[ { "id": "authors:e24t8-8p337", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "e24t8-8p337", "cite_using_url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/e24t8-8p337", "type": "article", "title": "Learning through imitation: An experiment", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Lopez-Moctezuma Jassan", "given_name": "Gabriel", "orcid": "0000-0001-6520-5670", "clpid": "L\u00f3pez-Moctezuma-G" }, { "family_name": "Strack", "given_name": "Philipp", "orcid": "0000-0002-7960-9243" }, { "family_name": "Tamuz", "given_name": "Omer", "orcid": "0000-0002-0111-0418", "clpid": "Tamuz-O" } ], "abstract": "We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no additional payoff-relevant information, and despite potential herd behavior, free riding and information overload issues, observing and imitating the actions of others leads agents to take the optimal action more often in the second setting. We also investigate the effect of group size, as well as a setting in which agents observe private data and others' actions.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jet.2026.106203", "issn": "0022-0531", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Journal of Economic Theory", "publication_date": "2026-06", "volume": "235", "pages": "106203" }, { "id": "authors:cxgn7-cfm95", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "cxgn7-cfm95", "cite_using_url": "https://authors.library.caltech.edu/records/cxgn7-cfm95", "type": "article", "title": "Trust me: Communication and Competition in a Psychological Game", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Dasgupta", "given_name": "Utteeyo", "orcid": "0000-0003-4187-0494" }, { "family_name": "Schotter", "given_name": "Andrew" } ], "abstract": "

We study, both theoretically and experimentally, a communication game with and without seller competition and embed it in a psychological-game framework where players experience costs for lying, misleading others, and being disappointed. We derive the equilibrium predictions of this model, compare them to the setting without psychological payoffs, and test these predictions in a laboratory experiment, in which we induce both material and psychological payoffs. We find that the setting in which players have both material and psychological payoffs features more trade, trades goods of marginally better quality, and does so without welfare losses to either side of the market relative to the setting with material payoffs only. However, the introduction of competition counteracts this improvement and lowers welfare for both sides of the market. This happens due to a surge in dishonesty by sellers in the competitive setting and the buyers' inability to detect this deception.

", "doi": "10.1093/jeea/jvae012", "issn": "1542-4766", "publisher": "Oxford University Press (OUP)", "publication": "Journal of the European Economic Association", "publication_date": "2024-02-23" }, { "id": "authors:9vrz3-ds530", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "9vrz3-ds530", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220808-886765000", "type": "article", "title": "Revealed Preferences for Randomization: An Overview", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Ortoleva", "given_name": "Pietro", "orcid": "0000-0002-5943-6621", "clpid": "Ortoleva-Pietro" } ], "abstract": "We survey the empirical evidence on subjects' desire to randomize and its relation to stochastic choice. Preferences for randomization are documented by a substantial body of empirical work using different methodologies and in several domains, including objective lotteries and ambiguous gambles, social preferences, time preferences, and games. The desire to randomize is correlated across domains and related to standard evidence of stochastic choice. We relate this evidence to models of nonexpected utility and incomplete preferences.", "doi": "10.1257/pandp.20221093", "issn": "2574-0768", "publisher": "American Economic Association", "publication": "AEA Papers and Proceedings", "publication_date": "2022-05-01", "volume": "112", "pages": "426-430" }, { "id": "authors:dze8d-r2907", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "dze8d-r2907", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20220201-345209300", "type": "article", "title": "Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Buyalskaya", "given_name": "Anastasia", "orcid": "0000-0002-1848-1661", "clpid": "Buyalskaya-Anastasia" } ], "abstract": "Private and public organizations are interested in finding effective ways to reduce crime and promote ethical behavior without investing heavy resources into monitoring and compliance. In this paper, we experimentally study how revealing different information about a fine distribution affects deterrence of an undesirable behavior. We use a novel incentive-compatible elicitation method to observe subjects lying (the undesirable behavior) and quantify the extent to which this behavior responds to information structures. We find that punishment schemes that communicate only partial information (the minimum fine in particular) are more effective than full information schemes at deterring lying. We explore the mechanism driving this result and link it to subjects' beliefs about their own versus the average expected fine in treatments with partial information.", "doi": "10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036", "issn": "0025-1909", "publisher": "INFORMS", "publication": "Management Science", "publication_date": "2022-05", "series_number": "5", "volume": "68", "issue": "5", "pages": "3573-3589" }, { "id": "authors:w38bs-4dq57", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "w38bs-4dq57", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20210728-211627192", "type": "article", "title": "The importance of Social Norms against Strategic Effects: The case of Covid-19 vaccine uptake", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Elliott", "given_name": "Matt", "clpid": "Elliott-Matt" }, { "family_name": "Ortoleva", "given_name": "Pietro", "clpid": "Ortoleva-Pietro" } ], "abstract": "We study how individual decisions are affected by those of other members of the society. We use the vaccine against COVID-19 as a case study and empirically estimate the magnitude of three key forces: Herding, Social Norms, and Free-riding. We find that Free-riding is dominated by the other two forces, and that Social Norms are a key driver of behavior. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity and systematic differences between people by demographics and their political preferences.", "doi": "10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109979", "pmcid": "PMC8252706", "issn": "0165-1765", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Economics Letters", "publication_date": "2021-09", "volume": "206", "pages": "Art. No. 109979" }, { "id": "authors:7gezk-prv41", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "7gezk-prv41", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20210607-115057084", "type": "article", "title": "Commitment and (in) Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Elliott", "given_name": "Matt", "clpid": "Elliott-Matthew-L" } ], "abstract": "In many matching markets, bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what terms. We experimentally investigate allocative efficiency and how subjects' payoffs depend on their matching opportunities in such markets. We consider three simple markets. There are no information asymmetries, subjects are patient, and a perfectly equitable outcome is both feasible and efficient. Efficient perfect equilibria of the corresponding bargaining game exist, but are increasingly complicated to sustain across the three markets. Consistent with the predictions of simple (Markov perfect) equilibria, we find considerable mismatch in two of the markets. Mismatch is reduced but remains substantial when we change the nature of bargaining by moving from a structured experimental protocol to permitting free-form negotiations, and when we allow players to renege on their agreements. Our results suggest that mismatch is driven by players correctly anticipating that they might lose their strong bargaining positions, and by players in weak bargaining positions demanding equitable payoffs.", "doi": "10.1093/jeea/jvaa012", "issn": "1542-4766", "publisher": "European Economic Association", "publication": "Journal of the European Economic Association", "publication_date": "2021-04-16", "series_number": "2", "volume": "19", "issue": "2", "pages": "790-838" }, { "id": "authors:x45v8-5kp69", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "x45v8-5kp69", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200727-104128922", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Stable Randomization", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Healy", "given_name": "Paul J.", "clpid": "Healy-P-J" }, { "family_name": "Nielsen", "given_name": "Kirby", "clpid": "Nielsen-Kirby" } ], "abstract": "We design a laboratory experiment to identify whether randomization behavior represents a stable \"type\" across different choice environments. In both games and individual choice questions, subjects face twenty simultaneous repetitions of the same choice. Randomization constitutes making different choices across the twenty repetitions. We find that randomization preferences are highly correlated across domains, with a sizable fraction of individuals randomizing in all domains, even in questions that offer a first-order stochastically dominant option. For some mixers, dominated randomization is responsive to intervention. Our results are inconsistent with many preference-based models of randomization, leaving open a role for heuristics and biases.", "publisher": "Caltech Library", "publication_date": "2020-07-10" }, { "id": "authors:8xyc3-48081", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "8xyc3-48081", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200319-144122348", "type": "article", "title": "Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Cotton", "given_name": "Christopher", "clpid": "Cotton-C" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members. Theoretically and experimentally, we compare this Endogenous Power environment with a standard Random Power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period. Although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent, the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games. The Endogenous Power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions, less-equitable budget allocations, the persistence of power across periods, and higher long-run inequality than the Random Power environment. We present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104126", "issn": "0047-2727", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "publication_date": "2020-04", "volume": "184", "pages": "Art. No. 104126" }, { "id": "authors:nps2y-bdz37", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "nps2y-bdz37", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200124-151122461", "type": "article", "title": "Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "abstract": "We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to explore the effect of income mobility and tax persistence on equilibrium tax rates and inequality. The theoretical framework of the experiment captures the essential elements of the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis in a two-period model and characterizes the dynamic equilibrium tax rates. The experiment allows for a clean test of causality between income mobility and redistributive taxes. Outcomes observed in the experiment are mostly consistent with the comparative static predictions of the model. Mobility and stickiness of taxes lead to lower tax rates, but neither is sufficient by itself. When tax rates are persistent, mobility has a significant negative effect on median implemented taxes. An increase in tax persistence decreases tax rates and increases inequality when mobility is present. An increase in mobility decreases inequality but the effect is modest and not statistically significant.", "doi": "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103372", "issn": "0014-2921", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "European Economic Review", "publication_date": "2020-04", "volume": "123", "pages": "Art. No. 103372" }, { "id": "authors:h974q-8p482", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "h974q-8p482", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190529-160643419", "type": "article", "title": "Communication