This dissertation consists of three essays that use lab and online experiments to investigate how individuals make decisions under uncertainty, in social contexts, and when forming beliefs about others. Each essay introduces a distinct setting, but all share a common goal, which is to improve our understanding of human decision-making.
\r\n \r\nChapter 1 examines commitment contracts. Their high rates of failure raise concerns since individuals may end up worse off than if they had never committed. We investigate whether some of these failures are actually anticipated, with individuals recognizing that future uncertainty might make failing the contract the best option upon some realizations of uncertainty. We refer to this behavior as planning for the possibility of failure. This approach is different from the usual interpretation of failures, which we call failing to plan, as it attributes failures to take-up mistakes. To study whether individuals plan for the possibility of failure, we conducted a controlled lab experiment designed to detect patterns of such planning. Our findings indicate that about one-third of all commitment choices can be attributed to this kind of foresight. This suggests that planning for failure is common, and that high failure rates are not necessarily driven by mistaken commitments. Thus, they do not by themselves call into question the value of commitment contracts.
\r\n\r\nThe second essay studies the decision to ask for help\u2014a behavior that can be critical in addressing information asymmetries but is often avoided. In an online experiment, we find that making potential helpers even minimally identifiable (e.g., through an uninformative ID number) significantly increases the likelihood of asking. Belief data suggest that this effect stems from shifts in how individuals weigh expected payoffs and other factors (particularly social ones) when deciding whether to ask.
\r\n\r\nThe third essay explores how people expect others to update their beliefs upon receiving new information. We find that when two individuals have different priors, people expect others\u2019 beliefs to move toward their own prior upon receiving new information. Although this result is consistent with the theoretical predictions for Bayesian agents, we find no support for the precision of information affecting the magnitude of the shift in the way the theory predicts. We find that this effect occurs not only due to under-updating of one's own beliefs but also due to recognition of under-updating by others.
", "doi": "10.7907/p5yr-yn70", "publication_date": "2025", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2025" }, { "id": "thesis:16369", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "16369", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05042024-221411474", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "LUCIA_ALDO_2024.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 1133182, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/16369/1/LUCIA_ALDO_2024.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation of Decision-Making Under Risk", "author": [ { "family_name": "Lucia", "given_name": "Aldo", "orcid": "0000-0002-4833-5948", "clpid": "Lucia-Aldo" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Sprenger", "given_name": "Charles D.", "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Pomatto", "given_name": "Luciano", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "clpid": "Pomatto-L" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Sprenger", "given_name": "Charles D.", "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D" }, { "family_name": "Pomatto", "given_name": "Luciano", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "clpid": "Pomatto-L" }, { "family_name": "Caradonna", "given_name": "Peter", "orcid": "0000-0002-4197-4739", "clpid": "Caradonna-Peter-P" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three chapters related to the fields of decision theory, game theory, and experimental economics. Chapters 1 and 2 use experimental and structural methods to study individual decision-making in the domain of risk, while Chapter 3 examines decision-making under risk in settings of strategic interaction.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, co-authored with Shunto Kobayashi, we conduct the first experiment that studies two classical behaviors under risk inconsistent with Expected Utility together: the common ratio effect and preferences for randomization. We show that these two behaviors are strongly positively correlated in a manner inconsistent with the predictions of leading economic models and machine learning algorithms. Motivated by this observation, we develop a novel empirical approach which, unlike machine learning algorithms, imposes some basic assumptions on preferences but does not rely on specific decision models. We further demonstrate that this approach provides more accurate predictions---both inside and outside laboratory settings---compared to leading economic models and machine learning algorithms.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I design an experiment testing Expected Utility's central independence axiom and contemporaneously eliciting measures of decision confidence. Recent theoretical work implicates decision confidence as a central component of decision-making under risk, attributing failures of Expected Utility to a lack of confidence. I find that choices characterized by high self-reported levels of decision confidence and low response times are more likely to comply with the independence axiom. Contrary to the common certainty effect rationale for independence violations, I show that subjects predominantly violate Expected Utility by choosing risky lotteries over certain amounts when they are unconfident in their choices.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Marco Loseto, we study static games in which players have convex preferences. Under convexity, players' preferences admit a conservative multi-utility representation: each utility generates an evaluation for each action, and actions are ranked according to the lowest evaluation. We characterize the set of optimal actions for players with convex preferences and propose an efficiency criterion to rank them. Next, we derive a new class of mixed Nash equilibria that we call ``strict'' because players strictly prefer randomization. In general, convexity may lead to a multiplicity of mixed Nash equilibria. However, we show that when they exist, only strict equilibria ensure that all mixed actions are efficient.
