Section 2, I look at the fundamental question: are people selfish or cooperative in volunteering to contribute to public good production? We look at five important early experiments that have laid the foundations for much that has followed. In Section 3, I look at the range of experimental research which tries to identify and study those factors which increase cooperation. In order to help those new to experimental work I have tried to focus on specific experimental designs in Section 2 and on general results and knowledge in Section 3. The reader will find that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.", "date": "1995-05", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Princeton University Press", "place_of_pub": "Princeton", "pagerange": "111-194", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171107-163442067", "isbn": "9780691042909", "book_title": "The Handbook of Experimental Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171107-163442067", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Kagel-J-H", "name": { "family": "Kagel", "given": "John H." } }, { "id": "Roth-A-E", "name": { "family": "Roth", "given": "Alvin E." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1995", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a64d9-6w039", "eprint_id": 65058, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 05:09:19", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:09:42", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Introduction [to a special issue of Games and Economic Behavior devoted to what we call experimental game theory]...", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "Copyright 1995 by Academic Press Inc.\n\n[Acknowledgements]. Finally, a special word of thanks to the many referees who participated in the editorial process. Their timely and thorough help was much appreciated by the authors as well as by us. We are also especially grateful to Victoria Mason and Marta Goodman for their valuable assistance with the process at Caltech. We thank the editor of Games and Economic Behavior, Ehud Kalai, for the good idea of having a special issue on experimental game theory and also thank Marilyn Lott for her excellent editorial and administrative help along the way.", "abstract": "This special issue of Games and Economic Behavior is devoted to what\nwe call experimental game theory, and the intention is threefold. First,\nwe want to provide a window into one of the exciting new areas in game\ntheoretic research. Second, we try to collect in one place some of the\nbest current work that spans many of the interesting topics current]y being\nstudied. Third, we hope to encourage more game theorists to think about\nthe behavioral and empirical content of their models, particularly in relation\nto data from carefully controlled laboratory experiments. The belief\nis that theory and experiment do not develop independently and the expectation\nis that better interaction will ultimately lead to both better theory\nand better experiment.", "date": "1995", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Games and Economic Behavior", "volume": "10", "number": "1", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "1-5", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155008643", "issn": "0899-8256", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-155008643", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1006/game.1995.1022", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1995", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/hg793-h4150", "eprint_id": 80962, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 04:46:24", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 19:18:36", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Szakaly-Moore-K", "name": { "family": "Szakaly-Moore", "given": "Kristin" } } ] }, "title": "Designing organizations for trading pollution rights", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1994 Elsevier B.V. \n\nWe would like to thank the Flight Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Lab (NASA) for financial support through their grant to the Program on Organization Design at Caltech. This is one of a number of studies on the transition from non-market allocation to market-like allocation mechanisms. We would also like to thank Jamie Kruse, Linda Cohen, and two anonymous referees for their comments.", "abstract": "Regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions. Our research focuses on choosing a permit trading mechanism that is both economically efficient and politically viable. We consider an organized trading process and a revenue neutral auction, both of which involve an initial allocation of permits based on past history. Each is tested in a competitive and in a non-competitive environment to determine which mechanism performs best. The results of our research suggest that, overall, the organized trading process outperforms the revenue neutral auction.", "date": "1994-10", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization", "volume": "25", "number": "2", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "167-196", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-130149209", "issn": "0167-2681", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-130149209", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/0167-2681(94)90009-4", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1994", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly-Moore, Kristin" }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pxy7d-tv538", "eprint_id": 65122, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 04:07:50", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 23:22:55", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109" } ] }, "title": "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1994 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.\nFirst version received January 1992; final version accepted November 1993 (Eds.).