Monograph records
https://feeds.library.caltech.edu/people/Katz-J-N/monograph.rss
A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenTue, 16 Apr 2024 13:46:58 +0000The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on Turnout
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-165011731
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Alvarez-R-M', 'name': {'family': 'Alvarez', 'given': 'R. Michael'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-8113-4451'}, {'id': 'Bailey-D', 'name': {'family': 'Bailey', 'given': 'Delia'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1084598
Since the passage of the "Help America Vote Act" in 2002, nearly half of the states have adopted a variety of new identification requirements for voter registration and participation by the 2006 general election. There has been little analysis of whether these requirements reduce voter participation, especially among certain classes of voters. In this paper we document the effect of voter identification requirements on registered voters as they were imposed in states in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, and in the 2002 and 2006 midterm elections. Looking first at trends in the aggregate data, we find no evidence that voter identification requirements reduce participation. Using individual-level data from the Current Population Survey across these elections, however, we find that the strictest forms of voter identification requirements—combination requirements of presenting an identification card and positively matching one's signature with a signature either on file or on the identification card, as well as requirements to show picture identification—have a negative impact on the participation of registered voters relative to the weakest requirement, stating one's name. We also find find evidence that the stricter voter identification requirements depress turnout to a greater extent for less educated and lower income populations, for both minorities and non-minorities.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a4nx9-8pq40Auctioning off the Agenda: Bargaining in Legislatures with Endogenous Scheduling
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-170556066
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Čopič-J', 'name': {'family': 'Čopič', 'given': 'Jernej'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/wkd74-vbm27
There are many examples of allocation problems where the final allocation affects more than one agent, but the models developed to study them typically allow for side payments between agents. However, there are political economy applications where it is hard to imagine monetary transfers between the agents, at least not legal ones. In this paper we propose a general political economic framework for the study of allocation problems with externalities without side payments. We consider a setup with complete information and we formulate the problem as one where the status quo describes an initial allocation that can altered in a sequence of proposals. The number of these proposals is restricted. In the context of our main application, bidding for slots on a legislative agenda, such restriction can be interpreted as scarcity of plenary time for considering the possible bills to move the policy. The intuition for our model comes out of framing the problem as a special type of a multi-good auction. We show that equilibria generically exist within the general model.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wkd74-vbm27What's age to do with it? Supreme Court appointees and the long run location of the Supreme Court median justice
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-113314415
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Spitzer-M-L', 'name': {'family': 'Spitzer', 'given': 'Matthew L.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/5j2s1-sgj23
[No abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5j2s1-sgj23The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-153714426
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Gelman-Andrew', 'name': {'family': 'Gelman', 'given': 'Andrew'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Tuerlinckx-Francis', 'name': {'family': 'Tuerlinckx', 'given': 'Francis'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/hpnm8-cmw66
In an election, voting power—the probability that a single vote is decisive—is affected by the rule for aggregating votes into a single outcome. Voting power is important for studying political representation, fairness and strategy, and has been much discussed in political science. Although power indexes are often considered as mathematical definitions, they ultimately depend on statistical models of voting. Mathematical calculations of voting power usually have been performed under the model that votes are decided by coin flips. This simple model has interesting implications for weighted elections, two-stage elections (such as the U.S. Electoral College) and coalition structures. We discuss empirical failings of the coin-flip model of voting and consider, first, the implications for voting power and, second, ways in which votes could be modeled more realistically. Under the random voting model, the standard deviation of the average of n votes is proportional to 1/√n, but under more general models, this variance can have the form cn^(−α) or √a−b log n. Voting power calculations under more realistic models present research challenges in modeling and computation.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/hpnm8-cmw66Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-162810725
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Gelman-Andrew', 'name': {'family': 'Gelman', 'given': 'Andrew'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Bafumi-Joseph', 'name': {'family': 'Bafumi', 'given': 'Joseph'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/8999e-yz237
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting). That assumption can be generalized to hold that the probability of a vote being decisive in a jurisdiction with n voters is proportional to 1/√n.
