[ { "id": "authors:emzdy-mwt63", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "emzdy-mwt63", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20230425-441449400.5", "type": "article", "title": "Lobbyists as Gatekeepers: Theory and Evidence", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Kang", "given_name": "Karam", "orcid": "0000-0001-9877-6744", "clpid": "Kang-Karam" }, { "family_name": "Montagnes", "given_name": "B. Pablo", "orcid": "0000-0003-1316-6926", "clpid": "Montagnes-B-Pablo" }, { "family_name": "You", "given_name": "Hye Young", "orcid": "0000-0003-4821-6428", "clpid": "You-Hye-Young" } ], "abstract": "Lobbyists are omnipresent in the policy-making process, but the value that they bring to both clients and politicians remains poorly understood. We develop a model in which a lobbyist's value derives from his ability to selectively screen which clients he brings to a politician, thereby earning the politician's trust and preferential treatment for his clients. Lobbyists face a dilemma, as their ability to screen also increases their value to special interests and the prices they can charge. A lobbyist's profit motive undermines his ability to solve this dilemma, but an interest in policy outcomes\u2014due to either a political ideology or a personal connection\u2014enhances it, which paradoxically increases his profits. Using a unique data set from reports mandated by the Foreign Agents Registration Act, we find that lobbyists become more selective when they are more ideologically aligned with politicians, consistent with our prediction.", "doi": "10.1086/723026", "issn": "0022-3816", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "publication": "Journal of Politics", "publication_date": "2023-04", "series_number": "2", "volume": "85", "issue": "2", "pages": "731-748" }, { "id": "authors:bnceq-6dn71", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "bnceq-6dn71", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20221115-640640900.2", "type": "article", "title": "Polarization and Campaign Spending in Elections", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "abstract": "I develop a Downsian model of electoral competition in which candidates with policy and office motivations use platforms and campaign spending to gain the median voter's support. The unique equilibrium involves randomizing over platforms and spending and exhibits the following properties: (i) ex ante uncertainty about the winner, (ii) platform divergence, (iii) inefficiency in spending and outcomes, (iv) polarization, and (v) voter extremism. I show that platform polarization and spending move in tandem, since spending is used by candidates to gain support for extreme platforms. Factors that contribute to both include the candidates' desire for extreme policies and their capability at translating spending into support for them. I also show that strong incumbents parlay an advantage into more extreme platforms, consistent with the classic marginality hypothesis but contrasting with a large theoretical literature in which candidates with an (exogenous or endogenous) valence advantage tend to moderate their platforms.", "doi": "10.1086/722045", "issn": "0022-3816", "publisher": "University of Chicago Press", "publication": "Journal of Politics", "publication_date": "2023-01", "series_number": "1", "volume": "85", "issue": "1", "pages": "240-249" }, { "id": "authors:9g31q-7qg58", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "9g31q-7qg58", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220429-926133700", "type": "article", "title": "A theory of policy sabotage", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Kastellec", "given_name": "Jonathan P.", "orcid": "0000-0002-7338-248X", "clpid": "Kastellec-Jonathan-P" } ], "abstract": "We develop a theory of policymaking that examines when policy sabotage\u2014the deliberate choice by an opposition party to interfere with the implementation of a policy\u2014can be an effective electoral strategy, even if rational voters can observe that it is happening. In our model, a potential saboteur chooses whether to sabotage an incumbent's policy by blocking its successful implementation. A voter then decides whether to retain the incumbent, who is of unknown ability, or to select a challenger. We find that the incentives for sabotage are broadly shaped by the underlying popularity of the incumbent\u2014it is most attractive when an incumbent is somewhat unpopular. If so, sabotage may decrease the probability the incumbent is reelected, even though sabotage is observable to the voter. This is because while the saboteur knows that sabotage will improve the incumbent's reputation, he fears that absent sabotage a policy success will improve that reputation even more.", "doi": "10.1177/09516298221085974", "issn": "0951-6298", "publisher": "SAGE Publications", "publication": "Journal of Theoretical Politics", "publication_date": "2022-04-01", "series_number": "2", "volume": "34", "issue": "2", "pages": "191-218" }, { "id": "authors:srbcg-35n75", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "srbcg-35n75", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20181011-135625543", "type": "article", "title": "Policy-Development Monopolies: Adverse Consequences and Institutional Responses", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Shotts", "given_name": "Kenneth W.", "clpid": "Shotts-K-W" } ], "abstract": "We analyze a model of policy making in which only one actor (e.g., a bureaucratic agency or a well-funded interest group) has the capacity to develop high-quality policy proposals. By virtue of her skills, this actor has an effective monopoly on policy development and thus can craft proposals that are good for herself but provide few benefits to decision makers who enact policies. We then examine institutional responses that decision makers can use to induce a policy-development monopolist to craft more appealing proposals: (i) establishing in-house policy development capacity, (ii) delegating authority to an agent who counterbalances the monopolist's preferences, and (iii) fostering competition by policy developers with different preferences. We apply our model to a diverse set of contexts, including lobbying in term-limited state legislatures, regulation of banking and financial services, and administrative procedures for rule making in US