Monograph records
https://feeds.library.caltech.edu/people/Banks-J-S/monograph.rss
A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenMon, 15 Apr 2024 13:19:27 +0000Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-100309309
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2001
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and convex but possibly non-rectangular. Thus, a player's feasible strategies may depend on the strategies used by others, as in Debreu's (1952,1982) generalized games. In contrast to the model of Debreu, we do not require preferences to be defined over infeasible strategy profiles, and we do not require a player's feasible strategy correspondence to have non-empty values. We prove existence of Nash equilibria under a lower hemicontinuity condition, and we give examples of classes of games in which this condition is satisfied.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qjjbv-8s142A multidimensional model of repeated elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-094506966
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2002
We analyze a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model of elections. In each period, a
challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a
majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional
policy space. Individuals' policy preferences are private information, whereas policy
choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in
"simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of
possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience
and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify
relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/at839-n8q12A bargaining model of legislative policy-making
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-102600263
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2003
DOI: 10.7907/2e007-xnw21
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models,
the status quo is not assumed to be "bad," and delay may be Pareto efficient. We
prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on
four factors: risk aversion of the legislators, the dimensionality of the policy space, the
voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse,
if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example,
then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the
status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome.
This "core selection" result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well-known median
voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the
status quo is close to the core, then equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the
core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators
are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads
to policy moderation).https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2e007-xnw21A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-153654831
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/eqx93-z9g89
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/eqx93-z9g89A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-171219202
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/0pn8v-n7v55
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be "bad," and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors: risk aversion of the legislators , the dimensionality of the policy space, the voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse, if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example, then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. This "core selection" result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well-known median voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the status quo is close to the core, t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads to policy moderation).https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0pn8v-n7v55An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-142127351
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}, {'id': 'Olson-M-A', 'name': {'family': 'Olson', 'given': 'Mark'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/cnh3w-1hp55
We investigate, in an experimental setting, the behavior of single decision makers who at discrete time intervals over an "infinite" horizon may choose one action from a set of possible actions where this set is constant over time, i.e. a bandit problem. Two bandit environments are examined, one in which the predicted behavior should always be myopic (the two-armed bandit) and the other in which the predicted behavior should never be myopic (the one-armed bandit). We also investigate the comparative static predictions as the underlying parameter of the bandit environments are changed. The aggregate results show that the cutpoint behavior in the two bandit environments are quantitatively different and in the direction of the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, while a significant number of individual cutpoints exhibit nonstationarity (contrary to the theory), the most likely, i.e. maximum likelihood estimates, collection of decision rules that best explain overall behavior are those that are consistent with the underlying theory.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cnh3w-1hp55An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Camerer-C-F', 'name': {'family': 'Camerer', 'given': 'Colin F.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-4049-1871'}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/p6hm5-2gb95
This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, Sequential, Intuitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilibrium selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered.
The pattern of outcomes suggest that individuals select the more refined equilibria up to the divinity concept. However, an anomaly occurs in the game in which the stable equilibrium is a clear preference among the subjects. Since the concepts are nested this suggests that the outcomes are game specific. Sender behavior does not seem to follow any specific decision rule (e.g., Nash, minmax, PIR, etc.) while receiver actions tend to correspond to the Nash equilibrium outcomes.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/p6hm5-2gb95Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-135234942
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Ledyard-J-O', 'name': {'family': 'Ledyard', 'given': 'John O.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/mhs8g-89z20
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include scheduling job shops, airports or super-computers, zero-inventory planning, and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. We show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65percent efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two that arise naturally from auctions used in the allocation of single dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of both administrative and market procedures.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mhs8g-89z20The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151906378
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Ledyard-J-O', 'name': {'family': 'Ledyard', 'given': 'John O.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David P.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/68k2y-nze20
This paper demonstrates the use of applied organizational design to investigate possible
mechanisms to allocate the resources of Space Station. First, a specific laboratory experimental
environment (testbed) and baseline policy are developed using the salient technical features of the
Space Station and past Space Shuttle experiences. The use of priority contracts to assist in
contingent rescheduling of resources due to supply curtailments is established. Next, generalized
versions of an English auction and Vickrey-Groves type sealed bid auction are designed and
developed to allocate scheduled resource use and priority. Finally, these mechanisms are tested and
evaluated in the testbed. The data demonstrates that the expected efficiency increases significantly
using the auction mechanisms rather than allocations from first-come-first-served processes.
However, the auction mechanisms do not produce outcomes near the 100% level of efficiency.
Several results are dedicated to the revenue generating properties of the mechanisms and individual
bidding behavior.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/68k2y-nze20Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-170013615
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/rp24m-ekx15
This paper develops a multi-stage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a non-cooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rp24m-ekx15Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/ghjz6-1sf90
The effect of different liability rules on the pretrial behavior of litigants to a civil suit is analyzed. The interaction is modeled as a game of incomplete information, where both the plaintiff and the defendant know whether or not they were negligent in actions leading to the accident. Selection criteria are used to refine the set of sequential equilibria of the game.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ghjz6-1sf90Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-153417196
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Gasmi-F', 'name': {'family': 'Gasmi', 'given': 'Farid'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/vdv5r-3s803
This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game is shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/vdv5r-3s803An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Plott-C-R', 'name': {'family': 'Plott', 'given': 'Charles R.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David P.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/msckd-0m869
The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/msckd-0m869Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-161826033
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sobel-J', 'name': {'family': 'Sobel', 'given': 'Joel'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/yf3x1-6g428
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/yf3x1-6g428Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-163219147
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/swecv-syw29
The recent experimental results of Plott and Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983) on the ability of single commodity markets to "reveal" the underlying state to initially uninformed traders were potentially influenced by a design in which the set of informed traders was held constant throughout the life of the market. Hence the performance of uninformed traders in the market might have been predicated on their knowledge of, and the observed behavior of, the informed traders. The experiment discussed below is a replication of one market in Plott and Sunder (1982), with the added feature that the traders who were to be informed of the state differed from period to period. The results are equivalent to those of Plott and Sunder (1982) in the price dynamics, while less conclusive regarding the acquisition and use of the state-price correspondence by uninformed traders.https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/swecv-syw29