We test and reject this hypothesis empirically, using data from several different U.S. and European elections. We find that the probability of a decisive vote is approximately proportional to 1/n. The random voting model (or its generalization, the square-root rule) overestimates the probability of close elections in larger jurisdictions. As a result, classical voting power indexes make voters in large jurisdictions appear more powerful than they really are.
The most important political implication of our result is that proportionally weighted voting systems (that is, each jurisdiction gets a number of votes proportional to n) are basically fair. This contradicts the claim in the voting power literature that weights should be approximately proportional to √n.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/8999e-yz237Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series–Cross-Section Political Economy Data
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-141913417
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Beck-N', 'name': {'family': 'Beck', 'given': 'Nathaniel'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/zx3dd-bq275
This paper deals with a variety of dynamic issues in the analysis of time- series–cross-section (TSCS) data. While the issues raised are more general, we focus on applications to political economy. We begin with a discussion of specification and lay out the theoretical differences implied by the various types of time series models that can be estimated. It is shown that there is nothing pernicious in using a lagged dependent variable and that all dynamic models either implicitly or explicitly have such a variable; the differences between the models relate to assumptions about the speeds of adjustment of measured and unmeasured variables. When adjustment is quick it is hard to differentiate between the various models; with slower speeds of adjustment the various models make sufficiently different predictions that they can be tested against each other. As the speed of adjustment gets slower and slower, specification (and estimation) gets more and more tricky. We then turn to a discussion of estimation. It is noted that models with both a lagged dependent variable and serially correlated errors can easily be estimated; it is only OLS that is inconsistent in this situation. We then show, via Monte Carlo analysis shows that for typical TSCS data that fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable performs about as well as the much more complicated Kiviet estimator, and better than the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (both designed for panels).https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/zx3dd-bq275Gerrymandering Roll-Calls: Votes, Decisions, and Partisan bias in Congress, 1879-2000
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-164857645
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Cox-G-W', 'name': {'family': 'Cox', 'given': 'Gary W.'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/pt2hj-d5610
We argue that the standard toolbox used in electoral studies to assess the bias and responsiveness of electoral systems can also be used to assess the bias and responsiveness of legislative systems. We consider which items in the toolbox are the most appropriate for use in the legislative setting, then apply them to estimate levels of bias in the U.S. House from 1879 to 2000. Our results indicate a systematic bias in favor of the majority party over this period, with the strongest bias arising during the period of "Czar rule" (51st-60th Congresses, 1889-1910) and during the post-packing era (87th-106th Congresses, 1961-2000). This finding is consistent with the majority party possessing a significant advantage in setting the agenda.
"The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power."
-–E. E. Schattschneider (1960, p. 86).https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pt2hj-d5610Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170802-162109260
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Gelman-Andrew', 'name': {'family': 'Gelman', 'given': 'Andrew'}}, {'id': 'King-G', 'name': {'family': 'King', 'given': 'Gary'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5327-7631'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/5pr6t-3a795
The 2000 U.S. presidential election has once again rekindled interest in possible electoral reform including the possible elimination of the Electoral College. Most arguments against the Electoral College have either been based on ancedotal evidence from particular elections or on highly stylized formal models We take a very different approach here. We develop a set of statistical models based on historical election results to evaluate the Electoral College as it has performed in practice. Thus, while we do not directly address the normative question of the value of the U.S. Electoral College, this paper does provide the necessary tools and evidence to make such an evaluation. We show that when one preforms such an analysis there is not much basis to argue for reforming the Electoral College. We first show that while the Electoral College may once have been biased against the Democrats, given the current distribution of voters, neither party is advantaged by the system. Further, the electoral vote will differ from the popular vote will only when the average votes shares are very close to a half. We then show that while there has been much temporal variation in voting power over the last several decades, the voting power of individual citizens would not likely increase under a popular vote system of electing the president.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5pr6t-3a795Correcting for Survey Misreports using Auxiliary Information with an Application to Estimating Turnout
