[ { "id": "authors:85p42-5cd71", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "85p42-5cd71", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160823-155716081", "type": "book_section", "title": "Second workshop on prediction markets", "book_title": "EC '07 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "author": [ { "family_name": "Chen", "given_name": "Yiling", "clpid": "Chen-Yiling" }, { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" }, { "family_name": "Pennock", "given_name": "David M.", "clpid": "Pennock-D-M" }, { "family_name": "Zitzewitz", "given_name": "Eric", "clpid": "Zitzewitz-E" } ], "abstract": "The Second Workshop on Prediction Markets, following\nthe success of the first workshop held in 2005, explores research challenges in using markets as predictive devices. The workshop brings together researchers and practitioners from a variety of relevant fields, including economics, finance, computer science, and statistics, in both academia and industry, to discuss the state of the art today, and the challenges and prospects for tomorrow in the field of prediction markets.", "doi": "10.1145/1250910.1250965", "isbn": "978-1-59593-653-0", "publisher": "ACM", "place_of_publication": "New York, NY", "publication_date": "2007-06", "pages": "361-362" }, { "id": "authors:zt1gv-9wb06", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "zt1gv-9wb06", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20100924-103442954", "type": "book_section", "title": "Optimal Combinatoric Auctions with Single-Minded Bidders", "book_title": "Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "abstract": "Combinatoric auctions sell K objects to N people who have preferences defined on subsets of the items. The optimal auction satisfies incentive compatibility (it is a dominant strategy to report true values), voluntary participation (bidders are not worse off through participation) and maximizes the expected revenue of the auctioneer among such auctions. In this paper, the optmal auction is characterized for the special case of single-minded bidders. It is shown that the optimal auction is not a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The optimal auction uses pivot prices, as in VCG, but it also uses bidder preferences. An example is provided showing improvement over the VCG mechanism can be large. The example also illustrates that auctions that are efficient or in the core are not optimal.", "doi": "10.1145/1250910.1250945", "isbn": "978-1-59593-653-0", "publisher": "Association for Computing Machinery", "publication_date": "2007", "pages": "237-242" }, { "id": "authors:tt5da-rj571", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "tt5da-rj571", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110726-142105653", "type": "book_section", "title": "A pricing mechanism which implements in Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in networks", "book_title": "Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control", "author": [ { "family_name": "Stoenescu", "given_name": "Tudor M.", "clpid": "Stoenescu-T-M" }, { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "abstract": "We present a pricing mechanism which implements\nin Nash equilibria a rate allocation problem in unicast\nservice provisioning. This mechanism is different from the ones\nwhich appear in the existing literature since it accounts for\nthe strategic behavior of individual users and achieves efficient\nallocations. We provide some insight on how one may generalize\nour mechanism, and we determine a particular network structure\nunder which this mechanism is informationally efficient.", "doi": "10.1109/CDC.2006.377177", "isbn": "978-1-4244-0170-3", "publisher": "IEEE", "place_of_publication": "Piscataway, NJ", "publication_date": "2006", "pages": "1270-1277" }, { "id": "authors:g3k5j-reg22", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "g3k5j-reg22", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161208-130503388", "type": "book_section", "title": "The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information market", "book_title": "EC '03 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "author": [ { "family_name": "Polk", "given_name": "Charles", "clpid": "Polk-C" }, { "family_name": "Hanson", "given_name": "Robin", "clpid": "Hanson-R" }, { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" }, { "family_name": "Ishikida", "given_name": "Takashi", "clpid": "Ishikida-Takashi" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Menasce", "given_name": "Danny", "clpid": "Menasce-D" } ], "abstract": "[no abstract]", "doi": "10.1145/779928.779994", "isbn": "1-58113-679-X", "publisher": "ACM", "place_of_publication": "New York, NY", "publication_date": "2003-06", "pages": "272-273" }, { "id": "authors:wa49w-k3z81", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "wa49w-k3z81", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161121-165809588", "type": "book_section", "title": "Baby bond connect: software for combined value trading", "book_title": "EC '03 Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" }, { "family_name": "Lin", "given_name": "John C.", "orcid": "0000-0003-2794-184X", "clpid": "Lin-John-C" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Menasce", "given_name": "Danny", "clpid": "Menasce-D" } ], "abstract": "BabyBondConnect (BBC) is a software package for trading goods with combined-value in a call market. The software was developed at Caltech under the direction of Dr. John O. Ledyard.