in bargaining games with unanimity", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "Communication has been shown to increase proposer power in multilateral bargaining settings that use majority voting rule via competition between non-proposers for a place in the coalition. In this paper we investigate whether communication affects bargaining outcomes and the bargaining process in settings in which the competition effect is not present. We study committees that use unanimity rule to pass allocations. We find that in these settings, communication has the complete opposite effect compared with the majority settings: under unanimity, communication eliminates the inefficiencies that are present in settings without communication and it shifts bargaining outcomes towards egalitarian allocations with no proposer power. Communication logs provide insights regarding the topics subjects discuss and communication content correlates with bargaining outcomes.", "doi": "10.1007/s10683-018-9571-6", "issn": "1386-4157", "publisher": "Springer", "publication": "Experimental Economics", "publication_date": "2019-06", "series_number": "2", "volume": "22", "issue": "2", "pages": "350-368" }, { "id": "authors:aexzc-f4275", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "aexzc-f4275", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20190103-140332366", "type": "article", "title": "What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Goeree", "given_name": "Jacob K.", "orcid": "0000-0001-9876-3425", "clpid": "Goeree-J-K" }, { "family_name": "Romero", "given_name": "Julian", "clpid": "Romero-J" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" } ], "abstract": "We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm\u2014that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find that voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections.", "doi": "10.1093/jeea/jvx023", "issn": "1542-4766", "publisher": "European Economic Association", "publication": "Journal of the European Economic Association", "publication_date": "2018-06-01", "series_number": "3", "volume": "16", "issue": "3", "pages": "825-856" }, { "id": "authors:0nrwa-phh33", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "0nrwa-phh33", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20180215-135400954", "type": "article", "title": "Collusion through communication in auctions", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" } ], "abstract": "We study the extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In an array of laboratory experiments we vary the amount of interactions (communication and/or transfers without commitment) available to bidders. We find that communication alone leads to statistically significant but limited price drops. When, in addition, bidders can exchange transfers, revenues decline substantially, with over 70% of our experimental auctions culminating in the object being sold for approximately the minimal price. Furthermore, the effects of communication and transfers are similar across auction formats. We contrast these results with those generated in repeated auctions. By and large, repeated auctions yield lower collusion and lower efficiency levels.", "doi": "10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.021", "issn": "0899-8256", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Games and Economic Behavior", "publication_date": "2018-01", "volume": "107", "pages": "93-108" }, { "id": "authors:a5190-18593", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "a5190-18593", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170309-135545191", "type": "article", "title": "Stochastic Choice and Preferences for Randomization", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Ortoleva", "given_name": "Pietro", "clpid": "Ortoleva-P" } ], "abstract": "We conduct an experiment in which subjects face the same questions repeated multiple times, with repetitions of two types: (1) following the literature, the repetitions are distant from each other; (2) in a novel treatment, the repetitions are in a row, and subjects are told that the questions will be repeated. We find that a large majority of subjects exhibit stochastic choice in both cases. We discuss the implications for models of stochastic choice.", "doi": "10.1086/689774", "issn": "0022-3808", "publisher": "University of Chicago Press", "publication": "Journal of Political Economy", "publication_date": "2017-02", "series_number": "1", "volume": "125", "issue": "1", "pages": "40-68" }, { "id": "authors:jsxnt-kf137", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "jsxnt-kf137", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20161116-152246560", "type": "article", "title": "Static and dynamic underinvestment: An experimental investigation", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Fr\u00e9chette", "given_name": "Guillaume", "clpid": "Fr\u00e9chette-G" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Vespa", "given_name": "Emanuel", "clpid": "Vespa-E" } ], "abstract": "In this paper, we analyze a stylized version of an environment with public goods, dynamic linkages, and legislative bargaining. Our theoretical framework studies the provision of a durable public good as a modified two-period version of Battaglini et al. (2012). The experimental design allows us to disentangle inefficiencies that would result in a one-shot world (static inefficiencies) from additional inefficiencies that emerge in an environment in which decisions in the present affect future periods (dynamic inefficiencies). We solve the first-best solution and compare it to the symmetric stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium of a legislative bargaining game. The experimental results indicate that subjects do react to dynamic linkages, and, as such, there is evidence of both static and dynamic inefficiencies. The quantitative predictions of the bargaining model with respect to the share of dynamic inefficiencies are closest to the data when dynamic linkages are high. To the extent that behavior is different from the model's predictions, a systematic pattern emerges \u2014 namely, the use of strategic cooperation, whereby groups increase the efficiency of current proposals by selectively punishing, in future proposals, individuals who propose highly inefficient allocations.