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-155558097
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Katz-Gabriel', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Gabriel'}, 'orcid': '0000-0001-5970-2769'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/r5ehj-emp92
Misreporting is a problem that plagues researchers that use survey data. In this paper, we develop a parametric model that corrects for misclassified binary responses using information on the misreporting patterns obtained from auxiliary data sources. The model is implemented within the Bayesian framework via Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, and can be easily extended to address other problems exhibited by survey data, such as missing response and/or covariate values. While the model is fully general, we illustrate its application in the context of estimating models of turnout using data from the American National Elections Studies.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/r5ehj-emp92An Empirical Bayes Approach to Estimating Ordinal Treatment Effects
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-161733786
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Alvarez-R-M', 'name': {'family': 'Alvarez', 'given': 'R. Michael'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-8113-4451'}, {'id': 'Bailey-D', 'name': {'family': 'Bailey', 'given': 'Delia'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/wn44k-gkd25
Ordinal variables—categorical variables with a defined order to the categories, but without equal spacing between them—are frequently used in social science applications. Although a good deal of research exists on the proper modeling of ordinal response variables, there is not a clear directive as to how to model ordinal treatment variables. The usual approaches found in the literature for using ordinal treatment variables are either to use fully unconstrained, though additive, ordinal group indicators or to use a numeric predictor constrained to be continuous. Generalized additive models are a useful exception to these assumptions (Beck and Jackman 1998). In contrast to the generalized additive modeling approach, we propose the use of a Bayesian shrinkage estimator to model ordinal treatment variables. The estimator we discuss in this paper allows the model to contain both individual group level indicators and a continuous predictor. In contrast to traditionally used shrinkage models that pull the data toward a common mean, we use a linear model as the basis. Thus, each individual effect can be arbitrary, but the model "shrinks" the estimates toward a linear ordinal framework according to the data. We demonstrate the estimator on two political science examples: the impact of voter identification requirements on turnout (Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2007), and the impact of the frequency of religious service attendance on the liberality of abortion attitudes (e.g., Singh and Leahy 1978, Tedrow and Mahoney 1979, Combs and Welch 1982).https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wn44k-gkd25Scheduling Auctions and Proto-Parties in Legislatures
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-143507538
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Čopič-J', 'name': {'family': 'Čopič', 'given': 'Jernej'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/7gq8e-c4j23
We consider the impact of the scarcity of plenary time in legislatures both on the outcome of the legislative bargaining process and the organization of the legislature itself. We do so by developing a novel model that we call scheduling auctions. In the model, the legislature is charged with allocating a fixed budget. Members can propose an allocation and the scheduling agent decides which one of the possible proposals will be considered by the entire legislature in plenary session for an up or down vote. We show in this simple setting that deciding which member should be selected as the scheduling agent endogenously induces the creation of nascent political parties that we call proto-parties. We also show that the these legislative structures have positive welfare implications.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/7gq8e-c4j23Indecision Theory: Quality of Information and Voting Behavior
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-152618695
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Ghirardato-P', 'name': {'family': 'Ghirardato', 'given': 'Paolo'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/x45sh-c4n27
In this paper we show how to incorporate quality of information into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their quality of information, which we refer to as ambiguity. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario.