\n\nAcknowledgments. This paper replaces an earlier version, entitled \"On the Optimality of Lottery Drafts: Characterization of Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem.\" We have benefited from comments by two referees and by seminar participants at Caltech, MIT, Northwestern, Texas, and Texas A&M, and the 1989 FRET Conference in San Diego. We especially wish to acknowledge useful conversations with Kim Border and Ed Green. Ledyard gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Palfrey gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8718657 and SES-8815097.", "abstract": "This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk-neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed-size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public goods decision, affects social welfare. An efficient public good decision can always be accomplished by a majority voting scheme, where the number of \"YES\" votes required depends on the welfare weights in a simple way. The results are shown to have a natural geometry and an intuitive interpretation. We also extend these results to allow for restrictions on feasible transfer rules, ranging from the traditional unlimited transfers to the extreme case of no transfers.\n\nFor a range of welfare weights, an optimal scheme is a two-stage procedure which combines a voting stage with a second stage where an even-chance lottery is used to determine who pays. We call this the \"lottery draft mechanism\" Since such a cost-sharing scheme does not require transfers, it follows that in many cases transfers are not necessary to achieve the optimal allocation. For other ranges of welfare weights the second stage is more complicated, but the voting stage remains the same. If transfers are completely infeasible, randomized voting rules may be optimal. The paper also provides a geometric characterization of the effects of voluntary participation constraints.", "date": "1994-04", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Review of Economic Studies", "volume": "61", "number": "2", "publisher": "Oxford University Press", "pagerange": "327-355", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-113140393", "issn": "0034-6527", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-113140393", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL Flight Projects Office" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-8718657" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SES-8815097" } ] }, "doi": "10.2307/2297984", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1994", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O. and Palfrey, Thomas R." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/j3tns-nm178", "eprint_id": 83558, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 03:38:09", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:13:50", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Rangel-A", "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" } } ] }, "title": "Using computerized exchange systems to solve an allocation problem in project management", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "keywords": "computerized exchange, experimental economics, project management, group decision support systems", "note": "\u00a9 1994 Taylor & Francis. \n\nWe thank the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA for their financial support. Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to John O. Ledyard. \n\nFormerly SSWP 874.", "abstract": "I n this article we study the allocation problem facing the management of a large research and development project. The project management has to allocate resources among competing users to achieve the project goal. Besides the constraint of scarcity, the allocation problem is difficult because users have private parameters that project management requires to know in order to make an optimal allocation. Furthermore, users have incentives to misrepresent the information about these parameters to advance their individual agendas, which can differ from the project goal. A method to solve the allocation problem using computerized exchange institutions is introduced and analyzed. We emphasize that the rules of the exchange should be carefully selected, because different rules produce different results. We use the methodology of experimental economics to demonstrate this conclusion. This research was motivated by JPL's Cassini Mission to Saturn. A computerized exchange described in this article has been implemented by the Cassini Project to assist in the management of the resources used in the design and operation of science instruments.", "date": "1994", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Organizational Computing", "volume": "4", "number": "3", "publisher": "Taylor & Francis", "pagerange": "271-296", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-165813373", "issn": "1054-1721", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-165813373", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "JPL" } ] }, "doi": "10.1080/10919399409540228", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1994", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O.; Porter, David; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/xvkqr-sec59", "eprint_id": 80866, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:10:27", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 18:32:58", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "assignment problem, mechanism design, incentive compatibility, cooperation, experimental economics", "note": "\u00a9 1993 Taylor & Francis.", "abstract": "We provide an introduction to a theory of coordination mechanism design and show how to apply it to an assignment problem. The purpose is to introduce those familiar with organizational computing, but unfamiliar with game theory and economics, to the subject. We also describe briefly how we can test new mechanisms before taking them into the field. Finally, we raise some unresolved research