", "doi": "10.7907/2sk6-j508", "publication_date": "2024", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2024" }, { "id": "thesis:16152", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "16152", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:08042023-224053566", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "gailmard_lindsey_2023_thesis.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 561745, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/16152/1/gailmard_lindsey_2023_thesis.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Reputation and Accountability", "author": [ { "family_name": "Gailmard", "given_name": "Lindsey Anne", "orcid": "0000-0001-7500-3466", "clpid": "Gailmard-Lindsey-Anne" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Katz", "given_name": "Jonathan N.", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "clpid": "Katz-J-N" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Gibilisco", "given_name": "Michael B.", "orcid": "0000-0002-6484-1314", "clpid": "Gibilisco-M-B" }, { "family_name": "Kiewiet", "given_name": "D. Roderick", "clpid": "Kiewiet-D-R" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "In this thesis, I explore how accountability relationships affect policymaking in two institutional contexts: internal executive branch operations and electoral contests. The overarching insight is that the potential for removal creates reputation concerns to demonstrate skill that, in turn, affect policymaking. For political appointees serving at the pleasure of the president, this means a reputation for management skill or technocratic policy expertise, whereas for elected representatives, this means maintaining a reputation for competent leadership with voters. The main result is that oversight creates both pathological policymaking incentives for accountable officials, but also potentially unintuitive selection by a principal\u2014either the president or voters.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapters 1 and 2, I explore political appointees\u2019 dual roles as agents of the president and managers of the bureaucracy. This view of appointee-careerist relations complicates standard notions of presidential control and bureaucratic power, by recognizing that appointees are reliant on presidential support to maintain their position within an administration. To cultivate a good reputation with the president, appointees may cede control to the bureaucracy. However, to understand how control is transferred to the bureaucracy, I argue that we must fully account for appointees\u2019 strategic roles in the administrative presidency\u2014and that, to do so, requires differentiating between types of appointments.
\r\n\r\nPresidential appointments that require Senate confirmation (PAS) and noncareer members of the Senior Executive Service (SES-NA) occupy positions that require direct oversight and management of subordinate career civil servants. As managers, these appointees must rely on the expertise, pragmatic or otherwise, and efforts of bureaucrats to implement the president\u2019s policies. I argue that presidents select these appointees primarily on the basis of their management skills. In contrast, Schedule C appointees occupy confidential or policymaking roles and serve directly under a political appointee. These appointees may substitute for the expertise of career bureaucrats. I argue that presidents select these appointees on the basis of policy expertise.
\r\n\r\nHowever, central to my argument is the idea that the president may still be uncertain of an appointee\u2019s management skill or policy expertise\u2014despite appointing him or her in the first place. This means there is scope for the president to learn about an appointee\u2019s ability based on how they perform or behave on the job. It is this residual uncertainty about an appointee\u2019s capabilities, along with the president\u2019s formal removal power, that create reputation concerns for appointees: appointees care about maintaining their position and to do so they must preserve their reputation with the president.
\r\n\r\nI argue that these reputation concerns shape how appointees manage interactions with the bureaucracy. Appointees in managerial roles may make more policy concessions to the bureaucracy than the president would like in order to ensure bureaucratic cooperation and avoid revealing managerial weaknesses. Instead, appointees in positions of policymaking authority may fail to empower or involve bureaucrats in policymaking. Both of these actions undermine the president\u2019s policy goals by either creating policies that increasingly reflect the views of the bureaucracy or by failing to create policies that reflect bureaucratic expertise. This suggests limitations of political control over the bureaucracy that cannot be alleviated through the exercise of formal administrative powers, namely appointment and removal powers.
\r\n\r\nUltimately, the agency issues I explore in this context follow from a fundamental and immutable constraint on presidential control: the president simply cannot unilaterally manage the executive branch. The demands of the presidency are too great for the president to preside over all operations. This means delegation is necessary\u2014and, even when the president delegates to advisors of \u201cher own choosing,\u201d some loss of control is inevitable.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I explore how majority selection operates in an environment in which politicians prefer to pursue particularistic policies. If special interest coalitions are sufficiently strong, a majority may expect that political expertise will be used to select policies that generate rents for narrow constituencies at the expense of its own welfare. I develop a model in which a majority prefers to elect the less competent politician in order to undermine the incumbent\u2019s ability to pursue the special interest agenda and derive the implications for accountability in this setting. The results demonstrate that the majority\u2019s attempts to reassert control over policy through its retention decisions impede social welfare maximizing reform and distort aggregate welfare by either encouraging (i) inefficient policy selection or (ii) inefficient candidate selection. Even if politicians choose policies that maximize social welfare doing so may only worsen aggregate welfare by providing voters with more information about candidate competence, which enables the majority to better select inept politicians.
", "doi": "10.7907/68tp-4t84", "publication_date": "2024", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2024" }, { "id": "thesis:16198", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "16198", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:09292023-062110859", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Thesis_Meng-Jhang Fong.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 3317541, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/16198/1/Thesis_Meng-Jhang Fong.pdf", "version": "v2.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays in Behavioral Economics and Game Theory", "author": [ { "family_name": "Fong", "given_name": "Meng-Jhang", "orcid": "0009-0008-8832-3985", "clpid": "Fong-Meng-Jhang" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Pomatto", "given_name": "Luciano", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "clpid": "Pomatto-L" }, { "family_name": "Sprenger", "given_name": "Charles David", "orcid": "0000-0001-6540-8814", "clpid": "Sprenger-C-D" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This thesis consists of three papers. Chapter 1 conducts experimental research on individual bounded rationality in games, Chapter 2 introduces a novel equilibrium solution concept in behavioral game theory, and Chapter 3 investigates confirmation bias within the framework of game theory.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1 (joint with Wei James Chen and Po-Hsuan Lin), we investigate individual strategic reasoning depths by matching human subjects with fully rational computer players in a lab, allowing for the isolation of limited reasoning ability from beliefs about opponent players and social preferences. Our findings reveal that when matched with robots, subjects demonstrate higher stability in their strategic thinking depths across games, in contrast to when matched with humans.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2 (joint with Po-Hsuan Lin and Thomas R. Palfrey), we investigate how players\u2019 misunderstanding about the relationship between opponents\u2019 private information and strategies influence their equilibrium behavior in dynamic environments. This theoretical study introduces a framework that extends the analysis of cursed equilibrium from the strategic form to multi-stage games and applies it to various applications in economics and political science.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I employ a game-theoretic framework to model how decision makers strategically interpret signals, particularly when they face a utility loss from holding beliefs that differ from their partners. The study reveals that the emergence of confirmation bias is positively associated with the strength of prior beliefs about a state, while the impact of signal accuracy remains ambiguous.