We show that in most elections voters who satisfy the Bayesian model do not strictly prefer abstaining over voting for one of the candidates. In contrast, a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are "ambiguity complements". Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to "hedge" the candidates' ambiguity.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/x45sh-c4n27How much does a vote count? Voting power, coalitions, and the Electoral College
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-140415393
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Gelman-Andrew', 'name': {'family': 'Gelman', 'given': 'Andrew'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/4q8jx-vrx44
In an election, the probability that a single voter is decisive is affected by the electoral system—that is, the rule for aggregating votes into a single outcome. Under the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting), we prove that the average probability of a vote being decisive is maximized under a popular-vote (or simple majority) rule and is lower under any coalition system, such as the U.S. Electoral College system, no matter how complicated. Forming a coalition increases the decisive vote probability for the voters within a coalition, but the aggregate effect of coalitions is to decrease the average decisiveness of the population of voters. We then review results on voting power in an electoral college system. Under the random voting assumption, it is well known that the voters with the highest probability of decisiveness are those in large states. However, we show using empirical estimates of the closeness of historical U.S. Presidential elections that voters in small states have been advantaged because the random voting model overestimates the frequencies of close elections in the larger states. Finally, we estimate the average probability of decisiveness for all U.S. Presidential elections from 1960 to 2000 under three possible electoral systems: popular vote, electoral vote, and winner-take-all within Congressional districts. We find that the average probability of decisiveness is about the same under all three systems.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/4q8jx-vrx44An Improved Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-153549706
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Honaker-J', 'name': {'family': 'Honaker', 'given': 'James'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'King-G', 'name': {'family': 'King', 'given': 'Gary'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5327-7631'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/c5d2w-qmn15
Katz and King (1999) develop a model for predicting or explaining aggregate electoral results in multiparty democracies. Their model is, in principle, analogous to what least squares regression provides American politics researchers in that two-party system. Katz and King applied their model to three-party elections in England and revealed a variety of new features of incumbency advantage and where each party pulls support from. Although the mathematics of their statistical model covers any number of political parties, it is computationally very demanding, and hence slow and numerically imprecise, with more than three. The original goal of our work was to produce an approximate method that works quicker in practice with many parties without making too many theoretical compromises. As it turns out, the method we offer here improves on Katz and King's (in bias, variance, numerical stability, and computational speed) even when the latter is computationally feasible. We also offer easy-to-use software that implements our suggestions.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/c5d2w-qmn15Aggregation and Dynamics of Survey Responses: The Case of Presidential Approval
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-164540519
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Alvarez-R-M', 'name': {'family': 'Alvarez', 'given': 'R. Michael'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-8113-4451'}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/kdsp6-nwb86
In this paper we critique much of the empirical literature on the important political science concept of presidential approval. Much of the recent research on presidential approval has focused on the dynamic nature of approval; arguments have raged about whether presidential approval is integrated, co-integrated, or fractionally integrated. We argue that none of these time-series concepts, imported from an econometrics literature which has fundamentally different types of data than do political scientists, can apply to the presidential approval time series. Instead, we advocate careful use of aggregated approval as a time-series cross-section, or the use of individual-level survey responses. Ultimately most of the important hypotheses political scientists wish to test regarding presidential approval involve individual voters or citizens; thus we argue that using the appropriate data unit is the best methodology.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/kdsp6-nwb86Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Yoon and Kim
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-170111519
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Beck-N', 'name': {'family': 'Beck', 'given': 'Nathaniel'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/mkbra-4vn16
[No abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mkbra-4vn16Post-Stratification without Population Level Information on the Post-Stratifying Variable, with Application to Political Polling
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-143149807
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Reilly-Cavan', 'name': {'family': 'Reilly', 'given': 'Cavan'}}, {'id': 'Gelman-Andrew', 'name': {'family': 'Gelman', 'given': 'Andrew'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/814rt-46j78
