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"datestamp": "2010-06-04 17:25:06", "lastmod": "2019-11-08 18:10:57", "status_changed": "2010-06-04 17:25:06", "type": "thesis", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "email": "mmcconnell@gmail.com", "id": "McConnell-Margaret-Anne", "name": { "family": "McConnell", "given": "Margaret Anne" }, "show_email": "NO" } ] }, "title": "Social Interactions and Giving", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "experiments, giving", "abstract": "
This thesis presents four experimental studies addressing theories of social interactions and charitable contributions. Social interactions have been identified as an important nonmarket determinant of economic outcomes. My research provides theoretically motivated experimental evidence to advance our understanding of strategic communication and voluntary contributions.
\r\n\r\nI consider a model of communication in the presence of investment opportunities with uncertain returns and positive social externalities. The model predicts that welfare improving communication can only occur when individuals can communicate by sending a costly signal. I test this model with experiments. While the model predicts that individuals need to \"burn money\" in order to effectively communicate, in our experiments individuals overcommunicate when messages are free and undercommunicate when they are costly. Therefore, we do not see welfare improvements from costly communication.
\r\n\r\nIn joint work with Jacob Goeree, Leeat Yariv, Tiffany Mitchell, and Tracy Tromp, we consider the relationship between social closeness and the tendency to be generous to others in an actual social network. We find that dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance: giving follows a simple inverse distance law. Our results suggest that social closeness is a more important predictor of generosity than individual demographic characteristics.
\r\n\r\nIn another study conducted with Sera Linardi, we adapt Benabou and Tirole's (2006) model in order to address the role of honor, stigma and visibility on contributions of time. We consider the effect of excuses and monitoring on the willingness to volunteer in an experiment combining elements of lab and field. We find that removing available excuses for not volunteering significantly increases the willingness to volunteer without negatively affecting productivity.
\r\n\r\nIn further work on charitable giving with Jacob Goeree and Antonio Rangel, we provide experimental evidence consistent with morally motivated charitable giving. We find that providing subjects with a suggested contribution amount increases the willingness to give and that framing the suggestion with moral language further increases contributions. However, moral framing language does not impact the share of individuals who make no contributions, suggesting that individuals may value contributions above a moral reference point differently from contributions below it.
\r\n", "date": "2010-05", "date_type": "degree", "id_number": "CaltechTHESIS:05282010-072910292", "refereed": "FALSE", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282010-072910292", "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "collection": "CaltechTHESIS", "reviewer": "Gayle Hammer", "deposited_by": "Margaret McConnell", "deposited_on": "2010-06-04 17:25:06", "doi": "10.7907/ZP35-GR57", "divisions": { "items": [ "div_hss" ] }, "institution": "California Institute of Technology", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_advisor": { "items": [ { "email": "jacob.goeree@gmail.com", "id": "Goeree-J-K", "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "role": "advisor" }, { "email": "lyariv@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Yariv-L", "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "role": "co-advisor" } ] }, "thesis_committee": { "items": [ { "email": "jacob.goeree@gmail.com", "id": "Goeree-J-K", "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "role": "chair" }, { "email": "lyariv@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Yariv-L", "name": { "family": "Yariv", "given": "Leeat" }, "role": "member" }, { "email": "rangel@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Rangel-A", "name": { "family": "Rangel", "given": "Antonio" }, "role": "member" }, { "email": "snowberg@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Snowberg-E", "name": { "family": "Snowberg", "given": "Erik" }, "role": "member" } ] }, "thesis_degree": "PHD", "thesis_degree_grantor": "California Institute of Technology", "thesis_defense_date": "2009-09-10", "gradofc_approval_date": "2010-05-28", "review_status": "approved", "option_major": { "items": [ "socsci" ] }, "copyright_statement": "Author's Rights Authorization: I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted here is the same as that approved by my advisory committee.