", "doi": "10.7907/5xh7-yw15", "publication_date": "2024", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2024" }, { "id": "thesis:15268", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "15268", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06012023-230351408", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Zeidel_Jeffrey_2023.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 1202611, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/15268/1/Zeidel_Jeffrey_2023.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays in Behavioral Economics", "author": [ { "family_name": "Zeidel", "given_name": "Jeffrey Roy", "orcid": "0009-0004-0407-2391", "clpid": "Zeidel-Jeffrey-Roy" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Shum", "given_name": "Matthew S.", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "clpid": "Shum-M-S" }, { "family_name": "Pomatto", "given_name": "Luciano", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "clpid": "Pomatto-L" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays in three chapters. Chapter 1 contributes to the literature on reference dependent preferences, chapter 2 introduces a new solution concept for games played by teams of players, and chapter 3 analyzes a model of biased beliefs in law enforcement.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, I study the role of reference dependent preferences in motivating effort in online chess. In online chess, players are assigned ratings that measure chess skill and update after every game. I find evidence of bunching above round numbers in the distribution of ratings, suggesting that players care about their rating and that round numbers serve as reference points. I estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of the decision to end a playing session that nests both loss aversion and an alternative 'aspiration' specification involving a discrete jump in utility at reference points. I reject loss aversion in favor of aspirational preferences. I show that higher skilled players are significantly more aspirational, and that aspiration does not diminish with experience.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, coauthored with Jeongbin Kim and Thomas R. Palfrey, we develop a general framework for the analysis of games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines standard non-cooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on the collective choice rules such that team decisions are stochastically optimal: the probability the team chooses an action is increasing in its equilibrium expected payoff. The theory is illustrated with some binary action games.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, I model a social welfare maximizing law enforcement agency that does not know the supply of crime, that may have incorrect beliefs about its ability to detect crime, and that only observes the quantity of crime that it detects. An equilibrium is defined in which the enforcement agency is not surprised by the crime data it observes, and believes itself to be maximizing social welfare. Sufficient conditions for existence are provided. The model is shown to capture the intuition of crime-policing 'feedback loops' in which inefficient overpolicing or underpolicing is supported in equilibrium.
", "doi": "10.7907/779z-c728", "publication_date": "2023", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2023" }, { "id": "thesis:15250", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "15250", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06012023-000259864", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "hann-caruthers_wade_2023.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 545003, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/15250/1/hann-caruthers_wade_2023.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays on Social Learning and Social Choice", "author": [ { "family_name": "Hann-Caruthers", "given_name": "Wade Daniel", "orcid": "0000-0002-4273-6249", "clpid": "Hann-Caruthers-Wade-Daniel" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Tamuz", "given_name": "Omer", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "clpid": "Tamuz-O" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tamuz", "given_name": "Omer", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "clpid": "Tamuz-O" }, { "family_name": "Pomatto", "given_name": "Luciano", "orcid": "0000-0002-4331-8436", "clpid": "Pomatto-L" }, { "family_name": "Rosenthal", "given_name": "Jean-Laurent", "clpid": "Rosenthal-J-L" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation contains three essays, two which contribute to the study of social learning (Chapters 1 and 2) and one which contributes to the study of social choice (Chapter 3).
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 1, I introduce a fully rational model of social learning on networks with endogenous action timing. I show that the structure of the network can play an important role in the aggregation of information. When the social network contains high-degree vertices, agents can be arbitrarily likely to make good choices. In contrast, when the social network is linear, there is a bound on how likely agents are to make good choices which holds regardless of how patient they are. The main contribution of this chapter is the identification of a novel mechanism through which strategic behavior can substantially impede the flow of information through a social network.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, co-authored with Vadim Martynov and Omer Tamuz, we study the asymptotic rate at which the probability of taking the correct action converges to 1 in the classical sequential learning model with unbounded signals. We provide a characterization of the asymptotic law of motion of the public belief, and we use this characterization to show that convergence occurs more slowly than when agents directly observe private signals, and that the expected time until the last incorrect action can be finite or infinite.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Laurent Bartholdi, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, and Leeat Yariv, we introduce equitability as a less stringent alternative to symmetry for modeling egalitarianism in voting rules. We then use techniques from group theory to show that equitable voting rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but they cannot be smaller than the square root of the population size.