We investigate the construction of more precise estimates of a collection of population means using information about a related variable in the context of repeated sample surveys. The method is illustrated using poll results concerning presidential approval rating (our related variable is political party identification). We use post-stratification to construct these improved estimates, but since we don't have population level information on the post-stratifying variable, we construct a model for the manner in which the post-stratifier develops over time. In this manner, we obtain more precise estimates without making possibly untenable assumptions about the dynamics of our variable of interest, the presidential approval rating.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/814rt-46j78Beyond Ordinary Logit: Taking Time Seriously in Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Models
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-133839169
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Beck-N', 'name': {'family': 'Beck', 'given': 'Nathaniel'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Tucker-R', 'name': {'family': 'Tucker', 'given': 'Richard'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/2fmk9-nvs52
Researchers typically analyze time-series-cross-section data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS) using ordinary logit or probit. However, BTSCS observations are likely to violate the independence assumption of the ordinary logit or probit statistical model. It is well known that if the observations are temporally related that the results of an ordinary logit or probit analysis may be misleading. In this paper, we provide a simple diagnostic for temporal dependence and a simple remedy. Our remedy is based on the idea that BTSCS data is identical to grouped duration data. This remedy does not require the BTSCS analyst to acquire any further methodological skills and it can be easily implemented in any standard statistical software package. While our approach is suitable for any type of BTSCS data, we provide examples and applications from the field of International Relations, where BTSCS data is frequently used. We use our methodology to re-assess Oneal and Russett's (1997) findings regarding the relationship between economic interdependence, democracy, and peace. Our analyses show that 1) their finding that economic interdependence is associated with peace is an artifact of their failure to account for temporal dependence and 2) their finding that democracy inhibits conflict is upheld even taking duration dependence into account.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2fmk9-nvs52The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-144530248
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Cox-G-W', 'name': {'family': 'Cox', 'given': 'Gary W.'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/xt8ng-zdv36
We develop a simple formal model of the redistricting process that highlights the importance of two factors: first, partisan or bipartisan control of the redistricting process; second, the nature of the reversionary outcome, should the state legislature and governor fail to agree on a new districting plan. Using this model, we derive various predictions about the levels of partisan bias and responsiveness that should be observed under districting plans adopted under various constellations of partisan control of state government and reversionary outcomes, testing our predictions on postwar (1946{70) U.S. House electoral data. We find strong evidence that both partisan control and reversionary outcomes systematically affect the nature of a redistricting plan and the subsequent elections held under it. Further, we show that the well-known disappearance circa 1966 of what had been a long-time pro-Republican bias of about 6% in nonsouthern congressional elections can be explained completely by the changing composition of northern districting plans.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/xt8ng-zdv36A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170814-155246837
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'King-G', 'name': {'family': 'King', 'given': 'Gary'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5327-7631'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/ktgms-6m904
We propose an internally consistent and comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, district-level aggregate election data. This model can be used to explain or predict how the geographic distribution of electoral results depends upon economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic compositions, campaign spending, and other features of the election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate areas. We also provide several new graphical representations for help in data exploration, model evaluation, and substantive interpretation.
Although the model applies more generally, we use it to help resolve an important controversy over the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of incumbency in Great Britain. Contrary to previous analyses, which are all based on measures now known to be biased, we demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is small but politically meaningful. We also find that it differs substantially across the parties, about half a percent for the Conservatives, 1% for the Labor Party, and 3% for the Liberal party and its successors. Also contrary to previous research, we show that these effects have not grown in recent years. Finally, we are able to estimate from which party each party's incumbency advantage is predominantly drawn.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ktgms-6m904Why Did The Incumbency Advantage In U.S. House Elections Grow?
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170817-154732918
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Cox-G-W', 'name': {'family': 'Cox', 'given': 'Gary W.'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/mztr7-cd807
In the last twenty years, scholars have scrutinized the electoral advantages conferred by incumbency-both at the federal and at the state level-more than perhaps any other factor affecting U .S. legislative elections.1 Much of the literature focuses on explaining why the incumbency advantage in U .S. House elections grew so substantially, starting in the mid-1960s. The dominant contenders in the literature are two, one emphasizing resources of various kinds (Mayhew 1974) and opportunities to perform constituency services (Fiorina 1977; 1989), one emphasizing partisan dealignment (Erikson 1972; Burnham 1974; Ferejohn 1977). While not incompatible, these explanations do point to significantly different factors as key, and neither has emerged as a clear winner.