\n\nI hereby grant to California Institute of Technology or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified under \"Thesis Availability\" in this submission, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation, or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report.", "resource_type": "thesis", "pub_year": "2010", "author_list": "McConnell, Margaret Anne", "advisor_list": "Goeree, Jacob K. and Yariv, Leeat", "comittee_list": "Goeree, Jacob K.; Yariv, Leeat; et el." }, { "id": "https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/id/eprint/5945", "eprint_id": 5945, "rev_number": 17, "documents": [ { "id": "/id/document/10510", "doc_id": 10510, "rev_number": 4, "files": [ { "id": "/id/file/72629", "fileid": 72629, "datasetid": "document", "objectid": 10510, "filename": "Dissertation_corrected.pdf", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "filesize": 3953741, "mtime": "2012-12-26 04:29:12", "url": "/5945/1/Dissertation_corrected.pdf" } ], "eprint_id": 5945, "pos": 1, "mime_type": "application/pdf", "format": "application/pdf", "language": "en", "security": "public", "license": "other", "main": "Dissertation_corrected.pdf", "media_duration": 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"media_sample_stop": "0", "relation": { "items": [ { "type": "http://eprints.org/relation/isVersionOf", "uri": "/id/document/10510" }, { "type": "http://eprints.org/relation/isVolatileVersionOf", "uri": "/id/document/10510" }, { "type": "http://eprints.org/relation/isIndexCodesVersionOf", "uri": "/id/document/10510" } ] } } ], "eprint_status": "archive", "userid": 1939, "dir": "disk0/00/00/59/45", "datestamp": "2010-08-04 17:59:40", "lastmod": "2019-11-08 18:12:08", "status_changed": "2010-08-04 17:59:40", "type": "thesis", "metadata_visibility": "show", "creators": { "items": [ { "email": "cbrunner@uni-hd.de", "id": "Brunner-Christoph", "name": { "family": "Brunner", "given": "Christoph" }, "show_email": "YES" } ] }, "title": "Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Complex Environments", "ispublished": "unpub", "full_text_status": "public", "keywords": "Experimental Economics; Combinatorial Auctions; Information Cascades; Social Learning; Behavioral Economics; Game Theory", "abstract": "It has been suggested that information cascades might occasionally prevent asset markets from performing efficiently. We run experiments in which private signals about an asset with a common value are released sequentially. That allows us to compare the quality of information aggregation in periods in which an information cascade would occur in the absence of prices to the quality of information aggregation in other periods but we find no significant differences.
\r\n\r\nIn a second chapter, we focus on information cascades in sequential games, where subjects choose between two options and each subject has a small chance of being perfectly informed about which option is correct. When subjects can only observe the number of times each option has been chosen by their predecessors, the Nash prediction is that subjects follow the minority of predecessors but subjects tend to follow the majority instead. Models that combine heterogeneity in the level of strategic thinking and allow for some degree of trembling (e.g., noisy introspection) fit the data best.
\r\n\r\nA third chapter evaluates the performance of four different auction formats. We find that bidders are not always bidding on the currently most-profitable combination of available items. Instead, subjects sometimes submit jumpbids. As a result, a clock auction in which prices can only increase incrementally generates particularly high revenues. We also find that subjects are reluctant to risk exposure. In the presence of value complementarities, introducing the possibility to submit package bids therefore increases efficiency.
\r\n\r\nIn the last chapter, we compare five different stationary concepts: Nash equilibrium, quantal-response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium and impulse-balance equilibrium. Selten and Chmura (2008) run a large number of completely mixed 2 x 2 games in the laboratory for that purpose. We reanalyze their data and find that there are no significant differences with respect to goodness of fit except that the Nash equilibrium fits worse than all the other models. We also estimate the same models on other data sets.
", "date": "2010", "date_type": "degree", "id_number": "CaltechTHESIS:06092010-233303171", "refereed": "FALSE", "official_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06092010-233303171", "referencetext": { "items": [ "Alevy, J. E., M. S. Haigh, and J. A. List (1997) ``Information cascades: Evidence from a field experiment with financial market professionals,'' The Journal of Finance, 62(1), 151-180.\r\n\r\nAnderson, L. R. and C. A. Holt (1997) ``Information cascades in the laboratory,'' American Economic Review, 87, 847-862.\r\n\r\nAusubel, L. M., P. Cramton, and P. Milgrom (2006) ``The clock-proxy auction: A practical combinatorial design,'' Combinatorial Auctions, Cramton, P., R. Steinberg, and Y. Shoham, eds., MIT Press, 115-138.\r\n\r\nAvery, C. and P. Zemsky (1998) ``Multidimensional uncertainty and herd behavior in financial markets,'' American Economic Review, 88, 724-748.\r\n\r\nBanerjee, A. V. (1992) ``A simple model of herd behavior,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (3), 797-817.\r\n\r\nBanks, J., J.O. Ledyard, and D. Porter (1989) ``Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 20(1), 1-25.\r\n\r\nBanks, J., M. Olson, D. Porter, S. Rassenti, and V. Smith (2003) ``Theory, experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions,'' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, 303-350.