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https://feeds.library.caltech.edu/people/Banks-J-S/combined.rss
A Caltech Library Repository Feedhttp://www.rssboard.org/rss-specificationpython-feedgenenTue, 16 Apr 2024 14:56:38 +0000Price-conveyed information versus observed insider behavior: A note on rational expectations convergence
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-140732818
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1985
DOI: 10.1086/261333
[No abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/gp8c3-gc809Price-conveyed Information versus Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-112911877
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1985
DOI: 10.1086/261333
In a recent paper on behavior in experimental securities markets, Plott and Sunder ( 1982) concluded that the rational expectations (RE) model was superior to the traditional prior information (Pl) model in predicting equilibrium prices and holdings. In particular, given a
market with one commodity, three possible states of the world, and three groups of trader "types," each with differing valuations on the commodity per state, initially uninformed traders were able to infer the underlying state from the current market price and act accordingly. In a related paper, Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984)
observed that, given the existence of a futures market, the RE model outperformed the PI model in multiperiod, single-commodity markets as well. One source of potential misinterpretation, however, comes from the fact that, although one-half of the traders of each type were informed of the true state at the beginning of each period in Plott and Sunder (1982) and one-third of the traders of each type
in Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984), the same traders were informed in almost every period. In a more recent paper, Plott and Sunder (1983) constructed markets where all traders received partial information (i.e., given possible states X, Y, and Z, a trader's private information would be either "not X" or "not Y" if the state were Z),
yet the combinations of traders receiving a certain message in any period were determined randomly.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/znhpn-gyf88Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-154536814
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'J. S.'}}]}
Year: 1985
DOI: 10.1007/BF00649265
Necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternative to be a sophisticated voting outcome under an amendment procedure are derived. The uncovered set, as first defined by Miller (1980), is shown to be potentially reducible, and conditions are determined for which this reduction equals the set of sophisticated voting outcomes. In addition, simple methods are given for calculating both the uncovered set and its reduction.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/je6wq-akr56Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-120531056
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sobel-J', 'name': {'family': 'Sobel', 'given': 'Joel'}}]}
Year: 1987
DOI: 10.2307/1913604
This paper studies the sequential equilibria of signaling games. It introduces a new solution concept, divine equilibrium, that refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction. This restriction rules out implausible sequential equilibria in many examples. We show that divine equilibria exist by demonstrating that a sequential equilibrium that fails to be divine cannot be in a stable component. However, the stable component of signaling games is typically smaller than the set of divine equilibria. We demonstrate this fact through examples. We also present a characterization of the stable equilibria in generic signaling games.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/q5q3f-pcg81Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-100726111
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'J. S.'}}, {'id': 'Gasmi-F', 'name': {'family': 'Gasmi', 'given': 'F.'}}]}
Year: 1987
DOI: 10.1007/BF00450995
This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game in shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/sr4wx-93m58Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-101449328
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'J. S.'}}, {'id': 'Bordes-G-A', 'name': {'family': 'Bordes', 'given': 'G. A.'}}]}
Year: 1988
DOI: 10.1007/BF00435496
We present four choice functions which characterize the stationary points of sequential search rules derived from a preference relation over outcomes. These functions are contrasted with others in the literature in terms of narrowness of choice as well as their ability to satisfy certain normative and consistency conditions, and it is shown how two of these sets arise as the set of equilibrium outcomes of a voting game under different tie-breaking assumptions.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ye9hr-gd010An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-145338589
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Plott-C-R', 'name': {'family': 'Plott', 'given': 'Charles R.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David P.'}}]}
Year: 1988
DOI: 10.2307/2297583
The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6zjjm-5nh64Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-111234141
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}]}
Year: 1988
DOI: 10.2307/1957393
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dh1vf-gzs30Electoral accountability and incumbency
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1989
This volume's sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/73a4m-ggz80Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-065131499
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Ledyard-J-O', 'name': {'family': 'Ledyard', 'given': 'John O.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David P.'}}]}
Year: 1989
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65% efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single-dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer-assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g74e1-vvg20Equilibrium Outcomes in Two-Stage Amendment Procedures
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-141833087
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.2307/2111252
This paper analyzes the set of sophisticated voting outcomes under the following two-stage
amendment procedure: the set of alternatives is partitioned into two subsets; one subset is voted on
via an amendment procedure at the first stage, followed by the remaining subset at the second stage.