In this paper, we suggest a new approach to measuring the incumbency advantage, one that disaggregates the total value of incumbency into three components. By examining the trends over time in these three components we find evidence suggesting that much of the growth in the incumbency advantage at the federal level cannot be accounted for by resource growth; rather, some version of the dealignment story will have to be employed.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mztr7-cd807Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance: A Corrigendum
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170824-162753007
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Beck-N', 'name': {'family': 'Beck', 'given': 'Nathaniel'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Alvarez-R-M', 'name': {'family': 'Alvarez', 'given': 'R. Michael'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-8113-4451'}, {'id': 'Garrett-G', 'name': {'family': 'Garrett', 'given': 'Geoffrey'}}, {'id': 'Lange-P', 'name': {'family': 'Lange', 'given': 'Peter'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/5f7wb-bjt75
Alvarez, Garrett and Lange (1991) used cross-national panel data on the OECD nations to show that countries with left governments and encompassing labor movements enjoyed superior economic performance. Here we show that the standard errors reported in that article are incorrect. Re-estimation of the model using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors shows that the major finding of Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, regarding the political and institutional causes of economic growth, is upheld but the findings for unemployment and inflation are open to question. We show that the model used by Alvarez, Garrett and Lange, feasible generalized least squares, cannot produce standard errors when the number of countries analyzed exceeds the length of the time period under analysis. Also, we argue that ordinary least squares with robust standard errors is superior to feasible generalized least squares for typical cross-national panel studies.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5f7wb-bjt75Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series–Cross-Section Data
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-164513923
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Beck-N', 'name': {'family': 'Beck', 'given': 'Nathaniel'}}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}]}
Year: 2019
DOI: 10.7907/dgeyw-vqa80
This paper considers random coefficient models (RCMs) for time-series–cross-section data. These models allow for unit to unit variation in the model parameters. After laying out the various models, we assess several issues in specifying RCMs. We then consider the finite sample properties of some standard RCM estimators, and show that the most common one, associated with Hsiao, has very poor properties. These analyses also show that a somewhat awkward combination of estimators based on Swamy's work performs reasonably well; this awkward estimator and a Bayes estimator with an uninformative prior (due to Smith) seem to perform best. But we also see that estimators which assume full pooling perform well unless there is a large degree of unit to unit parameter heterogeneity. We also argue that the various data driven methods (whether classical or empirical Bayes or Bayes with gentle priors) tends to lead to much more heterogeneity than most political scientists would like. We speculate that fully Bayesian models, with a variety of informative priors, may be the best way to approach RCMs.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dgeyw-vqa80Hidden Donors: The Censoring Problem in U.S. Federal Campaign Finance Data
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200109-081212045
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Alvarez-R-M', 'name': {'family': 'Alvarez', 'given': 'R. Michael'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-8113-4451'}, {'id': 'Katz-J-N', 'name': {'family': 'Katz', 'given': 'Jonathan N.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-5287-3503'}, {'id': 'Kim-Seo-young Silvia', 'name': {'family': 'Kim', 'given': 'Seo-young Silvia'}, 'orcid': '0000-0002-8801-9210'}]}
Year: 2020
DOI: 10.33774/apsa-2020-sdjkp
Inferences about individual campaign contributors are limited by how the Federal Election Commission collects and reports data. Only transactions that exceed a cycle-to-date total of $200 are individually disclosed, so that contributions of many donors are unobserved. We contrast visible and "hidden" donors, i.e., small donors who are invisible due to censoring—and routinely ignored in existing research. We use the Sanders presidential campaign in 2016, whose unique campaign structure received money only through an intermediary/conduit committee. These are governed by stricter disclosure statutes, allowing us to study donors who are normally hidden. For Sanders, there were seven hidden donors for every visible donor, and altogether, hidden donors were responsible for 33.8% of Sanders' campaign funds. We show that hidden donors start giving relatively later, with contributions concentrated around early primaries. We suggest that as presidential campaign strategies change towards wooing smaller donors, more research on what motivates them is necessary.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pvv8e-ae423