questions.", "date": "1993", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Organizational Computing", "volume": "3", "number": "1", "publisher": "Taylor & Francis", "pagerange": "121-134", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-145216139", "issn": "1054-1721", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170828-145216139", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1080/10919399309540197", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1993", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/fm315-1t493", "eprint_id": 83133, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-20 02:10:49", "lastmod": "2024-01-14 05:49:38", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Easley-D", "name": { "family": "Easley", "given": "David" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 Addison-Wesley 1993. \n\nFormerly SSWP 611.", "abstract": "We provide a theory to explain the data generated by experiments with double oral auctions. Our theory predicts convergence to the equilibrium implied by the law of demand and supply and provides an explanation of disequilibrium behavior. The predictions of our theory seem to fit the data better than do the predictions of Walrasian, Marshallian, or game theoretic models. Our theory also suggests that, in demand-supply environments, the double oral auction is remarkably robust in the sense that aggregate performance is similar for a very wide range of individual behaviors.", "date": "1993", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Addison-Wesley", "place_of_pub": "Boston", "pagerange": "63-97", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-151818390", "isbn": "0201624591", "book_title": "The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-151818390", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Friedman-D", "name": { "family": "Friedman", "given": "Danile" } }, { "id": "Rust-J", "name": { "family": "Rust", "given": "John" } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1993", "author_list": "Easley, David and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/akh8x-d1e58", "eprint_id": 81528, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 23:31:46", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 20:50:51", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Market Failure", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1991 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited.", "abstract": "The best way to understand market failure is first to understand market success, the ability of a collection of idealized competitive markets to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resources which is Pareto optimal. This characteristic of markets, which was loosely conjectured by Adam Smith, has received its clearest expression in the theorems of modern welfare economics. For our purposes, the first of these, named the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics, is of most interest. Simply stated it reads: (1) if there are enough markets, (2) if all consumers and producers behave competitively, and (3) if an equilibrium exists, then the allocation of resources in that equilibrium will be Pareto optimal (see Arrow, 1951, or Debreu, 1959). Market failure is said to occur when the conclusion of this theorem is false; that is, when the allocations achieved with markets are not efficient.", "date": "1991", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Palgrave Macmillan", "place_of_pub": "London", "pagerange": "407-412", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-122035887", "isbn": "978-0-333-55177-6", "book_title": "The World of Economics", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-122035887", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Eatwell-J", "name": { "family": "Eatwell", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Milgate-M", "name": { "family": "Milgate", "given": "Murray" } }, { "id": "Newman-P", "name": { "family": "Newman", "given": "Peter" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_53", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1991", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g74e1-vvg20", "eprint_id": 67323, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 21:12:40", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 22:50:08", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Banks-J-S", "name": { "family": "Banks", "given": "Jeffrey S." } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } }, { "id": "Porter-D-P", "name": { "family": "Porter", "given": "David P." } } ] }, "title": "Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1989 RAND Corporation. \n\nThis work was partially funded by Caltech and NASA-Jet Propulsion Laboratories. We thank them for their support. They are not responsible for the content. We thank Peter Gray and Mark Olson for computer programming assistance. We also thank Charles Plott, Jim Quirk, and Stan Reiter for helpful insights and discussions.", "abstract": "We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65% efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single-dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer-assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures.", "date": "1989", "date_type": "published", "publication": "RAND Journal of Economics", "volume": "20", "number": "1", "publisher": "Blackwell Publishing", "pagerange": "1-25", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-065131499", "issn": "0741-6261", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-065131499", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NASA/JPL/Caltech" } ] }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1989", "author_list": "Banks, Jeffrey S.; Ledyard, John O.; et el." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/z3mme-9r294", "eprint_id": 81385, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 21:13:46", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 19:48:40", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Incentive Compatibility", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "\u00a9 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited.", "abstract": "Allocation mechanisms, organizations, voting procedures, regulatory bodies and many other institutions are designed to accomplish certain ends such as the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources or the equitable resolution of disputes. In many situations it is relatively easy to conceive of feasible processes; processes which will accomplish the goals if all participants follow the rules and are capable of handling the informational requirements. Examples of such mechanisms include marginal cost pricing, designed to attain efficiency, and equal division, designed to attain equity. Of course once a feasible mechanism is found, the important question then becomes whether such a mechanism is also informationally feasible and compatible with 'natural' incentives of the participants. Incentive compatibility is the concept introduced by Hurwicz (1972, p. 320) to characterize those mechanisms for which participants in the process would not find it advantageous to violate the rules of the process.", "date": "1989", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Palgrave Macmillan", "place_of_pub": "London", "pagerange": "141-151", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-151329290", "isbn": "978-0-333-49539-1", "book_title": "Allocation, Information and Markets", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-151329290", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Eatwell-J", "name": { "family": "Eatwell", "given": "John" } }, { "id": "Milgate-M", "name": { "family": "Milgate", "given": "Murray" } }, { "id": "Newman-P", "name": { "family": "Newman", "given": "Peter" } } ] }, "doi": "10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_15", "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1989", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/an8qg-fv712", "eprint_id": 83131, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 19:10:56", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:55:19", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The economics of the space station", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "Much of the research for this paper, the details of which can be found in the referenced JPL working papers, was funded by NASA through JPL. They bear absolutely no responsibility for any of my conclusions. This paper was significantly improved with the help of comments from Jeffrey Banks, Peter Cray. Hamid Habibagahi, Molly Macauley, and especially David Porter. They also bear no responsibility for its contents. \n\nFormerly SSWP 617.\n\nPublished - sswp617_-_published.pdf
", "abstract": "Space exploration and development are naturally conducted on the cutting edge of science and technology. Such efforts inevitably involve decisions made in the presence of extensive uncertainty. For some projects, particularly those which involve the creation and maintenance of an infrastructure, the emphasis is switching from specific engineering goals (for example, a man on the moon by 1969) to more diffuse, continuing, multiple-dimensional goals. This is especially true of the space station, which is envisioned as both a vital link in the exploration of the planets and a major facility for the advancement of commercial efforts in space. The combination of uncertainty and diffuse, long-term goals fundamentally alters the viability and validity of traditional economic and engineering approaches to the management of large public research and development projects.\nIt has become popular to call into question the recent management of continuing projects like the space shuttle or major new weapons systems. We must, however, recognize that cost overruns, gold plating and other forms of apparent mismanagement are usually not the result of individual venality and misbehavior but only the natural outcomes of the existing organizational rules of the game. Just as the performance of an engineering design is guided by the laws of physics, the performance of an organizational design is guided by the laws of behavior. This fact means that to improve performance we cannot simply add more or better manpower; rather, we must look for new organizational solutions. There are many ad hoc opinions about how to do this; what I propose is a more systematic, scientific approach.\nThis paper examines some of the economic and management issues which must be addressed if the space station is to effectively and efficiently pursue the myriad goals that have been chosen for it. I characterize and evaluate in a somewhat stylized fashion three possible policies: an \"engineering\" approach, an \"economics\" approach, and a systematic custom design approach. I will use the space station as an example to highlight some of the major economic issues facing large-scale multipurpose research and development efforts, the analytical capabilities we now have to address these issues, and the (non-engineering) research that needs to be done to advance the successful long-term development of space.", "date": "1987", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "National Academy of Engineering", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-142543364", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-142543364", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NASA/JPL/Caltech" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Macauley-M-K", "name": { "family": "Macauley", "given": "M. K." } } ] }, "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp617_-_published.