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.001", "issn": "0047-2727", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "publication_date": "2016-11", "volume": "143", "pages": "125-141" }, { "id": "authors:15m59-zva74", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "15m59-zva74", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-111918164", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "abstract": "We explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies. An infinite-horizon theoretical model is developed, and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and the degree of after-tax inequality are characterized. Mobility and stickiness of tax policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate. However, neither is sufficient by itself. Social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy is voted on in every period, and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of social mobility. The two forces are complementary. Tax persistence leads to higher levels of post-tax inequality, for any amount of mobility. The effect of mobility on inequality is less clear-cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence. A laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions of the theory, and the results are generally supportive.", "doi": "10.7907/15m59-zva74", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2016-10-14" }, { "id": "authors:985q4-dvp06", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "985q4-dvp06", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-155700804", "type": "article", "title": "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and the Selection of Candidates", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "abstract": "We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections\nin which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries\nand general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen\nplatforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing\ncandidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates'\ntypes depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two\npatterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates\npander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in\nthe general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to\nthe detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's generalelection\nprospects.", "doi": "10.1257/mic.20130036", "issn": "1945-7669", "publisher": "American Economic Association", "publication": "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics", "publication_date": "2016-05", "series_number": "2", "volume": "8", "issue": "2", "pages": "61-85" }, { "id": "authors:tqhvb-gq879", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "tqhvb-gq879", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160601-080258744", "type": "article", "title": "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "orcid": "0000-0002-0642-7975", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "abstract": "We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's general-election prospects.", "doi": "10.1257/mic.20130036", "issn": "1945-7669", "publisher": "American Economic Association", "publication": "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics", "publication_date": "2016-05", "series_number": "2", "volume": "8", "issue": "2", "pages": "61-85" }, { "id": "authors:11hnt-hg168", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "11hnt-hg168", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160302-155632805", "type": "article", "title": "Naive play and the process of choice in guessing games", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Caplin", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Caplin-A" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "There is growing evidence that not all experimental subjects understand their strategic environment. We introduce a \"choice process\" (CP) protocol that aids in identifying these subjects. This protocol elicits in an incentive compatible manner provisional choices as players internalize their decision making environment. We implement the CP protocol in the modified 2/3 guessing game and use it to pinpoint players that are naive by identifying those who make weakly dominated choices some time into the play. At all time horizons these players average close to 50. This is consistent with the assumption in Level-K theory that the least sophisticated subjects (the naive ones) play uniformly over the [1\u2013100] action space. In contrast, sophisticated players show evidence of increased understanding as time passes. We find that the CP protocol mirrors play in multiple setups with distinct time constraints. Hence it may be worth deploying more broadly to understand the interaction between decision time and choice.", "doi": "10.1007/s40881-015-0003-5", "issn": "2199-6776", "publisher": "Springer", "publication": "Journal of the Economic Science Association", "publication_date": "2015-12", "series_number": "2", "volume": "1", "issue": "2", "pages": "146-157" }, { "id": "authors:gwymj-jy028", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "gwymj-jy028", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-145403385", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Collusion through Communication in Auctions", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" } ], "abstract": "We study the extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. Theoretically, second-price auctions are more fragile to collusion through communication than first-price auctions. In an array of laboratory experiments we vary the amount of interactions (communication and/or transfers without commitment) available to bidders. We find that the auctioneer's revenues decrease significantly when bidders can communicate. When, in addition, bidders can make transfer promises, revenues decline substantially, with 70% of our experimental auctions culminating in the object being sold for approximately the minimal price. Furthermore, the