", "doi": "10.7907/4v8h-z740", "publication_date": "2023", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2023" }, { "id": "thesis:14116", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "14116", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:04042021-172613123", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "ABuyalskaya_Thesis_Final_5 27 21.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 10955944, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/14116/1/ABuyalskaya_Thesis_Final_5 27 21.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Investigating Drivers of Repeated Behaviors in Field Data", "author": [ { "family_name": "Buyalskaya", "given_name": "Anastasia", "orcid": "0000-0002-1848-1661", "clpid": "Buyalskaya-Anastasia" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Camerer", "given_name": "Colin F.", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "clpid": "Camerer-C-F" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Shum", "given_name": "Matthew S.", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "clpid": "Shum-M-S" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Wood", "given_name": "Wendy", "orcid": "0000-0002-6117-558X", "clpid": "Wood-Wendy" }, { "family_name": "Camerer", "given_name": "Colin F.", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "clpid": "Camerer-C-F" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation investigates the influences on frequently repeated human behaviors (e.g. eating, exercising, washing hands) using empirical tests on field data. While some of the phenomena discussed have been studied in lab settings (e.g., self-regulation failures, insensitivity to reward devaluation), these studies present some of the first tests of these behavioral phenomena in the field. This dissertation also assembles a number of methodologies which can be used to study individual-level field data, informed by an interdisciplinary perspective on social and decision science research.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter uses field data to study spillovers across behavioral domains, namely exercise and food choice. This work joins a small group of papers which document field evidence related to domain spillovers and failures of self-regulation. Most of the existing research on self-regulation has been conducted in controlled laboratory settings, where participants are either asked to imagine making hypothetical restrained choices or exert effort on a laboratory task as a proxy for making a restrained choice. As is the critique of many lab studies without direct field equivalents however, it is debatable whether the self-regulation behaviors observed in survey and laboratory settings necessarily generalize to the field. We fill this gap by looking at how natural (rather than incentivized) changes in exercise systematically affect food choice, thus empirically identifying spillovers across two behavioral domains in field data. We find that, even after controlling for individual fixed effects, there is a robust effect of morning exercise on the healthiness of a lunch choice. We complement the analysis of field data with surveys to better understand the mechanism driving this result.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter presents a novel methodology for identifying behaviors that are highly and predictably context-sensitive, and thus candidates for being habitual. While there is a large body of laboratory research documenting the mechanisms underlying well-developed habits in animals and humans, there is much less field research on how human habits naturally develop over time. Using two large datasets on gym attendance and handwashing behavior, we use machine learning to statistically classify when choices are predicted by an identifiable set of context variables. This technique generates a person-specific measure of behavioral predictability, which can then be used to study individual differences in predictability and speed of habit formation. This allows us to establish two important discoveries. First, the sets of context cues that are predictive of individual-level behavior are different for different people. Specifically, while historical behavior is an important universal predictor, other context variables such as day of the week or month of the year have more heterogeneous effects. Second, contrary to common wisdom, there is no \"magic number\" for how long it takes to form a habit. Instead, the speed of habit formation appears to vary significantly, both between behavioral domains and between individuals within domains.
\r\n \r\nThe third chapter uses a novel methodology to run a field experiment testing the effect of a price promotion on consumer behavior. The goal of this \"pilot study\" is to credibly dissociate predictions made by brand loyalty/habit formation from reference-dependence theories. A customizable vending machine serves as a \"mini-retailer,\" allowing for full control of price promotion details in an ecologically valid setting. The vending machine allows controlling for stockpiling behavior, an important concern for empirical work analyzing price promotions in the marketing literature. Analysis of the data collected from this pilot study suggests that price promotions increase the sales of both discounted and non-discounted items, as well as the total number of unique customers making purchases. Furthermore, in line with the loss leader hypothesis, more items are purchased during the sale period overall.
", "doi": "10.7907/wbrp-ca13", "publication_date": "2021", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2021" }, { "id": "thesis:11734", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "11734", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06102019-125021538", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "New_Perspectives_in_Political_Communication.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 1950938, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/11734/1/New_Perspectives_in_Political_Communication.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "New Perspectives in Political Communication", "author": [ { "family_name": "Adams-Cohen", "given_name": "Nicholas Joseph", "orcid": "0000-0003-2251-1744", "clpid": "Adams-Cohen-Nicholas-Joseph" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Katz", "given_name": "Jonathan N.", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "clpid": "Katz-J-N" }, { "family_name": "Rosenthal", "given_name": "Jean-Laurent", "clpid": "Rosenthal-J-L" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation contains three chapters exploring the nature of political communication and public opinion formation by analyzing social media data. Each chapter uses original sets of Twitter data to examine the public\u2019s response to major shifts in public policy (Chapter Two), the differences between partisan networks (Chapter Three), and how citizens engage with gun policy after mass shootings (Chapter Four).
\r\n\r\nChapter Two examines how public opinion towards gay marriage changed before and after the legalization of same-sex marriage as a result of the 2016 Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision. Exploiting the variation in state law prior to the Court\u2019s decision, I use a difference-in-difference approach to find causal evidence that citizens residing in states where the Supreme Court overturns state laws are more likely to have a negative opinion of the federal decision.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Three, I collect an original dataset of Twitter conversations about the American political parties to develop a supervised learning algorithm that classifies users as liberal or conservative, using these labels to then map out separate ideological network structures. Analyzing these networks, I find significant differences in how conservative and liberal citizens form online networks, leading to important consequences for information diffusion and action coordination.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Four, I examine how messages from the political and media elite concerning gun control impact citizen engagement with gun policy issues in the wake of high-profile mass shootings. I analyze the impact of elite messaging with a panel data set of sixty thousand partisan Twitter users, data that includes each user\u2019s full Twitter history as well as information on which accounts they follow. By building this Twitter panel, I am able to better determine which elite messages each user receives and whether the recipient chooses to engage with gun policy. I find that elite messages increase the likelihood a user will engage with gun policy issues, but further determine that we must broaden the notion of elite to include users only considered influential on the Twitter platform.