\n\nThe poster session will explain in detail the problem of trading combined-value goods, the mechanism used by BBC, and the technical specification of the software package. The poster will suggest further development of the BBC software package, the role software engineering and experimental economics can play in understanding traditional markets and electronic markets, and how new market mechanisms can be developed and tested.", "doi": "10.1145/779928.779996", "isbn": "1-58113-679-X", "publisher": "ACM", "place_of_publication": "New York, NY", "publication_date": "2003-06", "pages": "275" }, { "id": "authors:j8m8y-vxn95", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "j8m8y-vxn95", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-142725559", "type": "book_section", "title": "Experimental testbedding of a pollution trading system: Southern California's RECLAIM emissions market", "book_title": "Research in Experimental Economics", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ishikida", "given_name": "Takashi", "clpid": "Ishikida-Takashi" }, { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" }, { "family_name": "Olson", "given_name": "Mark", "clpid": "Olson-M" }, { "family_name": "Porter", "given_name": "David", "clpid": "Porter-D-P" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Isaac", "given_name": "R. M.", "clpid": "Isaac-R-M" } ], "abstract": "The efficient management of air quality through the use of pollution emissions trading systems is not a new idea (see Montgomery (1972)). However, the implementation of such systems is new. The design of the pollution permits being exchanged and the market in which the permits are traded requires the integration of environmental economics, game theory, operations research and experimental testing (see Ledyard (1993)). This chapter reports on experiments that were used to help design and testbed a novel pollution trading system used in Southern California. This system allows participants to trade two pollutants (nitrogen and sulfur oxides \u2013 NOx and SOx) across two zones (upwind and downwind) over 9 years separate years (1994-2003). The complexity associated with such an interdependent system of commodities makes the design of the trading system challenging. Testbedding new systems is standard fare in engineering but only recently has been applied to economics through the use of experiments (see Plott (1994)). Unlike experiments designed to test specific theories of behavior, testbedding is used when theory supplies little design advice and when the process is relatively new and there is no experience.", "doi": "10.1016/S0193-2306%2801%2908009-7", "isbn": "978-0-76230-702-9", "publisher": "Emerald Group", "place_of_publication": "Bingley, England", "publication_date": "2001", "pages": "185-220" }, { "id": "authors:ncrm5-t7v27", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "ncrm5-t7v27", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-094205367", "type": "book_section", "title": "Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence", "book_title": "Advances in Experimental Markets", "author": [ { "family_name": "Williams", "given_name": "Arlington W.", "clpid": "Williams-A-W" }, { "family_name": "Smith", "given_name": "Vernon L.", "clpid": "Smith-V-L" }, { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" }, { "family_name": "Gjerstad", "given_name": "Steven", "clpid": "Gjerstad-S" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Cason", "given_name": "Timothy", "clpid": "Cason-T-N" }, { "family_name": "Noussair", "given_name": "Charles", "clpid": "Noussair-C-N" } ], "abstract": "We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings functions defined over the two traded goods, with a fiat money expenditure constraint. Sellers receive independent marginal cost arrays for each commodity. Parameters for buyers\" earnings functions and sellers' costs are set to yield a stable, competitive equilibrium. In spite of the complexity introduced by the demand interdependence, the competitive model is a good predictor of market outcomes, although prices tend to be above (below) the competitive prediction in the low-price (high-price) market.", "doi": "10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_2", "isbn": "978-3-642-62657-9", "publisher": "Springer", "place_of_publication": "Berlin", "publication_date": "2001", "pages": "15-32" }, { "id": "authors:6w2tn-cpt82", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "6w2tn-cpt82", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171107-163442067", "type": "book_section", "title": "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research", "book_title": "The