The surviving alternatives are then paired at the final vote. This procedure is related to that used in
congressional decision making when both a bill and a substitute bill are in order on the floor and
hence are open to amendments. It is shown that it is "easier" for alternatives initially considered at
the second stage to be the outcome of the voting game than those considered at the first stage. The set
of outcomes is contrasted with that generated by the (one-stage) amendment procedure as well as the
concept of the uncovered set.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/sg58x-b0173Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-144934917
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.2307/2111068
A model of legislature-agency interaction is analyzed where the agency possesses an informational
advantage in that only it knows the cost of its services. The legislature has the ability
to audit the agency, where auditing is a costly means of verifying the agency's information.
Two different procedures are analyzed for determining the agency's budget: in one, the agency
makes a budget request, after which the legislature can either accept or reject the request, or
audit the agency and impose a budget equal to the true cost of services. In the other procedure,
the legislature can follow a request with a counterproposal to the agency, which can then either
accept or reject. Since under both procedures auditing is costly, it will be optimal for the legislature
to refrain from auditing a request if the perceived benefits do not outweigh this cost.
At issue is the ability of the legislature to impose discipline on the agency's request and final
budget through an optimal choice of audit and counterproposal strategies, the extent of the
information transmitted through the agency's budget request, and the efficiency of the resulting
outcomes. A refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept provides the behavioral predictions
for the procedures.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/wqhk0-dh005Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160218-135729564
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Kiewiet-D-R', 'name': {'family': 'Kiewiet', 'given': 'D. Roderick'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.2307/2111118
The low probability of defeating incumbent members of Congress deters potentially strong rivals from challenging them. Yet almost all incumbents are challenged, usually by opponents who lack previous experience in office and run underfinanced, ineffectual campaigns. But if strong challengers are deterred from challenging incumbents, why are not weak challengers, who have even less chance of unseating an incumbent?
The model developed in this paper indicates that there is a simple reason why weak candidates choose to run against incumbents: they do so in order to maximize their probability of getting elected to Congress. Together with the findings of previous researchers, the results of our analyses of congressional primary data from 1980 through 1984 provide strong support for the major hypotheses derived from our model.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/p11v3-2qb73Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-151310390
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Kiewiet-D-R', 'name': {'family': 'Kiewiet', 'given': 'D. Roderick'}}]}
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.2307/2111118
The low probability of defeating incumbent members of Congress deters potentially strong
rivals from challenging them. Yet almost all incumbents are challenged, usually by opponents who
lack previous experience in office and run underfinanced, ineffectual campaigns. But if strong challengers
are deterred from challenging incumbents, why are not weak challengers, who have even less
chance of unseating an incumbent?
The model developed in this paper indicates that there is a simple reason why weak candidates
choose to run against incumbents: they do so in order to maximize their probability of getting elected
to Congress. Together with the findings of previous researchers, the results of our analyses of congressional
primary data from 1980 through 1984 provide strong support for the major hypotheses
derived from our model.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/50yde-bvn20A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-075029015
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1990
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5
A model of two-candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected. Candidates simultaneously announce policy positions, from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt. Announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate, with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases. A refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g6hxa-ct853Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-074526852
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1990
This paper extends the Romer-Rosenthal [1978, 1979] model of monopoly
agenda control to an environment where only the agenda setter knows with certainty
the outcome associated with a failed proposal. The presence of this asymmetric
information implies that any "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal may provide information
crucial to the decision calculus of the voters, a fact which an optimal proposal
strategy will incorporate. The equilibrium behavior of the agenda setter and voters is
characterized and contrasted with that in the complete information environment,
and a number of empirical predictions concerning the nature of elections with
monopoly controlled agendas are derived.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/j1ctk-pkc67Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-072532526
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sundaram-R-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sundaram', 'given': 'Rangarajan K.'}}]}
Year: 1990
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O
We study the structure of Nash equilibria in 2-player repeated games played with finite automata, when complexity considerations matter. We argue that the traditional number-of-states measure of complexity of an automaton neglects some essential features such as informational requirements at a state. We propose a criterion of complexity to remedy this; our criterion takes into account both the size (number of states) and transitional structure of a machine. We prove that the resulting Nash equilibria of the machine game are now trivial: the machines recommend actions every period that are invariably stage-game Nash equilibria.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/r7ga6-hm710Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-152122595
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1990
DOI: 10.2307/2111390
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one
player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war. I derive conclusions
about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints, where these constraints
hold regardless of the game form; hence, the qualitative results are "game-free." I show that the
higher the informed player's payoff from war, the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling
the dispute short of war, and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war. The latter result rationalizes
the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war. I then
provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the
probability of war.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/dhzm3-9jy18Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-105606489
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}]}
Year: 1990
DOI: 10.2307/1962771