\r\n", "doi": "10.7907/7TDG-4R42", "publication_date": "2019", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2019" }, { "id": "thesis:11734", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "11734", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:06102019-125021538", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "New_Perspectives_in_Political_Communication.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 1950938, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/11734/1/New_Perspectives_in_Political_Communication.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "New Perspectives in Political Communication", "author": [ { "family_name": "Adams-Cohen", "given_name": "Nicholas Joseph", "orcid": "0000-0003-2251-1744", "clpid": "Adams-Cohen-Nicholas-Joseph" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Katz", "given_name": "Jonathan N.", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "clpid": "Katz-J-N" }, { "family_name": "Rosenthal", "given_name": "Jean-Laurent", "clpid": "Rosenthal-J-L" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation contains three chapters exploring the nature of political communication and public opinion formation by analyzing social media data. Each chapter uses original sets of Twitter data to examine the public\u2019s response to major shifts in public policy (Chapter Two), the differences between partisan networks (Chapter Three), and how citizens engage with gun policy after mass shootings (Chapter Four).
\r\n\r\nChapter Two examines how public opinion towards gay marriage changed before and after the legalization of same-sex marriage as a result of the 2016 Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision. Exploiting the variation in state law prior to the Court\u2019s decision, I use a difference-in-difference approach to find causal evidence that citizens residing in states where the Supreme Court overturns state laws are more likely to have a negative opinion of the federal decision.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Three, I collect an original dataset of Twitter conversations about the American political parties to develop a supervised learning algorithm that classifies users as liberal or conservative, using these labels to then map out separate ideological network structures. Analyzing these networks, I find significant differences in how conservative and liberal citizens form online networks, leading to important consequences for information diffusion and action coordination.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter Four, I examine how messages from the political and media elite concerning gun control impact citizen engagement with gun policy issues in the wake of high-profile mass shootings. I analyze the impact of elite messaging with a panel data set of sixty thousand partisan Twitter users, data that includes each user\u2019s full Twitter history as well as information on which accounts they follow. By building this Twitter panel, I am able to better determine which elite messages each user receives and whether the recipient chooses to engage with gun policy. I find that elite messages increase the likelihood a user will engage with gun policy issues, but further determine that we must broaden the notion of elite to include users only considered influential on the Twitter platform.
\r\n", "doi": "10.7907/7TDG-4R42", "publication_date": "2019", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2019" }, { "id": "thesis:10231", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "10231", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312017-141442186", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Mayskaya_Tatiana_2017.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 3141859, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/10231/1/Mayskaya_Tatiana_2017.pdf", "version": "v5.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays on Information Collection", "author": [ { "family_name": "Mayskaya", "given_name": "Tatiana S.", "orcid": "0000-0003-1445-4612", "clpid": "Mayskaya-Tatiana-S" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "clpid": "Echenique-F" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "clpid": "Echenique-F" }, { "family_name": "Cvitani\u0107", "given_name": "Jak\u0161a", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "clpid": "Cvitani\u0107-J" }, { "family_name": "Gillen", "given_name": "Benjamin J.", "clpid": "Gillen-B-J" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This thesis is devoted to the problem of information collection from theoretical and experimental perspectives.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I characterize the unique optimal learning strategy when there are two information sources, three possible states of the world, and learning is modeled as a search process. The optimal strategy consists of two phases. During the first phase, only beliefs about the state and the quality of information sources matter for the optimal choice between these sources. During the second phase, this choice also depends on how much the agent values different types of information. The information sources are substitutes when each individual source is likely to reveal the state eventually, and they are complements otherwise.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Li Song, we conducted an experiment which demonstrates that even in a simple four person circle network people appear to fail to account for possible repetition of information they receive. Moreover, we show that this phenomenon can be partially attributed to rational considerations, which take into account other people\u2019s deviations from optimal behavior.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, co-authored with Marcelo A. Fern\u00e1ndez,we model overconfidence as if a decision maker perceives information as being more precise than it actually is. We show that the effect of overconfidence on the quality of the final decision is shaped by three forces, overestimating the precision of future information, overestimating the precision of past information and overestimating the amount of information to be collected in the future. The first force pushes an overconfident decision maker to collect more information, while the second and the third forces work in the other direction.
