- Agranov, Marina and Ortoleva, Pietro (2022) Revealed
Preferences for Randomization: An Overview; AEA Papers and
Proceedings; Vol. 112; 426-430; 10.1257/pandp.20221093
- Agranov, Marina and Buyalskaya, Anastasia (2022) Deterrence
Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study; Management
Science; Vol. 68; No. 5; 3573-3589; 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4036
- Agranov, Marina; Elliott, Matt; et el. (2021) The
importance of Social Norms against Strategic Effects: The case of
Covid-19 vaccine uptake; Economics Letters; Vol. 206; Art.
No. 109979; PMCID PMC8252706; 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109979
- Agranov, Marina and Elliott, Matt (2021) Commitment
and (in) Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment; Journal of the
European Economic Association; Vol. 19; No. 2; 790-838; 10.1093/jeea/jvaa012
- Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2020) Effects
of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and
Inequality; European Economic Review; Vol. 123; Art. No. 103372; 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103372
- Agranov, Marina; Cotton, Christopher; et el. (2020) Persistence
of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda
setting authority; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 184; Art.
No. 104126; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104126
- Agranov, Marina and Tergiman, Chloe (2019) Communication
in bargaining games with unanimity; Experimental Economics; Vol. 22;
No. 2; 350-368; 10.1007/s10683-018-9571-6
- Agranov, Marina; Goeree, Jacob K.; et el. (2018) What
Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs; Journal of
the European Economic Association; Vol. 16; No. 3; 825-856; 10.1093/jeea/jvx023
- Agranov, Marina and Yariv, Leeat (2018) Collusion
through communication in auctions; Games and Economic Behavior; Vol.
107; 93-108; 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.021
- Agranov, Marina and Ortoleva, Pietro (2017) Stochastic
Choice and Preferences for Randomization; Journal of Political
Economy; Vol. 125; No. 1; 40-68; 10.1086/689774
- Agranov, Marina; Fréchette, Guillaume; et el. (2016) Static
and dynamic underinvestment: An experimental investigation; Journal
of Public Economics; Vol. 143; 125-141; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.09.001
- Agranov, Marina (2016) Flip-Flopping,
Primary Visibility and the Selection of Candidates; American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 8; No. 2; 61-85; 10.1257/mic.20130036
- Agranov, Marina (2016) Flip-Flopping,
Primary Visibility, and the Selection of Candidates; American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 8; No. 2; 61-85; 10.1257/mic.20130036
- Agranov, Marina; Caplin, Andrew; et el. (2015) Naive
play and the process of choice in guessing games; Journal of the
Economic Science Association; Vol. 1; No. 2; 146-157; 10.1007/s40881-015-0003-5
- Agranov, Marina and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2015) Equilibrium
tax rates and income redistribution: A laboratory study; Journal of
Public Economics; Vol. 130; 45-58; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.08.008
- Agranov, Marina; Bisin, Alberto; et el. (2014) An
experimental study of the impact of competition for Other People’s
Money: the portfolio manager market; Experimental Economics; Vol.
17; No. 4; 564-585; 10.1007/s10683-013-9384-6
- Agranov, Marina and Tergiman, Chloe (2014) Communication
in multilateral bargaining; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 118;
75-85; 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.006
- Agranov, Marina and Schotter, Andrew (2013) Language
and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in
the announcement game; Journal of Public Economics; Vol. 104; 26-39;
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.006
- Agranov, Marina and Tergiman, Chloe (2013) Incentives
and compensation schemes: An experimental study; International
Journal of Industrial Organization; Vol. 31; No. 3; 238-247; 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.001
- Agranov, Marina; Potamites, Elizabeth; et el. (2012) Beliefs
and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study; Games and
Economic Behavior; Vol. 75; No. 2; 449-463; 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.002
- Agranov, Marina and Schotter, Andrew (2012) Ignorance
is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in
the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs; American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics; Vol. 4; No. 2; 77-103; 10.1257/mic.4.2.77