Different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects, or dimensions, of policy. Such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members. Given a distribution of such portfolios, final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members' decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities. We develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy decision in multiparty legislatures. In particular, we focus on stable portfolio allocations, where a stable allocation is one that yields a policy that no legislative coalition is willing or able to overturn. Several notions of stability are considered and related to the usual concept of the core. Among the results are that although stable allocations are not guaranteed, such allocations can exist with minority governments; and that final policy outcomes associated with stable governments need not be "centrist."https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ah34e-wye40The space shuttle program
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-074910267
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1991
On April 12, 1981, the maiden flight of the space shuttle Columbia began, three years past the original launch date, 30 percent over the original estimated R&D costs, and 120 percent over the original estimated average cost per flight for the first three years of operation. On January 28, 1986, a seal failed on the right solid rocket booster of the shuttle Challenger, leading to an explosion seventy-three seconds into the launch and the loss of the seven crew members on board.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/xzjge-b0e36The politics of commercial R&D programs
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-070658298
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Cohen-L-R', 'name': {'family': 'Cohen', 'given': 'Linda R.'}}, {'id': 'Noll-R-G', 'name': {'family': 'Noll', 'given': 'Roger G.'}}]}
Year: 1991
The Selection and management of commercial research and
J. development projects differ between the public and private sectors in two important respects. One is the inclusiveness of the economic
effects considered in evaluating a project. Private decisions are largely
motivated by prospective profitability, whereas a wider array of social benefits and costs are relevant in the public sector. Specifically, public decisions would normally take into account economic benefits accruing to
parties other than the innovating firm (such as competitive copiers of the technology and the customers of the industry), as well as any external costs from adopting the innovation (such as increased environmental pollution).https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/158kg-xys22Signaling games in political science
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-110318273
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1991
[no abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0c29n-1ae88Monotonicity in Electoral Systems
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-145834215
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}]}
Year: 1991
DOI: 10.2307/1963173
Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral
rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures.
And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral
rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences,
that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in
the context of a complete electoral system-voting, selection of legislature, and legislative
choice of policy-we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue:
depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything
is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a6y8c-z6e19Comment on Jankowski's "Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games"
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-145508369
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1991
DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003003008
The forum consists of comments on previously published papers and responses by authors. Unlike the Comment section in many other academic journals, the Forum includes solicited as well as unsolicited contributions. We encourage debates by actively seeking points of view contrary to those expressed in articles published in the journal. The Forum section is intended to promote an open and critical debate that contributes to the intellectual vitality and further development of rational-choice-based theory and research.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/1dhtp-d2c48Covering relations, closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-130230346
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Bordes-G', 'name': {'family': 'Bordes', 'given': 'Georges'}}, {'id': 'Le-Breton-M', 'name': {'family': 'Le Breton', 'given': 'Michel'}}]}
Year: 1991
DOI: 10.1007/BF00183046
We show that the Slater's set of a tournament, i.e. the set of the top elements of the closest orderings, is a subset of the top cycle of the uncovered set of the tournament. We also show that the covering relation is related to the hamiltonian bypaths of a strong tournament in that if x covers y, then there exists an hamiltonian bypath from x to y.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/94xya-gja91Monopoly Pricing and Regulatory Oversight
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-131728232
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1992
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00203.x
This paper analyzes the interaction between a regulator and monopolist in the determination of the price for the monopolist's product, where only the monoplast knows ex ante its true marginal cost of production. The regulator observes the market price proposed by the monopolist and decides whether to hold a rate hearing, where suck a hearing is a costly means of verifying the monopolist's marginal cost. Subsequent to a rate hearing, the regulator can impose a market price for the monopolist's product; in the absence of a rate hearing, the market price is set equal to the monopolist's proposed price. Equilibrium behavior by the monopolist and regulator is characterized, and the degree of regulatory "activism," as defined by the probability a rate hearing is held, is seen to vary ex post with the monopolist's true marginal cost.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/3djnr-xsg65The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Weingast-B-R', 'name': {'family': 'Weingast', 'given': 'Barry R.'}}]}
Year: 1992
DOI: 10.2307/2111488
We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three premises: (I) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-à-vis their political overseers, concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest groups.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ehkpf-wkz33A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-070914374
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Calvert-R-L', 'name': {'family': 'Calvert', 'given': 'Randall L.'}}]}
Year: 1992
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-S
A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information presents two different efficiency problems: coordination, and maximizing ex ante expected utility by favoring a player facing high stakes. Communication and mediation can allow an optimal tradeoff between the two problems. This paper gives (1) necessary conditions for (and specification of) an incentive-efficient mediation mechanism and (2) necessary and sufficient conditions for mediation to be required for efficiency. These conditions yield additional results concerning the necessity of privacy in communications and the superfluity of enforcement. Contrary to some recent studies, our results demonstrate that unmediated communication is insufficient to achieve incentive efficiency. An application to the theory of regulation is suggested.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/28e9e-3vr04Denumerable-Armed Bandits
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-072126405