", "doi": "10.7907/Z9DV1GWC", "publication_date": "2017", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2017" }, { "id": "thesis:10231", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "10231", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05312017-141442186", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Mayskaya_Tatiana_2017.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 3141859, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/10231/1/Mayskaya_Tatiana_2017.pdf", "version": "v5.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays on Information Collection", "author": [ { "family_name": "Mayskaya", "given_name": "Tatiana S.", "orcid": "0000-0003-1445-4612", "clpid": "Mayskaya-Tatiana-S" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "clpid": "Echenique-F" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "orcid": "0000-0002-1567-6770", "clpid": "Echenique-F" }, { "family_name": "Cvitani\u0107", "given_name": "Jak\u0161a", "orcid": "0000-0001-6651-3552", "clpid": "Cvitani\u0107-J" }, { "family_name": "Gillen", "given_name": "Benjamin J.", "clpid": "Gillen-B-J" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Hirsch", "given_name": "Alexander V.", "orcid": "0000-0001-5166-9853", "clpid": "Hirsch-A-V" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This thesis is devoted to the problem of information collection from theoretical and experimental perspectives.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, I characterize the unique optimal learning strategy when there are two information sources, three possible states of the world, and learning is modeled as a search process. The optimal strategy consists of two phases. During the first phase, only beliefs about the state and the quality of information sources matter for the optimal choice between these sources. During the second phase, this choice also depends on how much the agent values different types of information. The information sources are substitutes when each individual source is likely to reveal the state eventually, and they are complements otherwise.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 3, co-authored with Li Song, we conducted an experiment which demonstrates that even in a simple four person circle network people appear to fail to account for possible repetition of information they receive. Moreover, we show that this phenomenon can be partially attributed to rational considerations, which take into account other people\u2019s deviations from optimal behavior.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 4, co-authored with Marcelo A. Fern\u00e1ndez,we model overconfidence as if a decision maker perceives information as being more precise than it actually is. We show that the effect of overconfidence on the quality of the final decision is shaped by three forces, overestimating the precision of future information, overestimating the precision of past information and overestimating the amount of information to be collected in the future. The first force pushes an overconfident decision maker to collect more information, while the second and the third forces work in the other direction.
", "doi": "10.7907/Z9DV1GWC", "publication_date": "2017", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2017" }, { "id": "thesis:9806", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "9806", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05272016-192342051", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Zhang_Qiaoxi_2016.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 459538, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/9806/1/Zhang_Qiaoxi_2016.pdf", "version": "v2.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Three Essays on Information Economics", "author": [ { "family_name": "Zhang", "given_name": "Qiaoxi", "orcid": "0000-0002-3139-7659", "clpid": "Zhang-Qiaoxi" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "clpid": "Echenique-F" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "clpid": "Echenique-F" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "The main theme of my thesis is how uncertainty affects behaviors. I explore how agents seek to resolve uncertainty in different environments. In Chapter 1, agents learn from the messages of informed experts in a signaling game. In Chapter 2, an agent learns about a fixed and uncertain physical environment through dynamic experimentation. In the last chapter, agents learn about others' preferences through the outcome of a central matching mechanism.
\r\n\r\nMotivated by the question of how opposing political candidates who are policy experts can communicate to voters in a way that helps them win the election, I study a delegation problem with two informed, self-interested agents. Agents make proposals before the decision maker decides to whom to delegate a task. The innovation is that there are multiple issues that the principal and agents care about, and the agents can be vague about any issue in their proposals. Intuition says that agents should be specific about the issues that they are trusted on and vague about other issues. I find the opposite: an agent is disadvantaged by revealing information about certain issues to the decision maker, those on which he is trusted by the principal on. The reason is that doing so enables his opponent to take advantage of this revealed information and undercut him. Essentially, when the principal is on an agent's side for some issue, that agent does not want to be specific, because it creates a visible target for his opponent to react to. He wants to be vague, because that allows the principal's ignorance about the optimal action create an insurmountable obstacle for his opponent. As a result, it is to an agent's advantage to be vague about the issue that he is trusted on.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter investigates the implication of biased updating in dynamic experimentation such as a firm's R&D process. People exhibit near miss effect during gambling. For example, if the first two wheels of a slot machine indicate a potential final outcome of jackpot but the last wheel indicates a loss, people are motivated to gamble more. An outcome that is close to a success but is still a failure is called a "near miss." In this chapter, I explain the near miss effect in a firm's repeated R&D process. There are two factors that sequentially affect the profitability of R&D, both of which are uncertain. First is whether the R&D team is skilled enough to make a technical breakthrough. If a breakthrough occurs, then a second factor comes into play, which is whether the market demand is high enough to make the product profitable. Moreover, good news for the first stage is a prerequisite for learning about the second stage. In each one of the infinite periods, the decision maker of the firm decides whether to involve in risky R&D and observe whether the outcome is a failure (no breakthrough), a success (with breakthrough and high market demand), or a near miss (with breakthrough but low market demand). I assume that the decision maker of the firm learns about the skill of the team properly, but when she updates about the market demand, she updates incorrectly and overweighs her prior. In particular, her posterior about the market demand is a convex combination of her prior and the Bayesian posterior. This bias affects the relative updating of the two factors, which gives rise to the near miss effect: after a near miss is observed, the decision maker values doing R&D more than before although she has received no payoff.
\r\n\r\nI show that if the decision maker is sufficiently biased and overweighs her prior enough, then she exhibits the near miss effect. I also compare the near miss effect for decision makers with different degrees of biases. As it turns out, the more biased a decision maker is, the more sever she exhibits the near miss effect. However, given the decision maker's belief about the two factors, the more biased she is, the less she values R&D. Consequently, the value of R&D is highest for a Bayesian.
\r\n\r\nIn the last chapter, I study how well a centralized matching mechanism works when agents do not know others' preferences. I consider a standard two-sided marriage matching problem, except that agents only know their own preferences. Roth(1989) proved by an example the non-existence of a mechanism with at least one stable equilibria. In his proof, an agent is allowed to report a preference that is realized with ex ante zero probability, which violates the setup of a Bayesian game. Instead, by restricting agents to report only preferences with positive realization probabilities, I show that Roth's result still holds. More interestingly, as long as agents are allowed to form blocking pairs after a matching outcome is announced, the final outcome is always stable with respect to the true preferences. This means that even when the mechanism fails to produce a stable outcome, it can still release enough information for agents to initialize a blocking pair, which induces a stable outcome.