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/an8qg-fv712/files/sswp617_-_published.pdf" }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1987", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5m9sr-vg645", "eprint_id": 83192, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 18:40:23", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 22:58:19", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1986 Academic Press, Inc. \n\nReceived October 29, 1984; revised February 4, 1986. \n\nThis paper is an extensive revision of one presented in the Theory workshop at Caltech and at the Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications at the University of Minnesota. I thank both sets of participants for their suggestions and comments. I especially thank Kim Border and Charles Plott who asked the right questions at the right times. The revision of the first version has benefited from the insightful and careful comments of Steve Matthews, Mark Satterthwaite, Robert Wilson, and a good referee. Finally, I thank the intransigent referee of Easley and Ledyard, whose misguided refusal to consider the behavior proposed in that as reasonable led me to the research reported here. \n\nFormerly SSWP 532.", "abstract": "What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is-almost anything. Given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors, and given any vector of nondominated strategies. there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of the transformed game. Any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. Some comments on the implications of these results for game theory are included.", "date": "1986-06", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Theory", "volume": "39", "number": "1", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "59-82", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-133240240", "issn": "0022-0531", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-133240240", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "doi": "10.1016/0022-0531(86)90020-7", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1986", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/60y7s-cvp08", "eprint_id": 83377, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 13:47:04", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 21:58:49", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The paradox of voting and candidate competition: A general equilibrium analysis", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "(c) 1980 Purdue University Press. \n\nI wish to thank both the Fairchild Foundation (as a Fairchild Scholar at Caltech) and the National Science Foundation (Grant #SOC 76-20953 to the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at Northwestern University) for their support. My debt to John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, who tolerated my incursion into their domain with patience, help, and humor, will be obvious to any reader. A seminar at Caltech brought forth the expected boos, \"what is that?\", and help. I thank the participants. Finally, as expected, I alone remain responsible for any errors and misrepresentations which may be left. \n\nFormerly SSWP 224.", "abstract": "[No abstract]", "date": "1981", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Purdue University Press", "place_of_pub": "West Lafayette, Indiana", "pagerange": "54-80", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-165125711", "isbn": "9780911198591", "book_title": "Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics in Honor of Emmanuel T. Weiler (1914-1979)", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-165125711", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC76-20953" }, { "agency": "Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science" } ] }, "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Horwich-G", "name": { "family": "Horwich", "given": "George" } }, { "id": "Quirk-J-P", "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1981", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/7bse9-00w25", "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 13:47:01", "lastmod": "2023-08-19 13:47:01", "type": "book_section", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The paradox of voting and candidate competition: A general equilibrium analysis", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "note": "(c) 1980 Purdue University Press. \n\nI wish to thank both the Fairchild Foundation (as a Fairchild Scholar at Caltech) and the National Science Foundation (Grant #SOC 76-20953 to the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at Northwestern University) for their support. My debt to John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, who tolerated my incursion into their domain with patience, help, and humor, will be obvious to any reader. A seminar at Caltech brought forth the expected boos, \"what is that?\", and help. I thank the participants. Finally, as expected, I alone remain responsible for any errors and misrepresentations which may be left. \n\nFormerly SSWP 224.\n\nThe files for this record are restricted to users on the Caltech campus network:", "abstract": "[No abstract]", "date": "1981", "date_type": "published", "publisher": "Purdue University Press", "place_of_pub": "West Lafayette, Indiana", "pagerange": "54-80", "isbn": "9780911198591", "book_title": "Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics in Honor of Emmanuel T. Weiler (1914-1979)", "official_url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/7bse9-00w25", "rights": "(c) 1980 Purdue University Press. \n\nI wish to thank both the Fairchild Foundation (as a Fairchild Scholar at Caltech) and the National Science Foundation (Grant #SOC 76-20953 to the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science at Northwestern University) for their support. My debt to John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, who tolerated my incursion into their domain with patience, help, and humor, will be obvious to any reader. A seminar at Caltech brought forth the expected boos, \"what is that?\", and help. I thank the participants. Finally, as expected, I alone remain responsible for any errors and misrepresentations which may be left. \n\nFormerly SSWP 224.