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sundaram-R-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sundaram', 'given': 'Rangarajan K.'}}]}
Year: 1992
DOI: 10.2307/2951539
This paper studies the class of denumerable-armed (i.e. finite- or countably infinitearmed)
bandit problems with independent arms and geometric discounting over an
infinite horizon, in which each arm generates rewards according to one of a finite number
of distributions, or "types." The number of types in the support of an arm, as also the
types themselves, are allowed to vary across the arms. We derive certain continuity and
curvature properties of the dynamic allocation (or Gittins) index of Gittins and Jones
(1974), and provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the Gittins-Jones
result identifying all optimal strategies for finite-armed bandits may be extended to
infinite-armed bandits. We then establish our central result: at each point in time, the
arm selected by an optimal strategy will, with strictly positive probability, remain an
optimal selection forever. More specifically, for every such arm, there exists (at least) one
type of that arm such that, when conditioned on that type being the arm's "true" type,
the arm will survive forever and continuously with nonzero probability. When the reward
distributions of an arm satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), the
survival prospects of an arm improve when conditioned on types generating higher
expected rewards; however, we show how this need not be the case in the absence of
MLRP. Implications of these results are derived for the theories of job search and
matching, as well as other applications of the bandit paradigm.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/vsa5p-pdt20A Class of Bandit Problems Yielding Myopic Optimal Strategies
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-080809749
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sundaram-R-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sundaram', 'given': 'Rangarajan K.'}}]}
Year: 1992
DOI: 10.2307/3214899
We consider the class of bandit problems in which each of the n ≧ 2 independent arms generates rewards according to one of the same two reward distributions, and discounting is geometric over an infinite horizon. We show that the dynamic allocation index of Gittins and Jones (1974) in this context is strictly increasing in the probability that an arm is the better of the two distributions. It follows as an immediate consequence that myopic strategies are the uniquely optimal strategies in this class of bandit problems, regardless of the value of the discount parameter or the shape of the reward distributions. Some implications of this result for bandits with Bernoulli reward distributions are given.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6djvz-wtf18Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-080446952
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sundaram-R-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sundaram', 'given': 'Rangarajan K.'}}]}
Year: 1993
[no abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qvvb0-pva13Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-070155180
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1993
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90095-B
We extend the Romer-Rosenthal model of representative democracy to a signaling environment, in which (i) only the representatives knows the 'status quo' outcome resulting if her take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal is rejected by the voters, while (ii) only the voters know their true preferences over policies. A separating sequential equilibrium is shown to exist, and to uniquely satisfy a common equilibrium refinement. Furthermore, this equilibrium has the property that, relative to the environment where the status quo is known to the voter, there is a downward bias in the setter's proposal, and an associated upward bias in the probability of the proposal's acceptance by the voter.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ftss0-12w94Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-073945363
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1993
DOI: 10.2307/2938830
These two books consider a number of foundational
issues in game theory having to do with common
knowledge and rationality. Robert Koons is concerned
with these issues primarily in relation to equilibrium
concepts-such as subgame perfection-that rely on the
notion of backward induction.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/20rmd-t1707Switching Costs and the Gittins Index
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-075122129
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sundaram-R-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sundaram', 'given': 'Rangarajan K.'}}]}
Year: 1994
DOI: 10.2307/2951664
The Theorem of Gittins and Jones (1974) is, perhaps, the single most powerful result
in the literature on Bandit problems. This result establishes that in independent-armed
Bandit problems with geometric discounting over an infinite horizon, all optimal strategies
may be obtained by solving a family of simple optimal stopping problems that
associate with each arm an index known as the dynamic allocation index or, more
popularly, as the Gittins index. Importantly, the Gittins index of an arm depends solely
on the characteristics of that arm and the rate of discounting, and is otherwise
completely independent of the problem under consideration. These features simplify
significantly the task of characterizing optimal strategies in this class of problems.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/a6m0e-vjc04The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1995
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2
Agency theory provides a systematic analysis of bilateral or multilateral exchange of goods and services in the presence of various factors that bring into question the neoclassical assumption of costless transactions. These factors include most prominently various forms of asymmetric information, wherein one party to an exchange has better information about the consequences of such an exchange than does another. The goal of agency theory is to identify efficient organizational responses to these complicating factors; the intent of this chapter is to survey some of the principle results from this literature and view these as fundamental building blocks in the efficient design of institutions.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g5twa-sjm14Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-084438391
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1995
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-E
When the dimension of the outcome space in a voting game is sufficiently high, a core outcome will fail to exist for almost all utility profiles. Previous work by Schofield and McKelvey has identified critical dimensions for this generic non-existence, employing results on singularities of mappings and transversal intersections. In this paper we demonstrate that their proofs are incorrect, and determine the right dimensions implied by their singularity approach.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2c6ax-vra92Modern political economy : old topics, new directions
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-110709121
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Hanushek-E-A', 'name': {'family': 'Hanushek', 'given': 'Eric A.'}}]}
Year: 1995
[no abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/kycnw-r5219Toward a History of Game Theory [Reviews]
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-113258531
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1995
DOI: 10.2307/205778
This collection of eleven essays examines the development of game theory from its inception in the 1920s to the 1950s and offers examples of games and solutions from the probabilists of the early 1700s. Four general topics are covered, and some chapters deal with more than one.