", "doi": "10.7907/Z9TB14WS", "publication_date": "2016", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2016" }, { "id": "thesis:8862", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "8862", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05172015-200111758", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Fisher_Geoffrey_2015_thesis.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 3877202, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/8862/1/Fisher_Geoffrey_2015_thesis.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Value Estimation and Comparison in Multi-Attribute Choice", "author": [ { "family_name": "Fisher", "given_name": "Geoffrey W.", "clpid": "Fisher-Geoffrey-W" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Rangel", "given_name": "Antonio", "clpid": "Rangel-A" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Rangel", "given_name": "Antonio", "clpid": "Rangel-A" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Saito", "given_name": "Kota", "clpid": "Saito-K" }, { "family_name": "Gillen", "given_name": "Benjamin J.", "clpid": "Gillen-B-J" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "The following work explores the processes individuals utilize when making multi-attribute choices. With the exception of extremely simple or familiar choices, most decisions we face can be classified as multi-attribute choices. In order to evaluate and make choices in such an environment, we must be able to estimate and weight the particular attributes of an option. Hence, better understanding the mechanisms involved in this process is an important step for economists and psychologists. For example, when choosing between two meals that differ in taste and nutrition, what are the mechanisms that allow us to estimate and then weight attributes when constructing value? Furthermore, how can these mechanisms be influenced by variables such as attention or common physiological states, like hunger?
\r\n\r\nIn order to investigate these and similar questions, we use a combination of choice and attentional data, where the attentional data was collected by recording eye movements as individuals made decisions. Chapter 1 designs and tests a neuroeconomic model of multi-attribute choice that makes predictions about choices, response time, and how these variables are correlated with attention. Chapter 2 applies the ideas in this model to intertemporal decision-making, and finds that attention causally affects discount rates. Chapter 3 explores how hunger, a common physiological state, alters the mechanisms we utilize as we make simple decisions about foods.
\r\n", "doi": "10.7907/Z9ZP441D", "publication_date": "2015", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2015" }, { "id": "thesis:8894", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "8894", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05282015-050921863", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "Matthew Chao - Thesis - Caltech 2015 Social Sciences.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 1218528, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/8894/1/Matthew Chao - Thesis - Caltech 2015 Social Sciences.pdf", "version": "v8.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "How Behavioral Economics Can Shape Firm Strategy and Public Policy: Lessons from the Field and Laboratory", "author": [ { "family_name": "Chao", "given_name": "Matthew C.", "clpid": "Chao-Matthew-C" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Camerer", "given_name": "Colin F.", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "clpid": "Camerer-C-F" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Camerer", "given_name": "Colin F.", "orcid": "0000-0003-4049-1871", "clpid": "Camerer-C-F" }, { "family_name": "Shum", "given_name": "Matthew S.", "orcid": "0000-0002-6262-915X", "clpid": "Shum-M-S" }, { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "Incentives are not always economic or monetary in nature. Individuals are often influenced by socially-based incentives centered on how he or she wants to be perceived in a social setting, such as the desire to publicly adhere to a norm of fairness. Likewise, individuals can also be influenced by cognitively-based incentives centered on self-perception and self-attribution, such as the desire to convince oneself that he or she is altruistic. Behavioral economists have incorporated some of these concepts into standard economic models of decision-making, but there is much we still do not understand about the role of these psychology-based incentives in organizational strategy and public policy contexts.
\r\n\r\nThis thesis examines the effects of several social and cognitive incentives across different settings. In Chapter I, I use a laboratory experiment to examine why individuals feel the need to reciprocate to gifts and favors, even when those gifts are from businesses looking to take advantage of our tendency to reciprocate. Specifically, I demonstrate that individuals reciprocate simply to the intent to give a gift or favor, regardless of the ulterior motives or actual utility resulting from the favor. In Chapter II, I use observational data to investigate how pharmaceutical firms exploit social incentives that invoke reciprocity in order to influence how physicians prescribe. I concurrently examine how regulators also use social incentives, but as a way to protect consumers from these manipulative marketing strategies. In Chapter III, I collaborate with a non-profit public radio station to test the interaction between psychological and economic incentives in a fundraising context. In particular, Chapter III uses a field experiment to show that economic incentives in a fundraising campaign can reduce donation rates by detracting attention from the psychological reasons for donating, and thereby inducing a different mindset in donors.
\r\n\r\nThis thesis builds upon the field of behavioral economics in two ways. First, it uses experimental methods to extend our theoretical understanding of non-monetary, psychological incentives, including some of the mechanisms that drive reciprocity, social image, and motivation crowding out. Second, the thesis applies this knowledge toward understanding the effects of several commonly used marketing campaigns and regulatory policies.
\r\n", "doi": "10.7907/Z9FJ2DQW", "publication_date": "2015", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2015" }, { "id": "thesis:8741", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "8741", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:12152014-105910005", "type": "thesis", "title": "The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context", "author": [ { "family_name": "Kimble", "given_name": "Jaclyn", "clpid": "Kimble-Jaclyn" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Alvarez", "given_name": "R. Michael", "orcid": "0000-0002-8113-4451", "clpid": "Alvarez-R-M" }, { "family_name": "Katz", "given_name": "Jonathan N.", "orcid": "0000-0002-5287-3503", "clpid": "Katz-J-N" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Kiewiet", "given_name": "D. Roderick", "clpid": "Kiewiet-D-R" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a \u201ccarrot and stick\u201d approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.