effects of communication and transfers are similar across auction formats.", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2015-10-26" }, { "id": "authors:pb9xv-kyb69", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "pb9xv-kyb69", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20151210-103521591", "type": "article", "title": "Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "abstract": "This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer\u2013Richard model of equilibrium tax rates, inequality, and income redistribution. The experiment varies the amount of wage inequality and the political process used to determine tax rates. We find that higher inequality leads to higher tax rates; the effect is significant and large in magnitude. The tax rates and labor supply functions are both quantitatively close to the theory. The result is robust to the political institution. The theoretical model of Meltzer\u2013Richard is extended to incorporate social preferences in the form of altruism and inequity aversion, which are found to have negligible effects in the data.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008", "issn": "0047-2727", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "publication_date": "2015-10", "volume": "130", "pages": "45-58" }, { "id": "authors:77dwy-0rp12", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "77dwy-0rp12", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095152009", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Stochastic Choice and Preferences for Randomization", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Ortoleva", "given_name": "Pietro", "clpid": "Ortoleva-P" } ], "abstract": "We conduct an experiment to investigate the origin of stochastic choice and to differentiate between the three main classes of models that account for it: Random Expected Utility; Mistakes; and Deliberate Randomization. Subjects face the same questions multiple times in two ways: 1) following the literature, with repetitions distant from each other; 2) in a novel treatment, with repetitions in a row, telling subjects that questions will be repeated. A large majority of subjects exhibited stochastic choice in both cases, and stochasticity is strongly correlated in the two cases. Our results support the class of models of Deliberate Randomization.", "doi": "10.7907/77dwy-0rp12", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2015-01" }, { "id": "authors:dv3vt-ztf54", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "dv3vt-ztf54", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-144613925", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Static and Dynamic Underinvestment: an Experimental Investigation", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" }, { "family_name": "Frechette", "given_name": "Guillaume", "clpid": "Frechette-G" }, { "family_name": "Vespa", "given_name": "Emanuel", "clpid": "Vespa-E" } ], "abstract": "In this paper we design a stylized version of an environment with public goods, dynamic linkages, and legislative bargaining. Our theoretical framework studies the provision of a durable public good as a modified version of Battaglini et al. (2012). We develop an experimental design that allows us to disentangle inefficiencies that would result in a one-shot world (static inefficiencies) from extra inefficiencies that emerge in an environment in which decisions in the present affect the future (dynamic inefficiencies). We solve for efficiency and also characterize the bargaining equilibrium, a symmetric stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium, which is the most common concept used in applied work. The experimental results indicate that subjects do react to dynamic linkages and, as such, we find evidence of both static and dynamic inefficiencies.\nIn fact, the quantitative predictions of the model with respect to the share of dynamic inefficiencies are closest to the data when dynamic linkages are high. To the extent that behavior is different from what is predicted by the model, a systematic pattern emerges, namely the use of strategic cooperation whereby subjects increase the efficiency of period one proposals by selectively punishing, in period two, subjects who did not propose efficient allocations.", "doi": "10.7907/dv3vt-ztf54", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2015-01" }, { "id": "authors:v0mdy-epq83", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "v0mdy-epq83", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-144052263", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Goeree", "given_name": "Jacob K.", "orcid": "0000-0001-9876-3425", "clpid": "Goeree-J-K" }, { "family_name": "Romero", "given_name": "Julian", "clpid": "Romero-J" }, { "family_name": "Yariv", "given_name": "Leeat", "clpid": "Yariv-L" } ], "abstract": "We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm { that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a\nsetup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find\nthat voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections.", "doi": "10.7907/v0mdy-epq83", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2014-12-29" }, { "id": "authors:7rwxx-sx770", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "7rwxx-sx770", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20141211-092039279", "type": "article", "title": "An experimental study of the impact of competition for Other People's Money: the portfolio manager market", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Bisin", "given_name": "Alberto", "clpid": "Bisin-A" }, { "family_name": "Schotter", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Schotter-A" } ], "abstract": "In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers compensated through an option-like scheme according to which the manager receives (most of) the compensation only for returns in excess of pre-specified strike price. We find that such a competitive environment and contractual arrangement lead, both in theory and in the lab, to inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of portfolio managers. We then study various policy interventions, obtained by manipulating various aspects of the competitive environment and the contractual