Handbook of Experimental Economics", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Kagel", "given_name": "John H.", "clpid": "Kagel-J-H" }, { "family_name": "Roth", "given_name": "Alvin E.", "clpid": "Roth-A-E" } ], "abstract": "Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues. In this chapter I will look at one small but fundamental part of the rapidly expanding experimental research. In Section 1, I describe a very simple public good experiment - what it is, what some theories predict, what usually happens, and why we should care - and then provide a methodological and theoretical background for the rest of the chapter. In Section 2, I look at the fundamental question: are people selfish or cooperative in volunteering to contribute to public good production? We look at five important early experiments that have laid the foundations for much that has followed. In Section 3, I look at the range of experimental research which tries to identify and study those factors which increase cooperation. In order to help those new to experimental work I have tried to focus on specific experimental designs in Section 2 and on general results and knowledge in Section 3. The reader will find that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control. The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways. Nothing is known for sure. Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.", "isbn": "9780691042909", "publisher": "Princeton University Press", "place_of_publication": "Princeton", "publication_date": "1995-05", "pages": "111-194" }, { "id": "authors:fm315-1t493", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "fm315-1t493", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-151818390", "type": "book_section", "title": "Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral auctions", "book_title": "The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence", "author": [ { "family_name": "Easley", "given_name": "David", "clpid": "Easley-D" }, { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Friedman", "given_name": "Danile", "clpid": "Friedman-D" }, { "family_name": "Rust", "given_name": "John", "clpid": "Rust-J" } ], "abstract": "We provide a theory to explain the data generated by experiments with double oral auctions. Our theory predicts convergence to the equilibrium implied by the law of demand and supply and provides an explanation of disequilibrium behavior. The predictions of our theory seem to fit the data better than do the predictions of Walrasian, Marshallian, or game theoretic models. Our theory also suggests that, in demand-supply environments, the double oral auction is remarkably robust in the sense that aggregate performance is similar for a very wide range of individual behaviors.", "isbn": "0201624591", "publisher": "Addison-Wesley", "place_of_publication": "Boston", "publication_date": "1993", "pages": "63-97" }, { "id": "authors:akh8x-d1e58", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "akh8x-d1e58", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170918-122035887", "type": "book_section", "title": "Market Failure", "book_title": "The World of Economics", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Eatwell", "given_name": "John", "clpid": "Eatwell-J" }, { "family_name": "Milgate", "given_name": "Murray", "clpid": "Milgate-M" }, { "family_name": "Newman", "given_name": "Peter", "clpid": "Newman-P" } ], "abstract": "The best way to understand market failure is first to understand market success, the ability of a collection of idealized competitive markets to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resources which is Pareto optimal. This characteristic of markets, which was loosely conjectured by Adam Smith, has received its clearest expression in the theorems of modern welfare economics. For our purposes, the first of these, named the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics, is of most interest. Simply stated it reads: (1) if there are enough markets, (2) if all consumers and producers behave competitively, and (3) if an equilibrium exists, then the allocation of resources in that equilibrium will be Pareto optimal (see Arrow, 1951, or Debreu, 1959). Market failure is said to occur when the conclusion of this theorem is false; that is, when the allocations achieved with markets are not efficient.", "doi": "10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_53", "isbn": "978-0-333-55177-6", "publisher": "Palgrave Macmillan", "place_of_publication": "London", "publication_date": "1991", "pages": "407-412" }, { "id": "authors:z3mme-9r294", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "z3mme-9r294", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-151329290", "type": "book_section", "title": "Incentive Compatibility", "book_title": "Allocation, Information and