<h1>Banks, Jeffrey</h1>
<h2>Book Chapter from <a href="https://authors.library.caltech.edu">CaltechAUTHORS</a></h2>
<ul>
<li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2005) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-144351615">Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates</a>; ISBN 978-3-540-22053-4; Social Choice and Strategic Decisions; 15-56; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2">10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2</a></li>
<li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (2002) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-143117193">Strategic aspects of political systems</a>; ISBN 978-0-444-89428-1; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications; 2203-2228; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9">10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03022-9</a></li>
<li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1995) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-082207293">The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective</a>; ISBN 9780792395034; Institutional Design; 17-36; <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2">10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2</a></li>
<li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Sundaram, Rangarajan K. (1993) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-080446952">Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model</a>; ISBN 9780521417815; Political Economy; 295-311</li>
<li>Banks, Jeffrey S. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-074910267">The space shuttle program</a>; ISBN 0815715080; The Technology Pork Barrel; 179-215</li>
<li>Banks, Jeffrey S. and Cohen, Linda R., el al. (1991) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160526-070658298">The politics of commercial R&amp;D programs</a>; ISBN 0815715080; The Technology Pork Barrel; 53-76</li>
<li>Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1989) <a href="https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-103321089">Electoral accountability and incumbency</a>; ISBN 978-0472101221; Models of Strategic Choice in Politics; 121-149</li>
</ul>