The first concerns the work ofJohn von Neumann and Emile Borel in the 1920s on the minimax theorem, a theoretical result on equilibrium behavior in two-person, zero-sum games. Von Neumann was the first to prove this theorem, in a paper published in 1928. However his proof followed on the heels of notes by Borel establishing the result for
three-strategy and five-strategy games. The ensuing debate as to which of these two mathematical giants had the rightful claim as "the inventor" of game theory was to turn nasty.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/5279r-pex29Acyclic social choice from finite sets
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-133219475
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1995
DOI: 10.1007/BF00179983
This paper characterizes acyclic preference aggregation rules under various combinations of monotonicity, neutrality, decisiveness, and anonymity, in the spirit of Nakamura's (1979) Theorem on the core of simple games. Each of these characterizations can be seen to follow from Ferejohn and Fishburn's (1979) result on acyclic aggregation rules assuming only independence of irrelevant alternatives. We then state as corollaries to these characterizations extant results such as Sen's (1970) liberal paradox, Blau and Deb's (1977) theorem on the existence of vetoers, and Brown's (1975) theorem on the non-emptiness of the collegium.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/e8n83-e5b41Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-143248707
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1996
DOI: 10.2307/2082796
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred. Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative. However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference. In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/j7tn8-0pj80An experimental analysis of the bandit problem
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-081816722
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}, {'id': 'Olson-M-A', 'name': {'family': 'Olson', 'given': 'Mark'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 1997
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050146
We investigate, in an experimental setting, the behavior of single decision makers who at discrete time intervals over an "infinite" horizon may choose one action from a set of possible actions where this set is constant over time, i.e. a bandit problem. Two bandit environments are examined, one in which the predicted behavior should always be myopic (the two-armed bandit) and the other in which the predicted behavior should never be myopic (the one-armed bandit). We also investigate the comparative static predictions as the underlying parameters of the bandit environments are changed. The aggregate results show that the behavior in the two bandit environments are quantitatively different and in the direction of the theoretical predictions.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ddy95-avb36Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:AUSarps98
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1998
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259
We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/yvkjr-7mt55Reviewed Work: Analytical Politics
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-070121127
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1998
Mathematical models of political processes
have become increasingly sophisticated over
the last few decades, with the lessons drawn
from such models generating insights relevant
for both political scientists and economists.