\r\n\r\nBarner, M., F. Feri, and C. R. Plott (2005) ``On the microstructure of price determination and information aggregation with sequential and asymmetric information arrival in an experimental asset market,'' Annals of Finance, 1, 73-107. \r\n\r\nBikhchandani, S., D. Hirschleifer, and I. Welch (1992) ``A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades,'' Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), 992-1026.\r\n\r\nBose, S., G. Orosel, M. Ottaviani, and L. Vesterlund (2009) ``Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model,'' Economic Theory, forthcoming.\r\n\r\nCallander, S. and J. Hoerner (2009) ``The wisdom of the minority,'' Journal of Economic Theory, 144(4), 1421-1439.\r\n\r\nCamerer, C. F. (2003) Behavioral game theory: Experiments on strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.\r\n\r\nCamerer, C. F., T.-H. Ho, and J.-K. Chong (2004) ``A cognitive hierarchy model of games,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861-898.\r\n\r\nCapra, C. M., R. Gomez, J. K. Goeree, and C. H. Holt (2002), ``Learning and noisy equilibrium behavior in an experimental study of imperfect price competition,'' International Economic Review, 43(3), 613-636.\r\n\r\nCelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004a) ``Distinguishing informational cascades from herd behavior in the laboratory,'' American Economic Review, 94(3), 484-498.\r\n\r\nCelen, B. and S. Kariv (2004b) ``Observational learning under imperfect information,'' Games and Economic Behavior, 47(1), 72-86.\r\n\r\nCipriani, M. and A. Guarino (2005) ``Herd behavior in a laboratory financial market,'' American Economic Review, 95(5), 1427-1443.\r\n\r\nCrawford, V. P. and N. Iriberri (2007a) ``Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games,'' American Economic Review, 97, 1731-1750.\r\n\r\nCrawford, V. P. and N. Iriberri (2007b) ``Level-k auctions: Can a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions?'' Econometrica, 75, 1721-1770.\r\n\r\nDrehmann, M., J. Oechssler, and A. Roider (2005a) ``Herding and contrarian behavior in financial markets-an internet experiment,'' American Economic Review, 95(5), 1403-1426.\r\n\r\nDrehmann, M., J. Oechssler, and A. Roider (2005b) ``Herding with and without payoff externalities-an internet experiment,'' University of Heidelberg Discussion Paper No. 420.\r\n\r\nFama, E. (1970) ``Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work,'' Journal of Finance, 25, 383-417.\r\n\r\nFligner, M. A. and G. E. Policello (1981) ``Robust rank procedures for the Behrens-Fisher problem,'' Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76(373), 162-168.\r\n\r\nGarber, P. M. (1990) ``Famous first bubbles,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (2), 35-54.\r\n\r\nGoeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2002) ``Learning in economics experiments,'' Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, volume 2, L. Nagel, ed., London: Nature Publishing Group, McMillan, 1060-1069.\r\n\r\nGoeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2004) ``A model of noisy introspection,'' Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), 2004, 365-382.\r\n\r\nGoeree, J. K. and C. A. 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(1989) ``Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses\" Econometrica, 57(2), 307-333." ] }, "rights": "No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.", "funders": { "items": [ { "agency": "Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation" } ] }, "collection": "CaltechTHESIS", "reviewer": "Gayle Hammer", "deposited_by": "Christoph Brunner", "deposited_on": "2010-08-04 17:59:40", "doi": "10.7907/79W2-DW28", "divisions": { "items": [ "div_hss" ] }, "institution": "California Institute of Technology", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_advisor": { "items": [ { "email": "jkg@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Goeree-J-K", "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "role": "advisor" } ] }, "thesis_committee": { "items": [ { "email": "jkg@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Goeree-J-K", "name": { "family": "Goeree", "given": "Jacob K." }, "role": "chair" }, { "email": "cplott@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Plott-C-R", "name": { "family": "Plott", "given": "Charles R." }, "role": "member" }, { "email": "trp@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Palfrey-T-R", "name": { "family": "Palfrey", "given": "Thomas R." }, "role": "member" }, { "email": "camerer@hss.caltech.edu", "id": "Camerer-C-F", "name": { "family": "Camerer", "given": "Colin F." }, "role": "member" } ] }, "thesis_degree": "PHD", "thesis_degree_grantor": "California Institute of Technology", "thesis_defense_date": "2009-09-09", "gradofc_approval_date": "2010-07-19", "review_status": "approved", "option_major": { "items": [ "socsci" ] }, "copyright_statement": "Author's Rights Authorization: I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted here is the same as that approved by my advisory committee.\n\nI hereby grant to California Institute of Technology or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified under \"Thesis Availability\" in this submission, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation, or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report.", "resource_type": "thesis", "pub_year": "2010", "author_list": "Brunner, Christoph", "advisor_list": "Goeree, Jacob K.", "comittee_list": "Goeree, Jacob K.; Plott, Charles R.; et el." } ]