[ { "id": "authors:x45v8-5kp69", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "x45v8-5kp69", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200727-104128922", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Stable Randomization", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Healy", "given_name": "Paul J.", "clpid": "Healy-P-J" }, { "family_name": "Nielsen", "given_name": "Kirby", "clpid": "Nielsen-Kirby" } ], "abstract": "We design a laboratory experiment to identify whether randomization behavior represents a stable \"type\" across different choice environments. In both games and individual choice questions, subjects face twenty simultaneous repetitions of the same choice. Randomization constitutes making different choices across the twenty repetitions. We find that randomization preferences are highly correlated across domains, with a sizable fraction of individuals randomizing in all domains, even in questions that offer a first-order stochastically dominant option. For some mixers, dominated randomization is responsive to intervention. Our results are inconsistent with many preference-based models of randomization, leaving open a role for heuristics and biases.", "publisher": "Caltech Library", "publication_date": "2020-07-10" }, { "id": "authors:15m59-zva74", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "15m59-zva74", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-111918164", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "abstract": "We explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies. An infinite-horizon theoretical model is developed, and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and the degree of after-tax inequality are characterized. Mobility and stickiness of tax policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate. However, neither is sufficient by itself. Social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy is voted on in every period, and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of social mobility. The two forces are complementary. Tax persistence leads to higher levels of post-tax inequality, for any amount of mobility. The effect of mobility on inequality is less clear-cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence. A laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions of the theory, and the results are generally supportive.", "doi": "10.7907/15m59-zva74", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2016-10-14" }, { "id": "authors:gwymj-jy028", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "gwymj-jy028", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-145403385", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Collusion through Communication in Auctions", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" } ], "abstract": "We study the extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. Theoretically, second-price auctions are more fragile to collusion through communication than first-price auctions. In an array of laboratory experiments we vary the amount of interactions (communication and/or transfers without commitment) available to bidders. We find that the auctioneer's revenues decrease significantly when bidders can communicate. When, in addition, bidders can make transfer promises, revenues decline substantially, with 70% of our experimental auctions culminating in the object being sold for approximately the minimal price. Furthermore, the effects of communication and transfers are similar across auction formats.", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2015-10-26" }, { "id": "authors:dv3vt-ztf54", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "dv3vt-ztf54", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-144613925", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: an Experimental Investigation", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Frechette", "given_name": "Guillaume", "clpid": "Frechette-G" }, { "family_name": "Vespa", "given_name": "Emanuel", "clpid": "Vespa-E" } ], "abstract": "In this paper we design a stylized version of an environment with public goods, dynamic linkages, and legislative bargaining. Our theoretical framework studies the provision of a durable public good as a modified version of Battaglini et al. (2012). We develop an experimental design that allows us to disentangle inefficiencies that would result in a one-shot world (static inefficiencies) from extra inefficiencies that emerge in an environment in which decisions in the present affect the future (dynamic inefficiencies). We solve for efficiency and also characterize the bargaining equilibrium, a symmetric stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium, which is the most common concept used in applied work. The experimental results indicate that subjects do react to dynamic linkages and, as such, we find evidence of both static and dynamic inefficiencies.\nIn fact, the quantitative predictions of the model with respect to the share of dynamic inefficiencies are closest to the data when dynamic linkages are high. To the extent that behavior is different from what is predicted by the model, a systematic pattern emerges, namely the use of strategic cooperation whereby subjects increase the efficiency of period one proposals by selectively punishing, in period two, subjects who did not propose efficient allocations.", "doi": "10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2015-01" }, { "id": "authors:77dwy-0rp12", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "77dwy-0rp12", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095152009", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Stochastic Choice and Preferences for Randomization", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Ortoleva", "given_name": "Pietro", "clpid": "Ortoleva-P" } ], "abstract": "We conduct an experiment to investigate the origin of stochastic choice and to differentiate between the three main classes of models that account for it: Random Expected Utility; Mistakes; and Deliberate Randomization. Subjects face the same questions multiple times in two ways: 1) following the literature, with repetitions distant from each other; 2) in a novel treatment, with repetitions in a row, telling subjects that questions will be repeated. A large majority of subjects exhibited stochastic choice in both cases, and stochasticity is strongly correlated in the two cases. Our results support the class of models of Deliberate Randomization.", "doi": "10.7907/77dwy-0rp12", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2015-01" }, { "id": "authors:v0mdy-epq83", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "v0mdy-epq83", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-144052263", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Goeree", "given_name": "Jacob K.", "orcid": "0000-0001-9876-3425", "clpid": "Goeree-J-K" }, { "family_name": "Romero", "given_name": "Julian", "clpid": "Romero-J" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" } ], "abstract": "We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm { that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a\nsetup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find\nthat voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections.", "doi": "10.7907/v0mdy-epq83", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2014-12-29" }, { "id": "authors:0g2gw-ayy10", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "0g2gw-ayy10", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-145809760", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Transparency Versus Back-Room Deals in Bargaining", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "We design an experiment to study the effects of transparency on bargaining processes. We show that whether transparency arises endogenously depends on the degree of competition between subjects. In a competitive setting there is no transparency: subjects use private communication channels to compete for favors from those in power and establish backroom deals. In the absence of competition the bargaining process is transparent: subjects communicate publicly and outcomes are more egalitarian. We further show that in a competitive setting, imposing transparency by requiring all communication to be public reduces the observed competition between subjects and leads to more egalitarian outcomes.", "doi": "10.7907/0g2gw-ayy10", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2014-07" }, { "id": "authors:q0zaq-zax13", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "q0zaq-zax13", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-152606828", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Communication in Multilateral Bargaining", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to - and do - engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is submitted. We find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed. Communication increases proposer power through two channels. First, it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept. Second, it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price.", "doi": "10.7907/q0zaq-zax13", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2013-06" }, { "id": "authors:0xp5n-z9471", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "0xp5n-z9471", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-144342297", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "abstract": "This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer-Richard model of equilibrium tax rates, inequality, and income redistribution. We also extend that model to incorporate social preferences in the form of altruism and inequality aversion. The experiment varies the amount of inequality and the collective choice procedure to determine tax rates. We report four main findings. First, higher wage inequality leads to higher tax rates. The effect is significant and large in magnitude.\nSecond, the average implemented tax rates are almost exactly equal to the theoretical ideal tax rate of the median wage worker. Third, we do not observe any significant differences in labor supply or average implemented tax rates between a direct democracy institution and a representative democracy system where tax rates are determined by candidate competition. Fourth, we observe negligible deviations from labor supply behavior or voting behavior in the directions implied by altruism or inequality aversion.", "doi": "10.7907/0xp5n-z9471", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2012-09" }, { "id": "authors:5tzpw-t0696", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "5tzpw-t0696", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095607758", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and the Selection of Candidates", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "abstract": "We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's general-election prospects.", "doi": "10.7907/5tzpw-t0696", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2012-08" }, { "id": "authors:avqen-78z78", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "avqen-78z78", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095936436", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "The Process of Choice in Guessing Games", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Caplin", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Caplin-A" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "This paper employs a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic choice in one shot games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3 guessing game in the period after the structure of the game has been communicated. Early selections in this \"strategic choice process\" data provide insight into naive (L0) play, and support the standard assumption that such choices average 50. While average strategic sophistication rises over time, we identify significant individual differences in this respect. These differences appear to be broad-based: those whose strategic sophistication grows most in our experiment also perform best at separate\nlearning tasks.", "doi": "10.7907/avqen-78z78", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2010-12" } ]