arrangement, e.g., the Transparency of the contracts offered, the Risk Sharing component in the contract linking portfolio managers to investors, etc. While all these interventions would induce portfolio managers, at equilibrium, to efficiently invest funds in safe assets, we find that, in the lab, Transparency is most effective in incentivising managers to do so. Finally, we document a behavioral \"Other People's Money\" effect in the lab, where portfolio managers tend to invest the funds of their investors in a more risky manner than their Own Money, even when it is not in either the investors' or the managers' interest to do so.", "doi": "10.1007/s10683-013-9384-6", "issn": "1386-4157", "publisher": "Springer", "publication": "Experimental Economics", "publication_date": "2014-12", "series_number": "4", "volume": "17", "issue": "4", "pages": "564-585" }, { "id": "authors:vg4rt-qk380", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "vg4rt-qk380", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20141030-090720806", "type": "article", "title": "Communication in multilateral bargaining", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to \u2013 and do \u2013 engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron\u2013Ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is submitted. We find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed. Communication increases proposer power through two channels. First, it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept. Second, it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.006", "issn": "0047-2727", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "publication_date": "2014-10", "volume": "118", "pages": "75-85" }, { "id": "authors:0g2gw-ayy10", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "0g2gw-ayy10", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-145809760", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Transparency Versus Back-Room Deals in Bargaining", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "We design an experiment to study the effects of transparency on bargaining processes. We show that whether transparency arises endogenously depends on the degree of competition between subjects. In a competitive setting there is no transparency: subjects use private communication channels to compete for favors from those in power and establish backroom deals. In the absence of competition the bargaining process is transparent: subjects communicate publicly and outcomes are more egalitarian. We further show that in a competitive setting, imposing transparency by requiring all communication to be public reduces the observed competition between subjects and leads to more egalitarian outcomes.", "doi": "10.7907/0g2gw-ayy10", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2014-07" }, { "id": "authors:ybg17-0b563", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "ybg17-0b563", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130913-110628972", "type": "article", "title": "Language and government coordination: An experimental study of\n communication in the announcement game", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Schotter", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Schotter-A" } ], "abstract": "One of the key roles of government is to coordinate the activities of citizens. One reason why governments are efficient facilitators of coordinated action, in addition to their ability to force compliance or tax, is that they are typically endowed with more information than the individuals they govern. This advantage creates a dilemma for them, however, since it forces them to decide on how they should distribute the information in their possession to the population. This paper investigates this question. We investigate the \"Announcement Game\" defined by the government and those it governs and focus on communication strategy that government uses to communicate private information to the citizens. This communication strategy involves (1) partitioning the state space in an attempt to mask the true state of the world and (2) choosing what type of language to use in order to communicate elements of this partition. We present evidence that the language used to execute a communication strategy does affect the efficiency of the equilibrium convergence process and also demonstrate that subjects playing the role of the government exhibit a great deal of sophistication in the communication strategies they employ and the language they use to execute them.", "doi": "10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.006", "issn": "0047-2727", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Journal of Public Economics", "publication_date": "2013-08", "volume": "104", "pages": "26-39" }, { "id": "authors:q0zaq-zax13", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "q0zaq-zax13", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-152606828", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Communication in Multilateral Bargaining", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to - and do - engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal is submitted. We find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed. Communication increases proposer power through two channels. First, it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept. Second, it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price.", "doi": "10.7907/q0zaq-zax13", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2013-06" }, { "id": "authors:06jrr-y6z88", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "06jrr-y6z88", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20130711-092414935", "type": "article", "title": "Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "When the performances of agents are correlated (because of a common random component), contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank-order tournaments and piece-rate schemes. Although the theoretical advantage of such contracts has long been noticed in the literature, the empirical papers that study this question have produced mixed results. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we shed light on the performance of these contracts. We focus on the simplest version of such a contract: the relative piece-rate (RPR) and compare its performance with that of the tournament and piece-rate schemes. We find that when the RPRs are imposed on the agents, they exert higher effort levels and give the principal (weakly) higher profits than the tournament and piece-rate contracts. Second, we find that agents have little aversion to self-select into the RPR scheme when other alternatives are available. In our paper we fix the environment agents face and vary only their wage scheme. Our results support the theoretical predictions and suggest that principals can benefit from using RPR schemes in places where the piece-rate and tournament contracts would otherwise be used.", "doi": "10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.001", "issn": "0167-7187", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "International Journal of Industrial Organization", "publication_date": "2013-05", "series_number": "3", "volume": "31", "issue": "3", "pages": "238-247" }, { "id": "authors:0xp5n-z9471", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "0xp5n-z9471", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-144342297", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Equilibrium Tax Rates and Income Redistribution: A Laboratory Study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Palfrey", "given_name": "Thomas R.", "orcid": "0000-0003-0769-8109", "clpid": "Palfrey-T-R" } ], "abstract": "This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer-Richard model of equilibrium tax rates, inequality, and income redistribution. We also extend that model to incorporate social preferences in the form of altruism and inequality aversion. The experiment varies the amount of inequality and the collective choice procedure to determine tax rates. We report four main findings. First, higher wage inequality leads to higher tax rates. The effect is significant and large in magnitude.\nSecond, the average implemented tax rates are almost exactly equal to the theoretical ideal tax rate of the median wage worker. Third, we do not observe any significant differences in labor supply or average implemented tax rates between a direct democracy institution and a representative democracy system where tax rates are determined by candidate competition. Fourth, we observe negligible deviations from labor supply behavior or voting behavior in the directions implied by altruism or inequality aversion.", "doi": "10.7907/0xp5n-z9471", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2012-09" }, { "id": "authors:5tzpw-t0696", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "5tzpw-t0696", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095607758", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "Flip-Flopping, Primary Visibility and the Selection of Candidates", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" } ], "abstract": "We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe the chosen platforms, but infer the candidates' ideologies from observing candidates' campaigns. The ability of voters to detect candidates' types depends on the visibility of the race. This model captures two patterns: the post-primary moderation effect, in which candidates pander to the party base during the primary and shift to the center in the general election; and the divisive-primary effect, which refers to the detrimental effect of hard-fought primaries on a party's general-election prospects.", "doi": "10.7907/5tzpw-t0696", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2012-08" }, { "id": "authors:2cjnm-s1q33", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "2cjnm-s1q33", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-135722745", "type": "article", "title": "Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Potamites", "given_name": "Elizabeth", "clpid": "Potamites-E" }, { "family_name": "Schotter", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Schotter-A" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.", "doi": "10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002", "issn": "0899-8256", "publisher": "Elsevier", "publication": "Games and Economic Behavior", "publication_date": "2012-07", "series_number": "2", "volume": "75", "issue": "2", "pages": "449-463" }, { "id": "authors:3jk0k-bcp47", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "3jk0k-bcp47", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-143431181", "type": "article", "title": "Ignorance is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Schotter", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Schotter-A" } ], "abstract": "We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner.", "doi": "10.1257/mic.4.2.77", "issn": "1945-7669", "publisher": "American Economic Association", "publication": "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics", "publication_date": "2012-05", "series_number": "2", "volume": "4", "issue": "2", "pages": "77-103" }, { "id": "authors:avqen-78z78", "collection": "authors", "collection_id": "avqen-78z78", "cite_using_url": "https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-095936436", "type": "publication_workingpaper", "title": "The Process of Choice in Guessing Games", "author": [ { "family_name": "Agranov", "given_name": "Marina", "clpid": "Agranov-M" }, { "family_name": "Caplin", "given_name": "Andrew", "clpid": "Caplin-A" }, { "family_name": "Tergiman", "given_name": "Chloe", "clpid": "Tergiman-C" } ], "abstract": "This paper employs a new experimental design to provide insight into strategic choice in one shot games. We incentivize and observe provisional choices in the 2/3 guessing game in the period after the structure of the game has been communicated. Early selections in this \"strategic choice process\" data provide insight into naive (L0) play, and support the standard assumption that such choices average 50. While average strategic sophistication rises over time, we identify significant individual differences in this respect. These differences appear to be broad-based: those whose strategic sophistication grows most in our experiment also perform best at separate\nlearning tasks.", "doi": "10.7907/avqen-78z78", "publisher": "California Institute of Technology", "publication_date": "2010-12" } ]