In Analytical Politics, Professors
Hinich and Munger present some of the primary
building blocks of these models, show
how they fit together, and describe some of
the more fundamental conclusions established
to date. The material is pitched to an
audience of graduate and advanced undergraduate
students in political science and
economics (exercises are provided), as well as
to scholars unfamiliar with the terrain. Most
of the formal results are stated without proof,
and no new results are presented.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0xjj7-87g29Optimal Retention in Agency Problems
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-094124135
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sundaram-R-K', 'name': {'family': 'Sundaram', 'given': 'Rangarajan K.'}}]}
Year: 1998
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2422
This paper studies the interaction between a single long-lived principal and a series of short-lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. We assume that the principal can influence the agents' behavior only through her choice of a retention rule; this rule is further required to be sequentially rational (i.e., no precommitment is allowed). We provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where (a) the principal adopts a "cut-off" rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound; and (b) agents separate according to type, with better agents taking superior actions. We show that in equilibrium, a retained agent's productivity is necessarily declining over time, but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects. Finally, we show that for each given type, agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard (i.e., when that type is the sole type of agent in the model); nonetheless, adding uncertainty about agent-types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/r2p3y-qwc14Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-111454470
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1999
[no abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/6qsc9-nem35A model of price promotions with consumer search
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-141323813
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}, {'id': 'Moorthy-S', 'name': {'family': 'Moorthy', 'given': 'Sridhar'}}]}
Year: 1999
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00033-7
This paper presents a price discrimination model of price promotions. The distinguishing feature of our model is the explicit distinction between regular and promotional prices: Regular prices are chosen first, then promotional prices. Further, while regular prices are always available to everyone, promotional prices are only available when offered, and only to those who search for them. We show that even a monopolist will offer random promotions under these circumstances. Furthermore, as search costs increase, the frequency and depth of promotions increase. With competition for the promotion-oriented consumers, the seller becomes more aggressive in his promotional policies, even more so as search costs increase. The high reservation price consumers, however, end up worse off with competition.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/kgev6-8x027Committee proposals and restrictive rules
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20141126-122952822
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1999
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.96.14.8295
PMCID: PMC22228
I analyze a game-theoretic model of committee–legislature interaction in which a majority decision to adopt either an open or closed amendment rule occurs following the committee's proposal of a bill. I find that, in equilibrium, the closed rule is almost always chosen when the dimension of the policy space is >1. Furthermore, the difference between the equilibrium outcome and that which would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily small.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/kq33t-zvw72Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-075941094
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 1999
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050167
McKelvey [4] proved that for strong simple preference aggregation rules applied to multidimensional sets of alternatives, the typical situation is that either the core is nonempty or the top-cycle set includes all available alternatives. But the requirement that the rule be strong excludes, inter alia, all supermajority rules. In this note, we show that McKelvey's theorem further implies that the typical situation for any simple rule is that either the core is nonempty or the weak top-cycle set (equivalently, the core of the transitive closure of the rule) includes all available alternatives. Moreover, it is often the case that both of these statements obtain.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/c9zy4-jkx70Cheap Talk and Burned Money
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-104604366
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2000
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2591
We augment the standard Crawford–Sobel (1982, Econometrica 50, 1431–1451) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/nqhcr-bjs88A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-070919757
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2000
DOI: 10.2307/2586381
We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the
strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-F ere john (1989) model of bargaining
to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper
hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural and preference parameters, and equivalence of
equilibrium outcomes and the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model
generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, and it yields a "continuous" generalization
of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional
detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings and provides a
benchmark for the general analysis of legislative and parliamentary politics.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/pfps9-69969Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-152837001
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2000
DOI: 10.2307/2585839
I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal ma1onty and universal coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0jx7g-04m45Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-100309309
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2001
We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and convex but possibly non-rectangular. Thus, a player's feasible strategies may depend on the strategies used by others, as in Debreu's (1952,1982) generalized games. In contrast to the model of Debreu, we do not require preferences to be defined over infeasible strategy profiles, and we do not require a player's feasible strategy correspondence to have non-empty values. We prove existence of Nash equilibria under a lower hemicontinuity condition, and we give examples of classes of games in which this condition is satisfied.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/qjjbv-8s142Strategic aspects of political systems
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-143117193
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9
Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognition of the importance of modeling institutional details in political processes. A sample of the literature on game-theoretic models of political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of sophisticated voting over certain kinds of binary agendas, such as might occur in a legislative setting, equilibria exist and can be nicely characterized. Endogenous choice of the agenda can sometimes yield "sophisticated sincerity", where equilibrium voting behavior is indistinguishable from sincere voting. Under some conditions there exist agenda-independent outcomes. Various kinds of "structure-induced equilibria" are also discussed. Finally, the effect of various types of incomplete information is considered. Incomplete information of how the voters will behave leads to probabilistic voting models that typically yield utilitarian outcomes. Uncertainty among the voters over which is the preferred outcome yields the pivotal voting phenomenon, in which voters can glean information from the fact that they are pivotal. The implications of this phenomenon are illustrated by results on the Condorcet Jury problem, where voters have common interests but different information.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/61fh5-cfj14Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-092601151
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}, {'id': 'Le-Breton-M', 'name': {'family': 'Le Breton', 'given': 'Michel'}}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2825
We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments, and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and as a special case, we obtain a long-standing claim to the same effect, due to R. McKelvey (Amer. J. Polit. Sci.30 (1986), 283–314), in the political science literature. Further, we prove the nonemptiness of the uncovered set under quite general assumptions, and we establish, under various assumptions, the coanalyticity and measurability of this set. In the concluding section, we indicate how the inclusion result may be extended to multiplayer, non-zero-sum games.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/nbmem-grv38Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-142040085
