Banks, Jeffrey S.

Combined from CaltechAUTHORS

• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2008) A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces; Quarterly Journal of Political Science; Vol. 3; No. 3; 269-299; 10.1561/100.00006009
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2006) A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 26; No. 2; 285-304; 10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, el al. (2006) Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 126; No. 1; 194-234; 10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2006) A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making; Quarterly Journal of Political Science; Vol. 1; No. 1; 49-85; 10.1561/100.00000001
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2005) Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure; ISBN 9780472098941
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2005) Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates; ISBN 978-3-540-22053-4; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; 15-56; 10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games; 10.7907/eqx93-z9g89
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) A bargaining model of legislative policy-making; 10.7907/2e007-xnw21
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice; 10.7907/0pn8v-n7v55
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2002) A multidimensional model of repeated elections
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence; European Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 18; No. 2; 263-280; 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00080-0
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John, el al. (2002) Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 103; No. 1; 88-105; 10.1006/jeth.2001.2825
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) Strategic aspects of political systems; ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications; 2203-2228; 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2001) Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (2000) Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 3; 677-681; 10.2307/2585839
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2000) A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice; American Political Science Review; Vol. 94; No. 1; 73-88; 10.2307/2586381
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (2000) Cheap Talk and Burned Money; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 91; No. 1; 1-16; 10.1006/jeth.1999.2591
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 16; No. 4; 663-672; 10.1007/s003550050167
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) Committee proposals and restrictive rules; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America; Vol. 96; No. 14; 8295-8300; PMCID PMC22228; 10.1073/pnas.96.14.8295
• Banks, Jeffrey and Moorthy, Sridhar (1999) A model of price promotions with consumer search; International Journal of Industrial Organization; Vol. 17; No. 3; 371-398; 10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00033-7
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1999) Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference; ISBN 0472104802
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1998) Optimal Retention in Agency Problems; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 82; No. 2; 293-323; 10.1006/jeth.1998.2422
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1998) Reviewed Work: Analytical Politics; Journal of Economic Literature; Vol. 36; No. 3; 1506-1507
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1998) Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory; Annual Review of Political Science; Vol. 1; 259-287; 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259
• Banks, Jeffrey and Olson, Mark, el al. (1997) An experimental analysis of the bandit problem; Economic Theory; Vol. 10; No. 1; 55-77; 10.1007/s001990050146
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1996) Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem; American Political Science Review; Vol. 90; No. 1; 34-45; 10.2307/2082796
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) Acyclic social choice from finite sets; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 12; No. 3; 293-310; 10.1007/BF00179983
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) Toward a History of Game Theory [Reviews]; Journal of Interdisciplinary History; Vol. 25; No. 4; 647-648; 10.2307/205778
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective; ISBN 9780792395034; Institutional Design; 17-36; 10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Hanushek, Eric A. (1995) Modern political economy : old topics, new directions; ISBN 0521472334
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model; Journal of Mathematical Economics; Vol. 24; No. 6; 523-536; 10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-E
• Banks, Jeffrey and Olson, Mark, el al. (1994) An Experimental Analysis of the Two-Armed Bandit Program; 10.7907/cnh3w-1hp55
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1994) Switching Costs and the Gittins Index; Econometrica; Vol. 62; No. 3; 687-694; 10.2307/2951664
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1993) Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction; American Political Science Review; Vol. 87; No. 4; 1000-1001; 10.2307/2938830
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1993) Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 50; No. 3; 429-444; 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90095-B
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1993) Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model; ISBN 9780521417815; Political Economy; 295-311
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1992) A Class of Bandit Problems Yielding Myopic Optimal Strategies; Journal of Applied Probability; Vol. 29; No. 3; 625-632; 10.2307/3214899
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1992) Denumerable-Armed Bandits; Econometrica; Vol. 60; No. 5; 1071-1096; 10.2307/2951539
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Calvert, Randall L. (1992) A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 4; No. 3; 347-372; 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90044-S
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Weingast, Barry R. (1992) The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 36; No. 2; 509-524; 10.2307/2111488
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1992) Monopoly Pricing and Regulatory Oversight; Journal of Economics Management Strategy; Vol. 1; No. 1; 203-233; 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00203.x
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Bordes, Georges, el al. (1991) Covering relations, closest orderings and hamiltonian bypaths in tournaments; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 8; No. 4; 355-363; 10.1007/BF00183046
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) Comment on Jankowski's "Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games"; Rationality and Society; Vol. 3; No. 3; 381-385; 10.1177/1043463191003003008
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1991) Monotonicity in Electoral Systems; American Political Science Review; Vol. 85; No. 2; 531-537; 10.2307/1963173
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Cohen, Linda R., el al. (1991) The politics of commercial R&D programs; ISBN 0815715080; The Technology Pork Barrel; 53-76
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) Signaling games in political science; ISBN 9783718650873
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) The space shuttle program; ISBN 0815715080; The Technology Pork Barrel; 179-215
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1990) Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios; American Political Science Review; Vol. 84; No. 3; 891-906; 10.2307/1962771
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 34; No. 3; 599-614; 10.2307/2111390
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1990) Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol. 2; No. 2; 97-117; 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Camerer, Colin F., el al. (1990) An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games; 10.7907/p6hm5-2gb95
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information; Quarterly Journal of Economics; Vol. 105; No. 2; 445-464
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information; Journal of Economic Theory; Vol. 50; No. 2; 309-325; 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Kiewiet, D. Roderick (1989) Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 4; 997-1015; 10.2307/2111118
• Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 4; 997-1015; 10.2307/2111118
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 3; 670-699; 10.2307/2111068
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) Equilibrium Outcomes in Two-Stage Amendment Procedures; American Journal of Political Science; Vol. 33; No. 1; 25-43; 10.2307/2111252
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) Electoral accountability and incumbency; ISBN 978-0472101221; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 121-149
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1989) Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach; RAND Journal of Economics; Vol. 20; No. 1; 1-25
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1988) Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources; 10.7907/mhs8g-89z20
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1988) Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes; American Political Science Review; Vol. 82; No. 2; 405-422; 10.2307/1957393
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R., el al. (1988) An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms; Review of Economic Studies; Vol. 55; No. 2; 301-322; 10.2307/2297583
• Banks, J. S. and Bordes, G. A. (1988) Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 5; No. 1; 31-44; 10.1007/BF00435496
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Ledyard, John O., el al. (1987) The Design of Mechanisms to Allocate Space Station Resources; 10.7907/68k2y-nze20
• Banks, J. S. and Gasmi, F. (1987) Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 4; No. 2; 133-152; 10.1007/BF00450995
• Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1987) Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes; 10.7907/rp24m-ekx15
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sobel, Joel (1987) Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games; Econometrica; Vol. 55; No. 3; 647-661; 10.2307/1913604
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Gasmi, Farid (1986) Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees; 10.7907/vdv5r-3s803
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1986) Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement; 10.7907/ghjz6-1sf90
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R., el al. (1986) An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity; 10.7907/msckd-0m869
• Banks, J. S. (1985) Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control; Social Choice and Welfare; Vol. 1; No. 4; 295-306; 10.1007/BF00649265
• Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sobel, Joel (1985) Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games; 10.7907/yf3x1-6g428
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1985) Price-conveyed information versus observed insider behavior: A note on rational expectations convergence; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 95; No. 4; 807-815; 10.1086/261333
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1985) Price-conveyed Information versus Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence; Journal of Political Economy; Vol. 93; No. 4; 807-815; 10.1086/261333
• Banks, Jeffrey S. (1984) Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence; 10.7907/swecv-syw29