\r\n \t\r\nWithout Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.
\r\n\r\nI propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.
", "doi": "10.7907/Z9S75D86", "publication_date": "2015", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2015" }, { "id": "thesis:7494", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "7494", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:02252013-111730958", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "ThesisMuruvvetBuyukboyaci.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 2434463, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/7494/1/ThesisMuruvvetBuyukboyaci.pdf", "version": "v2.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays on Contests, Coordination Games, and Matching", "author": [ { "family_name": "B\u00fcy\u00fckboyaci Hanay", "given_name": "M\u00fcr\u00fcvvet Ilknur", "clpid": "B\u00fcy\u00fckboyaci-Hanay-M\u00fcr\u00fcvvet-Ilknur" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Echenique", "given_name": "Federico", "clpid": "Echenique-F" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "In this thesis, I use theory and experiments (sometimes only experiments), to investigate the impact of agents\u2019 heterogeneity on economic environments such as tournaments, decentralized matching, and coordination games.
\r\n\r\nThe first chapter analyzes a coordination game (a stag-hunt game) in which one of the equilibria gives a higher payoff to the players, but playing the corresponding strategy profile leading to this equilibrium entails strategic risk. In this chapter, I ask whether agents can coordinate on the equilibrium that gives a higher payoff when they are provided information about an opponent\u2019s risk aversion. Two key insights result from my analysis. First, a subject\u2019s propensity to choose the risky action depends on her opponent\u2019s risk attitude. Second, this propensity is independent of the subject\u2019s own risk attitude.
\r\n\r\nThe second chapter compares the performance of two tournament designs when contestants are heterogeneous in their abilities. One of the designs is the standard winner-take-all (WTA) tournament, which is common both in the literature and in the real world. The alternative tournament design involves two tournaments with different prizes (parallel tournaments) where individuals choose which tournament to enter before competing. With a simple model and an experiment, I show that when contestants\u2019 abilities differ substantially, the designer makes higher profit using parallel tournaments. Nevertheless, when the contestants\u2019 abilities are similar, the designer makes higher profit in the WTA tournament.
\r\n\r\nThe third chapter studies a two-period decentralized matching game under complete information with frictions in the form of time discounting. I find that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game coincides with a stable outcome for most preference profiles. The selection of which stable outcome emerges depends on the level of frictions: the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of this game yields the firm-optimal stable match (a worker-optimal stable match) when the time discount is sufficiently high or low (intermediate values).
", "doi": "10.7907/BZX2-PF49", "publication_date": "2013", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2013" }, { "id": "thesis:7092", "collection": "thesis", "collection_id": "7092", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:05292012-234329897", "primary_object_url": { "basename": "nunnari_thesis2012.pdf", "content": "final", "filesize": 1870497, "license": "other", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "url": "/7092/1/nunnari_thesis2012.pdf", "version": "v4.0.0" }, "type": "thesis", "title": "Essays on Dynamic Political Economy", "author": [ { "family_name": "Nunnari", "given_name": "Salvatore", "orcid": "0000-0002-1525-798X", "clpid": "Nunnari-Salvatore" } ], "thesis_advisor": [ { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "thesis_committee": [ { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Mattozzi", "given_name": "Andrea", "clpid": "Mattozzi-A" }, { "family_name": "Snowberg", "given_name": "Erik", "clpid": "Snowberg-E" }, { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "local_group": [ { "literal": "div_hss" } ], "abstract": "This dissertation comprises three essays that are linked by their focus on dynamic models of political economy, in which farsighted agents interact over an infinite number of periods, and the strategic environment evolves endogenously over time.
\r\n\r\nIn Chapter 2, \"Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with Veto Power\", I analyze the consequences of veto power in an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous status quo policy. I show that a Markov equilibrium of this dynamic game exists, and that, irrespective of the discount factor of legislators, their recognition probabilities, and the initial division of the dollar, policy eventually gets arbitrarily close to full appropriation of the dollar by the veto player.
\r\n\r\nChapters 3 and 4 -- coauthored with Thomas Palfrey and Marco Battaglini -- study free riding in a dynamic environment where a durable public good provides a stream of benefits over time and agents have opportunities to gradually build the stock. We consider economies with reversibility, where investments can be positive or negative, and economies with irreversibility, where investments are non-negative and the public good can only be reduced by depreciation. In Chapter 3, \"The Free Rider Problem: A Dynamic Analysis\", we study and compare the set of Markov equilibria of these models. With reversibility, there is a continuum of equilibrium steady states: the highest equilibrium steady state of the public good is increasing in the group size, and the lowest is decreasing. With irreversibility, the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero: the highest steady state possible with reversibility. In Chapter 4, \"The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: An Experimental Study\", we test the results from this model with controlled laboratory experiments. The comparative static predictions for the treatments are supported by the data: irreversible investment leads to significantly higher public good production than reversible investment.
", "doi": "10.7907/YZ75-CH25", "publication_date": "2012", "thesis_type": "phd", "thesis_year": "2012" } ]