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2002
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0
The motivation for the paper is that, insofar as agents can inflict self-imposed utility losses, purely cheap talk communication is never the only available instrument for information transmission. Given this and the importance of recent work applying cheap talk models to understand a variety of political phenomena, we explore two related questions for the theory. First, what are the equilibrium implications for cheap talk communication when an informed agent is free to use both costless and costly signals and, second, what are the consequences of allowing both sorts of signal for the widespread use of ex ante welfare comparisons as a basis for predictions on the degree of information transmission or institutional choice?https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/gwqwm-8fr28A multidimensional model of repeated elections
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-094506966
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2002
We analyze a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model of elections. In each period, a
challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a
majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional
policy space. Individuals' policy preferences are private information, whereas policy
choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in
"simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of
possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience
and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify
relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/at839-n8q12A bargaining model of legislative policy-making
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-102600263
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2003
DOI: 10.7907/2e007-xnw21
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models,
the status quo is not assumed to be "bad," and delay may be Pareto efficient. We
prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on
four factors: risk aversion of the legislators, the dimensionality of the policy space, the
voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse,
if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example,
then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the
status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome.
This "core selection" result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well-known median
voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the
status quo is close to the core, then equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the
core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators
are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads
to policy moderation).https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/2e007-xnw21Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-144351615
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2005
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2
We unify and extend much of the literature on probabilistic voting in two-candidate elections. We give existence results for mixed and pure strategy equilibria of the electoral game. We prove general results on optimality of pure strategy equilibria vis-a-vis a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, and we derive the well-known "mean voter" result as a special case. We establish broad conditions under which pure strategy equilibria exhibit "policy coincidence," in the sense that candidates pick identical platforms. We establish the robustness of equilibria with respect to variations in demographic and informational parameters. We show that mixed and pure strategy equilibria of the game must be close to being in the majority rule core when the core is close to non-empty and voters are close to deterministic. This controverts the notion that the median (in a one-dimensional model) is a mere "artifact." Using an equivalence between a class of models including the binary Luce model and a class including additive utility shock models, we then derive a general result on optimality vis-a-vis the Nash social welfare function.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/02jpy-zz509Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-111911252
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2005
[no abstract]https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/gkrmh-mq013Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-093333667
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}, {'id': 'Le-Breton-M', 'name': {'family': 'Le Breton', 'given': 'Michel'}}]}
Year: 2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001
This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate the properties of social preferences generated by simple games; we extend results on generic emptiness of the core; we prove the general nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated sets; and we prove the upper hemicontinuity of these correspondences when the voters' preferences are such that the core is nonempty and externally stable. Finally, we give conditions under which the undominated set is lower hemicontinuous.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/g3br6-6r406A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BANqjps06
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2006
DOI: 10.1561/100.00000001
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. We show that if all legislators are risk averse or if even limited transfers are possible, then delay is only possible if the status quo lies in the core. Thus, we expect immediate agreement in multidimensional models, where the core is typically empty. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: moderate status quos imply moderate policy outcomes, and legislative patience implies policy moderation.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/8e4c9-hxy44A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-083103850
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2006
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0sfmt-emy08A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BANqjps08
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2008
DOI: 10.1561/100.00006009
We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in "simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives maylead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters become-arbitrarily patient.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cwww2-ex396A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-153654831
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/eqx93-z9g89
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/eqx93-z9g89A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-171219202
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Duggan-J', 'name': {'family': 'Duggan', 'given': 'John'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/0pn8v-n7v55
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be "bad," and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors: risk aversion of the legislators , the dimensionality of the policy space, the voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse, if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example, then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. This "core selection" result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well-known median voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the status quo is close to the core, t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads to policy moderation).https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/0pn8v-n7v55An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-142127351
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey'}}, {'id': 'Olson-M-A', 'name': {'family': 'Olson', 'given': 'Mark'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/cnh3w-1hp55
We investigate, in an experimental setting, the behavior of single decision makers who at discrete time intervals over an "infinite" horizon may choose one action from a set of possible actions where this set is constant over time, i.e. a bandit problem. Two bandit environments are examined, one in which the predicted behavior should always be myopic (the two-armed bandit) and the other in which the predicted behavior should never be myopic (the one-armed bandit). We also investigate the comparative static predictions as the underlying parameter of the bandit environments are changed. The aggregate results show that the cutpoint behavior in the two bandit environments are quantitatively different and in the direction of the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, while a significant number of individual cutpoints exhibit nonstationarity (contrary to the theory), the most likely, i.e. maximum likelihood estimates, collection of decision rules that best explain overall behavior are those that are consistent with the underlying theory.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cnh3w-1hp55An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Camerer-C-F', 'name': {'family': 'Camerer', 'given': 'Colin F.'}, 'orcid': '0000-0003-4049-1871'}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/p6hm5-2gb95
This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, Sequential, Intuitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilibrium selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered.
