[
    {
        "id": "authors:z22ae-zqp35",
        "collection": "authors",
        "collection_id": "z22ae-zqp35",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-103104630",
        "type": "article",
        "title": "Pre-Meeting Discussions and the Possibility of Coalition-Breaking Procedures in Majority Rule Committees",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Hoffman",
                "given_name": "Elizabeth",
                "clpid": "Hoffman-E"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Plott",
                "given_name": "Charles R.",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628",
                "clpid": "Plott-C-R"
            }
        ],
        "abstract": "The concept of a coalition is fundamental to many formal and informal\nmodels of group decision processes. It finds its way into discussions which\nreport impressionistic accounts of political decisions. It underlies most of\ncooperative game theory. And, it is at the heart of legal theories which justify\ninstitutions (such as sunshine laws)1 which in the name of social policy limit\nthe activities of some individuals or groups. However, in spite of its widespread\npopularity the \u00b7usefulness of the concept is still open to question.\nCoalitions are not always operationally defined and models which do not reify\ncoalitions predict outcomes as well as those which do.",
        "issn": "0048-5829",
        "publisher": "Springer",
        "publication": "Public Choice",
        "publication_date": "1983",
        "series_number": "1",
        "volume": "40",
        "issue": "1",
        "pages": "21-39"
    },
    {
        "id": "authors:sbyps-be461",
        "collection": "authors",
        "collection_id": "sbyps-be461",
        "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140220-111730862",
        "type": "article",
        "title": "The Effect of Intertemporal Speculation on the Outcomes in Seller Posted Offer Auction Markets",
        "author": [
            {
                "family_name": "Hoffman",
                "given_name": "Elizabeth",
                "clpid": "Hoffman-E"
            },
            {
                "family_name": "Plott",
                "given_name": "Charles R.",
                "orcid": "0000-0001-8363-3628",
                "clpid": "Plott-C-R"
            }
        ],
        "abstract": "This paper extends the experimental examination of posted offer auction markets to a market with intertemporal speculators. Previous experimental results demonstrate that posted offer markets induce inefficiencies, and also an income distribution that works to the disadvantage of those facing posted prices. The results of this paper suggest that these properties of the posted offer institution hold in the presence of intertemporal speculation.",
        "issn": "0033-5533",
        "publisher": "Oxford University Press",
        "publication": "Quarterly Journal of Economics",
        "publication_date": "1981-05",
        "series_number": "2",
        "volume": "96",
        "issue": "2",
        "pages": "223-242"
    }
]