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC76-20953" }, { "agency": "Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science" } ] }, "collection": "CaltechAUTHORS", "contributors": { "items": [ { "id": "Horwich-G", "name": { "family": "Horwich", "given": "George" } }, { "id": "Quirk-J-P", "name": { "family": "Quirk", "given": "James P." } } ] }, "resource_type": "book_section", "pub_year": "1981", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0t36a-dte23", "eprint_id": 83407, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 13:28:45", "lastmod": "2023-10-20 22:07:27", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Groves-T", "name": { "family": "Groves", "given": "Theodore" } }, { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "The existence of efficient and incentive compatible equilibria with public goods", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Public goods, Consumer bankruptcy, Consumer goods, Taxes, Private goods, Consumer equilibrium, Economic theory, Consumer prices, Consumer economics, Consumer choice", "note": "\u00a9 1980 The Econometric Society. \n\nThis paper is a revision of reference [16] in our earlier paper, Groves and Ledyard (1977). We gratefully acknowledge support by National Science Foundation Grants SOC775-21820 and SOC76-20953 and a Fairchild Foundation Grant at California Institute of Technology where Ledyard was a Fairchild Scholar. We also would like to thank the referees and Michael Rothschild whose notes (1976) and comments prompted us to complete this work. All errors are, of course, our own. \n\nFormerly SSWP 203.\n\nPublished - sswp203_-_published.pdf
", "abstract": "In our previous paper, \"Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...,\" (1977) we presented a mechanism for determining efficient public goods allocations when preferences are unknown and consumers are free to misrepresent their demands for public goods. We proved the basic welfare theorem for this model: If consumers are competitive in markets for private goods and follow Nash behavior in their choice of demands to report to the mechanism, then equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibria will be Pareto optimal. In this paper we show this result is not vacuous by proving that an equilibrium will exist for a wide class of economies. Our conditions are slightly stronger than those required to prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium. In order to rule out the possibility of bankruptcy, we assume additionally that at all Pareto optimal allocations, private goods consumption is bounded away from zero.", "date": "1980-09", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Econometrica", "volume": "48", "number": "6", "publisher": "Econometric Society", "pagerange": "1487-1506", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-142550221", "issn": "1468-0262", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-142550221", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC76-20953" }, { "agency": "NSF", "grant_number": "SOC775-21820" }, { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" } ] }, "doi": "10.2307/1912820", "primary_object": { "basename": "sswp203_-_published.pdf", "url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0t36a-dte23/files/sswp203_-_published.pdf" }, "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1980", "author_list": "Groves, Theodore and Ledyard, John O." }, { "id": "https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/7tw4m-gc231", "eprint_id": 83409, "eprint_status": "archive", "datestamp": "2023-08-19 11:08:31", "lastmod": "2023-10-17 23:06:15", "type": "article", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "id": "Ledyard-J-O", "name": { "family": "Ledyard", "given": "John O." } } ] }, "title": "Incentive compatibility and incomplete information", "ispublished": "pub", "full_text_status": "restricted", "note": "\u00a9 1978 by Academic Press, Inc. \n\nReceived August 30, 1976; revised May 5, 1978. \n\nBoth the National Science Foundation and the Fairchild Foundation are gratefully acknowledged for their support. Early parts of this work were completed at The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University. I thank Ted Groves, Andy Postlewaite, and John Roberts for helpful conversations. \n\nFormerly SSWP 187.", "abstract": "It is by now reasonably well known that when informationally decentralized processes are used to make collective choice decisions or to allocate resources, individuals may find it in their interest to distort the information they provide and that these distortions may lead to non-optimal group decisions. In the social choice context, this has been formalized in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, which states that all non-dictatorial rules will have this property. In a different context, Hurwicz has shown that there is a private goods neo-classical exchange economy such that any decentralized mechanism which selects Pareto-optimal allocations and which has a no-trade option will have this property. Roberts has provided a similar example in the public goods context. Other work (e.g., Green-Laffont, Groves-Loeb, Hurwicz, and Walker) indicates that, for mechanisms designed to select efficient outcomes, in most environments some agent will have an incentive to misrepresent his information and thus to manipulate the mechanism. All these results lead one to the conjecture that it is almost impossible to design any mechanism for group decisions which is compatible with individual incentives and efficiency.", "date": "1978", "date_type": "published", "publication": "Journal of Economic Theory", "volume": "18", "publisher": "Elsevier", "pagerange": "171-189", "id_number": "CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-144342176", "issn": "0022-0531", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-144342176", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Sherman Fairchild Foundation" }, { "agency": "NSF" } ] }, "doi": "10.1016/0022-0531(78)90047-9", "resource_type": "article", "pub_year": "1978", "author_list": "Ledyard, John O." } ]