The pattern of outcomes suggest that individuals select the more refined equilibria up to the divinity concept. However, an anomaly occurs in the game in which the stable equilibrium is a clear preference among the subjects. Since the concepts are nested this suggests that the outcomes are game specific. Sender behavior does not seem to follow any specific decision rule (e.g., Nash, minmax, PIR, etc.) while receiver actions tend to correspond to the Nash equilibrium outcomes.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/p6hm5-2gb95Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-135234942
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Ledyard-J-O', 'name': {'family': 'Ledyard', 'given': 'John O.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/mhs8g-89z20
We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include scheduling job shops, airports or super-computers, zero-inventory planning, and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. We show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65percent efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two that arise naturally from auctions used in the allocation of single dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of both administrative and market procedures.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/mhs8g-89z20The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151906378
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Ledyard-J-O', 'name': {'family': 'Ledyard', 'given': 'John O.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David P.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/68k2y-nze20
This paper demonstrates the use of applied organizational design to investigate possible
mechanisms to allocate the resources of Space Station. First, a specific laboratory experimental
environment (testbed) and baseline policy are developed using the salient technical features of the
Space Station and past Space Shuttle experiences. The use of priority contracts to assist in
contingent rescheduling of resources due to supply curtailments is established. Next, generalized
versions of an English auction and Vickrey-Groves type sealed bid auction are designed and
developed to allocate scheduled resource use and priority. Finally, these mechanisms are tested and
evaluated in the testbed. The data demonstrates that the expected efficiency increases significantly
using the auction mechanisms rather than allocations from first-come-first-served processes.
However, the auction mechanisms do not produce outcomes near the 100% level of efficiency.
Several results are dedicated to the revenue generating properties of the mechanisms and individual
bidding behavior.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/68k2y-nze20Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-170013615
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Austen-Smith-D', 'name': {'family': 'Austen-Smith', 'given': 'David'}}, {'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/rp24m-ekx15
This paper develops a multi-stage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a non-cooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/rp24m-ekx15Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/ghjz6-1sf90
The effect of different liability rules on the pretrial behavior of litigants to a civil suit is analyzed. The interaction is modeled as a game of incomplete information, where both the plaintiff and the defendant know whether or not they were negligent in actions leading to the accident. Selection criteria are used to refine the set of sequential equilibria of the game.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/ghjz6-1sf90Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-153417196
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Gasmi-F', 'name': {'family': 'Gasmi', 'given': 'Farid'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/vdv5r-3s803
This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game is shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/vdv5r-3s803An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Plott-C-R', 'name': {'family': 'Plott', 'given': 'Charles R.'}}, {'id': 'Porter-D-P', 'name': {'family': 'Porter', 'given': 'David P.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/msckd-0m869
The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/msckd-0m869Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-161826033
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}, {'id': 'Sobel-J', 'name': {'family': 'Sobel', 'given': 'Joel'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/yf3x1-6g428
We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/yf3x1-6g428Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-163219147
Authors: {'items': [{'id': 'Banks-J-S', 'name': {'family': 'Banks', 'given': 'Jeffrey S.'}}]}
Year: 2017
DOI: 10.7907/swecv-syw29
The recent experimental results of Plott and Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983) on the ability of single commodity markets to "reveal" the underlying state to initially uninformed traders were potentially influenced by a design in which the set of informed traders was held constant throughout the life of the market. Hence the performance of uninformed traders in the market might have been predicated on their knowledge of, and the observed behavior of, the informed traders. The experiment discussed below is a replication of one market in Plott and Sunder (1982), with the added feature that the traders who were to be informed of the state differed from period to period. The results are equivalent to those of Plott and Sunder (1982) in the price dynamics, while less conclusive regarding the acquisition and use of the state-price correspondence by uninformed traders.https://authors.library.caltech.eduhttps://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/swecv-syw29