Markets", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Eatwell", "given_name": "John", "clpid": "Eatwell-J" }, { "family_name": "Milgate", "given_name": "Murray", "clpid": "Milgate-M" }, { "family_name": "Newman", "given_name": "Peter", "clpid": "Newman-P" } ], "abstract": "Allocation mechanisms, organizations, voting procedures, regulatory bodies and many other institutions are designed to accomplish certain ends such as the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources or the equitable resolution of disputes. In many situations it is relatively easy to conceive of feasible processes; processes which will accomplish the goals if all participants follow the rules and are capable of handling the informational requirements. Examples of such mechanisms include marginal cost pricing, designed to attain efficiency, and equal division, designed to attain equity. Of course once a feasible mechanism is found, the important question then becomes whether such a mechanism is also informationally feasible and compatible with 'natural' incentives of the participants. Incentive compatibility is the concept introduced by Hurwicz (1972, p. 320) to characterize those mechanisms for which participants in the process would not find it advantageous to violate the rules of the process.", "doi": "10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_15", "isbn": "978-0-333-49539-1", "publisher": "Palgrave Macmillan", "place_of_publication": "London", "publication_date": "1989", "pages": "141-151" }, { "id": "authors:an8qg-fv712", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "an8qg-fv712", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-142543364", "type": "book_section", "title": "The economics of the space station", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Macauley", "given_name": "M. K.", "clpid": "Macauley-M-K" } ], "abstract": "Space exploration and development are naturally conducted on the cutting edge of science and technology. Such efforts inevitably involve decisions made in the presence of extensive uncertainty. For some projects, particularly those which involve the creation and maintenance of an infrastructure, the emphasis is switching from specific engineering goals (for example, a man on the moon by 1969) to more diffuse, continuing, multiple-dimensional goals. This is especially true of the space station, which is envisioned as both a vital link in the exploration of the planets and a major facility for the advancement of commercial efforts in space. The combination of uncertainty and diffuse, long-term goals fundamentally alters the viability and validity of traditional economic and engineering approaches to the management of large public research and development projects.\nIt has become popular to call into question the recent management of continuing projects like the space shuttle or major new weapons systems. We must, however, recognize that cost overruns, gold plating and other forms of apparent mismanagement are usually not the result of individual venality and misbehavior but only the natural outcomes of the existing organizational rules of the game. Just as the performance of an engineering design is guided by the laws of physics, the performance of an organizational design is guided by the laws of behavior. This fact means that to improve performance we cannot simply add more or better manpower; rather, we must look for new organizational solutions. There are many ad hoc opinions about how to do this; what I propose is a more systematic, scientific approach.\nThis paper examines some of the economic and management issues which must be addressed if the space station is to effectively and efficiently pursue the myriad goals that have been chosen for it. I characterize and evaluate in a somewhat stylized fashion three possible policies: an \"engineering\" approach, an \"economics\" approach, and a systematic custom design approach. I will use the space station as an example to highlight some of the major economic issues facing large-scale multipurpose research and development efforts, the analytical capabilities we now have to address these issues, and the (non-engineering) research that needs to be done to advance the successful long-term development of space.", "publisher": "National Academy of Engineering", "publication_date": "1987" }, { "id": "authors:60y7s-cvp08", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "60y7s-cvp08", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-165125711", "type": "book_section", "title": "The paradox of voting and candidate competition: A general equilibrium analysis", "book_title": "Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics in Honor of Emmanuel T. Weiler (1914-1979)", "author": [ { "family_name": "Ledyard", "given_name": "John O.", "clpid": "Ledyard-J-O" } ], "contributor": [ { "family_name": "Horwich", "given_name": "George", "clpid": "Horwich-G" }, { "family_name": "Quirk", "given_name": "James P.", "clpid": "Quirk-J-P" } ], "abstract": "[No abstract]", "isbn": "9780911198591", "publisher": "Purdue University Press", "place_of_publication": "West Lafayette, Indiana", "publication_date": "1981", "pages": "54-80" } ]