federal bureaucracies.", "doi": "10.1086/698930", "issn": "0022-3816", "publisher": "University of Chicago Press", "publication": "Journal of Politics", "publication_date": "2018-10", "series_number": "4", "volume": "80", "issue": "4", "pages": "1339-1354" }, { "id": "authors:8awah-j8d47", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "8awah-j8d47", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170706-133543556", "type": "article", "title": "Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence", "author": [ { "family_name": "Gurantz", "given_name": "Ron", "clpid": "Gurantz-R" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "abstract": "Governments often fear the future intentions of their adversaries. In this article we show how this fear can make deterrent threats credible under seemingly incredible circumstances. We consider a model in which a defender seeks to deter a transgression with both intrinsic and military value. We examine how the defender's fear of the challenger's future belligerence affects his willingness to respond to the transgression with war. We derive conditions under which even a very minor transgression effectively \"tests\" for the challenger's future belligerence, which makes the defender's deterrent threat credible even when the transgression is objectively minor and the challenger is ex ante unlikely to be belligerent. We also show that fear can actually benefit the defender by allowing her to credibly deter. We apply the model to analyze a series of historical cases and show the robustness of our results to a variety of extensions.", "doi": "10.1086/691054", "issn": "0022-3816", "publisher": "University of Chicago Press", "publication": "Journal of Politics", "publication_date": "2017-07", "series_number": "3", "volume": "79", "issue": "3", "pages": "1041-1056" }, { "id": "authors:zhpz1-f8v55", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "zhpz1-f8v55", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160512-104652785", "type": "article", "title": "Signaling and Counter-Signaling in the Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Analysis of En Banc Review", "author": [ { "family_name": "Beim", "given_name": "Deborah", "clpid": "Beim-D" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Kastellec", "given_name": "Jonathan P.", "clpid": "Kastellec-J-P" } ], "abstract": "We leverage the institutional features of American courts to evaluate the importance of whistleblowers in hierarchical oversight. Drawing on a formal theory of signaling in the judicial hierarchy, we examine the role of whistleblowing dissents in triggering en banc review of three-judge panels by full circuits of the Courts of Appeals. The theory generates predictions about how dissent interacts with judicial preferences to influence circuits' review and reversal decisions, which we test using original and existing data. First, we show that judges who dissent counter to their preferences are more likely to see their dissents lead to review and reversal. Second, we show that dissents are most influential when the likelihood of non-compliance by a three-judge panel is highest. Our results underscore the importance of dissent in the judicial hierarchy and illustrate how judicial whistleblowers can help appellate courts target the most important cases for review.", "doi": "10.1111/ajps.12193", "issn": "0092-5853", "publisher": "Midwest Political Science Association", "publication": "American Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "2016-04", "series_number": "2", "volume": "60", "issue": "2", "pages": "490-508" }, { "id": "authors:wj1ms-rrj04", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "wj1ms-rrj04", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160520-092315336", "type": "article", "title": "Experimentation and Persuasion in Political Organizations", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "abstract": "Different beliefs about how to achieve shared goals are common in political organizations such as government agencies, campaigns, and NGOs. However, the consequences of such conflicts have not yet been explored. We develop a formal model in which a principal and an agent disagree about the right policy for achieving their shared goals. Disagreement creates a motivational problem, but we show how both observing policy outcomes and experimenting with policies can ameliorate it. We also show that the principal often defers to the agent in order to motivate him, thereby generating more informative policy outcomes and building future consensus. Most surprisingly, she sometimes allows the agent to implement his desired policy even when she is sure it is wrong, to persuade him through failure that he is mistaken. Using the model, we generate empirical implications about performance measurement and Presidential appointments in U.S. federal agencies.", "doi": "10.1017/S0003055415000568", "issn": "0003-0554", "publisher": "Cambridge University Press", "publication": "American Political Science Review", "publication_date": "2016-02", "series_number": "01", "volume": "110", "issue": "01", "pages": "68-84" }, { "id": "authors:ync8w-np949", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "ync8w-np949", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20150423-150238667", "type": "article", "title": "Competitive Policy Development", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Shotts", "given_name": "Kenneth W.", "clpid": "Shotts-K-W" } ], "abstract": "We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a given proposal, which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power. Competition undermines this agenda power, forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker. This beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences, because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals.", "doi": "10.1257/aer.20130250", "issn": "0002-8282", "publisher": "American Economic Association", "publication": "American Economic Review", "publication_date": "2015-04", "series_number": "4", "volume": "105", "issue": "4", "pages": "1646-1664" }, { "id": "authors:2w9re-sg138", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "2w9re-sg138", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190430-081921310", "type": "article", "title": "Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy", "author": [ { "family_name": "Beim", "given_name": "Deborah", "clpid": "Beim-D" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Kastellec", "given_name": "Jonathan P.", "clpid": "Kastellec-J-P" } ], "abstract": "One way that principals can overcome the problem of informational asymmetries in hierarchical organizations is to enable whistleblowing. We evaluate how whistleblowing influences compliance in the judicial hierarchy. We present a formal model in which a potential whistleblower may, at some cost, signal noncompliance by a lower court to a higher court. A key insight of the model is that whistleblowing is most informative when it is rare. While the presence of a whistleblower can increase compliance by lower courts, beyond a certain point blowing the whistle is counterproductive and actually reduces compliance. Moreover, a whistleblower who is a \"perfect ally\" of the higher court (in terms of preferences) blows the whistle too often. Our model shows an important connection between the frequency of whistleblowing and the effectiveness of whistleblowing as a threat to induce compliance in hierarchical organizations.", "doi": "10.1111/ajps.12108", "issn": "0092-5853", "publisher": "Midwest Political Science Association", "publication": "American Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "2014-10", "series_number": "4", "volume": "58", "issue": "4", "pages": "904-918" }, { "id": "authors:00zv7-jht12", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "00zv7-jht12", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190502-143313442", "type": "article", "title": "Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy", "author": [ { "family_name": "Baron", "given_name": "David P.", "clpid": "Baron-D-P" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "abstract": "This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies can first influence the choice of a proto-coalition and then influence the legislative bargaining over policy within that coalition. The equilibrium policy in the legislative bargaining stage maximizes the aggregate policy utility of the coalition members and the lobbies, but lobbying can also lead to the preservation of the status quo and lobby-induced gridlock. When the status quo does not persist, the policy outcome is largely determined by the selection of a coalition, since legislative bargaining under unanimity within the coalition leads to a coalition-efficient policy regardless of the identity of the proposer. An example is presented to identify the types of equilibria and provide a full characterization of an equilibrium.", "doi": "10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4", "issn": "0938-2259", "publisher": "Springer", "publication": "Economic Theory", "publication_date": "2012-04", "series_number": "3", "volume": "49", "issue": "3", "pages": "639-681" }, { "id": "authors:spx6z-44e90", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "spx6z-44e90", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190430-081249006", "type": "article", "title": "Policy-Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Shotts", "given_name": "Kenneth W.", "clpid": "Shotts-K-W" } ], "abstract": "In Gilligan and Krehbiel's models of procedural choice in legislatures, a committee exerts costly effort to acquire private information about an unknown state of the world. Subsequent work on expertise, delegation, and lobbying has largely followed this approach. In contrast, we develop a model of information as policy valence. We use our model to analyze a procedural choice game, focusing on the effect of transferability, i.e., the extent to which information acquired to implement one policy option can be used to implement a different policy option. We find that when information is transferable, as in Gilligan and Krehbiel's models, closed rules can induce committee specialization. However, when information is policy\u2010specific, open rules are actually superior for inducing specialization. The reason for this surprising result is that a committee lacking formal agenda power has a greater incentive to exercise informal agenda power by exerting costly effort to generate high\u2010valence legislation.", "doi": "10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00538.x", "issn": "0092-5853", "publisher": "Midwest Political Science Association", "publication": "American Journal of Political Science", "publication_date": "2012-01", "series_number": "1", "volume": "56", "issue": "1", "pages": "67-83" }, { "id": "authors:0zmcs-qew16", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "0zmcs-qew16", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190506-142217393", "type": "article", "title": "Theory Driven Bias in Ideal Point Estimates\u2014A Monte Carlo Study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "abstract": "This paper analyzes the use of ideal point estimates for testing pivot theories of lawmaking such as Krehbiel's (1998, Pivotal politics: A theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago) pivotal politics and Cox and McCubbins's (2005, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representations. New York: Cambridge University Press) party cartel model. Among the prediction of pivot theories is that all pivotal legislators will vote identically on all successful legislation. Clinton (2007, Lawmaking and roll calls. Journal of Politics 69:455\u201367) argues that the estimated ideal points of the pivotal legislators are therefore predicted to be statistically indistinguishable and false when estimated from the set of successful final passage roll call votes, which implies that ideal point estimates cannot logically be used to test pivot theories. I show using Monte Carlo simulation that when pivot theories are augmented with probabilistic voting, Clinton's prediction only holds in small samples when voting is near perfect. I furthermore show that the predicted bias is unlikely to be consequential with U.S. Congressional voting data. My analysis suggests that the methodology of estimating ideal points to compute theoretically relevant quantities for empirical tests is not inherently flawed in the case of pivot theories.", "doi": "10.1093/pan/mpq028", "issn": "1047-1987", "publisher": "Oxford University Press", "publication": "Political Analysis", "publication_date": "2011-12", "series_number": "1", "volume": "19", "issue": "1", "pages": "87-102" } ]