<h1>Banks, Jeffrey</h1> <h2>Combined from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS</a></h2> <ul> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2008) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BANqjps08">A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces</a>; Quarterly Journal of Political Science; Vol. 3; No. 3; 269-299; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006009">10.1561/100.00006009</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-083103850">A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26; No. 2; 285-304; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6">10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:BANqjps06">A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making</a>; Quarterly Journal of Political Science; Vol. 1; No. 1; 49-85; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00000001">10.1561/100.00000001</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, el al. (2006) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-093333667">Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 126; No. 1; 194-234; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001">10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-144351615">Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates</a>; ISBN 978-3-540-22053-4; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; 15-56; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2">10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-111911252">Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure</a>; ISBN 9780472098941</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-102600263">A bargaining model of legislative policy-making</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/2e007-xnw21">10.7907/2e007-xnw21</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-153654831">A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/eqx93-z9g89">10.7907/eqx93-z9g89</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-171219202">A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/0pn8v-n7v55">10.7907/0pn8v-n7v55</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-094506966">A multidimensional model of repeated elections</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-142040085">Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence</a>; European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 18; No. 2; 263-280; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0">10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, el al. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-092601151">Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 103; No. 1; 88-105; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2825">10.1006/jeth.2001.2825</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-143117193">Strategic aspects of political systems</a>; ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications; 2203-2228; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9">10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2001) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-100309309">Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-152837001">Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 3; 677-681; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2585839">10.2307/2585839</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-070919757">A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 1; 73-88; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2586381">10.2307/2586381</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2000) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-104604366">Cheap Talk and Burned Money</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 91; No. 1; 1-16; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2591">10.1006/jeth.1999.2591</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-075941094">Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16; No. 4; 663-672; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050167">10.1007/s003550050167</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20141126-122952822">Committee proposals and restrictive rules</a>; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America; Vol. 96; No. 14; 8295-8300; PMCID PMC22228; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.14.8295">10.1073/pnas.96.14.8295</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey and Moorthy, Sridhar (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-141323813">A model of price promotions with consumer search</a>; International Journal of Industrial Organization; Vol. 17; No. 3; 371-398; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00033-7">10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00033-7</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-111454470">Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference</a>; ISBN 0472104802</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1998) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-094124135">Optimal Retention in Agency Problems</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 82; No. 2; 293-323; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422">10.1006/jeth.1998.2422</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1998) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-070121127">Reviewed Work: Analytical Politics</a>; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 36; No. 3; 1506-1507</li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1998) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:AUSarps98">Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory</a>; Annual Review of Political Science; Vol. 1; 259-287; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259">10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey and Olson, Mark, el al. (1997) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-081816722">An experimental analysis of the bandit problem</a>; Economic Theory; Vol. 10; No. 1; 55-77; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050146">10.1007/s001990050146</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1996) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-143248707">Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 90; No. 1; 34-45; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2082796">10.2307/2082796</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-133219475">Acyclic social choice from finite sets</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12; No. 3; 293-310; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179983">10.1007/BF00179983</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-113258531">Toward a History of Game Theory [Reviews]</a>; Journal of Interdisciplinary History; Vol. 25; No. 4; 647-648; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/205778">10.2307/205778</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-084438391">Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model</a>; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 24; No. 6; 523-536; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-E">10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-E</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293">The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective</a>; ISBN 9780792395034; Institutional Design; 17-36; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2">10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Hanushek, Eric A. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-110709121">Modern political economy : old topics, new directions</a>; ISBN 0521472334</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey and Olson, Mark, el al. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170822-142127351">An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/cnh3w-1hp55">10.7907/cnh3w-1hp55</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1994) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-075122129">Switching Costs and the Gittins Index</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 62; No. 3; 687-694; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2951664">10.2307/2951664</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-073945363">Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 87; No. 4; 1000-1001; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2938830">10.2307/2938830</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-070155180">Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model</a>; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 50; No. 3; 429-444; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90095-B">10.1016/0047-2727(93)90095-B</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-080446952">Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model</a>; ISBN 9780521417815; Political Economy; 295-311</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-072126405">Denumerable-Armed Bandits</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 60; No. 5; 1071-1096; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2951539">10.2307/2951539</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-080809749">A Class of Bandit Problems Yielding Myopic Optimal Strategies</a>; Journal of Applied Probability; Vol. 29; No. 3; 625-632; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3214899">10.2307/3214899</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Calvert, Randall L. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-070914374">A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 4; No. 3; 347-372; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-S">10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-S</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Weingast, Barry R. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-153913543">The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 36; No. 2; 509-524; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111488">10.2307/2111488</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1992) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-131728232">Monopoly Pricing and Regulatory Oversight</a>; Journal of Economics Management Strategy; Vol. 1; No. 1; 203-233; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00203.x">10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00203.x</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Bordes, Georges, el al. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-130230346">Covering relations, closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8; No. 4; 355-363; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183046">10.1007/BF00183046</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-145508369">Comment on Jankowski's "Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games"</a>; Rationality and Society; Vol. 3; No. 3; 381-385; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463191003003008">10.1177/1043463191003003008</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-145834215">Monotonicity in Electoral Systems</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 85; No. 2; 531-537; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1963173">10.2307/1963173</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Cohen, Linda R., el al. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-070658298">The politics of commercial R&D programs</a>; ISBN 0815715080; The Technology Pork Barrel; 53-76</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-074910267">The space shuttle program</a>; ISBN 0815715080; The Technology Pork Barrel; 179-215</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-110318273">Signaling games in political science</a>; ISBN 9783718650873</li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-105606489">Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 84; No. 3; 891-906; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1962771">10.2307/1962771</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-152122595">Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 34; No. 3; 599-614; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111390">10.2307/2111390</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Camerer, Colin F., el al. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059">An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/p6hm5-2gb95">10.7907/p6hm5-2gb95</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-072532526">Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity</a>; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 2; No. 2; 97-117; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O">10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-074526852">Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information</a>; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 105; No. 2; 445-464</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-075029015">A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information</a>; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 50; No. 2; 309-325; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5">10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Kiewiet, D. Roderick (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-151310390">Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 4; 997-1015; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111118">10.2307/2111118</a></li> <li>Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160218-135729564">Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 4; 997-1015; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111118">10.2307/2111118</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-144934917">Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 3; 670-699; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111068">10.2307/2111068</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-141833087">Equilibrium Outcomes in Two-Stage Amendment Procedures</a>; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 1; 25-43; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2111252">10.2307/2111252</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-065131499">Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach</a>; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 20; No. 1; 1-25</li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089">Electoral accountability and incumbency</a>; ISBN 978-0472101221; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 121-149</li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-135234942">Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/mhs8g-89z20">10.7907/mhs8g-89z20</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-111234141">Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes</a>; American Political Science Review; Vol. 82; No. 2; 405-422; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1957393">10.2307/1957393</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R., el al. (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-145338589">An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms</a>; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 55; No. 2; 301-322; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2297583">10.2307/2297583</a></li> <li>Banks, J. S. and Bordes, G. A. (1988) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-101449328">Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5; No. 1; 31-44; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435496">10.1007/BF00435496</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151906378">The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/68k2y-nze20">10.7907/68k2y-nze20</a></li> <li>Banks, J. S. and Gasmi, F. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-100726111">Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4; No. 2; 133-152; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00450995">10.1007/BF00450995</a></li> <li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-170013615">Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/rp24m-ekx15">10.7907/rp24m-ekx15</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sobel, Joel (1987) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-120531056">Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games</a>; Econometrica; Vol. 55; No. 3; 647-661; <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1913604">10.2307/1913604</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R., el al. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840">An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/msckd-0m869">10.7907/msckd-0m869</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119">Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/ghjz6-1sf90">10.7907/ghjz6-1sf90</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Gasmi, Farid (1986) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-153417196">Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/vdv5r-3s803">10.7907/vdv5r-3s803</a></li> <li>Banks, J. S. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-154536814">Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control</a>; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1; No. 4; 295-306; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00649265">10.1007/BF00649265</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sobel, Joel (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-161826033">Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/yf3x1-6g428">10.7907/yf3x1-6g428</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-112911877">Price-conveyed Information versus Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence</a>; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 93; No. 4; 807-815; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/261333">10.1086/261333</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1985) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-140732818">Price-conveyed information versus observed insider behavior: A note on rational expectations convergence</a>; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 95; No. 4; 807-815; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/261333">10.1086/261333</a></li> <li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1984) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170919-163219147">Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence</a>; <a href="https://doi.org/10.7907/swecv-syw29">10.7907/swecv-syw29</a></li> </ul>